The physical world, the ordinary stuff with which we are most familiar, like rocks and trees and tables and chairs, is stuff in the middle of that spectrum: those are abstract structures that we suppose are a part of the abstract structure that is our world, on account of (and held to account by) our concrete experiences. — Pfhorrest

I tried to draft a response to this, but really couldn't, without going into too much detail. I'll try and pick some of these points up in ongoing discussions.

No worries. I don't need anything in particular in response. I wasn't originally even going to post that, it was just an idle thought I had somewhere in the midst of my day, but then your John Wheeler Participatory Universe post reminded me of it, so I decided to share after all.

I cannot assert this with 100% certainty, but I have a high level of confidence that - at best - metaphysics is a form of poetry in which people attempt to express vague feelings of, umm, well - and here I get stuck - I'm not quite sure what it is they're trying to express. I get that you are dissatisfied with the notion that everything (whatever "everything" means) is explicable in terms of a physical reality (AKA physicalism). But once you get beyond the physical, language falls apart - there are no clear definitions and you end up with a word salad - and no two people can agree on anything. — EricH

This is Nietzsche 101 basically. It's not language that fails, it's that you have nothing 'out there', nothing concrete to test your ideas to. And if that's the case, the source of those ideas can only be human (all to human) psychology. He showed that metaphysics is in fact a subset of psychology... not everybody has gotten the memo though.

your John Wheeler Participatory Universe post reminded me of it, — Pfhorrest

I have thought of something to say. It is that Wheeler’s ‘participatory universe’ challenges materialism, because it places ‘the observer’ in the picture (‘the observer’ being the participant in question.) So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’.

Whereas, in your post, I feel as though you are trying to treat everything - mind included - as object. That’s how come you can say that the Universe is ‘an abstract object’.

It is that Wheeler’s ‘participatory universe’ challenges materialism, because it places ‘the observer’ in the picture (‘the observer’ being the participant in question.) So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. — Wayfarer

Right, that's what made me think of the thought that I then posted. Like Wheeler's participation of the observer, on my view it is precisely our participation as part of the abstract object that is our concrete universe that makes it concrete, to us. There are other abstract objects very similar to our universe that contain within them structures much like the structures that we are, that participate as part of those objects/universes, and so experience them as concrete, whereas to us they are abstract -- and to them, our universe is an abstract object. It's being an interacting, participating part of this universe that makes it concrete from our perspective, and other structures that we are not part of abstract from our perspective.

But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’.

Whereas, in your post, I feel as though you are trying to treat everything - mind included - as object. — Wayfarer

On my account, 'object' and 'subject' are roles in or perspectives on an interaction, and everything is both. It's true that we can't get out of our own perspective, except perhaps inasmuch as we can become something else so as to have the perspective of that kind of thing instead, but then we're still in our own perspective, it's just a different kind of perspective.

But we can still acknowledge that there are perspectives other than ours. We see objects moving around that look like what we ourselves look like -- other humans -- and suppose that they are also subjects with their own first-person perspectives. Those objects are also subjects, and that's a natural intuition almost all humans have.

It's not that far a leap to just continue with the principle that all subjects are also objects (minds are things), or even that all objects are also subjects (every thing "has a mind", at least in a sense), and so that object and subject are just different perspectives on the same (if you prefer) beings, or entities, or whatever you'd like to call them.

The important differences between different things/beings/entities/whatever is their structure and function, which are abstract features independent of any substance. From there it's a short step to treating everything as equally abstract, with concreteness merely being participation in the same structure as oneself -- to wrap back around to Wheeler.

It's not that far a leap to just continue with the principle that all subjects are also objects (minds are things), or even that all objects are also subjects (every thing "has a mind", at least in a sense), and so that object and subject are just different perspectives on the same (if you prefer)- beings, or entities, or whatever you'd like to call them. — Pfhorrest

I think there really is a basic difference between objects and subjects. It’s an ontological distinction, and that not everything has or is a mind. I think your perspective arises from internalising the abstract view of physics - as treating everything as a point within a mathematical matrix. But what that doesn’t allow for, is the reality of suffering, which can’t be represented abstractly or converted into mathematical co-ordinates. Ballpoint pens and lumps of granite don’t have minds, animals and humans do, and the latter are also capable of reason.

The point I take from Wheeler’s observation is that it’s an acknowledgement of the role of the observer. Science has been forced to make that acknowledgement, for reasons I’m sure you know. But you can’t ‘get behind’ that - the role of the observer is acknowledged but there’s nothing in the mathematics that models it. That’s why it’s a turning point in science - it’s because hitherto, it was believed science was seeing the world ‘as it truly is’ as if in the absence of any observer. That is what has been called into question.

There are standard procedures for ruling out hallucinations and these are invariably scaled-up versions of the normal act of perceiving; people, more people, instruments, more instruments, you know the deal but the bottom line is the entire exercise is nothing but the act of perceiving just ramped up. — TheMadFool

It seems to me that what you are really getting at is a socially established notion of the real. Thinkers have made a strong case that perception is never pure (always involves interpretation.) So it's more like shared habits of interpretation-perception sort out hallucinations/noise from 'genuine' experience of the real. The word 'physical' gets some excited because of its association with hard science. But the prestige of hard science depends on its effectiveness in the ordinary lifeworld of medium sized dry goods.

It seems that physicalism is either false or circular. — TheMadFool

To me it seems like a bold and counterintuitive claim. It's like a leap of faith that directs research. Or as an outsider that's my impression. If I hope to reduce everything mental to the brain, then I want to assume that such a thing is possible in the first place. The circle had better be squarable if I'm going to dedicate my career to it. It's also aggressive and edgy like atheism, so it's a nice balcony from which to look down on the sentimental proles who think they exist as more than mere skullmeat.

I have thought of something to say. It is that Wheeler’s ‘participatory universe’ challenges materialism, because it places ‘the observer’ in the picture (‘the observer’ being the participant in question.) So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’. — Wayfarer

If you read my post, I go further than describing the observer as an active participant, to the point of arguing that "the observation", any observation, is a creation of this act of the observer. This produces the need for sound principles whereby we might distinguish a scientifically valid observation from a fabrication.

So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’. — Wayfarer

This describes the need to respect the tinted glass analogy. The reason why the mind must be immaterial, posited by ancient philosophers like Aquinas, is that only by being completely separate from the material, can the mind know all material existence. If any aspect of the mind is material, it will taint our understanding of the material, as looking through a tinted glass taints our ability to see the true colour of things.

Now there is a problem, and that is that following Aristotle's biology, "On the Soul", Aquinas describes the intellect as being dependent on the body, as all the various and distinct powers of the soul reside in the material aspect, the physical body. The human intellect itself is nothing other than an extension of the other described powers, self-nutrition, self-movement, and sensation. This is why the human intellect is deficient when compared to a completely free intellect like God. The human intellect is deficient because of that power's dependence on the body.

This implies that the tinted glass problem is inherent, or intrinsic to the human mind. The intellect is not completely immaterial (hence the divide between active and passive intellect), and this fact cannot be avoided. The human mind has material aspects which will necessarily taint its understanding of the material world, as the tint of the glass does to vision. However, we can learn from the tinted glass analogy, that the tinting does not necessarily incapacitate the understanding. What is required is that we determine the nature of the tint, through comparative methods, and then we may account for the tinting in the observations. The tinting itself can be found represented in Kant's critique as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These are the fundamental intuitions which form or structure "sensibility". The way that the world appears to us through sensation is fundamentally structured by these a priori intuitions, so they constitute the lens through which we naturally observe the world. The task for the metaphysician is to determine how the lens is constituted such that its contributions to the observations might be accounted for.

I think there really is a basic difference between objects and subjects. It’s an ontological distinction, and that not everything has or is a mind. I think your perspective arises from internalising the abstract view of physics - as treating everything as a point within a mathematical matrix. But what that doesn’t allow for, is the reality of suffering, which can’t be represented abstractly or converted into mathematical co-ordinates. Ballpoint pens and lumps of granite don’t have minds, animals and humans do, and the latter are also capable of reason.

The point I take from Wheeler’s observation is that it’s an acknowledgement of the role of the observer. Science has been forced to make that acknowledgement, for reasons I’m sure you know. But you can’t ‘get behind’ that - the role of the observer is acknowledged but there’s nothing in the mathematics that models it. That’s why it’s a turning point in science - it’s because hitherto, it was believed science was seeing the world ‘as it truly is’ as if in the absence of any observer. That is what has been called into question. — Wayfarer

Yeah, brains are objects, minds and ideas are not.

I think the basic difference is between information/ideas and physical stuff. The physical is that what exists in time and space, whereas information does not. You can convey the same information via a number of different physical media. The exact configuration in space or time doesn't really matter, as long as it contains certain signs that can be interpreted by some (physical) being that can grasp the meaning that is conveyed by those signs... otherwise it's just a bunch of random symbols that doesn't effect anything physical.

So the link between the physical and information is some entity that is capable of generating, communicating and interpreting agreed upon meanings of signs. Until relatively recently that was biological life exclusively (as far as we knew), but computers also do this now, albeit auto-matically via code that we programmed into it.

The point I want to get to, it that the notion of physicalism is still important for how we make sense of the world. The physical came first, and life grew out of that. In fact life developed this ability precisely to be able to affect the physical for its goals... to extend its physical life and reproduce physical life. So ideas and information can affect the physical only in this very specific way. The mistake that is being made, I think at least, is turning this specific way in which life uses information into some kind of metaphysical or ontological distinction.

As to the wheeler comment. There's an obvious way in which it's true that science, as something we beings with certain goals and cognitive abilities do, will reflect some of that. But I don't think scientist are wholly unaware of that, it's more that they don't particularly care about the possible metaphysical reality outside of human perspective. If it works and can predicts things we experience then it's fine. In fact, if you look at the history of quantum mechanics, the consensus for a long time was exactly that... we shouldn't look at what the shrödinger-equation really means, as long at it predicts things accurately.

And as another aside, much more has been made of the observer-problem in quantum mechanics than it probably warrants, because it doesn't really apply to the scale we typically operate in. Again, it seems to be a mistake to generalize a very specific problem into something of metaphysical proportions.

The reason why the mind must be immaterial, posited by ancient philosophers like Aquinas, is that only by being completely separate from the material, can the mind know all material existence. If any aspect of the mind is material, it will taint our understanding of the material, as looking through a tinted glass taints our ability to see the true colour of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought it was more because intellect, nous, is what grasps the forms and the final cause, the senses receive the material impression as per sensible and intelligible form.

The point I want to get to, it that the notion of physicalism is still important for how we make sense of the world. The physical came first, and life grew out of that. — ChatteringMonkey

Actually, Wheeler says not. He said that 'it' - a physical object - comes from 'bit' - binary choices, yes/no questions:

I, like other searchers, attempt formulation after formulation of the central issues and here present a wider overview, taking for working hypothesis the most effective one that has survived this winnowing: It from Bit. Otherwise put, every it — every particle, every field of force, even the spacetime continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes or no questions, binary choices, bits.

It from Bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe. — J A Wheeler, Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links

Wheeler's 'delayed choice' thought experiment also poses huge challenges for realism. See this article for an account.

Besides, where did 'the physical' originate? Complex matter, such as carbon and the other heavy elements, were the product of stellar explosions. But the formation of stars are in turn dependent on the existence of the fundamental constraints which governed the formation of the Universe, and it's impossible to say what the source of those constraints are, or if they're simply 'brute fact'.

Actually, Wheeler says not. He said that 'it' - a physical object - comes from 'bit' - binary choices, yes/no questions:

I, like other searchers, attempt formulation after formulation of the central issues and here present a wider overview, taking for working hypothesis the most effective one that has survived this winnowing: It from Bit. Otherwise put, every it — every particle, every field of force, even the spacetime continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes or no questions, binary choices, bits.

It from Bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe.
— J A Wheeler, Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links

Wheeler's 'delayed choice' thought experiment also poses huge challenges for realism. See this article for an account.

Besides, where did 'the physical' originate? Complex matter, such as carbon and the other heavy elements, were the product of stellar explosions. But the formation of stars are in turn dependent on the existence of the fundamental constraints which governed the formation of the Universe, and it's impossible to say what the source of those constraints are, or if they're simply 'brute fact'. — Wayfarer

Yeah ok maybe at the very bottom. But I think what reality ultimately is at bottom is a separate question from how reality at our scale operates.

So for instance it might very well be that we life in a simulated universe, but within that simulated universe what we call the physical still seems to comes first... and information doesn't seem to directly effect it.

Even if ultimately something like ideas, information or mind is at bottom of all the physical stuff in in the universe, it certainly doesn't seem to be 'our' mind or ideas that are that basis... we still need a physical biological organism to sustain our mind, and we still can't create or directly effect physical stuff with our thoughts.

If information is ultimately the source, then it certainly took a very long detour, by first creating all the physical stuff, that is able to give rise to biological life only in some corner case... which then finally is able to generate and process information again.

I want to stress that i'm not necessarily endorsing a metaphysical version of physicalism that makes definite claims about the basic substance of the universe, and I don't think science is doing that either for the most part. I think a more common version of physicalism just brackets that question altogether, and is only committed to the notion that we need to test our ideas to empirical data about the world.

I think a more common version of physicalism just brackets that question altogether, and is only committed to the notion that we need to test our ideas to empirical data about the world. — ChatteringMonkey

That is what is called 'methodological naturalism' which is perfectly fine. It doesn't make any claims about the world in general - but then, it probably also has no need to post to philosophy forums.

But physicalism is not that - physicalism is the 'thesis that everything is, or supervenes on, the physical'. It is the presumption of many people - maybe the majority! - in that having taken God out of the picture, then what you have left is a universe 'governed by' the laws of physics. If it can't be accounted for in those terms, then it isn't real, or it doesn't exist. It is the philosophy of modern scientific secular culture.

What I'm pointing out, is that, if not God, at least mind has now been re-introduced to the picture by physics itself. I know that's still a controversial point of view, but there's a lot of support for it. There's a strong idealist streak in physics since the 1920's. Arthur Eddington's Nature of the Physical World was an early example. Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy is another. The Copenhagen interpretation of physics is philosophically very interesting in its own right. (I know I can't follow the maths, but then, many of those who can often seem philosophically tone-deaf in their own right. I got a lot out of Paul Davies' books in the 1980's and 90's, particularly God and the New Physics and The Matter Myth.)

The European pioneers of quantum physics - Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, and others - were philosophically very deep thinkers, with a very wide range of interests. Schrodinger wrote later in life on philosophy and was interested in both European idealism and Vedanta. Heisenberg tended towards Platonism (as a lot of mathematicians do). But since WWII the focus shifted to the USA which is generally more pragmatist and (pardon me for saying) less philosophically literate.

So my view is that modern, or should we say post-modern, science, really undermines physicalism altogether. Of course a lot of people are going to disagree with that, but note this: those physicist 'public intellectuals' like David Deutsch and Sean Carroll who are most vocally wed to physicalism, are also advocates for 'many-worlds' and multiverse interpretations of physics. And I say that's because physicalism can't accomodate the paradoxes of quantum physics without introducing such ideas.

That is what is called 'methodological naturalism' which is perfectly fine. It doesn't make any claims about the world in general - but then, it probably also has no need to post to philosophy forums. — Wayfarer

I'm of the opinion that making claims about the world in general isn't very philosophical, but then I usually tend to side with what one might call anti-philosophers, so maybe that makes sense.

But physicalism is not that - physicalism is the 'thesis that everything is, or supervenes on, the physical'. It is the presumption of many people - maybe the majority! - in that having taken God out of the picture, then what you have left is a universe 'governed by' the laws of physics. If it can't be accounted for in those terms, then it isn't real, or it doesn't exist. It is the philosophy of modern scientific secular culture. — Wayfarer

As I alluded to earlier, I think physicalism is an extreme version of the common sense notion that ideas and dreams aren't real, as opposed to the world we experience via our senses. Rather than deep thoughts about the nature of reality, i'd say most people just start from this basic intuition. And that's not so much a philosophy, as it is something that is hard-wired in us to some extend. Even those who believe in God assume this much when they go about their day.

What I'm pointing out, is that, if not God, at least mind has now been re-introduced to the picture by physics itself. — Wayfarer

I do wonder how you would come to that conclusion? Granting that physics reveals basic stuff to be information-theoretical or mathematical values, that still doesn't necessitate something like mind or God. Minds, or rather thoughts, to me are something brains produce, I don't even know how to make sense of mind being part of the basic stuff of the universe. So yeah it's hard to respond to such claims if it isn't even clear what it is supposed to mean.

So my view is that modern, or should we say post-modern, science, really undermines physicalism altogether. Of course a lot of people are going to disagree with that, but note this: those physicist 'public intellectuals' like David Deutsche and Sean Carroll who are most vocally wed to physicalism, are also advocates for 'many-worlds' and multiverse interpretations of physics. And I say, that's because physicalism can't accomodate the paradoxes of quantum physics without introducing such ideas. — Wayfarer

Classical physics, Newtonian and Einsteinian physics, can't accomodate it, I don't know if that has much to do with the philosophical position of physicalism... maybe to some extend, sure.

And I think Sean Carroll would say that he's not so much introducing an idea to accomodate the paradox, rather that it's the interpretation that is the most simple and straightforward because it doesn't have to introduce new ideas to explain the disappearance or collapse of part of the wave-function. There is no paradox in many-worlds.

all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe — Wayfarer

Which is pretty much what I was saying.

NB that that doesn’t imply that there are any non-physical things.

Interesting. Nietzsche is one of those folks that I just "don't get" - but maybe I'll give it a second look one of these days

The point I want to get to, it that the notion of physicalism is still important for how we make sense of the world. The physical came first, and life grew out of that. In fact life developed this ability precisely to be able to affect the physical for its goals... to extend its physical life and reproduce physical life. — ChatteringMonkey

The problem with this is that idealism, and theology in general, dispute this claim that "the physical came first". They believe that the immaterial came first. If you take the time to follow the logical process outlined by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, the argument that the immaterial was first is actually quite strong.

I thought it was more because intellect, nous, is what grasps the forms and the final cause, the senses receive the material impression as per sensible and intelligible form. — Wayfarer

The tinted glass analogy is that if the intellect is not completely immaterial it could not properly know all material things, just like if we were looking through a tinted glass, we could not properly see the colours of things.

The problem with the idea that the intellect grasps the forms of things, as in Aristotle's description, is that then the intellect must have a passive aspect, in order to be a receptacle for forms. But this is the characteristic of matter, it is the receptacle which receives forms in the creation of material objects. This produces the difficult problem of what exactly is the passive intellect. If on the other hand, the intellect is understood as completely active, then it does not receive the forms of things, it creates forms. But now we have a separation between the senses, which must be passive receptacles of forms, and the intellect which is a creator of forms. So unless we allow passivity (the characteristic of matter) into the intellect, so that the intellect can receive forms from the senses, we have no way to reconcile the forms of the intellect with the forms of the senses.

all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe
— Wayfarer (quoting Wheeler)

Which is pretty much what I was saying. — Pfhorrest

I can’t see it, but never mind.

That is interesting, I hadn't encountered these nuances. I'm very interested in the medieval notion of the 'rational soul' and am doing some readings on it.

Good luck with the reading. I'm sure you'll find it very interesting.

We could understand physicalism as a scientific realism such as "our best scientific theory of the world tells us as much as we know about reality". We could also states that object such a consciousness doesnt exist. And then we have a complete metaphysical monism.

We could understand physicalism as a scientific realism such as "our best scientific theory of the world tells us as much as we know about reality". We could also states that object such a consciousness doesnt exist. And then we have a complete — Nzomigni

Yet, science can't explain consciousness. Surely, it ain't the best then, no?