They mean different things and have different truth conditions.
(a) is true if and only if the cat is on the mat
(b) is true if and only if I assert that the cat is on the mat
(b) can be true even if (a) is false. — Michael
There is no programmer out there, for example, that went through and intentionally answered whatever question you might pose to ChatGPT. — Hanover
I see your point. It's a tough nut. Do we need to try to find some limit cases where we could speak of a programmer "intentionally" doing something via a program? And do we agree that the idea of a program doing anything intentionally is a non-starter? (just leaving Davidson out of all this for the time being) — J
What this means to me is that the ability to engage in langauge games does not require an inner state. What this does not mean is that we can ignore what the conscious state is or that langauge does not provide us a means for that conversation. — Hanover
What this means to me is that the ability to engage in langauge games does not require an inner state. — Hanover
So when someone says, "The cat is on the mat," they are not asserting that the cat is on the mat? — Leontiskos
LLM's require going through a lot of complex inner states in order to engage in language use. — wonderer1
I see the cat on the mat! — MoK
Perhaps. But what I'd like to emphasis is that Davidson's theory of meaning is not dependent on intent. It assigns a truth value to an utterance. It can be used to infer an intent, but does not derive meaning from intent.But the intention of its programmers, as best we know, is to impersonate intention on the part of the program. — J
I’m a little confused. If malapropisms “by their very nature run contrary to the conventions of language” then there are conventions of language. So the very existence of malapropisms is proof that there is a (conventionally) “correct” way of speaking (else nothing could be a malapropism). — Michael
It can be used to infer an intent, but does not derive meaning from intent. — Banno
It explicitly isn't.intent is a necessary component in Davidson's triangulation theory. — Hanover
I don't see that you have explained why this must be so. Davidson is in line with Wittgenstein in saying that we should look at what is being done with an utterance rather then looking for any opaque intent on the part of the utterer.Should Davidson not hold that way, he would lose the foundational element for meaning to exist and he would blur into a "meaning is use" position. — Hanover
The question is whether it's entirely just a rules based language game or whether you're trying to find some other foundational structure. That's my point directly above related to Davidson's need to rely upon ascribing intent else he would just be a conventionalist. — Hanover
This account does not rely on speaker intent. Nor does it rely on setting out the intent of the speaker, although it might be used to do so.The interpreter surmises a sentence S such that the utterance of "p" by the speaker will be true if and only if S. S is confirmed or adjusted on the basis of ongoing empirical evidence.
There's no appeal to internal meaning or intention - doing so would result in circularity.
Intent might be inferred post hoc. — Banno
So you just wrote "the cat is on the mat". Twice.So when someone says, "The cat is on the mat," they are not asserting that the cat is on the mat? — Leontiskos
The inner state of a computer is usually described physically, while the inner state of a person is described using intentional terms - as believing this or that, wanting something to be the case, and so on. Two ways of speaking.I would say that both humans and LLM's require going through a lot of complex inner states in order to engage in language use. — wonderer1
The idea is that there is a correct interpretation. — Banno
Not useful - folk do put the texts to various and varied use. But that there is one interpretation that is the correct one - that's, shall we say, undecided, perhaps undecidable.I know you're doubtful whether there could be a useful interpretation of holy books — J
Better for what? Again, no absolute scale is available....A better interpretation... — J
So the question is, do we attribute belief and desire to ChatGPT?
And the partial answer is that we do not need to do so, in order to give meaning to the sentences it produces.
Which is another argument against the idea that meaning is speaker intent. — Banno
Been that way all my time.In about 10 years we may have... — Joshs
intent is a necessary component in Davidson's triangulation theory.
— Hanover
It explicitly isn't.
We can attribute an intent to someone only after we have understood what they are saying. Understanding their utterances is prior to attributing an intent. Understanding their utterances is not dependent on attributing an intent. — Banno
If we assume that the speaker’s beliefs, at least in the simplest and most basic cases, are largely in agreement with our own, and so, by our account, are largely true, then we can use our own beliefs about the world as a guide to the speaker’s beliefs. — SEP
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