There is the transformation of the foundations of normative, intersubjective argumentation, particularly in the realms of identity politics and online discourse. In this emerging framework, factual accuracy and logical coherence are increasingly overshadowed by emotional expressions of identity and marginalization, which come to serve as autonomous validations of truth and moral authority. — Number2018

Are you placing ‘factual accuracy’ on one side of a divide and ‘emotional expression’ on the other side in order to deconstruct and overturn this metaphysical dualism, as Nietzsche, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida have? Or do you seriously want to justify such a reason-privileging split? Or is ‘emotional expression’ as Deleuzian desire, Heideggerian attunement and Foucaultian power the very pre-condition of factuality?

I think that classical liberalism is largely defined by its anthropology, so that any system with an appropriate role for thymos and logos probably becomes something quite different. However, this doesn't mean it jettisons the things Fukuyama thinks are most valuable about liberalism, namely:

1. Accountable government (normally through some form of elections)
2. A strong, independent, professional civil society
3. A centralized state monopoly on force
4. Rule of law and property rights

So, whether you'd want to call a reform based on a "thick" anthropology "liberalism" or not seems besides the main point to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fukuyama’s desire to restore classical liberalism underestimates how thoroughly power has migrated away from the institutions and norms that liberalism depends on. Wokeness is not merely a cultural trend. It reveals that legitimacy, moral authority, and social control now flow through different channels. Reinvigorating liberal institutions without addressing this shift risks treating the symptoms without grasping the underlying transformation in how power and politics operate today. A return to classical liberal neutrality or abstraction deeply implausible in today’s affective, fragmented political landscape.

Your OP covers a slew of issues and connects them in a particular way. It begins with Doyle’s critique of wokism, and then lays out a Foucaultian analysis of wokism, from which vantage Doyle’s own thinking is itself a symptom of wokist power relations. This seems to drive more from Deleuze than Focault, since Deleuze insisted that only revolutionary change could break one free from the hegemony of discursive regimes, such as Capitalism. Foucault, on the other hand, was more open to compromise with the dominant cultural , since unlike Deleuze he didn’t see regimes like capitalism as monolithic entities but as already slowly transforming themselves from within their own power dynamics. This allowed him to accept a critique of Doyle from a wokist vantage that was itself open to its own transformation through its own dynamics of power. — Joshs

Indeed, I have attempted to analyze wokeness through the lens of Deleuze and Foucault’s theories of power. Contrary to your point, however, I do not believe that I have departed from their intellectual projects. On the contrary, I see my approach as the beginning of a modified Deleuzian–Foucauldian framework for thinking about wokeness.
But I still do not know whether this undertaking is even possible in principle. Deleuze and Foucault’s approaches are not entirely compatible, and our current digital reality tends to resist forms of theoretical inquiry altogether. Both thinkers emphasize the omnipresent, diffuse, and immanent nature of contemporary power—power that resists representation and totalizing frameworks. This implies that assuming a neutral, detached position that claims to be outside the field of power in order to conduct objective or universal researchis likely a mistake. As Foucault shows, and Deleuze echoes, the very act of representing pre-given realities risks reproducing the territorialities one seeks to critique.Where Deleuze diverges from Foucault is in his conception of resistance. For Deleuze, resistance lies in following a line of flight—creating a new reality that, in the moment of its emergence, escapes the capture of existing power structures. As Ray Brassier puts it:
“So long as practice is subordinated to representation, it can only more or less adequately trace a pre-existing reality, according to extant criteria of success or failure. But machinic pragmatics is not geared towards representation; it is an experimental practice oriented towards bringing something new into existence—something that does not pre-exist its process of production. It decouples performance from competence. It does not engage in a utilitarian tracing of the real; it generates a constructive mapping (and as we shall see, a diagramming) of the real: ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.’”
This outline of machinic pragmatics is especially relevant to the project of interrogating wokeness. Wokeness can be understood as a desiring-machine. Without mediation, conditioned by power, it prompts and modulates our human emotions: shame, guilt, pride, vulnerability, and anger. So, the Deleuzian project of creating lines of flight becomes a philosophical undertaking to produce autonomous, intensive machines that map reality rather than trace it. These machines are not about representing the already-given, but about experimentation that escape the dominant power formations.To enact a line of flight, a philosophical machine must activate and intensify its own internal dynamics, rather than remain entangled in the representational circuits of identity. This means breaking with the fixed, lived identity produced by the wokeness desiring-machine, which operates through affective capture and the reinforcement of socially legible forms of subjectivity.
Whereas the wokeness machine induces emotions like shame, guilt, and vulnerability to generate moral authority and political legitimacy, the philosophical machine must resist this affective economy by refusing to be coded within it. Instead, it amplifies its own intensity and its capacity to think and feel. In this sense, the line of flight is an experimental process that exceeds the coordinates of recognition and representation. It constructs an autonomous plane of consistency where thought is no longer mediated by identity, morality, or social function, but engages directly with the real.

My post-Marxist political stance is Old Left, or prioritizing the economic justice movement (e.g. democratizing workplaces, management & ownership) over social justice-identity politics aka "woke" policies such that the latter are historically situated, or grounded, by the former. Outside or in lieu of the movement – especially during the last half-century of Thatcher-Reagan neoliberal globalization – "wokeness" (like p0m0 discourse) has become reactionary to the degree it has failed to propose coherent alternatives to and practical resistance against populist support for rightwing, illiberal regimes. — 180 Proof

Your position likely aligns closely with Slavoj Žižek’s perspective on wokeness. Žižek argues that wokeness operates as a form of ideological displacement: it presents itself as a libertarian or emancipatory movement, but in reality, serves as a mechanism through which neoliberal capitalism maintains the appearance of moral progressivism—while evading any real confrontation with deeper structural or economic injustices. As he puts it, “Wokeness is a form of moralization that leaves intact the system of exploitation.”
In Žižek’s view, the focus on language, identity, and symbolic inclusion enables neoliberal systems to evolve and entrench themselves further. While he does not deny the existence of racial, gender, or cultural oppression, he contends that the contemporary left’s preoccupation with personal identity fragments solidarity and undermines the universalist ambitions of the leftist project.
Žižek’s post-Marxist critique of wokeness is compelling in many respects. However, he falls short of fully disclosing the nature of wokeness or accounting for its emotional appeal and social power. His framework remains confined to traditional ideological critique and thus may overlook a crucial dimension: wokeness is not purely ideological—it is affective. It is about the desire to feel seen, safe, included, or conversely, excluded. Through wokeness, underlying structures of power can engage with and regulate deeply human emotions of shame, guilt, pride, vulnerability, and anger. It operates without the mediation of ideology, class struggle, or systems of political representation.

So, I have three points. Please take hte first one gently, as I conclude somewhat different to how this reads (also, ignore the bolds until the conclusion which references them):

1. I think much of the above is self-involved wittering in the style of the Continentals, and I do not think you will be surprised by my position; HOWEVER;
2. You are not wrong. This, for example:

rejects the Kuhnian implication of critical theoretic approaches to objective truth — Joshs

and

languaged concepts hook up to objective truths which transcend cultural dynamics — Joshs

I think are true, regardless of Kuhn (though, obviously one of the best to articulate it). I think you're simply over-playing the hand this gives you, I guess. Not a massive objection but I think it means our approach to what Doyle is saying will necessarily come apart.

I suggest that Doyle’s rejection of this crucial philosophical underpinning of wokism motivates his rejection of it. — Joshs

To some degree that's going to be unavoidable: If we do not believe language creates structures "in the world" then we cannot assent to an ideology which takes this as fundamentally inarguable (which it is - Iand thats the main problem I have with Wokists. There is no discussion to be had. Its a brick wall. Contrary to their fundamental positions). I think Doyle is grokking this and it is almost impossible to see from inside the bubble. From, i expect, your perspective, these are simply "the way things are" type of statements you're making. I don't take them as such when considering them. They are arguable.

he would still find it wanting in comparison with his non-relativistic liberalism — Joshs

That is also, possibly, true, but something peculiar to Doyle and his own outlook - not his reasoning and research skills. I think I, too, would probably want to critique many views and beliefs thought of in this category despite not being asked to participate (which is what wokists do, generally usually with threats) the way I used to critique Vera constantly. Not because she wanted me to believe what she did, but because much of what she had to say was patently irrational, historically inaccurate or incoherent within her own worldview. These aren't critiques of a category, per se, but critiques of bad thinking. I suggest this is what Doyle is doing, but his current purpose is firmly embedded in taking to task the bolded items above as they appear to be features of those carrying the Woke ideology currentrly

Perhaps. If true though, I can't say I'm upset, as woke is a poison pill for ideology. Hopefully if the GoP doubles down on identity politics, this will swing us back to the middle again as they fracture their growing coalition.

But in a moral moment there is no authority to claim what is right, thus the importance of understanding the issue from the inside, on another's terms. To make the "strongest" case for them, which is not to say the one we ourselves would make (based on our standards), but respecting that they might have legitimate interests that we don't yet know. Thus a moral discussion is putting ourselves in the place of the other; digging deep to understand (not assume) what they value and want, and not dismissing them out of hand (as we too often do in philosophy, looking first to refute). — Antony Nickles

I understand and respect your position. Yet, contemporary moral discourse has undergone a dramatic transformation. The imperative to understand others ‘from the inside’ and to take their experience seriously on their own terms often becomes an impossible undertaking. How can one distinguish between authentic expressions of suffering and their strategic imitation? We are often caught between the necessity of listening and the danger of being manipulated. In the context of this thread, wokeness often transforms vulnerability into a source of ultimate moral authority.

:up:

contemporary moral discourse has undergone a dramatic transformation. — Number2018

But if we agree as to what moral discourse is, we can differentiate it from simply moralizing, which, as you say above to @180 Proof, leads to self-affirmation for being a “good” person without actually doing anything or adding to the conversation, identifying ourselves by our judgment of others as good or bad, etc. But I don’t see the justification to dismiss any actual interests and needs because I’m pretty sure we don’t understand those yet.

The imperative to understand others ‘from the inside’ and to take their experience seriously on their own terms often becomes an impossible undertaking. — Number2018

It is hard not to be inclined to judge others as irrational or unintelligible. I would still argue our responsibility is not to give up and simply moralize in return because others cast the first stone, as any dismissal based on characterization, the existence of worst cases actors, and presumed ends does not take the other person’s interests seriously.

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible.

How can one distinguish between authentic expressions of suffering and their strategic imitation? We are often caught between the necessity of listening and the danger of being manipulated. — Number2018

The possibility we may not ultimately agree or understand the other’s interests is not a reason to assume irrationality or disingenuousness. Sometimes attributing a serious person to some things that are said and done takes more imagination and generosity than you may receive. We may have to set aside our feelings, our desire to react, our inability to understand instantly, in order to not jump to the first conclusion, to paint the other in the easiest light, to deny their human interests because they don’t come to us on our terms, maybe don’t even live in our world of norms and practices.

In the context of this thread, wokeness often transforms vulnerability into a source of ultimate moral authority. — Number2018

But each of us does have the authority to make a claim on others, even our culture as a whole. Now I understand that you probably mean that just because they say it (are in pain) doesn’t make it right, which of course is true. All there is when someone is making an appeal of this kind for us to change our actions is that it can be done well or poorly, say, appropriately (as I’ve tried to draw out). Plato will call this persuasion and rhetoric because he wanted to only consider pure knowledge. Wittgenstein makes the analogy that we don’t know someone else’s pain (their “experience”) because the way it works is that we react to it (PI p. 223); we accept them as a person in pain, or ignore it. There is an appropriate way to see an aspect of us in the other; to take an attitude towards them (perspective). Wittgenstein will say we are not of the opinion they have a soul, because we treat them as if they do, or not.

The possibility we may not ultimately agree or understand the other’s interests is not a reason to assume irrationality or disingenuousness. Sometimes attributing a serious person to some things that are said and done takes more imagination and generosity than you may receive. We may have to set aside our feelings, our desire to react, our inability to understand instantly, in order to not jump to the first conclusion, — Antony Nickles

In the case of wokeness, the issue is not one of disagreement or misunderstanding. Rather, it lies in the complete blurring of boundaries between the authenticity of identity performance and the sincerity of moral expression.

The "metaphysics of power" normally tends to dissolve the subject possessing logos, and to make logos merely an illusion of power, or nothing but power itself. However, I don't think the foundations of this movement are actually philosophically sound, and even if they were, their logical conclusion will be fascism (what we are indeed seeing), not some sort of radically left egalitarianism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is your take on this video about contemporary fascism?
It highlights the stance of critical intellectuals against authoritarian regimes that are increasingly targeting academic freedom. They are completely genuine while expressing their concerns. The video constructs a stark us vs. them narrative. In fact, its moral binary and emotional framing reflect characteristics often associated with “woke culture”: strong normative certainty, oversimplification, moral urgency, and an appeal to identity and belonging. This resemblance suggests that the crisis revealed by wokeness is not merely cultural or political. Also, it reveals a deeper epistemic, ethical, and moral rupture.

Perhaps. If true though, I can't say I'm upset, as woke is a poison pill for ideology. Hopefully if the GoP doubles down on identity politics, this will swing us back to the middle again as they fracture their growing coalition.

I'm not sure if it will play out the same way. The noxious "White nationalist" faction notwithstanding, the fact that the GOP has embraced an identity politics of culture and tradition means that one can "convert" and be taken into the fold much more easily. One is not forced to sit outside the core of the movement as a mere "ally," but can become a leading protagonist in its story, which in turn spurs on more evangelical activity. The similarities lie more in the focus on identity, grievance, narratives of power, skepticism of institutions (instruments of power), and as Doyle puts it, "admission of spectral evidence," (i.e., personal feelings of grievance as indicative of moral wrong). There is also a similar distrust of scientific, journalistic, academic, etc. institutions as mere instruments of power, a sort of epistemology of power to go along with the metaphysics of power. The "nu-right" is a heavily aesthetic movement, drawing a lot from ancient epics and art, and so you also have an "aesthetics of power." The preference for classical art styles for instance, is not mere reactionary preference for the old, but obviously because these are taken to by symbols of imperial power and warrior spirit.

Sun and Steel is incredibly popular here for example, as well Jünger's Storm of Steel. Indeed, I think Musk has advocated both.





It's interesting to note too how much this bleeds into the "empirical sciences." The core anthropology still largely assumed for political economy (now economics and political science) was developed long before the statistical methods that helped the social sciences assert themselves alongside the physical sciences as "properly scientific." A lot of it was closer to armchair speculation (although obviously informed by powerful insights and observations). Yet the legacy has remained robust.

You can also see this in narratives in biology, or even the way nature documentaries get narrated. The reception of Darwin has remained ideologically charged. Consider the Lion King’s harmonious “Circle of Life” versus the famous 56th canto of Tennyson’s In Memoriam A.H.H.:

Man, her last work, who seem’d so fair,
Such splendid purpose in his eyes,
Who roll’d the psalm to wintry skies,
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer,

Who trusted God was love indeed
And love Creation’s final law —
Tho’ Nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravine, shriek’d against his creed

One can hardly choose between the two simply on the basis of "scientific data."

Time is a predictable cycle on a large enough scale. It will destroy them too in time. The question is how much damage will be done before that happens.

The similarities lie more in the focus on identity, grievance, narratives of power, skepticism of institutions (instruments of power), and as Doyle puts it, "admission of spectral evidence," (i.e., personal feelings of grievance as indicative of moral wrong). There is also a similar distrust of scientific, journalistic, academic, etc. institutions as mere instruments of power, a sort of epistemology of power to go along with the metaphysics of power. The "nu-right" is a heavily aesthetic movement, drawing a lot from ancient epics and art, and so you also have an "aesthetics of power." The preference for classical art styles for instance, is not mere reactionary preference for the old, but obviously because these are taken to by symbols of imperial power and warrior spirit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is essential to separate questionable political applications of ‘wokeness’ by individuals and groups who call themselves woke from the mix of underlying philosophical ideas they claim to be drawing from (and in many cases misinterpreting). This is important because I believe many of what are now seen as repressive excesses of the movement will likely be eliminated as the movement becomes more conversant with the most rigorous and forward-thinking philosophical elements it now engages with in an often superficial manner. As a result, far from ‘fading away’ as another regressive fad alongside far right thinking, the substantive grounding of what we
now call wokism will remain and eventually become the dominant political thinking among mainstream cultures around the world.

In order to separate the superficial from the substantive, it is necessary not to settle for surface comparisons like the following: both the far right and wokism is concerned with “narratives of power, skepticism of institutions (instruments of power), and as Doyle puts it, "admission of spectral evidence,"”.
While the Frankfurt school of critical theory understands the concept of power in terms of a willed force concentrated within , controlled and wielded by individuals and groups, this is not at all the case for poststructuralists like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida. Foucault’s notion of power, for instance, is a relation of mutual affecting connecting each individual to other individuals within a community rather than hierarchical weapon of domination. For him power isn’t something to overcome or control, it is the motivational and valuative basis of the reciprocal interactions from which our institutions of ethics, politicos and knowledge emerge.

What is your take on this video about contemporary fascism? It highlights the stance of critical intellectuals against authoritarian regimes that are increasingly targeting academic freedom. They are completely genuine while expressing their concerns. The video constructs a stark us vs. them narrative. In fact, its moral binary and emotional framing reflect characteristics often associated with “woke culture”: strong normative certainty, oversimplification, moral urgency, and an appeal to identity and belonging. This resemblance suggests that the crisis revealed by wokeness is not merely cultural or political. Also, it reveals a deeper epistemic, ethical, and moral rupture — Number2018

Timothy Snyder and Jason Stanley appear in the video. They are completely genuine in expressing not just their concerns about fascism, but also about wokism. In The Road to Unfreedom and On Freedom, Snyder critiques identity politics and the politicization of group-based grievances. He explicitly criticizes “identity politics” as a divisive force that fuels cultural polarization, framing it as part of authoritarian memory politics. He warns against narratives driven by victimhood and “us vs. them” thinking—structures often associated with woke discourse—even if the label isn’t used. In sum, Snyder’s critique overlaps with what critics call “wokism” — particularly around moralism, identity-based politics, and the erosion of shared facts.

Meanwhile, Jason Stanley offers a theoretical critique of political language and propaganda. Stanley’s work discusses woke moral language, examining “woke” discourse as a phenomenon that has peaked. He has also strongly condemned book bans and restrictions on speech tied to identity-driven moral politics, framing them as authoritarian and illiberal.

I think you’ll find moderate religious conservative like David Brooks and Peter Wehner making exactly the same points as the contributors to this video.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/04/donald-trump-authoritarian-actions/682486/

Does this fact make them woke? If so, then it seems to me the concept becomes meaningless.

In the case of wokeness, the issue is not one of disagreement or misunderstanding. Rather, it lies in the complete blurring of boundaries between the authenticity of identity performance and the sincerity of moral expression — Number2018

Btw, you never responded to my question to you:

“Are you placing ‘factual accuracy’ on one side of a divide and ‘emotional expression’ on the other side in order to deconstruct and overturn this metaphysical dualism, as Nietzsche, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida have? Or do you seriously want to justify such a reason-privileging split? Or is ‘emotional expression’ as Deleuzian desire, Heideggerian attunement and Foucaultian power the very pre-condition of factuality?”

In Australia, the only people who use the term 'woke' are Murdoch journalists and oddly discordant right-wingers, from what I’ve seen. It doesn't seem to have captured people’s imagination as widely. — Tom Storm

I would say in the UK the woke term has been extremely and enthusiastically taken up by right wingers. The Daily Mail newspaper uses it it nearly every article they print. Piers Morgan loves saying it last time I would see clips of him presenting daytime tv, which was some years ago. I hadn't heard of this author the OP discusses before but just a quick search and the first results show he is aligned with GB News and that said it all for me. It has proudly self styled itself after Fox News.

I am not going to blanket claim all his views are trash because of that, like 'woke' person would :), but I will say I am heavily de-incentivized to explore him further due to that association.

I am no fan of wokeness either but I think there are more careful considerations and critiques of it from the likes of Sam Harris to name one, or Zizek, from the little I watched of the latter, but I doubt this guy will fall into that category. I suspect it will just be the usual right-wing dog whistles of cultural marxism and such.

I am no fan of wokeness either but I think there are more careful considerations and critiques of it from the likes of Sam Harris to name one, or Zizek, from the little I watched of the latter, but I doubt this guy will fall into that category. I suspect it will just be the usual right-wing dog whistles of cultural marxism and such — unimportant

To effectively critique wokism you have to understand its philosophical underpinnings. As someone drawing from Freud, Lacan, Hegel and Marx, Zizek is actually a lot closer to these underpinnings than you might think. On the other hand, I don’t think writers like Sam Harris and Steven Pinker are in a position to do so, given their embrace of conventional aspects of their own field of psychology. Harris and Pinker may be limited by their empirical/rationalist frameworks, which aren’t well-equipped to grasp the continental philosophical roots of woke ideology. Zizek is just as likely to defend wokism from the likes of Harris and Pinker as he is to take their side.

To effectively critique wokism you have to understand its philosophical underpinnings. — Joshs

The problem with this is that basically "woke" and "Wokism" is defined by those who reject the whole thing. It already is a critique. Many of those then accused of being "woke" never have thought to be "woke" and don't understand what is meant by it. Hence starting to look at the underpinnings is a bit difficult.

For example, Zizek isn't in my view at all woke. Yes, he may be close to post-structuralism in some views, but basically he is just a leftist intellectual who obviously totally clear about the negative aspects of Marxism-Leninism as he was born in Yugoslavia.

Wokism is just a collection of leftist overreactions and eccentricities. That's the actual punchline.

Anyway, when wokism is officially attacked by the Trump administration, the whole issue is beyond stupidity just like with the so-called culture wars. Good luck having an intelligent discussion about the culture wars.

Wokism is just a collection of leftist overreactions and eccentricities. That's the actual punchline. — ssu

:smirk:

Btw, you never responded to my question to you: — Joshs

I will answer. Btw, I would appreciate your response to my previous post:

Your OP covers a slew of issues and connects them in a particular way. It begins with Doyle’s critique of wokism, and then lays out a Foucaultian analysis of wokism, from which vantage Doyle’s own thinking is itself a symptom of wokist power relations. This seems to drive more from Deleuze than Focault, since Deleuze insisted that only revolutionary change could break one free from the hegemony of discursive regimes, such as Capitalism. Foucault, on the other hand, was more open to compromise with the dominant cultural , since unlike Deleuze he didn’t see regimes like capitalism as monolithic entities but as already slowly transforming themselves from within their own power dynamics. This allowed him to accept a critique of Doyle from a wokist vantage that was itself open to its own transformation through its own dynamics of power.
— Joshs


Indeed, I have attempted to analyze wokeness through the lens of Deleuze and Foucault’s theories of power. Contrary to your point, however, I do not believe that I have departed from their intellectual projects. On the contrary, I see my approach as the beginning of a modified Deleuzian–Foucauldian framework for thinking about wokeness.
But I still do not know whether this undertaking is even possible in principle. Deleuze and Foucault’s approaches are not entirely compatible, and our current digital reality tends to resist forms of theoretical inquiry altogether. Both thinkers emphasize the omnipresent, diffuse, and immanent nature of contemporary power—power that resists representation and totalizing frameworks. This implies that assuming a neutral, detached position that claims to be outside the field of power in order to conduct objective or universal researchis likely a mistake. As Foucault shows, and Deleuze echoes, the very act of representing pre-given realities risks reproducing the territorialities one seeks to critique.Where Deleuze diverges from Foucault is in his conception of resistance. For Deleuze, resistance lies in following a line of flight—creating a new reality that, in the moment of its emergence, escapes the capture of existing power structures. As Ray Brassier puts it:
“So long as practice is subordinated to representation, it can only more or less adequately trace a pre-existing reality, according to extant criteria of success or failure. But machinic pragmatics is not geared towards representation; it is an experimental practice oriented towards bringing something new into existence—something that does not pre-exist its process of production. It decouples performance from competence. It does not engage in a utilitarian tracing of the real; it generates a constructive mapping (and as we shall see, a diagramming) of the real: ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.’”
This outline of machinic pragmatics is especially relevant to the project of interrogating wokeness. Wokeness can be understood as a desiring-machine. Without mediation, conditioned by power, it prompts and modulates our human emotions: shame, guilt, pride, vulnerability, and anger. So, the Deleuzian project of creating lines of flight becomes a philosophical undertaking to produce autonomous, intensive machines that map reality rather than trace it. These machines are not about representing the already-given, but about experimentation that escape the dominant power formations.To enact a line of flight, a philosophical machine must activate and intensify its own internal dynamics, rather than remain entangled in the representational circuits of identity. This means breaking with the fixed, lived identity produced by the wokeness desiring-machine, which operates through affective capture and the reinforcement of socially legible forms of subjectivity.
Whereas the wokeness machine induces emotions like shame, guilt, and vulnerability to generate moral authority and political legitimacy, the philosophical machine must resist this affective economy by refusing to be coded within it. Instead, it amplifies its own intensity and its capacity to think and feel. In this sense, the line of flight is an experimental process that exceeds the coordinates of recognition and representation. It constructs an autonomous plane of consistency where thought is no longer mediated by identity, morality, or social function, but engages directly with the real. — Number2018

There is the transformation of the foundations of normative, intersubjective argumentation, particularly in the realms of identity politics and online discourse. In this emerging framework, factual accuracy and logical coherence are increasingly overshadowed by emotional expressions of identity and marginalization, which come to serve as autonomous validations of truth and moral authority.
— Number2018

Are you placing ‘factual accuracy’ on one side of a divide and ‘emotional expression’ on the other side in order to deconstruct and overturn this metaphysical dualism, as Nietzsche, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida have? Or do you seriously want to justify such a reason-privileging split? Or is ‘emotional expression’ as Deleuzian desire, Heideggerian attunement and Foucaultian power the very pre-condition of factuality? — Joshs

It appears that your critique misrepresents the intent and scope of my argument. I do not attempt to re-inscribe a metaphysical binary between reason and emotion, nor am I blind to the epistemological critiques offered by Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Heidegger, and Deleuze.
Instead, I attempt to diagnose a shift in discursive practices, particularly in the domains of identity politics and online activism, where affective expressions of marginalization have begun to function as sufficient sources of epistemic and moral authority. My argument is not a metaphysical claim about truth; it is rather a phenomenological observation about a shift in rhetorical argumentation in public discourse. You rightly point out that for thinkers like Foucault, Deleuze, and Heidegger, knowledge is always situated in structures of power, affect, or ontological attunement. However, those thinkers are engaged in an epistemic inquiry, rather than describing contemporary discursive practices. What we are witnessing today is not the philosophical deconstruction of rationalism, but a normative inversion in the public sphere. Thus, emotional experience and perceived marginality are not retained within rigorous ontological framing. Instead, they assert themselves as affective self-reference of truth and moral authority, becoming resistant to questioning, nuance, or deliberate reflection. Therefore, one needs to differentiate the rigorous epistemic critiques of the mentioned thinkers from the description of today’s affective politics of visibility and recognition..

↪Joshs
Timothy Snyder and Jason Stanley appear in the video. They are completely genuine in expressing not just their concerns about fascism, but also about wokism.
— Joshs
But what is your assessment of the academic content of this video—especially considering that Snyder is a leading scholar on fascism and Nazi Germany? — Number2018

I think I’m understanding a bit better the points you’re making about the discursive structures within which affect is captured in wokist thought, but in the case of the contributors to the video, don’t we need to extend that critique to normed practices that I would argue are little changed from what they were prior to the emergence of wokism? And then wouldn’t it be useful to make distinctions between the sorts of affective stratifications you associate with wokism and those that are applicable to moderate conservatives and centrist liberals, both of whom disavow most aspects of woke practices?

I would in no way describe the analyses of Heidegger, Deleuze or Derrida as ‘epistemic’ as opposed to affective. As I said before, this implies a split between knowledge and feeling that none of these authors accept. Furthermore, epistemology derives from the platonic metaphysical traditions they critique. Can you locate any direct quotes from these authors supporting the distinction you’re trying to make? — Joshs

For Deleuze, Foucault’s philosophical project started within epistemology:
“He actually started with an epistemology, or with an attempt to construct a doctrine of knowledge, and it was this doctrine of knowledge that literally pushed him towards the discovery of a new domain, which would become that of power.”
— Deleuze, Foucault seminar, Lecture 8 (17 December 1985)it.wikipedia.org+7deleuze.cla.purdue.edu+7theanarchistlibrary.org+7
“We understand clearly that in experience, we always find ourselves confronted with mixtures of power knowledge. But that does not in the least deny philosophical analysis the right to disentangle two heterogeneous axes, a knowledge axis and a power axis… What we have seen … is how Foucault began by studying the forms of knowledge on their corresponding axis … Not that power was ignored, only that it is posed implicitly, presupposed… It is Discipline and Punish that marks the first break in Foucault’s oeuvre, passing from the knowledge axis to the power axis.”
https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/lecture/lecture-13/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

You mentioned Ray Brassier. Are you getting this from him? — Joshs

"Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines: Form and Function in
A Thousand Plateaus"
Ray Brassier
In "A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy", pg.262

Timothy Snyder and Jason Stanley appear in the video. They are completely genuine in expressing not just their concerns about fascism, but also about wokism. — Joshs

But what is your assessment of the academic content of this video—especially considering that Snyder is a leading scholar on fascism and Nazi Germany?

I would say in the UK the woke term has been extremely and enthusiastically taken up by right wingers. — unimportant

We know that Murdoch and his flunkies like to label progressives as out of touch and deluded, so the term "woke" works well for them to describe a supercharged from of progressive thinking that they consider close to madness. But that doesn’t actually say anything about what "woke" is or isn’t. Generally, if Murdoch's crew is eager to sell a particular frame, it's probably safe to ignore it.

It seems to me that "woke" is just an umbrella term for a diverse range of ideas in our public discourse that some people fear and choose to describe pejoratively. And no doubt there are some zealous left-wing activists who go too far, just as there are young, zealous right-wing ones who do the same.

instead, I attempt to diagnose a shift in discursive practices, particularly in the domains of identity politics and online activism, where affective expressions of marginalization have begun to function as sufficient sources of epistemic and moral authority. — Number2018

Fancy wording but I think this is certainly a widely held belief - perhaps that some people weaponise their lived experience. Can you provide a specific example you are thinking of here - one with broad repercussions?

Thus, emotional experience and perceived marginality are not retained within rigorous ontological framing. Instead, they assert themselves as affective self-reference of truth and moral authority, becoming resistant to questioning, nuance, or deliberate reflection. — Number2018

This builds on the above—I'm keen to understand specific instances.

In the case of wokeness, the issue is not one of disagreement or misunderstanding. Rather, it lies in the complete blurring of boundaries between the authenticity of identity performance and the sincerity of moral expression — Number2018

If I grant you there are real concerns about mere performance and whether a claim is an expression of a person’s actual interests (on top of social media grandstanding, moralizing, etc.), these objections are still only to the form of the claim (though, yes, something that needs to be addressed). Even judging the grounds we take (or are presented with) for a moral claim does not get at the reasons it is made, nor discharge our obligation to find the need for it. Is the extent of your OP that there are legitimate objections to these methods? That rational discourse has become lost? This is of course a serious issue (deeper and more wide-spread than even these concerns I would think). But do your objections to these methods include (and wish to refute) the underlying interests?

Because these failings do not preclude our ability to attribute (even if imagining) genuine, authentic interests and needs to others if we treat them as serious moral agents. To try to theoretically explain why they are doing this or why we are justified in dismissing them, is to avoid our moral responsibility. To speak frankly, not trying is a cop-out that reflects on us, on our part to bring back rational discourse (though again, I sympathize with the difficulty). I would even argue this is our duty as a citizen in a democracy (as I explain in my discussion of John Dewey - Democracy as a Personal Ethic “Democracy is… respect for the capacity of each other (as if we do not yet know the terms on which to judge).

In an attempt to provide an example of that kind of inquiry/discussion: If we look past the demonstrations we take as (somehow completely) reflecting “woke” “culture”, can we brainstorm what might be the circumstances involved, the necessity of the claim, even the need to make it in a fashion we might misinterpret or not know how to make intelligible? Don’t these claims have a history? Here I am not enough of a social critic to know the answers, but, if we are to be “woke”, what is it we were asleep to?

instead, I attempt to diagnose a shift in discursive practices, particularly in the domains of identity politics and online activism, where affective expressions of marginalization have begun to function as sufficient sources of epistemic and moral authority.
— Number2018

Fancy wording but I think this is certainly a widely held belief - perhaps that some people weaponise their lived experience. Can you provide a specific example you are thinking of here - one with broad repercussions? — Tom Storm

Critics argue that emotional discomfort has become a trigger for restricting speech, displacing debate with moral claims based solely on feeling hurt or offended. https://ncac.org/resource/ncac-report-whats-all-this-about-trigger-warnings?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://www.britannica.com/story/trigger-warnings-on-campus?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Also, #MeToo was important in addressing longstanding injustice. However, it was noted that the movement advanced trauma-based disclosures, establishing a cultural norm where a testimony of harm received moral and epistemic authority. Even in ambiguous cases, this framework often elevated belief in the speaker to the status of the primary epistemic standard.

I had edited the post you responded but apparently too later for you to see it. Here’s the edited post:

The analyses of Focault and Deleuze are not critiques of affect per se, but of how affect is disciplined and made legible—subsumed into power/knowledge formations. Critique is aimed at sedimentation, normalization, and instrumentalization—not at affect’s foundational role. Deleuze’s entire philosophical project (especially with Guattari) can be read as a critique of how desire/affect is captured by molar systems—Oedipal structures, the State, Capitalism, Signifiance, etc. Not a critique of affect as such—but of affect when it gets captured by stratifying assemblages that block lines of flight. When it is allowed to become via lines of flight, affect is liberating. When it becomes stratified within epistemological logics, it becomes repressive. It sounds like this is your point, also:

Whereas the wokeness machine induces emotions like shame, guilt, and vulnerability to generate moral authority and political legitimacy, the philosophical machine must resist this affective economy by refusing to be coded within it. Instead, it amplifies its own intensity and its capacity to think and feel. In this sense, the line of flight is an experimental process that exceeds the coordinates of recognition and representation. It constructs an autonomous plane of consistency where thought is no longer mediated by identity, morality, or social function, but engages directly with the real. — Number2018

Critics argue that emotional discomfort has become a trigger for restricting speech, displacing debate with moral claims based solely on feeling hurt or offended. — Number2018

Some young people and profs at universities have used this mechanism. What's the evidence that this is a broader social problem of significant concern? Universities have always been subject to value-based stunts. That's kind of their thing.

Critics argue that emotional discomfort has become a trigger for restricting speech, displacing debate with moral claims based solely on feeling hurt or offended — Number2018

What do you suppose elevates the role of feeling to the status of sovereign arbiter of justice for wokists? Is the affect doing all this ethical work by itself, or is it the interpretation of the discursive context within which the affect arises which grounds the supposed moral authority of feeling? I’m suggesting it is a certain moral absolutism associated with the attribution of causes for the sources and triggers of pain which is the culprit here, not affect in itself. If I address you with the wrong pronoun and you respond with pained moral outrage, it is because your feelings are expressing your assessment that I am culpable for my slight, even if I insist that it was inadvertent. There are no accidents or innocent mistakes when concepts like while privileged and implicit bias judge us guilty in advance. It is this assumed culpability by association, birth and ingrained use of language that is at the bottom of the hyper-moralism attributed to wokism, not a blind reliance on the authority of affect.

But is there not something of value to be gained from concepts like implicit bias? Do they not act as a corrective to the metaphysics of the autonomously willing subject? What such wokist memes could stand to learn from Focault and Deleuze is that there is no privileged moral vantage from which to judge whose community is more or less biased. What we want to do is to continually follow lines of flight away from the entrenchment within any particular bias, not reterritorialize on a transcendent objectivity beyond all bias.

Does the wokist reliance on a sovereign ground of moral truth amount to an abdication of factual accuracy and logical coherence? On the contrary, the most secure, emancipatory Hegelian logic can be located as an important thread within many strands of wokism, fueling their moralism and providing the metaphysical support for their objectivity. What they need more of factual accuracy and logical coherence but Deleuzian paradoxical nonsense, a logic of sense.