These arguments – or, less euphemistically, dogmas – are versions of Stove's `Worst Argument' because all there is to them as arguments is: our conceptual schemes are our conceptual schemes, so, we cannot get out of them (to know things as they are in themselves).
Strawson associates free will with being ‘ultimately morally responsible’ for one’s actions. He argues that, because how one acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M), for one to be responsible for that choice one must be responsible for M. To be responsible for M, one must have chosen to be M itself—and that not blindly, but deliberately, in accordance with some reasons r1. But for that choice to be a responsible one, one must have chosen to be such as to be moved by r1, requiring some further reasons r2 for such a choice. And so on, ad infinitum. Free choice requires an impossible infinite regress of choices to be the way one is in making choices.
In Stoveian fashion (as I understand it), I would say this is likewise a bad argument, because to have free will (in everyday terms) means that we are free to choose according to our will or according to our desires. We shouldn't be expected (in philosophical terms) to "get out of them" in order to remake the will as we desire. For then we would have no desires with which to choose how to remake the will. — Luke
Or in other words the issue I think he raises, is that you would in fact have to be able to choose your will to retain the idea of moral responsibility. I'm not sure I entirely agree with this, but I think that is the argument anyway. — ChatteringMonkey
The essence of free will is to be out of the causal web and still be in it - to wish not to be an effect and yet be a cause. Free will is defined thus: to be able to make choices (we want to be causes) without these choices being themselves out of our control (we don't want to be effects). Is this possible or should I say reasonable? — TheMadFool
Yes, this is how I also understand Strawson's argument. I'm calling it a bad argument because the will is the source of our choosing between options. According to Strawson "how one acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M)." To have truly free will, Strawson argues that we must be able to choose M (or how one is, mentally speaking) from scratch, whereas I would argue that one requires M in order to be able to choose anything, so one is not able to choose M without M. If "how one acts is a result of...M", then one cannot act without M (in order to choose M). — Luke
You might say we are 'free' to make choices according to our will, but what does the word free really mean in that instance? — ChatteringMonkey
It could mean, as you note, that nothing outside our will is forcing us to make that choice. — Luke
But what really matters is not so much if there is an account that would be acceptable, but if that account suffices to be able to speak about moral responsibility right? That's what really at stake it seems to me. — ChatteringMonkey
What's lacking, or what would such an account require in order to "suffice" in this way? — Luke
In Stoveian fashion (as I understand it), I would say this is likewise a bad argument, because to have free will (in everyday terms) means that we are free to choose according to our will or according to our desires. We shouldn't be expected (in philosophical terms) to "get out of them" in order to remake the will as we desire. For then we would have no desires with which to choose how to remake the will. — Luke
precisely because we don't choose our will. — ChatteringMonkey
Can you say someone is morally responsible if he couldn't have acted otherwise? — ChatteringMonkey
As far as I understand your opposition then I don't understand how a will can ever be "free". If you can choose between food item A or B, you need some sort of will to be able to choose. If you have to choose between will A or B you still need some sort of will to be able to choose. Having a will is required in order to make a choice. So by necessitating that a will must be chosen in order to be called "free" you create a sort of infinite regression because in order for a will to be free it must have been chosen by another will which must have been chosen by another will which must have.......
I feel it's a bit unfair when you define "free will" as an inconceivable concept and then proceed to say "free will doesn't exist". Sounds like "A square circle doesn't exist" to me. It's not a meaningful definition and is not what most people refer to when they think "free will" (though probably many people don't know what they refer to when they say it) — khaled
There is no proof that people couldn't have acted otherwise even given what you say. Determinism is very difficult to swallow not only because of recent advnces in quantum physics but also because it is completely untestable. After something happens you can't go and test if something else could have happened. — khaled
We don't have a right to a will that is free just because a concept like free will exists. — ChatteringMonkey
what does the word free do there? — ChatteringMonkey
On a macro-level things do seem to behave according to deterministic laws, by and large — ChatteringMonkey
It's just that when philosophers use the word there is usaully a conceivable meaning behind it. — khaled
Some say it is a substitute for "uncoerced" for one. That's what it means in the legal sense at least. I can't think of anything else but there are probably other wackier definitions — khaled
But you can't consider decisions in the brain "macro level things" I think. I remember reading Synapses and microtubles are small enough for quantum effects to actually matter. — khaled
Maybe there is a problem with our conception of morality being tied to freedom in the first place. Maybe we just lack adequate or accurate psychological descriptions at this point to make relevant distinctions for the purpose of assigning moral responsibility... In law for instance we do see some attempts at this, in that we do exempt people in some cases from legal responsibility, like age, (temporal) insanity etc... but we do not exempt other things that seem otherwise pretty similar. — ChatteringMonkey
If we do not choose our will, and our will determines what choices we make... you could say that that implies there is no way in which we could have chosen otherwise. — ChatteringMonkey
Acting otherwise implies in some sense that we would have another will, which we have no control over. — ChatteringMonkey
There was a fellow who said that free will and desire are incompatible. Further, that freedom is - means - freedom to do one's duty under direction of reason. But he was Prussian. — tim wood
I think the better presentation of the argument comes just after the piece you quoted - that we have eyes, and therefore we cannot see. — Banno
We cannot know ethical truths (if there are any) except through the urgings of our back-of-brain plumbing, therefore, we cannot know ethical truths at all.
A few issues to iron out, though. The tree, in the sight example, and the reality described by our conceptual scheme in the second example, are in a sense external, outside of and hence distinct from the seeing and the thinking. Are our desires external, in a suitably analogous way? — Banno
But why does she believe that it is cognitively limiting? Why, for no other reason in the world, except this one: that it is ours. Everyone really understands, too, that this is the only reason. But since this reason is also generally accepted as a sufficient one, no other is felt to be needed.
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