I was using the turnstile as a shorthand for Frege's judgement stroke, so read "⊢⊢the cat is on the mat" as "I think that I think..." or "I think that I judge..." or whatever. Not as "...is derivable from..." — bongo fury

Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat

(2) can be true even if (1) is false.

It may be that whoever asserts (1) is implicitly asserting (2), but they are nonetheless different claims.

two different claims: — Michael

Yes. In other words, two different assertions?

Yes.

Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat

(2) can be true even if (1) is false. — Michael

I think there is a lot of ambiguity in such formulations. For example:

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat
3. "The cat is on the mat"
4. I think, "The cat is on the mat."
5. "I think the cat is on the mat."
6. "I think the cat is on the mat."

And then add the fact that "think" is itself rather ambiguous. Note especially that (1) is not clearly a claim or an assertion at all, given that people will often write it that way and intend it to represent a truth or else a proposition that is not being asserted by anyone.

"P" probably entails that I know P, just as it entails that I exist and I'm communicating and I'm speaking a language.

"P" is not identical to any of those, though, I don't think. Whether it's identical to "P is true." is another matter. I would say yes — frank

Referring back to Rödl again. He insists we acknowledge that, fundamentally, we don't know what we're talking about when we talk about P.

Even something like "P = P is true" starts to look bizarre once you let go of the standard accounts of P. If P is true, and is the same thing as P, doesn't that mean that P is a bit of language? So when I see that bit of language, I know it's true? Obviously that's not what we mean; we need some kind of assertion to go along with it. So "P = P is true" isn't right. But how do we provide the assertion? Is there a single way this is supposed to happen?

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat

(2) can be true even if (1) is false.

It may be that whoever asserts (1) is implicitly asserting (2), but they are nonetheless different claims. — Michael

Rödl tells us that "I use 'judgment' and 'thought' interchangeably, following ordinary usage." Let's say we do the same. That means we can render 2 as "I judge that the cat is on the mat." The subject of this statement is now a particular judgment; and as @Michael points out, (2) can still be true even if (1) is false.

What about the "implicit assertion" of (2) from (1)? Does that change if we think of (2) as being about a judgment rather than a thought? We can see how Rödl's clarification of his usage is so important, because he's telling us not to interpret "thought" as a psychological event here. "Thought" is a "Fregean thought," a content, not an event. I say this because a judgment has to be understood that way. We don't say, "I formed a judgment at time T1 but I'm no longer sure if that is my judgment; let me go back and make it again . . . and again . . . and again . . ." "Judgment" is meant to enter the Space of Reasons, not be merely a report on brain activity.

So -- producing my rather tiny rabbit here -- I'd say yes, (2) is implicitly asserted by (1), if (1) is in fact asserted. Which is by no means clear, since it's a classic instance of "P" -- see above.

Is it then not an assertion? Is a name not a name when it's an example?

It's an assertion about a "name" right. So if I say: "an example of a proposition is: 'The cat is on the mat.'" I am saying something like: "it is true that S is an example of P," but crucially, not asserting S.

There is an added difficulty with context though. For instance, in theory, any sentence could be specified as a password, signal, safe word, etc. Philosophy of language has sometimes tended towards totalizing this relationship though, or absolutizing either speaker's intended meaning or social meaning. But words do have a stipulated, conventional meaning that relies on limited context, that is accessible to all speakers.

So if I say: "an example of a proposition is: 'The cat is on the mat.'" I am saying something like: "it is true that S is an example of P," but crucially, not asserting S. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good. Now take it a step further. Call this statement Q: "'S' is an example of P"; and this statement R: "It is true that 'S' is an example of P" ("It is true that Q").

Q itself is, presumably, also a proposition. I still haven't asserted S, of course, but have I asserted Q, if I don't also assert R? Or do I need the words "It is true that . . ." in order to turn "Q" from a sentence/statement/line of poetry into an assertion? Do I need to construct R in theory (in a post, for example), or is something more required?

Once we start asking questions like this, we see again how "queer" (in the Wittgensteinian sense) propositions and assertions are. I'm not saying these are profoundly unanswerable questions, only that the answers rely more than we like to acknowledge on some stipulations about how to hang the concepts together.

It's an assertion about a "name" right. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is? I don't follow. My "it" wasn't a name, and it wasn't about a name. It was your example token of the assertion "the cat is on the mat". You had seemed to suggest that its being used as an example of an assertion prevented it from being an assertion. I question that suggestion.

Incidentally, I doubt whether using it as an example of a declarative sentence or of a statement or of a proposition or of a claim prevents it being any of those. Indeed, it clouds the issue to take any clear distinction between any of those varieties of hot air for granted.

On the other hand, names seem to stand apart as a different kind of hot air. No? (E.g. they seem to be generally simpler in semantic structure and function.) And I wondered whether considering the situation of using a name as an example of a name, and this not appearing to cause it to cease being a name, might lead you to reconsider your reasoning in the case of assertions.

Perhaps I ought to have chosen a different analogy. Is a table not a table when presented as an example of a table?

If I use it mostly as a chair, perhaps it ceases being a table. But then I'm hardly presenting it as an example of a table.

So if I say: "an example of a proposition is: 'The cat is on the mat.'" I am saying something like: "it is true that S is an example of P," but crucially, not asserting S. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Rather, I think that, if you say: "an example of a proposition (assertion etc) is: 'The cat is on the mat.'" you are saying something like: "it is true that S is an example of a proposition (assertion etc) but, crucially, one that I don't necessarily endorse."

Even something like "P = P is true" starts to look bizarre once you let go of the standard accounts of P. If P is true, and is the same thing as P, doesn't that mean that P is a bit of language? — J

We could agree that "P" is an assertion from someone. The quotes indicate that? Does that work?

Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:

1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat — Michael

Yes. In other words, two different assertions? — bongo fury

Yes. — Michael

And 1. is no less a claim (or assertion) for lacking a personal endorsement (or other assertion sign).

And the string "the cat is on the mat" is no less a claim (etc.) even for being embedded in

3. It's false that the cat is on the mat.

But words do have a stipulated, conventional meaning that relies on limited context, that is accessible to all speakers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is that so? or is it right, up until we try to pay it out. Then we find that theory rests on a mistaken view of the nature of language.

There is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with — Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs

There are conventions, to be sure, but those conventions do not determine the meaning of an utterance - this is shown by your example, that any phrase can serve as a password.

We can make sense of the following:

Rather than take for granite that Ace talks straight, a listener must be on guard for an occasional entre nous and me. . . or a long face no see. In a roustabout way, he will maneuver until he selects the ideal phrase for the situation, hitting the nail right on the thumb. The careful conversationalist might try to mix it up with him in a baffle of wits. In quest of this pinochle of success, I have often wrecked my brain for a clowning achievement, but Ace’s chickens always come home to roast. From time to time, Ace will, in a jersksome way, monotonise the conversation with witticisms too humorous to mention. It’s high noon someone beat him at his own game, but I have never done it; cross my eyes and hope to die, he always wins thumbs down — Quoted in Davidson op cit

And we do so despite, not becasue, of the conventions. Any utterance can be used to mean anything.

We could agree that "P" is an assertion from someone. The quotes indicate that? Does that work? — frank

Yes, we could agree as to that. And that's usually what we do: We read "P" as something that can be asserted by someone -- a performance that someone can make -- and in some contexts we just take it as written that "P" has been asserted.

Nothing wrong with any of that. They're examples of what I meant by "some stipulations about how to hang the concepts together." The important point to me is that we don't treat "proposition" and "assertion" as if they have prior meanings that we discover, or that an ideal logical language would reveal as necessary.

The important point to me is that we don't treat "proposition" and "assertion" as if they have prior meanings that we discover, or that an ideal logical language would reveal as necessary. — J

I agree.

Even something like "P = P is true" starts to look bizarre once you let go of the standard accounts of P. If P is true, and is the same thing as P, doesn't that mean that P is a bit of language? So when I see that bit of language, I know it's true? Obviously that's not what we mean; we need some kind of assertion to go along with it. So "P = P is true" isn't right. But how do we provide the assertion? Is there a single way this is supposed to happen? — J

There's a difference between "p = p is true" and "p ≡ p is true".

If we allow "p = p is true" aren't we going to fall victim to the slingshot - that all true statements refer to the same fact? We can avoid this by realising that the mere occurrence of a sentence does not amount to an assertion of that sentence.

the mere occurrence of a sentence does not amount to an assertion of that sentence. — Banno

Yes, I'm not meaning to deny this. Without some such stipulation, we could hardly begin to create a workable structure. Nor could we fit the idea of "occurrence of a sentence" into our actual lives, which offer so many opportunities and manners for sentences to occur.

"p" is a place holder. We can replace it with some other sentence.

It's usually understood uncritically as standing for any sentence, but doubtless there are examples that do not work. Nevertheless, it is useful.

A very large part of the issue here - if not all of it - stems from the attempt to substitute illegitimately.

The Judgement Stroke in Frege was a first approximation to a context in which we could substitute while preserving the truth. Within the scope of a Judgement Stroke we may substitute like for like while preserving truth.

"p" and "p is true" are very different.

This is the part of Rödl I haven't been able to make sense of. He seems to want that the phrase “p is true” is not equivalent to the judgment that p, and in doing this he keeps the judgement as "the actualisation of self-consciousness", a substitutionally opaque context if ever there was one.

Simplest approach seems to be that Rödl is wrong. Or at least, doing something very different to logic as it is now understood and used. He wants to play another game, and it's very unclear that his game works - or what use his approach might have.

So while we can't foreclose on it entirely, it certainly needs a lot of explaining if it is going to carry any weight.

the mere occurrence of a sentence does not amount to an assertion of that sentence. — Banno

I would say, the mere occurrence of an assertion (claim, statement etc) doesn't amount to an assertion (claim, statement etc) of or about that assertion (claim, statement etc), but that doesn't in the least prevent it from being an instance of that very kind of linguistic entity.

I would say, the mere occurrence of an assertion (claim etc) doesn't amount to assertion (claim etc) of or about the assertion (claim etc), but that doesn't in the least prevent it from being an instance of that very kind linguistic entity. — bongo fury

What you are doing here is unclear to me.

To be sure, the mere occurrence of a sentence with a declarative grammatical structure does not amount to some's making an assertion - to their having performed that act.

We have the mere concatenation of 'T', 'h', 'e', ' ', 'c'... and so on. (Phonic act)

We can see this as a sentence with a declarative grammatical structure. Same thing, looked at in a slightly different way. (Phatic act)

Then we might give it an interpretation - "the cat" serves to pick out that cat; "the mat" serves to refer to that mat. The truth of the whole is not yet asserted - it might be so, it might not. Here we can say that "The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. (rhetic, and together with phonic and phatic, a locutionary act)

Then we might assign a truth value. "The cat is on the mat" is false. An illocution.

There are various judgements all through this. Austin names some of them phonic, phatic, rhetic, which together form the locutionary act and lead on to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. All acts, things we do with words, and all are different descriptions of the very same thing.

To me this is bread and butter stuff, pretty much granted. So I have trouble seeing why it is no obvious to others.

So I can agree with you if what you are saying is that the performance of a phonic, phatic, rhetic, or locutionary act need not amount to the performance of an illocutionary act.

Is that close?

Nor could we fit the idea of "occurrence of a sentence" into our actual lives, — J

I'm trying to see why you think this. Have you considered referring to the "string of words"? Thus casting it as a linguistic entity of (speaking loosely) lower type?

Somewhat like referring to the table as a pile of wood?

I think we're just trying to get straight on terminology. You seem to want any occurrence of a sentence to be an assertion of what it says (just as a table is, analogously, an "assertion" of what the pile of wood is), and I could imagine a framework where that was what everybody agreed. But then we'd need a different term to refer to the way assertions are commonly demarcated -- that is, as occurrences of sentences where some individual is using them to judge the content as true.

their having performed that act. — Banno

Why not performed that performance, acted that act, etc...

Austin names some of them phonic, phatic, rhetic, which together form the locutionary act and lead on to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. — Banno

Human linguistic behaviour is no doubt infinitely varied, but let's look for system where there is apparently system. Declarative sentences seem to fit an interesting pattern (logic). Perhaps what confounds our attempts to define that pattern is the inscrutability: the sentence is a machine for pointing predicates at things, but it doesn't really happen, it's all made up. We have to interpret, as you say. And there's no ultimate right interpretation of the game.

So why multiply entities and forces as though they are physical fact?

But then we'd need a different term to refer to the way assertions are commonly demarcated -- that is, as occurrences of sentences where some individual is using them to judge the content as true. — J

Well, we do have "the question whether or not... "

Why not performed that performance, acted that act, etc... — bongo fury

:worry:

If you like; They have acted.

...the sentence is a machine for pointing predicates at things, but it doesn't really happen, it's all made up. — bongo fury

Of course it's "made up". That's not a deprecation. It does really happen. We do make statements, ask questions, give orders.

The process of interpretation is the process of making stuff up.

If you like; They have acted. — Banno

My point is, there you almost go... reifying the act and the performing of it as distinct things.

Not sure what to make of that. The act is a distinct thing - asking a question, giving a command. Things we do with words, and they are recognisable different to the words themselves.

It's not seperate to the words - you can use a screw driver as a hammer. Neither the hammer nor the driver are the act of hammering, but the tool is not seperate to the hammering.

This is good, since I've long puzzled over what you were thinking on this topic.

Making an assertion is an act - like hammering. Various different locutions can be used to make an assertion.

There are conventions, but they do not determine the way in which the locution is to be understood - as is evident from various malapropisms. One can give an order or make a statement by asking a question.

That the score and a performance can't be identical is shown by the fact that we can have many performances of the same score. What's being reified?

Should that question be directed at ?

Should that question be directed at — Banno

Well, I was asking what you think.

Ok. What's the "reification" you are referring to?

...reifying the act and the performing of it as distinct things — bongo fury

??