That's not what the epistemological version states. It's just uncertainty about the existence or lack thereof of an external world/reality or other people. It rejects metaphysical because that is a claim to knowledge when it cannot prove so, so I guess it neither affirms nor denies but says it is uncertain.

"I don't think that solipsism states that nothing exists besides our consciousness, it merely states that we can never know anything about what exists outside our consciousness because we will never experience anything other than our consciousness. which means there is no reason to believe other people are actually other minds, or to believe that the external world's contents will 'continue to exist' when we are not experiencing them. — Darkneos

I suggest you read the other quote on this page.

Keep things simple. Do you disagree with (1), (2), (3), (4), or a combination of these? If so, explain why the disagreement.

I’m only interested in a discussion if you don’t go about waiving off logical conclusions when they don’t suit your fancy, as was previously done here: — javra

If you believe that I've done that then I'm sorry. But that being said, I am going to disagree with your argument, after all, that's what this forum is for, but I'll do my best to explain why.

I don't reject the first premise, but I do feel the need to clarify it.

1) Solipsism is the position that in the whole of existence only a single self occurs,... — javra

That's metaphysical solipsism. Let me quote wikipedia, rather than simply rely on my own personal understanding of solipsism.

metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence. — wikipedia

...or else is known to occur. — javra

That's epistemological solipsism. Likewise, the definition from wikipedia:

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia

Although it may seem as if these two positions are almost identical, they are in fact substantively different.

The first one makes a direct claim about what's knowable...that my mind is all that exists. The second one contradicts that claim by stating that I do in fact have no way of actually knowing if that claim is true or not...it's an assumption.

2) An epistemological solipsism that rejects metaphysical solipsism thereby rejects that only a single self occurs — javra

Absolutely not. Epistemological solipsism neither accepts nor rejects the metaphysical position, because it has no way of knowing if it's true. Therefore it can never take a position that's definitively for or against it. Individually, the epistemological solipsist can argue in favor of it, or they can argue against it, but they can never actually affirm that either of those positions are in fact true. As far as an epistemological solipsist is concerned, in such a scenario the only knowable position is...I don't know.

3) However, the position that multiple selves (be they fellow epistemological solipsists or not) co-occur and interact directly contradicts (1), thereby making the notion of solipsism nonsensical. — javra

The objection to premise #2 makes premise #3 moot.

4) Therefore, for solipsism as concept to hold any form of cogent meaning whatsoever, solipsism must be one of metaphysical solipsism. — javra

Since your premises don't hold, the conclusion doesn't hold either.

You wanted to know if I disagreed, and obviously the answer is yes. But I didn't reject your argument out of hand, I believe that your understanding of the differences between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism are fundamentally incomplete.

And likewise, if you disagree with my objections please let me know where.

Thank you for your reply. I do have difficulty with the notion of a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism. Your leading disagreement was with the definition of solipsism I provided, from which the rest of your arguments followed. Via the second wikipedia quote you specified:

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia

Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"?

As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition?

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence.

I'm in a little bit of hurry right now. Will try to get back tomorrow.

Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"? — javra

Forgive me for neglecting this bit, but I just find the next part of your post to be so amazingly fascinating that I can't wait to address it. Earlier magritte mentioned the rabbit hole, well this is where the journey down the solipsistic rabbit hole really begins.

And forgive me in advance, because I'm about to completely confuse you, but if you really want to understand metaphysical solipsism, then this is where you have to go.

Sorry

As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition? — javra

No, I wouldn't say that knowledge is infallible. In fact, I would argue that it's quite the opposite, knowledge is by it's very nature, incomplete, and always will be. There are certain things that are by their very nature "knowable", such as 1 + 1 = 2, but there are other things, such as why there's something rather than nothing, which are by their very nature unknowable. Any conscious being will find that question to be unanswerable, just as the question of other minds is unanswerable.

Thus there are certain questions which simply cannot be adequately answered, and that's why knowledge is always destined to be incomplete, and being incomplete, it's prone to being fallible.

But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. Now that's an egotistical statement if there ever was one...I'm infallible. But you have to think very deeply about what that statement means.

Richard Feynman used to explain why light travels in a straight line. He said that light, being a wave, takes every possible path from the source to the observer, but only those waves which don't encounter destructive interference survive. What's fascinating about this, is that this means that light, by it's very nature is infallible, it always takes the right path, even when that path isn't necessarily straight.

The light doesn't need to "know" what the right path is, and it doesn't need to "know" about the physics involved, it's just an inescapable product of light's nature that it always takes the right path.

But what does this have to do with metaphysical solipsism, and how I'm infallible?

People often wonder how the solipsistic consciousness can possibly know how to create things that it has no prior knowledge of. For example, how can it create a college textbook on applied mathematics if it has no prior knowledge of applied mathematics? It wouldn't seem to be logically possible. But then again, it isn't possible for the light to know which path to take either, none-the-less, it does it.

So in metaphysical solipsism it isn't that the mind knows how to create a coherent reality, it's that the mind can only exist in a coherent reality. Just as the light can only exist along the straight path. The mind doesn't need to know the law of non-contradiction, or the principle of sufficient reason, and it doesn't need to know the rules of quantum mechanics either. It's simply that consciousness, like light, can only exist under specific conditions. And for consciousness, that means a coherent reality. Any reality that isn't coherent, in which textbooks on applied mathematics don't make sense, simply can't contain consciousness. Because not only wouldn't college textbooks make sense, but nothing would make sense. It's an all or nothing scenario. The light has no other option than to go straight.

Now I've said all that, to say this, I'm an epistemological solipsist, but that doesn't mean that I haven't considered the metaphysical viewpoint, and I do believe that it has merit. But having merit doesn't make it right. So I can't claim to be a metaphysical solipsist, because at the end of the day I can philosophize about it all I want, but there are always going to be things that I simply cannot know.

Why is there something rather than nothing? And are there really other minds?

Forgive me for neglecting this bit, — Partinobodycular

Well, this is the bit that to me is nothing else be nonsensical equivocation.

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds?

As to the issue of infallibilism. I noticed that you ignored what I wrote about it:

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence. — javra

So I currently can't find meaning in this statement you gave:

But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. — Partinobodycular

Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way my mind can at least grasp what it is that your mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge.

Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge. — javra

Well rabbit holes do tend to be confusing, and unfortunately time isn't an unlimited commodity for me. But then again I do prefer discussions that move at something closer to a snail's pace. It gives one time for contemplation I think, as such I'll get back to you when time and inspiration allow. In the meantime don't think that I purposely overlook things, it's just that my thought processes don't always go where I intend them to. In fact sometimes they don't seem to go anywhere intelligible at all.

OK. Take your time. Don't forget about this other question when you reply:

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds? — javra

Also, as I'm kind'a laughing my ass off about it:

That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. — javra

This sentence has two grammatical typos that I've corrected. Nevertheless, it's unintentional presentation speaks volumes as to a solipsists pov: self without other that is yet conversing with another that is its own self. My bad for the typos, but they're humorous in a way.

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. — javra

Okay I'm back, and hopefully I'm ready to take another crack at this. Your above conclusion is absolutely correct. Uncertainty about whether or not there are other selves must by necessity lead to uncertainty about the concept of the "sole self". But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism.

It's metaphysical solipsism that claims that I am the sole self. As such it proposes an absolute that it can't possibly be certain of...that I alone exist. And it's against this type of solipsism that your objection is completely justified. Metaphysical solipsism is a position that's almost self-contradictory.

But that doesn't mean that it's wrong, it just means that there's no way of knowing if it's right.

On the other hand epistemological solipsism isn't as much a statement about what's true, as it is a statement about what's knowable. Consciousness by its very nature, is constrained by what's referred to as the egocentric predicament.

Egocentric predicament, a term coined by Ralph Barton Perry in an article (Journal of Philosophy 1910), is the problem of not being able to view reality outside of our own perceptions. All worldly knowledge takes the form of mental representations that our mind examines in different ways. Direct contact with reality cannot be made outside of our own minds; therefore, we cannot be sure reality even exists. This means that we are each limited to our own perceptual world and views. Solipsism is an extension of this which assumes that only one's own mind is sure to exist. — wikipedia

Epistemological solipsism isn't a statement about what its proponent knows about the world, it's a statement about what its proponent knows about itself, and its own limitations. The epistemological solipsist understands that they can never know, other than by faith, that other minds actually exist.

Now it may be that it's better to go around never questioning such things, and instead content ourselves with less irrational philosophies. But for many of us life isn't about simply being content, it's about being inquisitive, and perhaps the most intriguing question of all is...am I alone? And how do I choose to live my life in the face of that possibility?

But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m familiar with both notions of solipsism, its just that I find a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept - much as I find metaphysical solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept.

1) Again, if there is uncertainty about being the sole self, and if uncertainty about X entails lack of knowledge about X, then how can such a position be logically labeled an “epistemological sole-self-ism”?

2) As to the egocentric predicament you mentioned, an “ego” experiences more than just perception, it also experiences its own volitional actions: e.g., to have your will as an ego thwarted can result in differing intensities of suffering, which is also an experiential given. Which comes back around to the logical contradiction of intending X and intending not-X at the same time and in the same respect as an ego … Something which we as egos never experience, but would nevertheless need to be a known truth either for a metaphysical solipsist (who affirms the ontological stance that only he/she occurs) or for an epistemological solipsist (who affirms that the only knowledge to be had is that he/she occurs, while also claiming that knowledge and what is ontic are, or at least can be, distinct).

3) Likewise, we’re here addressing knowledge, epistemology. And, while you make the case of you being infallible, you as of yet have not provided any notion of what you mean by the term “infallible” so as to differentiate it from what I understand by the term “infallible”.

What you previously said about time being a limited commodity, it applies to most of us. No hard feelings, but if the conversation we’re having in a thread labeled “logically impeccable” isn’t going to adhere to logic, I’d much rather utilize my own time differently.

https://www.shroomery.org/forums/showflat.php/Number/13665046/fpart/5/vc/1#13665046

“
Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.

--Sextus Empiricus”

--Sextus Empiricus” — Darkneos

As in the truth to metaphysical and/or epistemological solipsism. Right. Deep questions that are best not cherry-picked.

Well I was referring to the pages in general, mostly 4 and 5, which state that a belief in others is not warranted as we have no evidence for any of them.

Or if you want to get at the direct version of it:

https://qr.ae/pNUkcv

"The origins of Solipsism in Western Philosophy comes from the Greek Pre-Socratic Sophist Gorgias who claimed that:

Nothing exists.
Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it.
Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others."

"I don't think that solipsism states that nothing exists besides our consciousness, it merely states that we can never know anything about what exists outside our consciousness because we will never experience anything other than our consciousness. which means there is no reason to believe other people are actually other minds, or to believe that the external world's contents will 'continue to exist' when we are not experiencing them. — Darkneos

This sounds more like the epistemological version of the argument but I can't say I agree that there is NO reason to believe other people are other minds considering they act and behave like we do, and I would imagine that the OP knows this if they posted it on a forum (otherwise such a comment would be moot). I also have a reason to believe the external world will continue to exist without me experiencing it since plenty of stuff happens without me being aware of it. I fail to understand how these people think that solipsism is the simplest explanation when thinking about it a lot shows all the holes.

"Western philosophy from Descartes up through Kant seemed to be going in a direction of increasing solipsism. Subject and object became further and further separated, and philosophers became more and more convinced that there was no way of knowing anything outside of them. In the 20th century, Heidegger rejected this notion as silly, noting that consciousness is defined by its being-in-the-world -- its utter dependence on outer objects to have any experience at all. Yet this concept of mind as social relations has, over the 20th century, led to a kind of different solipsism -- one of language. Wittgenstein really paved the way for this with his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations(in many ways a rebuttal of his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Post-modernists and post-structuralists explored how language and shared meaning don't describe reality so much as they create it. There was an emerging sense that the individual is nothing but a series of social relations -- a cultural construct with no real identity of their own. In this sense, it was a bit of an antithesis to solipsism. Rather than wondering if others are real, the more pertinent question becomes whether oneself is real. But if there's one thing I know from Hegel, it's that whenever there's a thesis and an antithesis, there's got to be a synthesis."

This sentiment however seems...interesting. I thought that language described reality but thinking about it now I can see how in some instances it can shape it. Simply exchanging one word for another can shift everything, I mean...it happens in politics all the time.