a system of ideas and ideals, especially one that forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy. "the ideology of republicanism"
synonyms: beliefs, ideas, ideals, principles, ethics, morals; More the ideas and manner of thinking characteristic of a group, social class, or individual.
"a critique of bourgeois ideology"
archaic
visionary speculation, especially of an unrealistic or idealistic nature.
the science of ideas; the study of their origin and nature. — Dictionary
I was thinking more of the the kind of practice the ordinary good citizen deploys: volunteering time to local needs, helping neighbors in need, staying on the job and supporting one's self and family--and staying in the family, as well. Keeping informed of what is going on in the world; tending one's garden, all that stuff ordinary good citizens do. — Bitter Crank
You are more the type to lay a siege and employ a trebuchet to hurl depressing texts over my high walls which do, over time, minutely undermine the enthusiasm to go on living of those whose viewpoints are subject to your bombardment. I, on the other hand, project positive sounding non-inferential dramas on my walls, which lure your troops into thinking that life might possibly, perhaps, be at least slightly worthwhile, after all. — Bitter Crank
Both of us can rest, assured that nobody is much persuaded by anything we say. Hell, they're not even listening, the sons of bitches. — Bitter Crank
The People are in la la land. "If you aren't depressed it is only because you aren't paying attention" Snark the Great said. — Bitter Crank
01 - Ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals that form the basis of economic or political theory and policy"
if ideology is a “system” of ideas and ideals, where ideas are about how things are (beliefs) and ideals about how things should be (norms), then those beliefs and norms are somehow interdependent. If ideology is the basis for economic/political theorising and policy, then ideology is a pre-theoretical system of ideas and ideals relevant for economy and politics. — neomac
02 - "The set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual"
If ideology is characteristic of a social group, then ideology is not only a shared system of beliefs, but something that helps us identify social groups. — neomac
The interesting question is what makes universal acquiescence impossible. I suppose it is possible that two different ideologies might be compatible, in the sense that it is possible for them to co-exist in the same society. One way is for an agreement to be struck, or worked out, which recognizes the other and makes room for them; I have in mind something rather stronger than passive toleration. One problem is the tendency for one ideology to define itself against the other.The relativist's plea for universal acquiescence can't be a long term solution — Kym
Ah, well, once we have acknowledged that we also have an ideology, we will inevitably be drawn into thinking differently about all those irrational other people. That might be very healthy, but, unless the others make the same acknowledgement, it may be rather dangerous.Too bad it went sour, because it would otherwise be a useful word, to describe the necessary set of ideas and ideals one needs to organize one's life. — BC
That is a most uncomfortable thought. What Wittgenstein regards as our ground turns out to be something quite different. My form of life, my facts turn out to be the other guy's ideology.If the method of validation is grounded on a set of norms and beliefs, such norms and beliefs can not be refuted, since the refutation must presuppose them (like Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions). — neomac
I think that is correct.In the first, what is described is the agreement amongst people, as to what they believe, and this constitutes their "ideology". In the second, we acknowledge that not only is there agreement amongst people as to what they believe, but their is also disagreement between people, and this produces a multitude of social groups with distinct "ideologies". — Metaphysician Undercover
I can't disagree with that, except that, at least as things are, the distinction between ideologies is extremely obscure. The lines are drawn on the level of praxis rather than intellect.So the first describes a general concept, "ideology", while the second describes what distinguishes separate, distinct and specific, ideologies. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the method of validation is grounded on a set of norms and beliefs, such norms and beliefs can not be refuted, since the refutation must presuppose them (like Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions). — neomac
That is a most uncomfortable thought. What Wittgenstein regards as our ground turns out to be something quite different. My form of life, my facts turn out to be the other guy's ideology.
I'm consoled by the thought that what Wittgenstein was gesturing at was something shared by all human beings. If we could delineate that, we might, just might, find a basis for unity (within diversity, of course). — Ludwig V
Here's a slightly different way of looking at things.
01 - Ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals that form the basis of economic or political theory and policy"
if ideology is a “system” of ideas and ideals, where ideas are about how things are (beliefs) and ideals about how things should be (norms), then those beliefs and norms are somehow interdependent. If ideology is the basis for economic/political theorising and policy, then ideology is a pre-theoretical system of ideas and ideals relevant for economy and politics. — neomac — Metaphysician Undercover
Under this definition, we accept that there is division, disagreement as to the facts, the truth, and this division manifests as distinct social groups.
With this way of looking at things, the two definitions are consistent, and not actually describing two different things — Metaphysician Undercover
If the method of validation is grounded on a set of norms and beliefs, such norms and beliefs can not be refuted, since the refutation must presuppose them (like Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions). But if we do not share such norms and beliefs, and they do not ground our system of validation then of course we can refute such norms and beliefs — neomac
That's not quite right. Obviously, if you want to refute a belief in order to persuade the believer to give up their belief, then you must, as it were, speak to/with their norms and beliefs. But it is perfectly possible to refute someone's belief to one's own satisfaction without speaking to them at all. I mention this because I suspect that situation arises much more frequently than it ought to. BTW, it may seem a bit pointless to refute someone's beliefs only to one's own satisfaction, but there is a point. You prevent the other side recruiting your own followers, which is much more important than convincing the opposition.If another group’s norms and beliefs don’t ground our system of validation, then we can’t refute those norms and beliefs because we won’t be able to understand them. Refutation only makes sense when it is based on normative criteria provided by the same Wittgensteinian hinge proposition as that which is to be refuted. — Joshs
I can't disagree with that, except that, at least as things are, the distinction between ideologies is extremely obscure. The lines are drawn on the level of praxis rather than intellect. — Ludwig V
That seems to be right. Given the hostility that there so often is between ideologies, I would expect that to be a major factor in how people decide to draw the lines.I think any boundaries between distinct ideologies are theoretical and made for a purpose. Consider, that no two people really share all their believes, so in that sense we could say that everyone has one's own distinct ideology. But on the other hand, if we limit a particular "ideology" to just a small set of very. general ideas, then many people have the same ideology. So the drawing of lines between ideologies is complex and purposeful, yet somewhat arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover
If another group’s norms and beliefs don’t ground our system of validation, then we can’t refute those norms and beliefs because we won’t be able to understand them. — Joshs
Given the hostility that there so often is between ideologies, I would expect that to be a major factor in how people decide to draw the lines. — Ludwig V
I.e. common sense (socialization aka "ideology") can be corrected, or coarse-grained, by science (observations + experiments) that in turn, through reflection (critique / dialectics), can be corrected, or biases exposed, by philosophy. "And so on and so on ..." :smirk: — 180 Proof
I was, rather, suggesting that what we can agree on might be a basis for working out a way of co-existing in spite of the things we do not agree on.
After all, different ideologies will either compete or co-exist, and we might all do better if we worked as hard at co-existing as we do at competing. — Ludwig V
There's so much going on that it is very hard to keep up with everything. I'm afraid I don't even try.I just realized I missed a comment of yours to my quote — neomac
There's a reason why I'm not. I oscillate between thinking that if only everybody would play nice, how much better it would be and thinking that we need someone even heavier than the heavies we have to knock heads together. Neither suggestion is particularly helpful, I know.I do not disagree with your general claims but they do not offer any concrete path toward peaceful coexistence. — neomac
Yes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend - at least until our common enemy is defeated, when any thing may happen. One of the differences between our situation now and the situation up to about 2000 is that we no longer live in a world with just one dominating struggle, but a multi-polar, multi-struggle world. Whether that's better or worse, I wouldn't like to say.Often competing ideologies can converge when there is a third ideology perceived as common threat — neomac
Adopting certain beliefs and norms as conditions for validation, already implies refusing to adopt other beliefs and norms as conditions for validation. And as long as beliefs and norms do not enjoy a special status of conditions for validation, then they can be scrutinised in light of beliefs and norms adopted as conditions for validation, and possibly refuted. So I get that mutual understanding presupposes shared assumptions. But ideological refutation is based on non-shared assumptions, so shared assumptions is not a requirement for ideological refutation — neomac
.One dictionary definition of ‘refute’ is: to prove (a statement or theory) to be wrong or false; disprove. If you accept this definition as consistent with your use of the word, then to refute is to access a vantage beyond ideology, an objective meta-position that transcends bias — Joshs
.In the philosophical literature one can find critiques of ideology from the left and the right. Critiques from the left tend to locate the concept of ideology with Marxist discourses. One can find such critiques among postmodern and poststructuralist writers. What they object to about the analysis of social configurations of knowledge in terms of ideology is not its assumption that knowledge is socially constructed, but that it can be totalized on the basis of a logic of development, that it moves toward an ultimate end — Joshs
.What the leftist critics of ideology keep from Marxism ( and Hegelianism) is the notion that knowledge is only produced within social formations, and the development of these formations does not proceed by way of refutation but revolutionary transformation — Joshs
.Common to Wittgenstein’s forms of life and hinges , Heidegger’s worldviews, Foucault’s epistemes and Kuhn’s paradigms is a rejection of the idea that social formations of knowledge progress via refutation — Joshs
It sounds like your critique of ideology is from the right, which places it as a pre-Hegelian traditionalist thinking. — Joshs
if refutation is based on non-shared assumptions there is no way to dialectically persuade those who do not share those assumptions with arguments based on those assumptions. Under this predicament, if we want them to act in accordance to our views, then we are left with the only option of imposing our views on them by brute force (or treachery?). But if we feel JUSTIFIED in doing this, this is because we take our views to be the valid ones, and their views the invalid ones. — neomac
Men have believed that they could make the rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. ( Wittgenstein, On Certainty)
Why are these the only two options? — Joshs
Why couldn't I teach someone a different way of looking at world, the way which grounds my own arguments and facts, so that they can understand the basis of my criteria of justification? It would not be a question of justifying the worldview I convert them to, but of allowing them to justify the arguments and views that are made intelligible from within that worldview. — Joshs
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