I've no doubt Pigliucci, as well as most philosophically sophisticated modern scientists, would agree that the physical sciences are applied metaphysics which actually work (i.e. reliably generate good explanations for physical phenomena and processes). — 180 Proof
Physical science "is misapplied science"? — 180 Proof
The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel
The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology. — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology? — Metaphysician Undercover
I think it would be more appropriate to say "knowledge" in English perhaps; "all men by nature desire to know." This is why the life of contemplation is the highest form of life for Aristotle (Ethics, Book X). The mind, being "potentially all things," can possess all perfections in this way (at the limit). All appetites are ultimately towards a sort of union, and knowledge is the highest form of union. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that? — boundless
Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good. — boundless
Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO. — boundless
Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'. — boundless
Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure. — boundless
I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. — boundless
Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. — boundless
I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way. — boundless
I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. — boundless
That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what ↪Wayfarer called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death. — Metaphysician Undercover
The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method. — Metaphysician Undercover
It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest? — Metaphysician Undercover
All this is exactly right. Strong emergence is not compatible with reductionism. That's the subject of the paper I linked. Perhaps I was confused. I thought you used reductionism/weak emergence as the necessary alternative to intention/teleology without considering another alternative - strong emergence. Was I wrong about that? — T Clark
As I understand it, reductionism's focus is on analysis of the properties of higher level phenomena from physical principles at lower levels while emergence focuses on constructing the properties of higher level phenomena from lower level principles. The difference between weak and strong emergence is that, for weak emergence, it works but for strong emergence it doesn't. The thermodynamic properties of gases can be determined based on the behavior of the gases themselves but also on the basis of the behavior of their molecular components - both reductionism and constructionism. On the other hand, the properties of biological phenomena can not be determined based on physical properties alone. At least that is the claim. — T Clark
I like this description. Apokrisis is a smart guy. When he says "non-reductionist physicalist model" I think he means one without reference to just the intentionist/teleological explanations this thread is about. Keeping in mind that I often misunderstand him. — T Clark
I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity. — T Clark
The author says that some (strongly) 'emergent properties', like violation of some symmetries, occur at the infinite limit of the number of the constituents.
So, the theory can explain the arising of those properties because they appear at that limit. — boundless
Newtonian mechanics is now understood as a limit case of relativity. And, in fact, one obtains Galileian trransformation by taking the limit where the velocity of light is infinite. But notice that there is a subtle difference here. The limit is taken to explain an approximation and to explain that, in fact, if you don't take that limit you actually get more precise results. — boundless
That's why I think that weak emergence and reductionism are the same thing seen in different ways. — boundless
his worldview is far more sympathetic of intentionality, purpose, 'holism' and so on than a purely mechanicistic worldview. — boundless
I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity.
— T Clark
I'm not sure of what you mean here. — boundless
the conservation laws are what is fundamental and they determine the behavior of the 'parts' of the isolated system. — boundless
:fire:If life has a meaning beyond mere survival it consists in the volition to thrive [ ... ] If there is a good we all strive for it is potence. Potence is naturally desirable (considered good) and impotence is naturally undesirable (considered bad). — Janus
... like e.g. disembodied mind.The idea of a transcendent meaning is incoherent ...
:100:All meaning is immanent and relative to life as lived.
the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. Asking what this purpose might be, in the abstract, is almost a red herring - it doesn’t really exist in the abstract, but it is inherent in the purposeful activities of beings of all kinds, human and other. It is, as it were, woven into the fabric. — Wayfarer
Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that. — boundless
If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state. — boundless
But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place. — boundless
Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment. — boundless
i.e. a composition fallacy. — 180 Proof
Greek atomists proposed this "idea" a couple of millennia ago.The idea that the universe is purposeless is a modern invention, arising in the early modern period ... — Wayfarer
:chin: So what was Platonism (re: the forms, universals) if not a "great abstraction"? or Pythagoreanism?That is briefly described in the OP under the heading of ‘The Great Abstraction’ — which is preciselywhat it was.
However the question of purpose, or its lack, doesn’t always require invoking some grand ‘cosmic meaning.’ Meaning and purpose are discovered first in the intelligibility of ordinary life—in the way we write, behave, build, and think. — Wayfarer
Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. — Wayfarer
Even the most rudimentary organisms behave as if directed toward ends: seeking nutrients, avoiding harm, maintaining internal equilibrium. Nothing in the inorganic realm displays these (or any!) behaviours. This kind of directedness—what might be called biological intentionality—is not yet consciously purposeful, but it is not mechanical either. — Wayfarer
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