No one is asking you to simplify anything. I'm asking you what you mean by a word — Kenosha Kid
The shape of an object is its outline — Kenosha Kid
What does it mean for a thing to "have experiences"? — Kenosha Kid
By all means, point out where I suggested that I have direct awareness of, say, stabilising my field of view or whiteshifting the colours I see. My statement was that abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience. For instance, I am not aware of turning the retinal image upside down; I am only aware of the transformed image (which is why I am happy to talk about qualia at all). — Kenosha Kid
abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience.
According to Fritjof Capra, the basic unit of cognition is a reaction to a disturbance of a state – I cant remember the exact words. — Pop
So basic cause and effect at the most fundamental level is cognition. Hence panpsychism. No? — Pop
This is circular. — Harry Hindu
What is an experiencer? — Harry Hindu
No, because I thought that — Harry Hindu
Telling me that it's an "experience" just tells me what scribble I can use to refer to this event, but what is this event? — Harry Hindu
Is it the only event (solipsism)? Is it an event among many others (realism)? If the latter, how does this event relate to, and interact with, the other events? You might say that all this is unimportant — Harry Hindu
Sure. Let's just say "experiences" then. Do you get what that means?
— khaled
No, — Harry Hindu
No, because I thought that seeing is a type of experience — Harry Hindu
What does it mean for a thing to "have experiences"? — Kenosha Kid
Because in my view, states of consciousness are just brain states — Kenosha Kid
Mind is not something passive and separate - an awareness - but a state of interpretance that arises through active engagement with the material potentials of the world. Mind and life exist as informational structure regulating the entropic physical goings-on of the world. — apokrisis
Semiosis is a process that requires the cooperation of three subjects, a representamen, its object, and its interpretant. (CP 5.484) A sign is a representamen “of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind.” (CP 2.242) However, some representama do not require human minds as we know them in order to achieve semiosis or carry signals. As we learn more, for example, about developmental genomics we should expect according to the hypothesis of synechism to be able to identify biological processes of duplication and repair that look as close to true signaling as are our intuitions about human communication.
The big picture afforded by synechism is an answer to the question of how the universe could have developed such that signs are possible within it. The answer is a transcendental argument: Without a universe capable of expressing relational generality [which is why Peirce insists on the reality of universals], signs would not exist. But signs do exist, and therefore relational generality is a character of our universe. This is a variation of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle which attempts to explain the emergence of certain cosmic properties as conditions for the emergence of biological systems capable of being scientists (Barrow & Tipler, 1986).
...In contrast with mechanical causation which is dyadic Peirce describes semiotic causation as a “tri-relative influence” (CP 5.484) between sign, object, and interpretant. This influence is inherently triadic and therefore irreducible. The world does not begin with objects, and then some objects take on sign-like qualities until they become quasi-interpreted by other objects which through practice become full-blown interpreters. Rather, if signs emerge it is only because the conditions of interpretation also emerge along with them. To explain this process Peirce used concepts like quasi-mind (CP 4.550f, MS 292), dual/dialogical/dyadic consciousness (CP 4.553), and the notion of percussivity (CP 8.370, MS 293) which describes a condition of proto consciousness as a kind of vibration that acts and is at once acted upon by its action causing a kind of echo. Peirce also explained semiosis in terms of a community of interpretation, which in its most advanced form exists in scientific communities.
Yep. He was talking about autopoiesis there most probably — apokrisis
I still don't see how Peirce avoids some form of panpsychism. — Wayfarer
In this regard, you didn't address my main query, that matter is a symbol of an ongoing process of self organization. It is not the end point, as all is in motion / evolution, but at any given time matter symbolizes the state of a process. — Pop
Matter can be seen as a material process or flow. So it is a succession of events organised within a context. Something is material for us as it can be recorded as an event happening and history being rewritten by a possibility being eliminated. — apokrisis
A word like “baby” doesn’t have intrinsic meaning just as a collection of four letters. It gains meaning as a communal habit of interpretation. — apokrisis
So how do you use “baby” in a sentence? Do you always have your own completely private meaning in mind? Is that a useful habit do you find? — apokrisis
A thought can be described in a similar way. As the current result of a process. — Pop
It would seem there is a process of self organization at play at the fundamental level, and this would suggest panpsychism. — Pop
This means that the first time that the word "baby" was used (we can assume that there was a first time can we not?), it was not a communal habit of interpretation which gave it its meaning, because there was no communal habit of interpretation of that word at that time. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, yes I find it very useful, having my own private reason for choosing the words that I do. This makes the words that I use very well suited to my own private intentions. Why would you think that it's not useful? — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you familiar with what is called "the division of labour"? There you will find clear evidence that difference between the actions of individuals is the essential property of meaning, not similarity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, so it plays the same role in your metaphysics than Saussure and structuralism in mine: a useful language to express systemic relations within any given field.Semiotics goes to the heart of the matter by being clear both about the general nature of the separation - symbols vs matter - and about the means of the interaction, the connection that is a modelling relation. — apokrisis
Ok, fine. The Rock....with or without hair? — Mww
Define, simplify, potato, potato. I cannot define it without referring to equally vague concepts becaue it doesn't get simpler than that. — khaled
consciousness is consciousness of something — Kenosha Kid
a reflexive, totalising consciousness of a subset of the consciousnesses — Kenosha Kid
When we apprehend multiple things — Kenosha Kid
say anything about consciousness at all that would shed any light on your question, without just deferring the ambiguity to other ambiguous terms — Kenosha Kid
That's part of the problem - in thinking of these concepts in this way.This is circular.
— Harry Hindu
Of course it is. As is every definition ever (at least of these basic concepts)... — khaled
What is an experiencer?
— Harry Hindu
No, because I thought that
— Harry Hindu
Whatever "I" is referring to here. — khaled
Telling me that it's an "experience" just tells me what scribble I can use to refer to this event, but what is this event?
— Harry Hindu
Oh so you understand what it means now all of a sudden? Yes, it is probably that event you had in mind while writing this (in a literal and metaphorical sense).
A sensible question. But consider this: maybe the reason we use that scribble only and we do not have accurate language to describe what is happening is because we don't know what is happening. — khaled
Well, you know that you are conscious. So you tell me the meter that you used to determine that you are conscious. Your meter seems to simply be how many human beings in your immediate environment use a particular scribble to refer to the event.Not at all, I wouldn't say it is unimportant, I would say we can't know the answers to these questions. Because this isn't an event we can detect. Show me the "consciousness-o-meter" and then we might be able to answer these questions, or show me how to make one. — khaled
:roll: I was asking what the event is, not what the scribble is. And in asking what the event is, I'm NOT asking what scribble most English speakers use to point to it (unless you're saying that consciousness is a word?). I'm asking about those relationships I spoke about earlier.Sure you do, you wrote that "experience" is a scribble that refers to an event. — khaled
:roll:Seeing is a type of experience. However "seeing eggs" =/= "experiencing eggs in the fridge" (whatever that means). You experience a certain image, of there being eggs in a fridge. I don't understant what "experiencing eggs in the fridge" means. That image may or may not reflect reality. — khaled
Spoken like a scientist overly concerned with hair! — Kenosha Kid
For me, "I" refers to my body as a whole. — Harry Hindu
I was asking what the event is, not what the scribble is. — Harry Hindu
First you say, "Seeing is a type of experience", and then seem confused about what it means to experience eggs in the fridge! — Harry Hindu
Sorry for jumping in, but by definition - and the reason I don't agree with panpsychism - anything capable of experiencing a subject of experience, and therefore not 'a thing'. Conversely, things are not subjects of experience. What makes something a subject of experience? The fact that it's a living thing. So any living thing is in principle a subject of experience, but non-living things are not. Hence the requirement for a dualist ontology. — Wayfarer
That's a form of 'brain-mind identity', is it not? — Wayfarer
Is drawing a rational inference - 'because this is the case, that must be the case' - also 'a brain state?' — Wayfarer
You cannot use the word in its definition. — khaled
So what exactly do you expect of me. Because so far none of your definitions pass your own criteria:
say anything about consciousness at all that would shed any light on your question, without just deferring the ambiguity to other ambiguous terms
— Kenosha Kid — khaled
And so you are claiming instead that the first person to utter this particular noise had exactly that clear intent of it being understood in that fashion ... by some linguistic community used to noises meaning something ... — apokrisis
It is pretty clear that the more private your meanings, the less useful they would be in a communal setting. — apokrisis
A major feature of a constraints-based causality is that it gives a solid answer on why nature repeats with variety. Similarity and difference are generated by the same process. — apokrisis
That is why when I say "baby" to you, I expect that to constrain your thoughts in a certain direction. But I don't make the mistake of expecting you to have some complete exact replica of whatever I have in my mind. There is always an element of variety or unconstrained spontaneity in the response you will have. Or even a surprisingly large degree of that uncertainty in your case? — apokrisis
So what actually is the story in terms of a constraints-based causality is that both similarity and difference can be produced. Difference will always exist in some degree. But we can regulate that to limit it to differences that don't make a pragmatic difference. Or we can also work to ensure that a difference that does make a difference gets maintained. — apokrisis
I never would say similarity was primary, nor that difference was primary. That is a false dichotomy you want to pursue. — apokrisis
Don’t you dare tell me you can get all that from a display on a machine strapped to my head. — Mww
I think a vaguely interested, vaguely intelligent human being can, if not fully understand what I meant, correctly establish bounds of possible interpretations of consciousness. — Kenosha Kid
nor your more standard panpsychists — Kenosha Kid
Btw, I never promised you a definition of consciousness because I'm not asking you questions about it. — Kenosha Kid
So, in this context, toward a neurological basis of psychology.
— Kenosha Kid
How is that related to consciousness if at all? — khaled
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