"I don't think that solipsism states that nothing exists besides our consciousness, it merely states that we can never know anything about what exists outside our consciousness because we will never experience anything other than our consciousness. which means there is no reason to believe other people are actually other minds, or to believe that the external world's contents will 'continue to exist' when we are not experiencing them. — Darkneos
I’m only interested in a discussion if you don’t go about waiving off logical conclusions when they don’t suit your fancy, as was previously done here: — javra
1) Solipsism is the position that in the whole of existence only a single self occurs,... — javra
metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence. — wikipedia
...or else is known to occur. — javra
Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia
2) An epistemological solipsism that rejects metaphysical solipsism thereby rejects that only a single self occurs — javra
3) However, the position that multiple selves (be they fellow epistemological solipsists or not) co-occur and interact directly contradicts (1), thereby making the notion of solipsism nonsensical. — javra
4) Therefore, for solipsism as concept to hold any form of cogent meaning whatsoever, solipsism must be one of metaphysical solipsism. — javra
Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia
Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"? — javra
As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition? — javra
Forgive me for neglecting this bit, — Partinobodycular
For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence. — javra
But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. — Partinobodycular
Well rabbit holes do tend to be confusing, and unfortunately time isn't an unlimited commodity for me. But then again I do prefer discussions that move at something closer to a snail's pace. It gives one time for contemplation I think, as such I'll get back to you when time and inspiration allow. In the meantime don't think that I purposely overlook things, it's just that my thought processes don't always go where I intend them to. In fact sometimes they don't seem to go anywhere intelligible at all.Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge. — javra
If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds? — javra
That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. — javra
If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. — javra
Egocentric predicament, a term coined by Ralph Barton Perry in an article (Journal of Philosophy 1910), is the problem of not being able to view reality outside of our own perceptions. All worldly knowledge takes the form of mental representations that our mind examines in different ways. Direct contact with reality cannot be made outside of our own minds; therefore, we cannot be sure reality even exists. This means that we are each limited to our own perceptual world and views. Solipsism is an extension of this which assumes that only one's own mind is sure to exist. — wikipedia
But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular
"I don't think that solipsism states that nothing exists besides our consciousness, it merely states that we can never know anything about what exists outside our consciousness because we will never experience anything other than our consciousness. which means there is no reason to believe other people are actually other minds, or to believe that the external world's contents will 'continue to exist' when we are not experiencing them. — Darkneos
"Western philosophy from Descartes up through Kant seemed to be going in a direction of increasing solipsism. Subject and object became further and further separated, and philosophers became more and more convinced that there was no way of knowing anything outside of them. In the 20th century, Heidegger rejected this notion as silly, noting that consciousness is defined by its being-in-the-world -- its utter dependence on outer objects to have any experience at all. Yet this concept of mind as social relations has, over the 20th century, led to a kind of different solipsism -- one of language. Wittgenstein really paved the way for this with his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations(in many ways a rebuttal of his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Post-modernists and post-structuralists explored how language and shared meaning don't describe reality so much as they create it. There was an emerging sense that the individual is nothing but a series of social relations -- a cultural construct with no real identity of their own. In this sense, it was a bit of an antithesis to solipsism. Rather than wondering if others are real, the more pertinent question becomes whether oneself is real. But if there's one thing I know from Hegel, it's that whenever there's a thesis and an antithesis, there's got to be a synthesis."
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