Indeed, and 'complicated' is certainly right, but is it that you think such a notion of free-choice need be abandoned for that reason? Or are you more in favour of rolling up one's sleeves and getting stuck in nonetheless? — Isaac
I'm sometimes required to help plead for judicial leniency on the grounds of a person's upbringing or environment. The basis for such action is that somewhere in this muddle we (those involved at the time) can agree that such influences were outside of the person's preferred choices. — Isaac
In retrospect, I think you are right that determinism is neither here nor there in the issue of moral responsibility and free will. — Olivier5
Yes, and that is the key take away message for me: whether one adopts a determinist or an indeterminist outlook doesn't change the problem of freedom that much.But he argues that indeterminism is no better than determinism in this respect — SophistiCat
You have no obligation to respond just because you are mentioned, but there's no need to be rude. — SophistiCat
if something can be said to not be caused by the self, the agency is lacking for attributing responsibility... — ChatteringMonkey
But this all seems build on very shaky grounds, because there is no objective measure for selfhood as you said... but more than that, identity is also ever changing and not entirely disconnected from how the world will react to certain presentations of self. — ChatteringMonkey
I am skeptical that such simple, exceptionless organizing principles could underlie most humanistic notions, such as responsibility or freedom, so to me the more obvious approach would be more in the line of stamp collecting than grand theorizing — SophistiCat
This approach is characteristic of the relatively new field of experimental philosophy ("x-phi") — SophistiCat
Oh, interesting. Yes, that's just the sort of example that I had in mind (and how such attitudes can vary, change, be contested, etc.) — SophistiCat
That's why I get so cross when people want to take that argument away on the purely ideological grounds that they feel more comfortable about the idea of free-will. It's fine on a random internet forum, but in the real world such nonsense actually threatens years of progress dealing with the mentally ill and socially deprived defendants. — Isaac
So assessing the origin of constraints on choice as self/non-self is just run-of-the-mill practice. It may be shaky, but we're going to do it anyway (we can't not) so we either do it with some attempt at scientific-style objectivity, or we just make it up. — Isaac
what is the attempt at scientific-style objectivity here? — ChatteringMonkey
I wonder if "we can't not" because we have some kind of a priori moral intuition that this is the right way to judge these matters... or if this moral intuition comes from our notions of identity and agency. If it's the former, maybe there is some merit to just calling it what it is, a moral intuition, and not to try to fabricate some theoretical post hoc justification. — ChatteringMonkey
Maybe, but by saying "we can't not", I was actually aiming to be much broader than that. In the context of this discussion, I think it extends out to simply that we make assumptions about how changes we make to the environment affect the behaviour of others. The very premise of criminal punishment is just such an assumption - that an environment in which criminals are punished will alter the behavior of would-be criminals to deter them from such activities.
All psychology is, when it gets involved, is a more formalised and better tested collection of these assumptions. Not perhaps the strength with which Geologists can tell us the earth is round, but significantly better (I hope) than whatever some random judge happens to reckon. — Isaac
So when I say "X's free choice was constrained by his circumstances such that he should not be punished for his actions to the same extent as someone less constrained" I'm not really saying anything about morality. I think the moral intuition is already assumed (that someone with less free-choice is more deserving of leniency - think gun-to-the-head). I'm just making the case about the existence and strength of such constraints. — Isaac
I've not heard of this, do you have any names or reading to suggest? — Isaac
I don't think the gun-to-head analogy works here. If it were a matter of free choice that would have to lead to acquittal it seems to me, and not leniency which already implies some guilt... — ChatteringMonkey
I could give other examples, like age-exemptions to responsibility, which also don't necessarily align with the self/non-self distinction and free choice.... but seem to be more a matter of an assumed lack of knowledge of the consequences etc. — ChatteringMonkey
the lack of clarity of which moral intuitions are applicable when. — ChatteringMonkey
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