The reasoning for blue eyed people specifically works because the guru said he sees blue eyes. — flannel jesus
Also I think the brown eyed people would not know their eye-colour for another 99 days after the blue eyes left, but only that they themselves didn't have blue eyes. — unenlightened
But as I said to flannel, the Guru doesn't even need to say it — Michael
Step 1 of his reasoning completely relies on the guru saying what he said. Can you see that? — flannel jesus
ok so your reasoning is different from unenlighteneds then. Can you tell us what it is? — flannel jesus
Notice that he doesn't mention the Guru or what she says at all. — Michael
The first sentence of his reasoning clearly depends on the guru saying what she said. — flannel jesus
How does the blue eyed person know they have blue eyes in that scenario? What's the single blue eyed persons reasoning in that scenario? — flannel jesus
but how would he know the guru knows that? The guru didn't say anything. He has no idea what the guru knows — flannel jesus
Every person on the island already knows that the Guru sees at least one person with blue eyes — Michael
Not in the scenario with one blue eyed person they don't — flannel jesus
If there's only one guy with blue eyes, he would only know that the guru sees blue eyes if the guru told him. — flannel jesus
No it doesn't. It only depends on "the Guru sees at least one blue-eyed person" being true. It doesn't depend on her saying so. — Michael
If there's an island with 2 people and the guru and he doesn't say anything, and there's no telepathy, nobody knows anything — flannel jesus
No. It does depend on the guru saying so unless everyone already knows that everyone already knows at the same time, as I suggested above and you ignored. This is the extra information that the guru imparts: she doesn't inform them about what she sees, but she puts everyone in a synchronised state of knowing each other's knowing. That is what is required for the nested hypotheticals to begin. — unenlightened
But the factual knowledge that I can see multiple blue eyes and thus already know that the guru can see blue eyes cannot be imported into the counterfactual hypothetical wherein the blue eyed person would know no such thing because he would not himself see blue eyes, and thus could not know therefore that the guru saw blue eyes ... wait for it ... UNLESS SHE SAID SO. — unenlightened
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