My take of The Problem Of The Criterion, just a variation on Roderick Chisholm's formulation:

Insofar as epistemology is concerned, two questions need to be answered:

1. What do we know?

2. How do we know?

The argument is that to answer query 1, we need to answer query 2 but to answer query 2, we need to answer query 1. In other words, to know what counts as knowledge, we need to have a criterion but to develop a criterion, we must know what counts as knowledge, thus both questions can't be answered and thus we can't have knowledge. Why? For two reasons: 1. we don't know what knowledge is [because there's no criterion] and 2. we can't construct a criterion [because we don't know what knowledge is].

So far, so good...or...bad!

At this point the problem of the criterion looms menacingly above us all, like a booby trap ready to unleash itself at the slightest hint of movement [toward knowledge.]

How do we extricate ourselves from this predicament?

I have a vague idea as to a solution which I would like to bounce off of forum members.

It begins with the simple realization that the problem of the criterion is one single instance of what is actually a much bigger problem in the sense that if it were true it would be impossible to develop any and all criterion, not just the criterion for knowledge. We wouldn't have any criterion for trees, plants, animals, books, whathaveyou. Yet, this isn't the case - we do have criterion for these categories. How is this possible?

By way of explanation, I would like you to imagine an alien, faer name is X, from a different universe visiting ours and it so happens that he lands on earth. Being from a different universe, fae would've been warned and cautioned thoroughly against trying to comprehend our universe in terms of his own. Fae would have to be as open-minded as possible and prepare faerself to be surprised beyond faers wildest dreams.

This means X has absolutely no clue about trees [let's stick to trees to keep things as simple as possible]. In other words, due to this universe being, actually poles apart from faer own, no criterion of classifying objects in faer universe will work in ours. It's, quite literally, impossible for X to develop a criterion for trees.

X lands on earth in the Amazon jungle. X walks around and begins to notice a pattern - objects with brown trunks, branches, and leaves. In short, fae's developed a criterion for trees. Fae succeeds in developing the criterion for trees by making observations and taking note of patterns in them but remember it was impossible for X to develop a criterion without having seen trees first.

Roderick Chisholm divides people in re the problem of the criterion into two groups:

1. Particularists who claim that we must first get our hands on instances of knowledge before a criterion for knowledge can be developed

2. Methodists who are of the opinion that we must first have a criterion before we can identify instances of knowledge

My alien thought experiment clearly shows that it makes more sense that criterion be developed after getting access to instances/particulars than identifying particulars/instancss after developing a criterion.

Please take a moment to recall what I said earlier. The problem of the criterion is just the tip of the iceberg, a much greater problem is hidden below the surface - that if the problem of the criterion really is an issue, classifactory criterion would be impossible in all fields of study.

To continue with my botanical analogy, classification of trees, criterion for trees, weren't developed because scientists had a preconceived idea of what trees are i.e. the criterion didn't precede the identification of trees. Au contraire, first came the observational data of plants and the criterion for trees emerged out of the analysis of that data.

Likewise, the criterion for knowledge comes from looking for and noting patterns in statements. Doing this will sort statements into various categories and one such category would be justified true beliefs and this is what we've decided to label as knowledge.

Please note one important detail: The categorization of statements is unrestricted in the sense that all features statements can and do possess are employed, either alone or in a combination, to sort statements i.e. We don't need and we're not using a criterion for knowledge to do the categorization. However, once the categories are completed, we make a decision regarding which category we would like to call knowledge. One such category happens to be justified true belief which is what knowledge is or so I hear.

One objection to my thesis is that when we choose a category of statements to label as knowledge, there's this vague "feeling" that a correct category that deserves the label knowledge exists and this betrays the unsettling truth that we already possessed a criterion for knowledge. How else can we explain the "feeling" that there's a correct category? Identifying the correct category can only be done if we already have a criterion for knowledge.

Can X, the alien, save the day now that we're back to square one, where this entire story began?

X contacts me telepathically and informs me that I have two choices here:

1. X already knew what trees are i.e. the criterion for trees preceded the categorization of plants. For the problem of the criterion that the criterion for knowledge was developed before the categorization of statements.

OR

2. X came to know of trees only after seeing trees. For the problem of the criterion that the criterion for knowledge was developed later than the categorization of statements.

Clearly, 1 is false. Ergo, the correct choice is 2 which for the problem of the criterion means the criterion for knowledge was developed after the categorization of statements.

What explains the "feeling" that there's a correct category? I ask X.

X replies, "the answer will be found in the difference between you all and me."

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN X, THE ALIEN, AND US?

X never saw trees. For us to be like faer, we should've never encountered knowledge. The "feeling" that there's a correct category and what this implies, to wit that we already possess a criterion for knowledge is because we've been exposed to the criterion for knowledge. The same thing would've happened to X had there been trees in faer homeworld. To make the long story short, the "feeling" that there's a correct category that we think deserves the label knowledge is nothing more than an indication that we've come across the criterion for knowledge in the past. It doesn't mean that the criterion for knowledge existed before the categorization of statements.

Phew :sweat: :sweat:

Long post, probably riddled with errors, big and small. Comments please...