So now I ask you, may the good philosophy devote itself to identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models?
— Fire Ologist

Yes. Though it needn't. — J

So good philosophy can completely forego the devotion to “ identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models”?

Or is there more to it that can still be rigorous and can be the work of philosophers?
— Fire Ologist

Yes. — J

Can you give an example?

So can we set out an argument that making any comparison requires some sort of "absolute"? — Banno

I'll help. I think your intuition is along these lines:

1. Making any comparison requires a standard.
2. That standard must be fixed
3. That fixed standard must be independent on the things being compared
4. to be both fixed and independent is to be absolute
5. hence any comparison requires an absolute standard

Something like that?

Can you see why this is incorrect?

The betting structure shows gives us a way of understanding what a belief and preference amount to, using just behaviour. — Banno

This reminds me of the Aristotle's practical syllogism, which is supposed to give a structure that applies to all actions whatever. In a way, it does, in the sense that you can shoe-horn actions into the formula. The same applies to Aristotle's syllogism, which was thought, for a long time, to give the structure of all arguments. What in fact happened was that arguments were shoe-horned into that structure, which was not particularly helpful. What tells you that the betting structure applies to all actions? The fact that you can shoe-horn things into the structure is not enough.

Better entails worst and best, in itself, by definition, in every appropriate use. We need that to be the case, to use “better” at all. — Fire Ologist

I'm interested in the limitation. Can you give me an example of an inappropriate use? Do you mean that in the inappropriate uses, better does not entail worst and best?
My problem is that although what you say applies, in a sense, to many cases, whether it applies to all cases is not clear to me, so your inappropriate uses might be rather interesting.

So good philosophy can completely forego the devotion to “ identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models”? — Fire Ologist

"Consistent" and "Coherent" only apply to a number of elements that relate to each other - that is, to a system. "Inconsistent" and "incoherent" mean "not systematic".

This reminds me of the Aristotle's practical syllogism, — Ludwig V

Sure. We learn where to use the syllogism, and where not to. We might do much the same with Ramsey's idea. We are not obligated to shoe-horn.

Again, I'm not seeing a substantive point if disagreement.

I think the Williamson essay is itself a good example, though I suppose some would dispute its rigor.

Or for a broader example, Thomas Nagel's work is my ideal of how philosophy can be remain rigorous and also ask questions that go beyond clarifying what is consistent or coherent within a given model. There are certainly others.

One thing to notice: The requirement to "completely forego the devotion to . . . " is surely too rigid, and also tendentious. By putting it in terms of "devotion," you're already building a rhetorical case against it, aren't you? Couldn't we just talk about "a type of philosophy that doesn't primarily concern itself with . . ." ?

Better entails worst and best, in itself, by definition, in every appropriate use. We need that to be the case, to use “better” at all.
— Fire Ologist
I'm interested in the limitation. Can you give me an example of an inappropriate use? Do you mean that in the inappropriate uses, better does not entail worst and best? — Ludwig V

Everyone seems to be comfortable using the word “better” and understanding what it is intended to add to a conversation. I am saying, by saying and using “better” appropriately, one not only must understand what better means and how to use “better”, one must also know what “best” means and how to use it as well. Better is defined by best. The better tends towards the best, while the worse tends towards the worst. You don’t know one of these, you don’t use one of these appropriately, without knowing the others.

Better is defined by best — Fire Ologist

Mere assertion.

"Longer" is defined by "longest'.

Nuh.

I'll help. I think your intuition is along these lines:

1. Making any comparison requires a standard.
2. That standard must be fixed
3. That fixed standard must be independent on the things being compared
4. to be both fixed and independent is to be absolute
5. hence any comparison requires an absolute standard

Something like that?

Can you see why this is incorrect? — Banno

That is the intuition. I think I see that it is not valid. Something about 2 and 4 seems tautological so nothing new can be concluded.

But…

Mere assertion. — Banno

How is ANY use of “better” anything more than mere assertion?

I AM merely making an assertion.

I’m basically asserting that language doesn’t work unless it refers to absolutes.

To call something misleading is to say it leads somewhere—but crucially, somewhere we didn’t intend, or that doesn’t fulfill the function we took ourselves to be engaging in. That’s not the same as saying there is a metaphysical end-point we ought to be led to; rather, it’s to say that a particular use diverts us from how the practice normally works or what it aims at internally. — Banno

That looks full of absolutes to me.
Absolute “misleading”.
Absolute “function we took ourselves to be engaging in.”
An absolute “normally”
Etc.

These are your assertions. I’m okay with assertions, depending on what follows from them. I think what follows from the assertion “we don’t need absolutes” is “we cannot communicate”.

I think the way you intuitively talk demonstrates my intuition about the reliance on absolutes essential to meaningful, useful language in the world of rational speakers.

The argument I could use help with is that two rational agents cannot communicate absent a medium separate from the both that lies between them and is fixed with absolutes; language is that medium, full of references to items named, relations rationalized, and absolute concepts binding these to the two rational agents at once.

Something must be fixed in this mix, or nothing like a communication would ever occur. And it already has occurred. I agree, it’s not much of an argument, but I think it is more than an adequate demonstration. We both need help with our assertions.

What a mess.

Ok, what you assert is true.

Then there's not much point in continuing this conversation, is there.

I think the Williamson essay is itself a good example, though I suppose some would dispute its rigor.

Or for a broader example, Thomas Nagel's work is my ideal of how philosophy can be remain rigorous and also ask questions that go beyond clarifying what is consistent or coherent within a given model. There are certainly others. — J

I agree with that. Williamson himself didn’t think his essay got any significant philosophic work done and lacked rigor, but I agree - it’s a work for philosophers exclusively and gets some work done.

Nagel keeps the questions alive.

One thing to notice: The requirement to "completely forego the devotion to . . . " is surely too rigid, and also tendentious. By putting it in terms of "devotion," you're already building a rhetorical case against it, aren't you? Couldn't we just talk about "a type of philosophy that doesn't primarily concern itself with . . ." ? — J

You said “though it need not” and so I asked if you were saying “completely forego” since it need not.

You changed “relegated” to “devoted”.

I am not building the case as much as confirming your case.

You ask, “Couldn't we just talk about "a type of philosophy that doesn't primarily concern itself with . . ." ?”

Well yes, but two points in the context of this thread. Isn’t this thread about more precision, so “doesn’t primarily concern” doesn’t seem rigorous and begs further details about what is the primary concern and how secondary or tertiary is the less concerning.
Also, I think this contradicts you saying “though it need not.” (Which is why you sensed a case against it.)

Bottom line to me, philosophy must concern itself with consistency and coherence of language and argument - that is logical validity. But philosophy must also concern itself with the world and the persons in it and their existential/metaphysical questions - that is where soundness of arguments is measured.

If you seek validity with no concern for soundness, you live in a hypothetical world at best, and further, like math, we all must think the exact same thing about what is valid. If you seek soundness but no concern for validity, no one will ever be able to follow your reasoning and logic and understand you, and we all may think totally different things. But if you can communicate both validity AND soundness, well maybe there is something truly interesting to talk about.

This isn’t an argument. It’s just why I bother to seek something valuable by talking with other people.

The sound experience conveyed validly.

What a mess.

Ok, what you assert is true.

Then there's not much point in continuing this conversation, is there. — Banno

I could be wrong.

What a mess? You seem to have more to say…

You changed “relegated” to “devoted”. — Fire Ologist

You're absolutely right, I did, as in "devote itself to" -- a slightly different meaning, but my apologies for not remembering.

So… that’s it then.

Bottom line to me, philosophy must concern itself with consistency and coherence of language and argument - that is logical validity. But philosophy must also concern itself with the world and the persons in it and their existential/metaphysical questions - that is where soundness of arguments is measured. — Fire Ologist

None of which implies absolutes, whatever they might be.

So… that’s it then. — Fire Ologist

Nah, just had to return to real life for a while. But I wanted to be sure to acknowledge my mistake first.

Isn’t this thread about more precision, so “doesn’t primarily concern” doesn’t seem rigorous and begs further details about what is the primary concern and how secondary or tertiary is the less concerning. — Fire Ologist

Precision is a focus here, for sure. But not at the cost of accuracy. I'm suggesting that it's more accurate to talk about a type of philosophy -- Nagel's, perhaps -- which avails itself when necessary of all the rigorous, analytic tools, but is aiming to discuss topics that lie beyond analysis as such. To try to carve this up into primary, secondary, and tertiary seems hopeless, but maybe you can give an example of what that might look like? I may not be picturing what you mean.

I think this contradicts you saying “though it need not.” — Fire Ologist

I don't see it. Can you elaborate?

This isn’t an argument. It’s just why I bother to seek something valuable by talking with other people. — Fire Ologist

Fair enough. As long as you agree it isn't an argument. There are about a bazillion arguments out there about how soundness and validity connect, if you want to chase them down. Maybe start with correspondence theories of truth?

None — Banno

Maybe none?

You seem to think you have made a point. Presumably that "none" is an absolute.

But you have yet to be clear as to what an "absolute" is.

I hope I've helped you see that your intuition is difficult, perhaps impossible, to clearly articulate.

You might reconsider.

The relevance here is to whether we must start doing philosophy at some firm foundation, or whether we find ourselves already doing philosophy, and must start instead from where we are.

Hence the relevance of Ramsey, who shows us a way to start from indifference.

And Wittgenstein, who asks us to look at what we do, not what we theorise.

I'm suggesting that it's more accurate to talk about a type of philosophy -- Nagel's, perhaps -- which avails itself when necessary of all the rigorous, analytic tools, but is aiming to discuss topics that lie beyond analysis as such. — J

I love it. That’s philosophy to me. Analysis, but not just analysis of analysis, but also analysis of living in the world or “topics that lie beyond analysis as such”. I’m good with that.

:party: At the risk of jeopardizing our accord, I do need to clarify that I'm using "analysis" to mean something like conceptual analysis and its logical paraphernalia. To "lie beyond analysis" in this sense doesn't relieve us of the responsibility of making sense. I don't think Nagel or anyone else should try to discuss topics which can't meaningfully be talked about at all -- not within philosophy, anyway.

whether we find ourselves already doing philosophy, and must start instead from where we are. — Banno

I started a post titled “Being in the Middle”.

Why do you think what we are doing should be called “philosophy”. Are the ends so remote here in the middle that we may as well call this “making cookies”?

No. We call it “philosophy” whatever philosophy absolutely turns out to be, whether we ever get there, however it may ever be known, but still, we don’t call it “automotive engineering”. We call it philosophy.

How is that?

There is something absolute involved, though I haven’t and maybe can’t define it.

But if we don’t aim for it, your next reply might be anything at all and neither could know of it was or wasn’t doing more philosophy.

I love it. That’s philosophy to me. Analysis, but not just analysis of analysis, but also analysis of living in the world or “topics that lie beyond analysis as such”. I’m good with that. — Fire Ologist

That's what we are doing.

Did it just click?

To "lie beyond analysis" in this sense doesn't relieve us of the responsibility of making sense. — J

Yes. I’d rather call the two anspects 1) analysis of analyzing (logic, language), and 2) analysis of the world (what language is about, why we speak, agreement itself).

So nothing need be outside of analysis.

Did it just click? — Banno

Well, no. I’m still trying to figure out why you disagree with me.

What I am doing is trying to have you present your account in a way that hangs together.

I can't really "disagree" with something that is so unclear.

must start instead from where we are.

Hence the relevance of Ramsey, who shows us a way to start from indifference. — Banno

Where we are, is already in the middle - neither starting nor at an end. But instead, already using language and reasoning and willing and wondering…

We can stay here.

Or we can do philosophy - which, inevitably remains already in the middle, but ALSO adds a new “start”. We construct it. And to do so, introduce the fixed “start”. We identify an absolute and stand on it or aim for it.

we find ourselves already doing philosophy — Banno

How is that universe you’ve just thrown me into any clearer a picture than what I am trying to acknowledge and talk about.

If you want to further clarify “finding ourselves already doing philosophy”, in my experience, at least one of not many absolutes will appear (also vaguely, but not with me in the middle but with me conceptually so I can call something a “start”).

There is no way to be perfectly clear about “that which lies outside of analysis”.

But if there was nothing to it, we would never build any agreement whatsoever. And we build agreement all of the time.

I can't really "disagree" with something that is so unclear. — Banno

First, I bet you could.
But more to the point, I bet you can agree to something unclear. I think agreeing on the unclear is part of your point about indifference. Careful, rigorous, moves, but ultimately in the middle with unknown beginnings and ends.

And to do so, introduce the fixed “start”. We identify an absolute... — Fire Ologist

You presume these are the same. Are you simply stipulating an absolute?

The conversation is now too suppositional to be useful.

What kind of line would separate being in the middle with being anywhere else (like a start)? There is an absolute difference between middle and start.

Starts make a line.
Middles need no lines or distinctions.

Being in the middle is not being at the end or the beginning.

A stipulation, then?

"Here is a hand".

Not as asn observation, but as a stipulation - "this counts as a hand"

Something to hang the door from.

And off we go.

Something to hang the door from. — Banno

Stipulations are functional, temporary versions of absolutes.

But if we never seek to convert one of these stipulations into something that just is, then you are right - “this conversation is too suppositional to be useful.”

What is a stipulation but a form of supposition?

Stipulations work really well when hanging doors. But nothing is forever, and all stipulations can be undercut, dissected, or shown to have been il-constructed and so serving no purpose at all.

Absolutes are suppositions. But suppositions we expect to remain as if fixed and permanent despite our desire to say we doubt they are absolute.

The LNC is an absolute. Maybe someday we’ll find we can use reason while contradicting reason, but probably not, so I see no need to say the LNC is merely stipulated and temporary and provisional awaiting its revision. It’s absolute - I can’t think otherwise and be thinking.
“I exist” is true absolutely. Again, I can’t think otherwise and be thinking.
Therefore, ‘absolutes exist’ is absolute. I can’t think otherwise and know I exist and know that while I exist I cannot simultaneously not exist.

I wouldn’t continue doing philosophy if I concluded absolutely that all we say is based solely on temporary stipulation. If there was no truth despite any and all stipulations, why would I care what anyone else think. I’m willing to stipulate that none of you are any better at life than me, so why should I stipulate things with you. I’d rather focus on less profound problems of there was nothing profound but a profound stipulation.

These are still assertions, but ones I can’t deny meaningfully, or without guile and misrepresentation. I can’t tell you what I see, but I just showed you how I see it, so maybe you can find it yourself. Such is the nature of the absolute - there whether we are looking or not, and not known until we see for ourselves.

I’m waiting for something to click in you, because I am sure you would be better equipped to argue it.

Stipulations are functional, temporary versions of absolutes. — Fire Ologist

Another mere assertion.

Why not "absolutes are arbitrary invalid inductions from particle instances"?

The LNC is an absolute. — Fire Ologist

Is it? Then whence paraconsistent logic, Dialetheism, Many-Valued Logics, Intuitionistic Logic, Non-Reflexive Logics...




The pattern, were you agree with the critique of your position, only to snap back of a sudden to were you started, is repeating.