Glad you found it helpful. I realised from the comments on this topic, that a lot of what I’ve learned (mainly from The Embodied Mind and Mind in LIfe) is not at all obvious to the casual reader so maybe some background would be helpful. As mentioned, that primer was generated by AI and I haven’t read everything on it but I’m working through it. (I’m dubious about the ‘radical enactivism’ section, which I wasn’t familiar with, but I’ll leave it there for the sake of completeness.)

Being in a pecking order does not make the other's good your good.

It does, you should spend more time with chickens.
When a new bird is introduced to the flock, she finds her place in the pecking order by a stand off with the dominant bird in the flock. If she loses, then she will stand off with other birds around the dominant bird until she finds her level. She then adopts the good of the birds above her in the flock and offers it to those below her in the flock. She also forms alliances and friendships and learns, adopts and maintains the good, or bad behaviours in the flock.

Yes, "consciousness" can mean what I call medical consciousness -- a certain state of responsiveness as opposed to being "knocked out."

Yes, that’s closer to what I was thinking, but it’s inferior to the consciousness of an ant for example. This is because it is a diseased, or disordered animal, hence not functional.
I see consciousness as the me-ness, the sense of me, here, now, aliveness that is present in all organisms. This is a knowing, or inherent knowledge of their own presence. It is not articulated intellectually, but that is not a prerequisite for this kind of consciousness.

By contrast, the consciousness of a human is richer and more integrated with a computational ability which gives self awareness, reflectiveness etc. However I see this self consciousness as emergent from the computational ability in the brain, which is separate from the inherent consciousness of the organism.

So a human is no more conscious than the ant, but has many more developed sensory and mental abilities through which that consciousness is enhanced.

The Materialist explanation for the evolutionary emergence of animated & motivated matter is based on random accidents : that if you roll the dice often enough, strings of order will be found within a random process*1. But they tend to avoid the term "Emergence", because for some thinkers it suggests that the emergence was pre-destined, presumably by God. And that's a scientific no-no. So, instead of "emergence", they may call Life a fortuitous "accident". — Gnomon

Well, I think that 'emergence' in fact doesn't have 'theological' or even 'teleological' connotations for most people. One example I made is how 'pressure' of a gas 'emerges' from the properties of the particles it is composed of. Yes, for the reductionist version of physicalism life is an 'accident'. Still, it is curious that in a reductionist model something like 'life' would eventually happen.

However, another perspective on Abiogenesis*2 is that the Cosmos is inherently self-organizing. And that notion implies or assumes a creative goal-oriented process, and ultimately Teleology. My personal Enformationism*3 thesis is an attempt to provide a non-religious philosophical answer to the mystery of Life & Mind emerging from the random roiling of atoms. But if you prefer a "theory" from a famous & credentialed philosopher, check-out A.N. Whitehead's book Process and Reality*4. :smile: — Gnomon

Well, that's a possibility. But it assumes that the cosmos is a sort of living being itself. IMO it is not a form of physicalism.

But hopefully an elaboration rather than a contradiction. — Wayfarer

Time will tell.

Enactivism can be consistent with more traditional Aristotleianism, Thomism (even of the existential variety), or more "Neoplatonic," thought, although it often isn't. Robert Sokolowski is an example of someone who is firmly within the tradition of phenomenology and enactivism and yet sees his work as consistent with Aristotle and Saint Thomas.

There is a slippery distinction here though. I'd like to say there are really multiple camps within phenomenology. They all take a lot from Husserl, but some stay closer to his original project and inclinations, some are more aligned with more broadly "post-modern" views and metaphysics (I know they don't consider them that), and then there are a lot of mostly, but not entirely, Catholic philosophers who see the project as consistent with realism (and tend to stress its Scholastic roots). But, all of them seem to have people who like enactivism, although they sometimes seem to draw quite different implications from it, or explain it in different ways, but the core themes and terms are the same.

None of them seem to have much use for Hegel's phenomenology.

Anyhow, to go back to the main topic, I think a difficulty in speaking about ends, telos, and human purpose is that terms like "transcendental," "absolute," and "platonic," which have come up in this thread, often get used in somewhat equivocal ways across traditions.

While goodness and truth are "transcendental properties of being," in the tradition coming out of (neo)Platonism and Aristotleianism, these are merely "logical/conceptual" distinctions. They don't add anything to being. They are being as considered from some particular perspective. Goodness (and so ends) is being considered in terms of desirability (i.e. the appetites, most appropriately, the will). Obviously, only living things have appetites, unless we speak in a quite analogous sense (e.g., "the air in a balloon 'wants' to expand"). So life and mind are quite relevant, in that only minds make conceptual distinctions and Good/True are conceptual distinctions. But conceptual distinctions also aren't arbitrary. This gets us a proper sort of perspectivism and relativism, without anti-realism re values and purpose.

Indeed, I am not sure you can have anti-realism re values without also ultimately having a sort of anti-realism re telos and purpose; they both become an illusion of sorts, leading physicalism back into a sort of mental/physical dualism.

Well, I think that 'emergence' in fact doesn't have 'theological' or even 'teleological' connotations for most people. One example I made is how 'pressure' of a gas 'emerges' from the properties of the particles it is composed of. Yes, for the reductionist version of physicalism life is an 'accident'. Still, it is curious that in a reductionist model something like 'life' would eventually happen. — boundless

A "weak"*1 scientific interpretation of evolution from simple to complex is specifically formulated to avoid any metaphysical (teleological or theological) implications. But a "strong"*2 interpretation directly addresses the philosophical implications that are meaningful to systematic & cosmological thinkers*3. Likewise a "weak" interpretation of the Anthropic Principle*4 can avoid dealing with Meaning by looking only at isolated facts. Both "weak" models are reductionist, while the "strong" models are holistic. The Strong models don't shy away from generalizing the evidence (facts). Instead, they look at the whole system in order to satisfy philosophical "curiosity" about Why such appearances of design should & could occur in a random mechanical process. :smile:


*1. Weak emergence describes a situation where a system's properties or behavior, though seemingly novel, can be fully explained by the interactions of its constituent parts and their underlying rules. It implies that while the emergent behavior is a product of the system's components, it's not fundamentally novel or irreducible. Examples include traffic jams, flocking behavior of birds, or the structure of a school of fish.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=weak+emergence

*2. Strong emergence describes a system property that arises from the interaction of its parts, but which cannot be predicted or understood from the properties of those parts alone, or from the interactions between them. It implies that the whole is more than the sum of its parts in a fundamental way, with novel behaviors or properties emerging that are irreducible to the lower-level components
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=strong+emergence

*3. Weak emergence and strong emergence are two ways of describing how complex systems exhibit properties not found in their individual components. Weak emergence refers to properties that, while not immediately obvious from the components, can still be explained and predicted by understanding the interactions of those components. Strong emergence, on the other hand, describes properties that cannot be predicted or explained solely by examining the components and their interactions, suggesting something genuinely new arises at the higher level.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=weak+emergence+vs+strong+emergence

*4. The Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP) suggests the universe's properties are specifically arranged to allow for the existence of intelligent observers, like humans. It implies that the universe's laws and constants are not just compatible with life, but that they necessitate it. This contrasts with the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP), which simply states that we observe a universe compatible with our existence because if it weren't, we wouldn't be here to observe it.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=strong+anthropic+principle

Enactivism can be consistent with more traditional Aristotleianism, Thomism (even of the existential variety), or more "Neoplatonic," thought, although it often isn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My comments on about were directed at dfpolis, who seemed dismissive of the idea of 'intentionality' in any context other than that of a rational subject. I was trying to explain that enactivism indicates to a larger sense of intentionality. That was very much the point of this post. But two of the books I'm reading on systems science and biology (Deacon and Juarrero) both draw on Aristotelian biological and (to some extent) metaphysical concepts. Aristotle after all is part of the 'grammar of Western culture'.

I will acknowledge that one source of my interest was my reading of Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. This is (again) the relevant passage from his précis of that book:

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone.

That “important aspect of nature left unexplained” refers to the very issue at the heart of the so-called hard problem of consciousness: the first-person, felt nature of experience — the immediacy of embodied existence. This, I think, is where phenomenology enters: it seeks to restore the primacy of first-person experience that the objective sciences methodologically bracket out.

What is bracketed, however, is not incidental. It is, quite simply, Being. (And tellingly, we ourselves are designated 'beings'.) Over the years, I’ve engaged in many vexed discussions on this forum over whether there is an ontological distinction between organisms and things. I continue to maintain that there is — and that this distinction begins to manifest as soon as life appears.

My view might resemble panpsychism in some respects, but it maintains a principled distinction between the organic and the inorganic. Call me romantic, but I’m drawn to the idea that the appearance of life just is the appearance of mind — not as an élan vital, a separable essence, but as that without which the constituents of life remain mineral. Life is not caused by mind as something external to it, but mind manifests itself as living organisms. And so the physical, as we understand it, is insufficient on its own: it is an abstraction, and something deeper — subjective presence, embodied directedness — has always been part of the picture, even if the objective sciences generally set it aside.

It is clear that you do not understand physics. So, you should not use it as the basis for your theories. — Dfpolis

Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts.

If you cannot understand the difference between a wine barrel having a purpose and a wine barrel thinking, further explanation will not help. — Dfpolis

We were not talking about "thinking". We were talking about having "intention". Can you not distinguish between these two?

I believe that thinking is an intentional activity, it is intentionally caused. Therefore intention is prior to thinking, as thinking is caused by intention, so thinking is not a necessary aspect of having intention. Do you not agree with this? Or, are you claiming that intention comes from thinking, is caused by thinking, so that all intention involves thinking? If you are proposing the latter, how would you justify this?

Once again, it is clear that we do not have enough common ground for a fruitful discussion.

A "weak"*1 scientific interpretation of evolution from simple to complex is specifically formulated to avoid any metaphysical (teleological or theological) implications. But a "strong"*2 interpretation directly addresses the philosophical implications that are meaningful to systematic & cosmological thinkers*3. Likewise a "weak" interpretation of the Anthropic Principle*4 can avoid dealing with Meaning by looking only at isolated facts. Both "weak" models are reductionist, while the "strong" models are holistic. The Strong models don't shy away from generalizing the evidence (facts). Instead, they look at the whole system in order to satisfy philosophical "curiosity" about Why such appearances of design should & could occur in a random mechanical process. :smile: — Gnomon

Yes. In other words the problem for the physicalist is: can we explain the 'strong emergence' of life and mind in purely physical terms given that reductionism seems to fail?

Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

With all due respect you made some controversial claims here:

So, we have to consider the reality of every aspect of a "physical system", to see how successful we can really be. I believe that the reality of entropy demonstrates that no physical system actually evolves in a completely deterministic way. That aspect of the activity of a physical system, which escapes determinability is known as "entropy". Therefore "purely physical systems" refers to an impossibility, if that implies completely deterministic evolution.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Conservation laws do not hold, to the contrary, they are always violated. This is the nature of entropy, that part of reality which is in violation of conservation. It's a loss which we just write off, and work around. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here.

Just noticed that this article was published the same day as your OP:

Teleology: What Is It Good For?, by John O'Callaghan

Why, thanks! Will read carefully.

Once again, it is clear that we do not have enough common ground for a fruitful discussion. — Dfpolis

This is not true at all. We've had many discussions in the past, and it is very clear that we have significant common ground. However, when specific points of difference become apparent, it appears like you choose to ignore my criticisms. You seem to be intent on throwing away all that common ground, along with any insight into specific problems which I may be offering. And for what?

The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here. — boundless

I don't understand why this feature of the concept of "energy" is so difficult for so many people to grasp. It's actually quite simple and straight forward, yet the minds of individuals are inclined to simply reject it out of principle. So, let me explain, and you tell me where you have a problem to understand.

First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. Second, experimental evidence has indicated over and over again, that the complete amount of energy is never conserved in any active system. That's why there is no perpetual motion system. So, the tendency was always to write off the lost energy, as lost to the system due to incomplete closure. Classically these were losses like heat loss due to friction, and other losses which could not be properly accounted for. No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible.

However, there are still some people who like to hypothesize an idealistic, absolutely closed system. We can theorize, that fi a system was absolutely closed, energy would be conserved within that system. But evidence indicates that even if such a system could be constructed, energy would likely still be lost to that system, and this loss was called entropy. This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical.

Please indicate which parts you have difficulty understanding.

Perhaps - but, ironically, the whole question of the mind-independence of the fundamental aspects of nature has been thrown into question by this objective process. — Wayfarer

If so, then it is not an "objective (mind-independent) process"; otherwise, "thrown into question" is only subjective (i.e. a mere interpretation). Scientific realism (à la Deutsch)** – contra "shut up and calculate" instrumentalism / positivism – makes more sense (and is more parsimonious) to me.

**bad philosophy –> bad physics –> woo :sparkle:

Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external:

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things. The external agents of this world can only impose external teleology upon other beings within the world because they presuppose the existence of those other beings, presuppose what they are and seek to modify them by imposing external teleology upon them. External agents imposing external teleology upon objects presuppose the already existing natures of what they act upon, and that those objects they act upon will respond actively or passively according to their own natures. An electron will respond differently to an artificially produced magnetic field than will a neutron, because of the natural difference between an electron and a neutron. A lion will respond differently to being pulled on by a human being than will a dandelion, because of the natural difference between a lion and a dandelion.

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. This would be a bottom-up process.

Good essay and very carefully composed. Overall, I find it congenial, although I’m not as disposed to consider the theological elements. But this concluding thought is not at all remote from the thrust of the OP:

What I have argued here does not prove that evolutionary history is teleological and has a purpose, much less a divinely intended purpose. But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose. Evolutionary science is and should be neutral with respect to the question of whether the process of evolution has a teleology. If an evolutionary biologist claims that evolution has no purpose because of the role of random variation within it, that is not a scientific statement of evolutionary biology.

(Although I would add, I'm more focussed on these relatively new areas of embodied cognition/enactivism and less so on theological or scholastic arguments, although, that said, I don't feel any conflict between the OP and O'Callaghan's essay.)

If so, then it is not an "objective (mind-independent) process"; otherwise, "thrown into question" is only subjective (i.e. a mere interpretation). Scientific realism (à la Deutsch)** – contra "shut up and calculate" instrumentalism / positivism – makes more sense (and is more parsimonious) to me. — 180 Proof

For Deutsch, the wavefunction never collapses; instead, all possible outcomes of a quantum event occur in a vast, branching multiverse. This preserves the universality of quantum laws and avoids the ambiguities associated with observation or measurement. But at what cost? Many physicists and philosophers question it, not least because it postulates an infinite proliferation of unobservable worlds. The deeper irony is that while Deutsch defends objectivity, the very proliferation of interpretations — none of which can be empirically distinguished — suggests, as I already said, that the concept of objectivity itself is under philosophical pressure, not from mysticism or “woo,” but from within the context of scientific theory. (Not to mention the intrinsic ridiculousness of the many-worlds theory being 'parsimonious' :lol: )

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you've cherry-picked that quote. O'Callaghan then distinguishes between 'creating' and 'making'. He says making 'presupposes something already existing upon which the maker acts'. That is the model for human artifacts. By contrast, 'God in creating all that is in every aspect in which it is, including the causal powers and efficacy of agents that respond actively or passively to other created agents, presupposes nothing other than God’s own being, power, knowledge, and goodness.' And that is nothing if not top-down!

Just noticed that this article was published the same day as your OP:

Teleology: What Is It Good For?, by John O'Callaghan

Nice essay, summed up in this sentence;

But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose.

The people who deny this teleological purpose are in a way blind to it. They see things only in the external. This results in a failure to understand what an organism is. In a sense they look at individual organisms, or species and see them as one of those body parts that Frankenstein was working with. But this denies the essence of life which courses through those organisms. They should remind themselves that all life of this planet is one family, literally brothers and sisters of one common parent* and that they are a result of one continuous lineage of life. One life begetting another all the way through our evolution.

*this does not require one individual common parent. But rather a pool of unicellular organisms at the point of the inception of life.

But you've cherry-picked that quote. O'Callaghan then distinguishes between 'creating' and 'making'. He says making 'presupposes something already existing upon which the maker acts'. That is the model for human artifacts. By contrast, 'God in creating all that is in every aspect in which it is, including the causal powers and efficacy of agents that respond actively or passively to other created agents, presupposes nothing other than God’s own being, power, knowledge, and goodness.' And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer

Yes, I cherry-picked the part where the difference between external and internal teleology is described, because I believe this is a very important distinction to understand. This is the difference I was trying to get Dfpolis to expound on earlier. In the case of living beings, where individual beings, are each observed to have one's own internal purpose (obvious in human intent), the causation here can only be accounted for as a bottom-up form of causation.

That is the point I made in reply to apokrisis' army example. To properly represent intentionality, each member of the army must, by one's own free will, have the desire to act the role. The whole, which is the army, is not caused to be, by some top-down form of causation, by which "the army" causes, through some force external to the individual participants, the unity of the parts. The thing called "the army" is caused to exist through a bottom-up process by which each individual apprehends the need, and willfully takes a role. Simply put, in order to represent the freeness of the free will, which is essential to intentionality, the causal process must be bottom-up. Otherwise, each individual part is portrayed as being forced by an external cause, to play a role in the whole, and free will is denied.

This representation of top-down teleology is the effect of determinist physicalism. By Newton's first law of motion, a body, which is any massive part, cannot be caused to move except by an external force. That is the premise of determinism, which denies that a body could be caused to change its motion through an internal cause, what we know as will. This determinist, physicalist perspective, induces the idea that intentional actions, such as the will to join the army, are caused by some sort of top-down form of causation which is external to the individual agent, because all causation is stipulated to be externally sourced. You can see how this is a misconception. Freely willed, intentional actions must be represented as derived from within the agent, internally sourced, and not be portrayed as caused by some external top-down force of constraint. Like @Punshhh pointed out, constraints are passive, they are not agential causes.

The fundamental problem, as I see it, is the pervasiveness of systems thinking, and the inability of systems theory to portray free bottom-up causation. In systems thinking, there is a separation between internal to the system, and external to the system. There is one proposed boundary which separates the two. What is not a part of the system is external to it, outside it. What is missing is a proper spatial representation which would distinguish what is not a part of the system to the inside. Systems theory has no proposal for a distinction between a boundary to the outside of the system, and a boundary to the inside of the system. This means that there is no epistemological principles describing a way to separate causation which comes form something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the internal, from causation which comes from something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the external. And because the determinist, physicalist way, is to represent all causation as external, then any causation which is not part of the system but across the boundary to the inside, must be represented as "external" causation. Conflating these two very distinct forms of causation is a misconception.

First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. But in open systems neither principle is applicable. There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation.

There is some controversy on the status of the universe. Some physicists do claim that, due to the expansion of the universe, the universe can't be considered a 'closed system'. There is disagreement here however.
Furthermore, there are those who also say that the 'universe as a whole' can't be considered as a physical system.

No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact.

Honestly, I think you conflate the two explanations here. But you do raise an interesting point about closed systems, yes. But the increase of entropy doesn't in any way negate the conservation of energy.

This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility?

Yes. In other words the problem for the physicalist is: can we explain the 'strong emergence' of life and mind in purely physical terms given that reductionism seems to fail? — boundless

That is indeed "the problem" for explaining Purpose & Emergence in reductive physical terms. Which is why philosophers use holistic Meta-Physical terms, such as teleology to explain, not how, but why complex self-sustaining & self-organizing systems emerge from a world presumably ruled by the destructive & dissipating second law of thermodynamics (entropy). It's also why I coined a new term, EnFormAction, that refers to the constructive force in physics, formerly labeled dismissively as Negentropy. :smile:


EnFormAction :
The concept of a river of creative causation running through the world in various streams has been interpreted in materialistic terms as Momentum, Impetus, Force, Energy, Negentropy, etc, and in metaphysical idioms as Will, Love, Conatus, and so forth. EnFormAction is all of those.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

Enformy :
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress. [ see post 63 for graph ]
1. I'm not aware of any "supernatural force" in the world. But my Enformationism theory postulates that there is a meta-physical force behind Time's Arrow and the positive progress of evolution. Just as Entropy is sometimes referred to as a "force" causing energy to dissipate (negative effect), Enformy is the antithesis, which causes energy to agglomerate (additive effect).
2. Of course, neither of those phenomena is a physical Force, or a direct Cause, in the usual sense. But the term "force" is applied to such holistic causes as a metaphor drawn from our experience with physics.
3. "Entropy" and "Enformy" are scientific/technical terms that are equivalent to the religious/moralistic terms "Evil" and "Good". So, while those forces are completely natural, the ultimate source of the power behind them may be supernatural, in the sense that the First Cause logically existed before the Big Bang. [ see ENTROPY at right ; Extropy ]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

Holism ; Holon :
Philosophically, a whole system is a collection of parts (holons) that possesses properties not found in the parts. That something extra is an Emergent quality that was latent (unmanifest) in the parts. For example, when atoms of hydrogen & oxygen gases combine in a specific ratio, the molecule has properties of water, such as wetness, that are not found in the gases. A Holon is something that is simultaneously a whole and a part — A system of entangled things that has a function in a hierarchy of systems.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

"Entropy" and "Enformy" are scientific/technical terms that are equivalent to the religious/moralistic terms "Evil" and "Good" [WOO]. So, while those forces are completely natural, the ultimate source of the power behind them may be supernatural [WOO], in the sense that the First Cause logically existed before the Big Bang. — Gnomon

:sweat: i.e. WOO-of-the-gaps (from ... appeal to ignorance)

NB: bad philosophy –> bad physics –> :sparkle:

In the case of living beings, where individual beings, are each observed to have one's own internal purpose (obvious in human intent), the causation here can only be accounted for as a bottom-up form of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Top-down causation doesn't mean external coercion or denial of agency—quite the opposite. It refers to the way the organization or unity of a system constrains and enables the behaviour of its parts from within (hence organism, organic, and organisation.) In O’Callaghan’s essay, it’s the Humpty Dumpty model: the organism is not built out of self-standing parts that can function on their own and just happen to join up; rather, the parts are what they are because of their roles in the whole. You can’t reassemble life from pieces. The individual’s capacity for intentional action—say, to enlist in an army—is already shaped by the larger context: language, culture, history, embodiment. There has to be an army to join, otherwise it's just a mob. These are not external impositions, but the structured conditions that make intentionality possible in the first place.

Bottom-up causation, by contrast, is the Frankenstein model: assemble a bunch of pieces, energise them with a force, and voila! a system emerges from their interactions. But as O’Callaghan points out, that’s not how living systems work—not even armies. The army doesn’t simply “emerge” from a collection of atomistic agents exercising unconditioned will. Rather, each agent is already a self-organizing being whose actions are meaningful within the constraints of larger wholes—biological, social, symbolic—which are not imposed externally, but are intrinsic to what agency even is. But the external structure of the army - ranks, divisions, formations - are constraints that determine how individual members are to behave.

So invoking top-down causation isn’t a denial of free will—it’s an attempt to explain how form, meaning, and function arise in organisms, including human beings. You don’t have to be a physicalist to see that.

One of the strengths of Aquinas’ philosophy, and a point O’Callaghan emphasizes, is that God doesn't need to control or micromanage natural beings in order for their actions to be meaningful or purposeful. Instead, God creates beings with their own natures—internal principles of motion, action, and teleology. This means that organisms act from within themselves; they are genuine agents, not mere instruments or puppets. Their purposes are real and intelligible because they arise from their God-given form or nature, not from external control.

In this view, natural causes are sufficient within their own order, which is precisely what makes natural science possible (and also why Aquinas saw no inherent conflict between religion and science). One can study organisms, physical systems, or even human agents without needing to invoke divine intervention at every step (which is why, incidentally, Thomist philosophers don't generally endorse 'Intelligent Design' ideas.) This the basis for Aquinas’ fifth way, where he says that even non-intelligent beings act toward ends—not because God is directing them, but because their nature is structured in such a way that they are inclined toward those ends. The teleology is internal, not imposed from the outside.

There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation. — boundless

I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth.

Consider the following example. When Copernicus first modeled the heliocentric solar system, the model failed, because it modeled perfect circles, and this produced inaccuracies which were accounted for by unacceptable descriptions.

The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation.

One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact. — boundless

The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction.

I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility? — boundless

No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time.

Top-down causation doesn't mean external coercion or denial of agency—quite the opposite. It refers to the way the organization or unity of a system constrains and enables the behaviour of its parts from within (hence organism, organic, and organisation.) — Wayfarer

Enabling is not causation. If, top-down causation "enables" behaviour, then this is not properly called "causation". Further, this is not consistent with what is known as final cause, intention, and free will, because these are known as agential causes, not instances of enabling. If top-down causation simply enables intentional acts, it is not a proper description of those acts, and therefore does not serve us as a representation of teleology, which is the study of those acts explicitly, not what enables them.

In O’Callaghan’s essay, it’s the Humpty Dumpty model: the organism is not built out of self-standing parts that can function on their own and just happen to join up; rather, the parts are what they are because of their roles in the whole. — Wayfarer

The issue though, the philosophical problem which we are addressing, is what causes the parts to have a role in the whole. If we follow the model of final cause, intention, and free will, we must allow that each part purposefully, and freely accepts its role within the whole, without being caused to do so by the whole itself.

The issue can be understood like this. The whole does not have existence until after the parts have taken up their respective positions, to produce the whole. Therefore it is impossible that the whole can cause the parts to each have the role that it has. It is true, as you say, that the parts are what they are, because of the roles that they play in the whole, that is how they are defined, as those parts. However, it is impossible that the whole causes the parts (top-down causation) to have the roles that they have, because the whole has no existence until after the parts have taken their roles. This is why we look to final cause, as a type of bottom-up causation, whereby each individual, which will be a part of that future whole, voluntarily takes up a role toward the creation of the whole.

This is the difference between O'Callaghan's external teleology, and internal teleology. In the case of external teleology, the parts are ordered towards the creation of a whole, by an external cause, which acts in a top-down way. In the case of internal teleology, God creates intention, and each part creates itself (seemingly from nothing but its own intention), such that each part has intention inherent within, as the cause of it producing what it is. Notice that "what it is" is determined by its role in the whole which comes to be from its intentional acts along with those of the other intentional agents.

You can’t reassemble life from pieces. The individual’s capacity for intentional action—say, to enlist in an army—is already shaped by the larger context: language, culture, history, embodiment. — Wayfarer

This model does not work out, because it dictates that you always have to seek a larger perspective as you look backward in time. And that is contrary to the reality of life. When we look backward in time we see that the multitude of variety in current life evolved from a narrower and narrower source. In reality, the individual's capacity for intentional action is derived from biological sources, and that demonstrates a narrower and narrower context. All those aspects you mention, "language, culture, history, embodiment" are the products of individual intentional actions.

Bottom-up causation, by contrast, is the Frankenstein model: assemble a bunch of pieces, energise them with a force, and voila! a system emerges from their interactions. — Wayfarer

This is an example of external teleology. But O'Callaghan is very explicit in distinguishing between external and internal teleology.

So invoking top-down causation isn’t a denial of free will—it’s an attempt to explain how form, meaning, and function arise in organisms, including human beings. You don’t have to be a physicalist to see that. — Wayfarer

I agree, that when you portray "top-down causation" as enabling, or as conditions, or as constraints, it isn't a denial of free will. However, it does not provide proper "causation", which must come from the act initialized by the individual agent. Then the proper representation of "causation" would be bottom-up agency. But if you portray "top-down causation" as properly causal, then free will is denied by that form of causation, and we have determinism. The ambiguity between these two ways of portraying "top-down causation" allows metaphysicians like apokrisis to slip back and forth, in ambiguity and equivocation. You'll notice that sometimes apokrisis claims that the whole provides merely global constraints, to local freedom, which could then have local parts which act freely as intentional agents. But then apokrisis will assign intentionality to the constraints, as if the constraints are the actual cause of what the agent's actions actually are, being fundamentally random chance activity which is constrained externally,.

One of the strengths of Aquinas’ philosophy, and a point O’Callaghan emphasizes, is that God doesn't need to control or micromanage natural beings in order for their actions to be meaningful or purposeful. Instead, God creates beings with their own natures—internal principles of motion, action, and teleology. This means that organisms act from within themselves; they are genuine agents, not mere instruments or puppets. Their purposes are real and intelligible because they arise from their God-given form or nature, not from external control. — Wayfarer

Don't you see that this form of causation you describe here, whereby individual beings are agents, is necessarily bottom-up causation?

The teleology is internal, not imposed from the outside. — Wayfarer

If the teleology is not imposed from outside, but is derived from within, then this is bottom-up causation.

I think we’re talking past each other at this point. My view, following O’Callaghan (and by extension, Aquinas and Aristotle), is that top-down causation refers to the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts—not as external coercion, but as internal teleology. That’s distinct from bottom-up causation, which builds from autonomous parts upward. Your framing treats top-down as necessarily determinist or imposed, which misrepresents the whole issue. I don’t think there’s much value in continuing this, as the conversation is getting buried in long and speculative detours. So I’ll leave it there. No hard feelings.

My view, following O’Callaghan (and by extension, Aquinas and Aristotle), is that top-down causation refers to the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts—not as external coercion, but as internal teleology. — Wayfarer

What you refer to here, as top-down causation, is what is known in Aristotelian principles as formal cause. Teleology studies final cause which is distinctly different from formal cause.

"Internal teleology", under O'Callaghan's description, which I posted above, refers to an agent which acts with intent, and that is final cause. "Internal teleology" is distinguished from "external teleology", the latter being the process by which intent is imposed onto things, giving them order as parts in the form of a whole.

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things.

I think you misunderstand what is meant by "internal teleology". It clearly refers to final cause, not formal cause which you describe with "the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts". Final cause refers to an agent acting for an end, which is what O'Callaghan classes as "internal teleology". And he claims that God is required to account for the existence of internal teleology, because the existence of the teleological movement is prior to the very thing which bears it internally.

MU, this is going to be my last word on the topic. You're confusing distinct Aristotelian categories by treating formal and final cause as though they must be opposed. In Aristotle’s account—especially as taken up by Aquinas—the form of a thing is its principle of organization and development, and it is inherently purposive. That’s why formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in living beings: a plant’s form includes its telos to grow, reproduce, and flourish.

As for O’Callaghan, his description of internal teleology clearly includes non-conscious natural purposiveness—such as organs functioning for the sake of the organism—not just the deliberate intention of agents. That’s why Aquinas can say even non-rational beings “act for an end.” He’s not talking about conscious volition, but about nature acting according to its form, which is exactly what top-down causation refers to in this context.

So no, what I’m describing is not determinist, nor external imposition, nor a confusion of causes. It’s classical metaphysics. I think we've hit the point where clarification isn't really advancing, so I’ll leave it there.

It's also why I coined a new term, EnFormAction, that refers to the constructive force in physics, formerly labeled dismissively as Negentropy. :smile: — Gnomon

Note that physical laws seem to be passive constraints, however. They are holistic in a sense but not like the 'holism' you see in living beings, where the whole actively and purposively seem to 'guide' its parts.

So, your model seems to me a bit like the 'world soul' present in some hellenistic philosophies, i.e. the universe as a whole as a sort of living being. So it seems to me that you are proposing a dualistic model or a dual-aspect monism, where mind and the 'physical' are two aspects of the whole.

I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would be careful here. Yes, it seems that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the whole universe, but our experiments tell us that when the approximation is reasonable, the results are coherent with conservation laws. Also, when we know the deviations that we expect from a non-isolated system (i.e. when we know 'how much' the system is not isolated), we find a coherent result.
This certainly points to the fact that, at least, conservation laws do point to something true about the physical universe, even if the conditions where they hold without errors are never actualized. Or maybe they are valid when you take the entire physical universe all together.

Furthermore, the conservation of energy (and of linear and angular momenta etc) has been a very good source of discoveries. For instance, in particle physics, the neutrinos weren't observed initially. Some energy seemed to be missing. But the neutrino were discovered.

The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation. — Metaphysician Undercover

But note that entropy is not a form of energy. Even its physical dimensions (measurement units) are different. Also, there is nothing like an energy-entropy equivalence like there is a mass-entropy equivalence.
Entropy is more like how energy is distributed than a measure of the quantity of energy that is 'lost'.

The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, you can measure the increase of temperature (and hence, internal energy) due to friction. But you can't recover it to use it again as work.

No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting, if contentious point. But it is unrelated to entropy. If there are no perfectly isolated systems, the law of conservation seem to never hold. But, again, note my points at the beginning of my response.