It does, you should spend more time with chickens.Being in a pecking order does not make the other's good your good.
Yes, that’s closer to what I was thinking, but it’s inferior to the consciousness of an ant for example. This is because it is a diseased, or disordered animal, hence not functional.Yes, "consciousness" can mean what I call medical consciousness -- a certain state of responsiveness as opposed to being "knocked out."
The Materialist explanation for the evolutionary emergence of animated & motivated matter is based on random accidents : that if you roll the dice often enough, strings of order will be found within a random process*1. But they tend to avoid the term "Emergence", because for some thinkers it suggests that the emergence was pre-destined, presumably by God. And that's a scientific no-no. So, instead of "emergence", they may call Life a fortuitous "accident". — Gnomon
However, another perspective on Abiogenesis*2 is that the Cosmos is inherently self-organizing. And that notion implies or assumes a creative goal-oriented process, and ultimately Teleology. My personal Enformationism*3 thesis is an attempt to provide a non-religious philosophical answer to the mystery of Life & Mind emerging from the random roiling of atoms. But if you prefer a "theory" from a famous & credentialed philosopher, check-out A.N. Whitehead's book Process and Reality*4. :smile: — Gnomon
A "weak"*1 scientific interpretation of evolution from simple to complex is specifically formulated to avoid any metaphysical (teleological or theological) implications. But a "strong"*2 interpretation directly addresses the philosophical implications that are meaningful to systematic & cosmological thinkers*3. Likewise a "weak" interpretation of the Anthropic Principle*4 can avoid dealing with Meaning by looking only at isolated facts. Both "weak" models are reductionist, while the "strong" models are holistic. The Strong models don't shy away from generalizing the evidence (facts). Instead, they look at the whole system in order to satisfy philosophical "curiosity" about Why such appearances of design should & could occur in a random mechanical process. :smile:Well, I think that 'emergence' in fact doesn't have 'theological' or even 'teleological' connotations for most people. One example I made is how 'pressure' of a gas 'emerges' from the properties of the particles it is composed of. Yes, for the reductionist version of physicalism life is an 'accident'. Still, it is curious that in a reductionist model something like 'life' would eventually happen. — boundless
Enactivism can be consistent with more traditional Aristotleianism, Thomism (even of the existential variety), or more "Neoplatonic," thought, although it often isn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone.
It is clear that you do not understand physics. So, you should not use it as the basis for your theories. — Dfpolis
If you cannot understand the difference between a wine barrel having a purpose and a wine barrel thinking, further explanation will not help. — Dfpolis
A "weak"*1 scientific interpretation of evolution from simple to complex is specifically formulated to avoid any metaphysical (teleological or theological) implications. But a "strong"*2 interpretation directly addresses the philosophical implications that are meaningful to systematic & cosmological thinkers*3. Likewise a "weak" interpretation of the Anthropic Principle*4 can avoid dealing with Meaning by looking only at isolated facts. Both "weak" models are reductionist, while the "strong" models are holistic. The Strong models don't shy away from generalizing the evidence (facts). Instead, they look at the whole system in order to satisfy philosophical "curiosity" about Why such appearances of design should & could occur in a random mechanical process. :smile: — Gnomon
Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, we have to consider the reality of every aspect of a "physical system", to see how successful we can really be. I believe that the reality of entropy demonstrates that no physical system actually evolves in a completely deterministic way. That aspect of the activity of a physical system, which escapes determinability is known as "entropy". Therefore "purely physical systems" refers to an impossibility, if that implies completely deterministic evolution.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Conservation laws do not hold, to the contrary, they are always violated. This is the nature of entropy, that part of reality which is in violation of conservation. It's a loss which we just write off, and work around. — Metaphysician Undercover
Once again, it is clear that we do not have enough common ground for a fruitful discussion. — Dfpolis
The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here. — boundless
If so, then it is not an "objective (mind-independent) process"; otherwise, "thrown into question" is only subjective (i.e. a mere interpretation). Scientific realism (à la Deutsch)** – contra "shut up and calculate" instrumentalism / positivism – makes more sense (and is more parsimonious) to me.Perhaps - but, ironically, the whole question of the mind-independence of the fundamental aspects of nature has been thrown into question by this objective process. — Wayfarer
Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things. The external agents of this world can only impose external teleology upon other beings within the world because they presuppose the existence of those other beings, presuppose what they are and seek to modify them by imposing external teleology upon them. External agents imposing external teleology upon objects presuppose the already existing natures of what they act upon, and that those objects they act upon will respond actively or passively according to their own natures. An electron will respond differently to an artificially produced magnetic field than will a neutron, because of the natural difference between an electron and a neutron. A lion will respond differently to being pulled on by a human being than will a dandelion, because of the natural difference between a lion and a dandelion.
So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.
However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.
What I have argued here does not prove that evolutionary history is teleological and has a purpose, much less a divinely intended purpose. But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose. Evolutionary science is and should be neutral with respect to the question of whether the process of evolution has a teleology. If an evolutionary biologist claims that evolution has no purpose because of the role of random variation within it, that is not a scientific statement of evolutionary biology.
If so, then it is not an "objective (mind-independent) process"; otherwise, "thrown into question" is only subjective (i.e. a mere interpretation). Scientific realism (à la Deutsch)** – contra "shut up and calculate" instrumentalism / positivism – makes more sense (and is more parsimonious) to me. — 180 Proof
I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. — Metaphysician Undercover
Nice essay, summed up in this sentence;Just noticed that this article was published the same day as your OP:
Teleology: What Is It Good For?, by John O'Callaghan
But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose.
But you've cherry-picked that quote. O'Callaghan then distinguishes between 'creating' and 'making'. He says making 'presupposes something already existing upon which the maker acts'. That is the model for human artifacts. By contrast, 'God in creating all that is in every aspect in which it is, including the causal powers and efficacy of agents that respond actively or passively to other created agents, presupposes nothing other than God’s own being, power, knowledge, and goodness.' And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer
First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. — Metaphysician Undercover
No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is indeed "the problem" for explaining Purpose & Emergence in reductive physical terms. Which is why philosophers use holistic Meta-Physical terms, such as teleology to explain, not how, but why complex self-sustaining & self-organizing systems emerge from a world presumably ruled by the destructive & dissipating second law of thermodynamics (entropy). It's also why I coined a new term, EnFormAction, that refers to the constructive force in physics, formerly labeled dismissively as Negentropy. :smile:Yes. In other words the problem for the physicalist is: can we explain the 'strong emergence' of life and mind in purely physical terms given that reductionism seems to fail? — boundless
:sweat: i.e. WOO-of-the-gaps (from ... appeal to ignorance)"Entropy" and "Enformy" are scientific/technical terms that are equivalent to the religious/moralistic terms "Evil" and "Good" [WOO]. So, while those forces are completely natural, the ultimate source of the power behind them may be supernatural [WOO], in the sense that the First Cause logically existed before the Big Bang. — Gnomon
In the case of living beings, where individual beings, are each observed to have one's own internal purpose (obvious in human intent), the causation here can only be accounted for as a bottom-up form of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover
There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation. — boundless
One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact. — boundless
I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility? — boundless
Top-down causation doesn't mean external coercion or denial of agency—quite the opposite. It refers to the way the organization or unity of a system constrains and enables the behaviour of its parts from within (hence organism, organic, and organisation.) — Wayfarer
In O’Callaghan’s essay, it’s the Humpty Dumpty model: the organism is not built out of self-standing parts that can function on their own and just happen to join up; rather, the parts are what they are because of their roles in the whole. — Wayfarer
You can’t reassemble life from pieces. The individual’s capacity for intentional action—say, to enlist in an army—is already shaped by the larger context: language, culture, history, embodiment. — Wayfarer
Bottom-up causation, by contrast, is the Frankenstein model: assemble a bunch of pieces, energise them with a force, and voila! a system emerges from their interactions. — Wayfarer
So invoking top-down causation isn’t a denial of free will—it’s an attempt to explain how form, meaning, and function arise in organisms, including human beings. You don’t have to be a physicalist to see that. — Wayfarer
One of the strengths of Aquinas’ philosophy, and a point O’Callaghan emphasizes, is that God doesn't need to control or micromanage natural beings in order for their actions to be meaningful or purposeful. Instead, God creates beings with their own natures—internal principles of motion, action, and teleology. This means that organisms act from within themselves; they are genuine agents, not mere instruments or puppets. Their purposes are real and intelligible because they arise from their God-given form or nature, not from external control. — Wayfarer
The teleology is internal, not imposed from the outside. — Wayfarer
My view, following O’Callaghan (and by extension, Aquinas and Aristotle), is that top-down causation refers to the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts—not as external coercion, but as internal teleology. — Wayfarer
Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things.
It's also why I coined a new term, EnFormAction, that refers to the constructive force in physics, formerly labeled dismissively as Negentropy. :smile: — Gnomon
I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
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