The way a lack of intent affects meaning can be seen by imagining that you see a handwritten note with poem written on it, stuck on a wall in a bar. You ponder the meaning of the poem, but then someone tells you it was computer generated. That's when you realize you have a reflexive tendency to assume intent when you see or hear language. You may experience cognitive dissonance because the poem had a profound meaning to it, all of which was coming from you.
The problem with using ChatGPT is that it's processing statements that were intentional. It's not just randomly putting words together. — frank
Charity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank
Then use a quote in support of that, that does not mention intentCharity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank
The missing bit is that a description of an intentional state is not a description of a physical state. — Banno
If we’re trying to capture the meaning of a statement and the meaning is encoded in intentional terms, — Joshs
Davidson's reply is that there is no law-like relation between physical states and intentions — Banno
...A better interpretation...
— J
Better for what? Again, no absolute scale is available. — Banno
Jenny says "the cat is on the mat"
Jenny often uses "the cat" to talk about Jack — Banno
But just as "the cat is on the mat" doesn't mean "I am speaking English", it also doesn't mean "I assert that the cat is on the mat". — Michael
Having said that, I should also say that I'm not very familiar with how computer programmers talk about their work. Is "inner state" a common term? If so, do you know what they're meaning to designate? Could there be a distinction between inner and outer, speaking strictly about the program? — J
But we are asking why, "I assert the cat is on the mat," cannot mean that one is asserting that the cat is on the mat. — Leontiskos
So with any such pair, we can assume that there is an implicit assertion or not, and we can identify the explicit assertion with that implicit assertion or not. — Leontiskos
I understood Tim to be arguing that it is convention that explains meaning. If that is so, it is hard to see how going against a convention, as in the case of malapropism, can be meaningful. — Banno
the most salient difference between human beings and chatbots. . .
stems from the fact that—in part because they are not embodied animals, and in part because they do not have instituted statuses like being citizens, business partners, or family members—chatbots aren't persons. — Pierre-Normand
We can transact in meanings with them, since they do understand what our words mean, but their words do not have the same significance and do not literally convey assertions, since they aren't backed by a personal stake in our game of giving and asking for reasons (over and above their reinforced inclination to provide useful answers to whoever happens to be their current user). — Pierre-Normand
The map does not know the way home, and the abacus is not clever at arithmetic. It takes knowledge to devise and use such models, but the models themselves have no knowledge. Not because they are ignorant, but because they are models: that is to say, tools. They do not navigate or calculate, and neither do they have destinations to reach or debts to pay. Humans use them for these epistemic purposes. LLMs have more in common with the map or abacus than with the people who design and use them as instruments. It is the tool creator and user, not the tool, who has knowledge.
Linking empty tokens based on probabilities (even in ways that we are in a position to know does reflect the truth of a given domain, be it a summarization task, physics, or arithmetic) does not warrant attributing knowledge of that domain to the token generator itself.
We said above that LLMs do not perform any tasks of their own, they perform our tasks. It would be better to say that they do not really do anything at all. Hence the third leap: treating LLMs as agents. However, since LLMs are not agents, let alone epistemic ones, they are in no position to do or know anything.
I am claiming these things:
1. The assertions... — Michael
The prefix, however we phrase it - "I hereby assert that..." [...] does seem to iterate naturally.
... A sentence is already an assertion sign. [...] How does it end up needing reinforcement? — bongo fury
John believes that the cat is on the mat. Jane does not believe that the cat is on the mat.
John asserts "the cat is on the mat".
Jane asserts "I disagree".
Jane is not disagreeing with the implicit assertion "I [John] assert that the cat is on the mat" because Jane agrees that John is asserting that the cat is on the mat. Jane is disagreeing with the explicit assertion "the cat is on the mat". As such, we should not identify the explicit assertion with the implicit assertion. — Michael
↪Joshs The letter you quote from makes an excellent case for why computer programs are not agents in anything like the sense a human is. Do you agree that we should try to avoid using language that appears to reify such programs as 1st-person entities? (or however you might phrase the latter idea) — J
To just assume that we are talking about assertions seems to beg the question of the whole thread.
...
You basically want to stipulate that everything we are talking about is an assertion. You could stipulate that, but it is contrary to the spirit of the thread because it moots the central question of the thread. — Leontiskos
But what if we actually spoke about assertions rather than circumlocutions that may or may not indicate assertion? What about:
"The cat is on the mat."
"I assert the cat is on the mat." — Leontiskos
and asked me about two such assertions: — Michael
In the extreme case, yep.As you will recall, Davidson focuses on a situation where you don't know the language Jenny is speaking. You don't recognize any of the words. All you get is behavior and the assumption that she believes the same things you do. — frank
Extended empirical observation of Jenny's behaviour within the community in which she participates. Watching her pet the cat, buy cat food, chastise someone for not chasing the cat off the mat. A Bayesian analysis of behavioural patterns, perhaps, although we don't usually need to go so far in order to recognise patterns in the behaviour of others.So how did you gather that Jenny uses "the cat" to talk about Jack? What behavior did you observe that caused you to conclude this? — frank
I don't disagree. Although asking someone to "dance the flamingo" need not be an intentional malapropism, and yet still be understood as a request to dance.I don't think it's mutually exclusive. — Michael
My second thought is: Like just about everyone else who talks about AI, you're accepting the fiction that there is something called a chatbot, that it can be talked about with the same kind of entity-language we used for, e.g., humans. I maintain there is no such thing. What there is, is a computer program, a routine, a series of instructions, that as part of its routine can simulate a 1st-person point of view, giving credence to the idea that it "is ChatGPT." I think we should resist this way of thinking and talking. In Gertrude Stein's immortal words, "There's no there there." — J
I may comment a bit more on the issue of personhood as an instituted status, and what some Supreme Court might or might not be able to rule, since you raised this pertinent question, later on. — Pierre-Normand
Extended empirical observation of Jenny's behaviour within the community in which she participates. Watching her pet the cat, buy cat food, chastise someone for not chasing the cat off the mat. A Bayesian analysis of behavioural patterns, perhaps, although we don't usually need to go so far in order to recognise patterns in the behaviour of others.
The interpreter assumes that Jenny and the others in her community have much the same beliefs as the interpreter - that there are cats, bowls, mats, and so on to talk about. — Banno
This is the same issue, for when you say that they "have different truth conditions," you are implying that they are both assertions. — Leontiskos
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.