Here's a link to a famous paper on emergence "More is less" by P.W. Anderson. — T Clark

Thanks for this link.

How is "scientism" related or relevant to my last post?

I've no doubt Pigliucci, as well as most philosophically sophisticated modern scientists, would agree that the physical sciences are applied metaphysics which actually work (i.e. reliably generate good explanations for physical phenomena and processes). — 180 Proof

It's not 'applied metaphysics' but 'misapplied science', as I've already made amply clear in the OP, and which I won't repeat.

Physical science "is misapplied science"?

Physical science "is misapplied science"? — 180 Proof

Not when it's applied to physical objects. But as I said in the OP, physics achieved its enormous successes by concentrating on what could be quantified and physically measured, to the exclusion of other factors. That is what I mean by the great abstraction.

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel

Hey, I may need some pointers on the difference between relativism and anti-realism.

I'm assuming the anti-realist says something like: "Murder isn’t wrong in any objective sense; saying it’s wrong is just an expression of personal preference or emotion."

Whereas the relativist says: "Murder is wrong according to contingent community standards, such as local values, cultural norms: views about harm and wellbeing, but those standards aren’t universally binding."

Both views agree that morality is something humans create through their agreements or social practices, right

Thanks for the reference, I'll read it. Anyway, I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. But given your response, I might be wrong, so I'll avoid to comment on this for a while (at least, I'll read the article before).

Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. Honestly, I don't think that there is a meaningful difference between the two positions. Rather the difference is on the emphasis on aspect (the undeniable 'apprearance' of the features for the emergentist) or another (the fact that the feature is totally explainable in terms of its parts for the reductionist).

Some time ago, I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way.

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. Consider a very simple, isolated system of two particles interacting via a force. You can 'derive' the conservation law of the linear momentum by considering the second and the third laws of newtonian dynamics. Generally, the proof assumed those laws and derive the conservation law, after all. But, I think that, with equal reason, one can, instead, point out that one might regard the conservation law as fundamental. If one does that, the result is that the time variation of the linear momenta of the particles is of equal magnitude and opposite in verse. So, the laws of dynamics can be derived by the conservation laws. But conservation laws refer to global properties of a (closed) physical system. if they are fundamental, then, they 'influence' the behavior of the 'parts'. So, really, even Newtonian mechanics doesn't have to be understood in a mechanicistic way.
Similarly, when one introduce the 'spontaneous symmetry breaking' to explain the phase transition, arguably, a similar thing happens. After all, IIRC the lagrangian refers to the whole system.
This doesn't necessarily imply that a reductionist reading of these things is wrong. Just that it's not the only possible 'reading', IMO.

Anyway, I'll read the article before talking about strong emergence...

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that?

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good.

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO.

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure.

I think it would be more appropriate to say "knowledge" in English perhaps; "all men by nature desire to know." This is why the life of contemplation is the highest form of life for Aristotle (Ethics, Book X). The mind, being "potentially all things," can possess all perfections in this way (at the limit). All appetites are ultimately towards a sort of union, and knowledge is the highest form of union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't resolve the issue we were discussing. When we put life in general within the context of purpose, assuming that life is purposeful, then knowledge itself is pragmatic, useful toward further ends.

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that? — boundless

That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity.

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good. — boundless

I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death.

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO. — boundless

The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method.

It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent.

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'. — boundless

Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt.

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure. — boundless

Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest?

Yes.

I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. — boundless

All this is exactly right. Strong emergence is not compatible with reductionism. That's the subject of the paper I linked. Perhaps I was confused. I thought you used reductionism/weak emergence as the necessary alternative to intention/teleology without considering another alternative - strong emergence. Was I wrong about that?

Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. — boundless

As I understand it, reductionism's focus is on analysis of the properties of higher level phenomena from physical principles at lower levels while emergence focuses on constructing the properties of higher level phenomena from lower level principles. The difference between weak and strong emergence is that, for weak emergence, it works but for strong emergence it doesn't. The thermodynamic properties of gases can be determined based on the behavior of the gases themselves but also on the basis of the behavior of their molecular components - both reductionism and constructionism. On the other hand, the properties of biological phenomena can not be determined based on physical properties alone. At least that is the claim.

I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way. — boundless

I like this description. @Apokrisis is a smart guy. When he says "non-reductionist physicalist model" I think he means one without reference to just the intentionist/teleological explanations this thread is about. Keeping in mind that I often misunderstand him.

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. — boundless

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity.

What could it mean to say the universe is inherently meaningful? Nothing other than that it was created for some purpose.

Of course the things we and other animals experience are meaningful to us and to them, insofar as we and they have needs we and they strive to meet.

Spinoza used the term 'conatus' to signify a natural tendency of things to persist― to survive. Nietzsche, who considered Spinoza to be a kindred thinker, expressed a similar idea with his 'will to power'. If life has a meaning beyond mere survival it consists in the volition to thrive, to reach one's potential (by 'one' here I include animals).

If there is a good we all strive for it is potence. Potence is naturally desirable (considered good) and impotence is naturally undesirable (considered bad). This is not to say that all animals ( or even humans) think consciously about such things.

The idea of a transcendent meaning is incoherent (unless there be posited a creator). All meaning is immanent and relative to life as lived, at least for animals. Humans who posit gods and spiritual realms of course do create, and may live in accordance with, dimensions of imagined meaning.

That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what ↪Wayfarer called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that.

I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death. — Metaphysician Undercover

I used 'rest' in a more general way. Even if we remain active, we can rest. After all, when we truly rest, we are, in fact, active in some way.
I meant something like 'not agitated'. If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state.

I believe that there is a reason why 'bliss' and 'knowledge', truth and goodness are so often associated in religions.

The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I can agree with this. Yes, it's not pure chance or pure randomness.

It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, fine. Stand corrected. But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place.

Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: Philosophy ceases when doubt ceases.

Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest? — Metaphysician Undercover

See before. Rest does not imply cessation of action. It certainly, implies, however a cessation of an agitated action that seeks fulfillment/realization.

Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment.

Ok, I read the article. So, I can respond now.

All this is exactly right. Strong emergence is not compatible with reductionism. That's the subject of the paper I linked. Perhaps I was confused. I thought you used reductionism/weak emergence as the necessary alternative to intention/teleology without considering another alternative - strong emergence. Was I wrong about that? — T Clark

Well, I probably dismissed the concept of 'strong emergent' in a flippant way. My bad. I believed that strong emergence was actually a form of reductionism for some reason but I was wrong, of course.

I wanted to ask you your opinion about a point the author makes which I remember that also troubled me in my years at uni (I honestly don't remember if such doubts were resolved at that time and I simply forgot the answer). The author says that some (strongly) 'emergent properties', like violation of some symmetries, occur at the infinite limit of the number of the constituents.
So, the theory can explain the arising of those properties because they appear at that limit.

Of course, considering the limit cases is extremely important in physics. Newtonian mechanics is now understood as a limit case of relativity. And, in fact, one obtains Galileian trransformation by taking the limit where the velocity of light is infinite. But notice that there is a subtle difference here. The limit is taken to explain an approximation and to explain that, in fact, if you don't take that limit you actually get more precise results.
But in the case of 'many-body' systems, you need to take the limit in order to get better results. Honestly, I see this as an indication that the 'general' theory is at least incomplete, if not wrong - after all, literally speaking there is no system with an infinite amount of constituents and if the theory gives the right result only by taking that limit, there is a problem. I don't see it as a success of the theory in the same way, at least, the 'recovery' of the results of Newtonian mechanics is a success of relavity: in this case, you obtain better results by not taking the limit.

What do you think of that?

I guess that this would imply that 'strong emergence' implies that our understanding of the physical world is incomplete.

As I understand it, reductionism's focus is on analysis of the properties of higher level phenomena from physical principles at lower levels while emergence focuses on constructing the properties of higher level phenomena from lower level principles. The difference between weak and strong emergence is that, for weak emergence, it works but for strong emergence it doesn't. The thermodynamic properties of gases can be determined based on the behavior of the gases themselves but also on the basis of the behavior of their molecular components - both reductionism and constructionism. On the other hand, the properties of biological phenomena can not be determined based on physical properties alone. At least that is the claim. — T Clark

Ok, thanks for the clarification. That's why I think that weak emergence and reductionism are the same thing seen in different ways. Strong emergence is however something else.

I like this description. Apokrisis is a smart guy. When he says "non-reductionist physicalist model" I think he means one without reference to just the intentionist/teleological explanations this thread is about. Keeping in mind that I often misunderstand him. — T Clark

Yes, at least not in the sense that of this thread. But certainly, his worldview is far more sympathetic of intentionality, purpose, 'holism' and so on than a purely mechanicistic worldview. I happen to not be a physicalist myself but I respect that.

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity. — T Clark

I'm not sure of what you mean here. My point was that, in the case of conservation laws, you can understand them in terms of the properties of their constituents and their interactions (i.e. in a 'reductionist' way) but at the same time you can also understand them in a 'holistic' way, that is that the conservation laws are what is fundamental and they determine the behavior of the 'parts' of the isolated system. Newtonian mechanics itself is neutral about which of these two 'pictures' is better. But I think that a strong case can actually be made for the 'holistic' one, ironically. It's after all more simple and it does explain better why the newtonian laws are valid for all forces, without assuming that it is a happy accident of sorts.

The author says that some (strongly) 'emergent properties', like violation of some symmetries, occur at the infinite limit of the number of the constituents.
So, the theory can explain the arising of those properties because they appear at that limit. — boundless

You're making the idea that properties manifest as the number of elements approach infinity seem more exotic than it is. The term is just shorthand for the number of elements necessary so that it makes sense to talk about specific macroscopic properties. For example - it doesn't really make sense to talk about the pressure of one molecule bouncing around inside a container. In a container full of air at atmospheric pressure, however, there are trillions of molecules bouncing around and off each other and talking about pressure is reasonable. Somewhere between one and trillions of molecules it starts to make sense to talk about pressure.

Newtonian mechanics is now understood as a limit case of relativity. And, in fact, one obtains Galileian trransformation by taking the limit where the velocity of light is infinite. But notice that there is a subtle difference here. The limit is taken to explain an approximation and to explain that, in fact, if you don't take that limit you actually get more precise results. — boundless

This is true, but a bit misleading. At normal human scale velocities, say 100 mph, length contraction will be less than 1/(1x10^14). Calling a value less than 1/(1/10^14) from the actual value an approximation or imprecise is a bit of a stretch.

That's why I think that weak emergence and reductionism are the same thing seen in different ways. — boundless

Agreed.

his worldview is far more sympathetic of intentionality, purpose, 'holism' and so on than a purely mechanicistic worldview. — boundless

I'm not sure he would agree with that. Then again, I'm not sure he wouldn't.

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity.
— T Clark

I'm not sure of what you mean here. — boundless

Newton's law of universal gravitation is specifically developed to address the gravitational attraction between massive objects. The physical properties considered - mass, distance, and time - are measured directly on those objects. There is no reduction.

the conservation laws are what is fundamental and they determine the behavior of the 'parts' of the isolated system. — boundless

I don't understand this. How can the law of conservation of energy be more fundamental than the idea of energy? Conservation of energy is a phenomenon that is understood by observing energetic interactions among physical objects. How can it be more fundamental? How do you observe conservation of energy? By making measurements of time, mass, and distance in various combinations.

If life has a meaning beyond mere survival it consists in the volition to thrive [ ... ] If there is a good we all strive for it is potence. Potence is naturally desirable (considered good) and impotence is naturally undesirable (considered bad). — Janus

:fire:

The idea of a transcendent meaning is incoherent ...

... like e.g. disembodied mind.

All meaning is immanent and relative to life as lived.

:100:

In my original response to this post, I wrote there are trillions of molecules in a container of air. That’s not right. When we deal with thermodynamic properties, we generally talk in terms of moles - 6x10^23 molecules. That’s almost a trillion trillion. Close enough to infinity for me.

The idea of a transcendent meaning is incoherent ...
... like e.g. disembodied mind. — 180 Proof

:up: A prime example!

The meaning of the idea of the transcendent is an immanent one too―we don't know anything transcendent, and this is so by mere definition.

the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. Asking what this purpose might be, in the abstract, is almost a red herring - it doesn’t really exist in the abstract, but it is inherent in the purposeful activities of beings of all kinds, human and other. It is, as it were, woven into the fabric. — Wayfarer

Immanent because inherent in everything you do, transcendent because it can’t be simply defined.

It's easy it seems to conflate the true and obvious idea that there are purposes and meaning within the universe, with the incoherent idea that the universe has an overarching purpose.

we don't know anything transcendent, and this is so by mere definition. — Janus

:up:

... i.e. a composition fallacy.

The idea that the universe is purposeless is a modern invention, arising in the early modern period with Newtonian science and Cartesian philosophy. That is briefly described in the OP under the heading of ‘The Great Abstraction’ — which is precisely what it was.

Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that. — boundless

I agree, but you don't seem to be getting the point. The problem is not with concluding that there was a time with no living beings, the problem is in assuming the concept referred to by "this world" as the premise. Assuming the conventional "this world" is begging the question, because a time with no life is implicit within that concept. So once you assume "the world", the conclusion is inevitable. The problem is with the concept "the world", in general.

To me, philosophy demonstrates that "this world" is a pragmatic concept which serves our mundane purposes, but it is far from reality. The evidence that "this world" is a false concept s demonstrated at the limits of the conception. Where accepted science fails us, it comes to a dead end. The dead ends are not simply a case of needing to go further with more application of the existing theories, they are an inability to go further due to limitations of the theory. This is evidence that much of realty escapes the theories altogether, and cannot be grasped by them, indicating that "the world" s not what it pretends to be. This implies that the theories are wrong, right from the base. Examples are dark matter, dark energy in physics, and the reliance on random chance in evolutionary biology, leading to the acceptance of abiogenesis.

If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state. — boundless

There are some very good arguments n Christian theology which indicate that human beings are incapable of apprehending the ultimate truth. In general, this is the difference between human beings and God, and why we can never consider ourselves to be in any way equal to God.

But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place. — boundless

I agree, but the thing is that once we rule out the possibility of a deterministic physical cause, tthen we seem to be left with two choices. Either its random chance, or some other type of cause. We know that final cause, or intentionality, is another type of cause. Also, we know very little about how final cause actually works as a cause in the physical world, only that it does, from the evidence. Since we cannot actually see final cause in action, only the effects of it, and since our judgements as to which specific types of things are the effects of final cause, are completely subjective, why not consider the possibility that final cause is far more extensive than what is commonly believed? Once we allow that final cause exists not only in human actions, but also in the actions of other living things, then why not consider that the actions of the heavenly bodies, as well as atoms and subatomic particles, which are "ordered", or "orderly", are not also the effects of final cause?

Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment. — boundless

I don't think I agree with this. Knowledge is always being gained, but philosophy never ceases because there is always more to learn.

It was realized that the old idea that the universe was created for a purpose was an anthropomorphic/ anthropocentric projection. Modern philosophical analysis has exposed the idea as incoherent.

Your "just-so" history is not factual, but merely one among many other possible interpretations.

It can reasonably be said that it strictly has nothing to do with science except generally insofar as part of the scientific method consists in not believing anything without evidence. Since all and everything we can know is within the universe, i.e. immanent, not transcendent, could there ever be definitive evidence that the universe was created for a purpose, or any reason, other than wishful thinking, to believe that it was?

Are you actually willing to claim that the Universe has an overarching purpose or are you just trading on the ambiguity, the conflation, I pointed to?

i.e. a composition fallacy. — 180 Proof

Exactly.

Modern philosophical analysis has exposed the idea as incoherent. — Janus

You’re not even addressing the OP, simply repeating the same positivist dogma you always fall back on.

"Your just a positivist". The usual lame response when you have no comeback that actually addresses my questions. Your OP says there is purpose and meaning for organisms. I can agree with that as a way of understanding animal, and perhaps plant, behavior.

Do you want to say something more than that? If so, what? I couldn't find it in your OP beyond some vague intimations.

When you have a question that has a bearing on the OP then I’ll be happy to respond.

The idea that the universe is purposeless is a modern invention, arising in the early modern period ... — Wayfarer

Greek atomists proposed this "idea" a couple of millennia ago.

That is briefly described in the OP under the heading of ‘The Great Abstraction’ — which is precisely what it was.

:chin: So what was Platonism (re: the forms, universals) if not a "great abstraction"? or Pythagoreanism?

:up: :up:

Of course, but the sense that the universe is, in Bertrand Russell’s words, ‘the meaningless outcome of the collocation of atoms’ is very much a product of Enlightment and post-Enlightenment rationalism. (And it’s not for nothing that Plato wanted all Democritus’ books burned ;-) )

To briefly recap the OP

• Modernity tends to view the universe as basically meaningless, although individuals and cultures may project concepts of meaning on it.
• But on the level of lived existence, organic life is animated by purpose, driven by the will to survive.
• Phenomenology has re-conceived intentionality as something much broader than conscious intention, instead identifying it as an aspect of the will to survive (re Hans Jonas The Phenomenon of Life)
• Enlightenment science divided the universe into the primary and secondary attributes of matter, roughly corresponding with the objective and subjective domains, respectively.
• A major aspect of early modern science was the abandonment of the idea of ‘telos’ associated with Aristotelian physics, which superseded by Galileo’s then-new physics.
• In this model, meaning, purpose and values are identified as being subjective and the universe said to be devoid of ‘telos’, however this view is itself a consequence of the perspective required by physics, now brought to bear on the life as a whole. This is the origin of physicalism.
• Biology is a different discipline to physics, and accordingly telos has had to be re-introduced through the neologism ‘teleonomy’ which describes the apparently-purposeful activities of organic life.
• Finally, unlike in early modern physics, current physics itself has now been obliged to take the context of its observations into account because of the ‘observer problem’ in quantum physics.

Meaning that the stark object-subject divide that characterised modern thought is now being challenged by science itself.

Why don't you answer the question in my last post? My first paragraph there explains what I found in your OP, that I can actually agree with.

OK, I'll play along:

However the question of purpose, or its lack, doesn’t always require invoking some grand ‘cosmic meaning.’ Meaning and purpose are discovered first in the intelligibility of ordinary life—in the way we write, behave, build, and think. — Wayfarer

You say "doesn't always require"―does it ever require? I agree that meaning and purpose would be impossible without our experience being intelligible to us in the ways it is, just as meaning and purpose for animals presumably could not be possible for them without their experience being intelligible to them in the ways it is.

Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. — Wayfarer

It's a judgement based on critical thought. The human notion of purpose presupposes agency. and agency presupposes perception/ experience. If the universe as a whole has no agency, no perception/ experience then how could it have a purpose?

Even the most rudimentary organisms behave as if directed toward ends: seeking nutrients, avoiding harm, maintaining internal equilibrium. Nothing in the inorganic realm displays these (or any!) behaviours. This kind of directedness—what might be called biological intentionality—is not yet consciously purposeful, but it is not mechanical either. — Wayfarer

Who ever said that the basic nature of life is mechanical? Mere mechanism doesn't allow for change based on feedback other than degradation. 'Intentionality' is a slippery term. We think of human behavior as intentional. We also think of some animal behavior as intentional, but it seems a stretch to call the behavior of simple organism, or even plants or fungi, intentional. You agree that the inorganic universe is not intentional or purposeful, and if the vast bulk of existence is inorganic, then how do you reconcile that?

I'll leave it there for now, because if you won't answer the questions already posed, I don't want to waste any more time.

[ ... ] Meaning that the stark object-subject divide that characterised modern thought is now being challenged by science itself. — Wayfarer

And yet, no doubt, this "being challenged by science" is an objective process. :zip:
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