What is often used that way? It was a question. Read it again. — Harry Hindu

What you asked. I'm not terribly fond of using computers as a metaphor for brains and minds, as I think it's misleading. But there are some similarities like handling information.

S the brain a metaphor for the mind? — Harry Hindu

No. It's what's responsible for the mind when it's alive.

If there is no internal world, why don’t you see what other people think? — leo

Why don't I see how their brain shivers are readying them to choose among which symbols to point at which objects? Why would you think that was a likely consequence?

They don’t really think? You’re a solipsist? — leo

Ditto.

Reminds me of the aliens in Liu Cixin's Three Body Problem trilogy. Their thoughts are always visible to one another as patterns of lights which are the result of their neural activity. They communicate directly in that sense. — Marchesk

Either (1) their brains are pre-connectionist symbolic computers, literally storing and retrieving symbols, in which case Searle's critique might or might not convince us to doubt whether they have a proper semantical understanding of their discourses; or (2) their neuroscience has advanced to the stage where they can see how each other's brain shivers are readying them to choose among which symbols to point at which objects.

Or (3) or (4) etc., of course.

Why don't I see how their brain shivers are readying them to choose among which symbols to point at which objects? — bongo fury

That’s all thinking is to you? To you there is no fundamental difference between the way a human thinks and how a computer operates?

Why do some ‘shivers’ give rise to the experience of thought, while other shivers give rise to the experience of color, or to the experience of love?

Also presumably if you crack open their skull you will see a brain there, and you can measure its shivers all you want, you still won’t see its thoughts or its feelings.

You're missing the point. I present below what is a scenario that's so common in our lives that it's both baffling and shocking that anyone would be required to narrate it to make a point.

John: Where have you been lately, Jane?

Jane: Oh, here and there, nowhere special except...there was this restaurant with a funny looking sign on its door.

John (intrigued): I see. What was this "funny sign"?

Jane (pulling out here mobile): My brother and I were looking for a place to eat when I saw this [pointing to a photograph] on the door of a restaurant. Isn't it funny?

John (looks at the photograph): Hahahahaha...I've been there too...Hahahaha...It is a funny sign that! Hahahaha

Had the camera not been faithful to what the eyes see, neither would Jane have pointed to the photograph and nor would John have recalled being there. The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera.

You did say something important though and I've been giving it some thought but it's not taken a definite form in my mind. I'll remember to invite you and @Wayfarer to a conversation if anything interesting comes up.

The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera. — TheMadFool

Sufficiently similar, surely. The people seen through the window would be different, for instance. And the photograph is analogous to the restaurant, not the subjective image of the restaurant: it is the cause of the second, similar image.

I present below what is a scenario that's so common in our lives that it's both baffling and shocking that anyone would be required to narrate it to make a point. — TheMadFool

You're arguing from the perspective of naive realism. It sounds a pejorative, but it's not intended as such. 'In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.' So, from that perspective there's no difference between a mental image and a camera image, because it doesn't consider the fundamental differences between minds and devices.

I don't detect any awareness in your posts of that issue, which is why you think it is 'baffling and shocking' that the realist attitude would be questioned. You take for granted that an image in a camera is the same as an image in a mind. Whereas I question that an image in a camera is an image at all, in the absence of it being recognised as such by an observer. The mind is what recognises an image as an image, categorises it in relation to other images, etc. I question whether an image is real the absence of that cognitive act.

As far as minds and computers are concerned:

here is what we are not born with: information, data, rules, software, knowledge, lexicons, representations, algorithms, programs, models, memories, images, processors, subroutines, encoders, decoders, symbols, or buffers – design elements that allow digital computers to behave somewhat intelligently. Not only are we not born with such things, we also don’t develop them – ever.

We don’t store words or the rules that tell us how to manipulate them. We don’t create representations of visual stimuli, store them in a short-term memory buffer, and thentransfer the representation into a long-term memory device. We don’t retrieve information or images or words from memory registers. Computers do all of these things, but organisms do not.

The Empty Brain

No.

To you there is no fundamental difference between the way a human thinks and how a computer operates? — leo

I think Searle identified precisely the fundamental difference between the way a human thinks and how any contemporary model of a Turing-test-aceing computer operates. We have a proper semantics, while the computer might be relying on syntax.

This essay says it much better than I ever could https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-information-and-it-is-not-a-computer
— Wayfarer

Great essay against the old, pre-connectionist, symbolic computer model of brain function, which I shall cite next time (and it won't be long) that I want to scorn the ancient myth of pictures in the head. Not an essay espousing the existence of ghosts (in machines), though. — bongo fury

You're missing the point. — TheMadFool

And you are still failing to reply to a single thing I write.
I would be quite interested to know how your "screenshot" notion of the brain would make sense of people failing to see the gorilla both in the moment and when thinking through their memories.
But I guess we'll never know because you don't respond to points.

My brother and I were looking for a place to eat when I saw this [pointing to a photograph] on the door of a restaurant. — TheMadFool

Sure there are a lot of words you can use colloquially that would need to be defined more concretely if they are being used as the basis of philosophical (and neurological) statements like "The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera".

Had the camera not been faithful to what the eyes see, neither would Jane have pointed to the photograph and nor would John have recalled being there — TheMadFool

Not necessarily, no. You can actually make numerous changes to a photograph that a human would be unlikely to notice. Indeed, if it's a digital camera, that's built into its design; it will ignore details that humans cannot notice.
And if it's a photo of the basketball game, Jane may well exclaim "What the hell is a gorilla doing there?!"

But, if we're purely talking about the camera sensor vs the sensitivity of the eye's rods and cones...yeah there's obviously some crossover there, by design. e.g. perhaps the sensor is better at detecting green than blue or red because so are our eyes.
Not the same by any means, but deliberately similar in some ways.

The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera. — TheMadFool

No I would disagree about a single image existing "in" our eye or that it is identical to the image in a camera. I have studied neuroscience (and indeed, computer graphics) and that's just not how it works.

Look, let's try to pull all this back. As I recall, your ultimate point is not that our brain's image is identical to the image in a camera; that was merely the premise for a bigger argument.
Premises should be uncontentious. How about you think of something else to be the premise for that argument?

Had the camera not been faithful to what the eyes see, neither would Jane have pointed to the photograph and nor would John have recalled being there. The image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera. — TheMadFool

Jane could have also just scribbled a few lines on a piece of paper, and it’s likely that John would have recalled being there. It isn’t that ‘the image in our eyes is identical to the image in a camera’, it’s that certain predictive patterns match what has been rendered by the camera.

For some reason, it's never broached in the Matrix Trilogy. Neo and the rest of the unplugged just accept that being outside the Matrix is the real world. — Marchesk

The Matrix may have touched on the verification problem indirectly, when someone notices a cat's movement replaying. Such "reality" defects indicate that the Matrix is not omnipotent, and may have technical glitches. But, even our normal perception of nature may experience perceptual glitches, in the form of illusions or mirages. So, it's the same old Brain In a Vat scenario. Ultimately, we can't be absolutely certain of anything. So we must just accept our personal view of reality as true most of the time. But a modicum of skepticism is warranted as a safeguard against deliberate deception. :smile:

glitches in the matrix : https://brightside.me/wonder-curiosities/11-stories-of-people-who-experienced-a-glitch-in-the-matrix-434460/

Brain in Vat : Here is the skeptical argument. If you cannot now be sure that you are not a brain in a vat, then you cannot rule out the possibility that all of your beliefs about the external world are false.
https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

Late Lament by the Moody Blues : But we decide which is right. And which is an illusion?

Glitches of Perception : https://open.spotify.com/album/7HFnb4ZHBSCS9gU5dxanqI

The problem is if we start off in the simulation/dream/vat, then we don't have the real world to compare glitching to.

But I agree, we can't be certain. I'd say the skeptical scenarios are unlikely.

@Wayfarer

people failing to see the gorilla — Mijin

I read up the gorilla experiment and it's an intriguing phenomenon to say the least. What's relevant about this experiment to our discussion is something that bothers me too.

Back in my college days I remember some of my friends doing their own funny little experiments on unsuspecting people and one of them was opening the eyes by gently tugging the eyelid up of sleeping colleagues. For sure, since the eyes were intact and healthy, an image did form in the retina of whatever was in front of the "subject" but, of course, the image didn't register (the "subjects" of this experiment were asleep) i.e. the "subjects" weren't conscious. It seems, from this fact, that the mere formation of an image in the eyes doesn't qualify as consciousness.

The image, of course, plays a key role in consciousness but, in and of itself, doesn't quite do the job of describing consciousness. There's something missing in the sleeping person who has faer eyes open - there's an image on faer retina but there's no consciousness. Let's call this missing piece of the puzzle X. I'm tempted to equate X with the soul or some other non-physical entity but kindly note that it can be a state of arousal of the physical brain. To keep things simple, let's call X the perceiver (of the image) and avoid commiting ourselves to any metaphysical position.

Coming to the gorilla in our midst, people didn't see the gorilla not because there wasn't an image of the gorilla in their retina - obviously there was - but because X (the perceiver) failed to notice it.

It's quite obvious then that there's something - we've labeled it X - that's scanning the mental image, understood in the broadest sense possible, and looking for points of interest. So, yeah, there's the perceiver (X) we have to reckon with in consciousness and the mental image simpliciter is only half the story.

Nevertheless, as I've repeatedly said, consciousness is, now acknowledging the necessity of an X, when we get down to the nitty-gritty, a confluence of X and the world outside or the X itself and that takes place at the level of what I've described as mental images.

X, by itself, though capable of becoming aware is not conscious unless there's a mental image it can be aware of/to. The world/X itself can't participate in consciousness unless there's a mental image, again, to be aware of/to. The mental image itself can't be part of consciousness unless there's an X that notices (gorilla) it.

In summary, there are three pieces to the consciousness puzzle:

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)

In terms of my camera analogy, what a camera lacks is X, the perceiver, capable of examining the image on the film or the image sensor and noticing what's in it (gorilla).

Consciousness in such a setup is the phenomenon that can be described as one or both of the following:

1. The perceiver (X) perceives the mental image and X has the ability to scan the mental image and notice (gorilla) whatever.

2. The perceiver (X) bypasses the mental image and is aware of the world and itself in an immediate, direct, deeply intimate, visceral sense. To my reckoning this is what mysticism and esotericism is all about.

As you can see, there's been a shift in my position (thanks to the two of you for that). That a mental image, alone, constitutes consciousness is untenable. Consciousness requires the perceiver (X) to notice the mental image as a whole or parts of it as the case may be. This is what awareness - the essence of consciousness - actually means.

Observe how the perceiver (X) has now assumed a critical role in consciousness. The existence of a camera unequivocally proves that we can replicate mental images (think in the broadest sense of images) with high fidelity in the form of photographs of the world and of the camera itself with a little bit of ingenuity of course. The matter of the world or the camera itself is, ergo, moot. However, what's missing in the camera is the X, the perceiver, that which can go over the images on the film/image sensor and notice (gorilla) stuff in it.

What all this means is simple. We need to do an overhaul of consciousness as a concept. For clarity I would like to reiterate my take on the Consciousness Trinity as I like to call it:

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)

The underlined part, X, is that which current science and technology can't create or have been in only a rudimentary, narrow, sense.

Consciousness must then be about X, the perceiver noticing (gorilla) the world or itself via mental images and this is what's meant by awareness. The world itself is out there - nothing much to comment on it - and the mental images that we form of it have been, more or less, artificially reproduced in the various gadgets that populate the modern era. In other words, to put it simply, consciousness is, at its core, about the perceiver (X) noticing (becoming aware of), not the [mental] images (modern gadgets are up to the task), nor the world (it's a passive component of consciousness).

We've finally reduced the entire consciousness business to,

1. X, the perceiver of mental images
2. The mental images themselves

All the action that we believe is consciousness (awareness) takes place where these two come together. X becomes aware of the mental images = consciousness [assuming you're not a mystic]

We can, for the moment, set aside the matter of the nature of X and focus our attention on awareness for that's the essence of consciousness. What exactly is this awareness (X being aware of the mental images)?

To get to the bottom of this puzzle, I suggest we do a little thought experiment. There's a person Y who's aware of an object T. Let's analyze the logic behind Y's claim that fae is aware of T.

Me: How do you, Y, know that you're aware of T?

Y: I am aware of T because I have (seen T) the mental image of T.

Me: How do you know you're aware of the mental image of T? [consciousness as per what we've discussed enters the stage here]

Y: I'm aware of it because I'm aware of it. That's all there is to it. All there is the awareness of the mental image.

Me: Ok. So, you, Y, is/are telling me that you're aware of the mental image but you don't have an explanation for it?

Y: Yes

Me: How do you, Y, know that you're aware of T?

Y: You've already asked me that question and I've answered it.

Me: Yes, I did ask and you did answer but I'm intrigued by how you have an explanation for the awareness of T but no explanation for the awareness of the mental image of T.

Y: I don't know what you mean.

Me: When it comes to T, the mental image of T satisfies the criteria for awareness, right?

Y: Yes.

Me: Well, then mental images of mental images should also satisfy the criterion for awareness of mental images, no?

Y: I guess so....it looks like right to me.

Me: Well, then, if that's the case, mental images are awareness. After all your awareness of T was based on a mental image of T and from that it follows that having mental image is awareness itself.

Y: Hold on! Not so fast! Actually I'm aware of T because I'm aware of the mental image of T. The mental image, by itself, doesn't quite cut it, you know. There's the awareness that you've not taken into account.

Me: I see. So, 1) you're aware of T because you're aware of the mental image of T and 2) you don't know how you're aware of the mental image of T, you're just aware of it and can't comment any further?

Y: Yeah! That's more accurate.

Me: Ok. According to you there's thing we call awareness, it seems to be sticking point in our discussion, and that it describes the interaction between you and the mental image of T. Am I right?

Y: Yes.

Me: But of course, as you yourself admitted, you don't know how it is that you become aware of the mental image of T. Correct?

Y: Yes.

Me: Am I correct then to say you're unaware of how you're aware of the mental image of T?

Y: Yes

Me: What would aid you in your quest, if it is one you'd choose, to become aware of how you're aware of the mental image of T?

Y: I don't know. Any ideas?

Me: Well, a mental image of T helped you in becoming aware of T. That should be a big clue, no? If you had a mental image of your awareness of the mental image of T, it should do the trick in my humble opinion. Am I making sense?

Y: Hmmmmm...

Me: It appears that there are two important facts here: 1) your awareness of the mental image of T satisfies the criteria for awareness of T and 2) you're not aware of how it is that you're aware of the mental image of T.

Y: Ok

Me: Ergo, a mental image of the awareness of the mental image of T is what's needed for you to become aware of how it is that you're aware of the mental image of T.

Y: Yes. That seems to be the case.

Me: But then the problem now has taken on a different character for how are you aware of the mental image of the awareness of the mental image of T? Awareness of another mental image of course and then my question would be how are you aware of that mental image? Another mental image one has to be aware of, so and so on, ad infinitum.

Y: So?

Me: If you claim that the mental images aren't awareness itself and that awareness is something else, above and beyond mental images (to become aware of), it leads to an infinite regress of mental images necessary for you to become aware of what awareness means/is.

That being the case you have two choices, 1) accept, since an infinite regress occurs, that you're actually unaware of what awareness means and if that's true, how could you say anything is aware, and by extension, that anything is conscious (awareness=consciousness) OR 2) accept that mental images, by themselves alone, is awareness and if that's the case cameras too, because they have counterparts of mental images on the film or on the image sensor, must be conscious.

If, however, you assert that we're consciousness and the camera not, you're drawing a distinction where there's none and so, as Dennett said, consciousness is an illusion

Sorry for the overly long post. I was doing this on the fly.

Nevertheless, as I've repeatedly said, consciousness is, now acknowledging the necessity of an X, when we get down to the nitty-gritty, a confluence of X and the world outside or the X itself and that takes place at the level of what I've described as mental images. — TheMadFool

. The world itself is out there - nothing much to comment on it — TheMadFool

This is the crux of the issue.

Take a look at the first paragraph of Schopenhauer's 'World as Will and Idea'.

“The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. — Arthur Schopenhauer

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself) — TheMadFool

This is basically representative realism, similar to that of the British empiricists, Locke, et al.

In all of this, you're assuming the independent reality of (let's call it) the sensory domain. From the practical point of view, that is perfectly sound. But from the viewpoint of philosophical analysis, it is the very thing which has to be called into question. And that is by no means an easy thing to do.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

If, however, you assert that we're consciousness and the camera not, you're drawing a distinction where there's none and so, as Dennett said, consciousness is an illusion — TheMadFool

No matter how often you say it, it's still bollocks. An illusion is 'an error in consciousness', so can only occur in a conscious being who is capable of making a wrong judgment. A camera could never suffer an illusion. Many people have of course already said this about Dennett, but as he's a 'moist robot', he just keeps going, like Terminator.


//ps// I should add, I'm not quoting Schopenhauer because I consider him an authority or as having the sole correct view. But it's necessary to understand the claim he's making as an antidote to the kind of ingrained realism that Bryan Magee talks about. Philosophy involves questioning what we generally assume or take for granted, it's the very taken-for-grantedness of 'the external world' which sorely in need of questioning IMO.//

1. The perceiver (noticer) of the mental image (X)
2. The mental image (sensations and thoughts)
3. That which can produce a mental image (The world and X itself)
— TheMadFool

This is basically representative realism, similar to that of the British empiricists, Locke, et al. — Wayfarer

I didn't know that. Thanks!

In all of this, you're assuming the independent reality of (let's call it) the sensory domain. From the practical point of view, that is perfectly sound. But from the viewpoint of philosophical analysis, it is the very thing which has to be called into question. And that is by no means an easy thing to do. — Wayfarer

I've touched upon this elsewhere - can't remember where exactly. In line with Cartesian thought and the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, the only certainty that's available to us is our own consciousness (cogito ergo sum), the external physical world might very well be an elaborate illusion created by our consciousness. This, I feel, is the strongest argument against physicalism for physicalism can't get off the ground and claim a justifiable existence unless we can established that the physical world isn't a consciousness-generated illusion. Thanks for reminding me.

No matter how often you say it, it's still bollocks. An illusion is 'an error in consciousness', so can only occur in a conscious being who is capable of making a wrong judgment. A camera could never suffer an illusion. Many people have of course already said this about Dennett, but as he's a 'moist robot', he just keeps going, like Terminator. — Wayfarer

As is obvious, I have to reconcile what I said above with my affirmation of Dennett's claim that consciousness is an illusion. First things first, the only thing we're 100% certain of is our consciousness and your refutation of my argument that consciousness is an illusion is Cartesian in spirit.

As far as I can see, the entire quarrel between physicalism and non-physicalism hinges on one crucial point - the existence/reality of consciousness itself. After all, the debate revolves around proving consciousness to be physical or non-physical. If Dennett can prove consciousness is not real or that it's an illusion it would be the ingenious removal of the most beautiful woman on earth, Helen of Troy, from the then Greek world - there would be no Trojan war, no debate between physicalists and non-physicalists.

If consciousness is an illusion it would severely undermine non-physicalism because the only thing they have to go on - the certainty regarding the reality of consciousness and what follows, the uncertainty of the physical world - vanishes into thin air. As you can see, the reality of consciousness is a bigger deal for non-physicalists than physicalists because non-physicalists would be approaching the issue from a Cartesian deus deceptor point of view but for that consciousness has to be real.

That said, I would like to discuss consciousness with the aim of finding out what it actually is. The wikipedia entry on consciousness states that it's - at its core - awareness but, the follow-up question is, what is awareness?

Let's look at an example. Suppose a John says that he's aware of something, say a golf ball, on a table. It only means that John is aware of the mental image - the internal reflection - of the golf ball. This is the basic scheme of awareness of the external world and also of the self, John himself. The awareness in John's awarness of the golf ball is what consciosuness is.

Suppose the mental image of the golf ball is A1. John is aware of the golf ball because he's aware of A1 and the awareness in John's awareness of A1 is what consciousness is. That means to be aware of what consciousness is John needs a mental image of consciousness that he can then become aware of. Basically, John needs a mental image of the awareness of the mental image of the golf ball, call this A2. For John to become aware of consciousness, John needs to be aware of A2 i.e. John needs to be aware of awareness (consciousness) and that can only happen if John has a mental image of awareness (consciousness) in order that he can be aware of it.

Sounds simple, right?

Not so! The problem is that John claims that he's aware of A1 and that means he must know, beforehand, what awareness is but he couldn't have known that for the simple reason that his awareness of awareness (awareness of A2) is premised on his awareness of A1.

I present below a conversation between John and I:

John: I'm aware of A1 (the mental image of the golf ball)

Me: Good for you. How do you know that you're aware of A1?

John: I know because I'm aware of A2 [the mental image of the awareness of A1 (the mental image of the golf ball)]

Me: You can't be aware of A1 unless you're aware of A2 because awareness of A2 tells you what awareness is and you had to know that before you can claim that you're aware of A1.

John: Right.

Me: But you can't be aware of A2 unless you're aware of A1. Awareness of awareness is only possible if you're already aware.

John: Correctamundo!

Me: So, to be aware of A1 you need to be aware of A2 (you have to know what awareness is before you can claim to be aware of anything) and to be aware of A2 you need to be aware of A1 (to be aware of awareness, you need to be first aware)

John: Right, again.

Me: So, you need to be aware of awareness to know what is awareness (before you can be aware of anything you need to know what awareness is) and you need to be aware to be aware of awareness (before you know what awareness is you need to be aware)

John: That's correct.

Me: That's a vicious circle if there ever was one. Let me make the circularity explicit:

1. To be (claim that you are) aware you need to be aware of awareness
2. To be aware of awareness you need to be aware

Since, awareness = consciousness, you can't know what consciousness is or, if one follows Dennett's footsteps, "consciousness" is an empty word for it doesn't mean anything at all and so, in his words, consciousness is an illusion.

Oliver sacks wrote of medical imaging and studies that prove 90% of what we see is generated from memory.
If you consider angle of vision and the infinite obstructions as well as pre existing prejudice,
reality would appear to be a consensus.

did you see that? followed by description

also the particles in your line of vision usually mean that
(if you could see everything, you could see nothing) just the particles floating in the
mucosal lining of the eye.
Each morning I watch the sun rise over a pristine mountain range and within 15 min. it completely disappears behind smog. fact