The water is physical, and the cold temperature is physical, and the ice is physical, but is the relation that describes and accounts for the transformation itself physical? — Leontiskos

That seems straight out of Hume to me. And I see his point.

And consider the world in which water never freezes. Surely that world has one less physical thing than our world, given that it lacks ice. But does it lack a second physical thing, namely the causal relation described by the consequence? — Leontiskos

But water mixed with cooling temperature followed by its becoming frozen water or ice…

Maybe we can say that like we sense water and then sense ice, causality is something we sense over time, it’s a name for the “and then” when we mix water with cold air over time. So like the other physical things causality isn’t just a mental relationship, but the motion of objects. Causality is a type of motion like icey or liquid are types of water depending on the temperature.

But this was the very question that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. His famous “answer to Hume” was, paraphrased, that we do not infer causality from observed sequences; rather, we could not even recognize those sequences as such unless the category of causation were already present in the intellect. The freezing of water is experienced as a physical transformation precisely because we perceive the world through the perspective of causality Causality isn’t a physical object to be found so much as a necessary condition for the coherence of experience.

Hume argues that since we never observe causality directly—only sequences of events—then causality must be a mental habit or convention, not something real, as it can’t be observed. But Kant says the fact that we can experience sequences as ordered events already presupposes the possibility of causal relationships. What makes experience possible is not just sensory data - as the empiricists argue - but the conceptual framework through which we cognise it.

The idea that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality is so familiar to us now that it is difficult for us to see what a pivotal insight this was for Kant. He was well aware of the idea’s power to overturn the philosophical worldviews of his contemporaries and predecessors, however. He even somewhat immodestly likens his situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our worldview. In the Lockean view, mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true nature of objects. Kant says, “Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects” (B xvi). But that approach cannot explain why some claims like, “every event must have a cause,” are a priori true. Similarly, Copernicus recognized that the movement of the stars cannot be explained by making them revolve around the observer; it is the observer that must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. It is the mind itself which gives objects at least some of their characteristics because they must conform to its structure and conceptual capacities. Thus, the mind’s active role in helping to create a world that is experiencable must put it at the center of our philosophical investigations. The appropriate starting place for any philosophical inquiry into knowledge, Kant decides, is with the mind that can have that knowledge. — Kant Metaphysics IEP

What is an example of such an idea? Who holds that there is such a thing? — Wayfarer

Many people.

A general outline could be someone holds a belief (1) and has an intentional response (2) to said belief.

The most common examples of this are A Believes (mental state) it will rain, does not Desire (mental state) to get wet, and so intends (mental state) to take an umbrella when they go outside.

A Mental State being a non-reductive state: As Nagel and Chalmers put forward.

There are differing approaches to this position obviously. Eliminitivism (something liek Dennett) and Dualism (something like Descartes) are two other different perspectives.

As for mental causation, what if I were to write something that caused you to become agitated? Would that not constitute an example of mental causation that has physical consequences such as increasing your pulse? — Wayfarer

That sounds like a physical reduction argument. Some argue that all mental states are physically reducible - then we enter into the Hard Problem of consciousness.

That is an interesting approach. Not sure I buy into it though as there is evidence enough that one physical event leads to another (physically) and this is quite easily observed.

If you push your view to the point you are I feel you are effectively end up arguing for solipsism?

Yes. What do we do about this? Ignore it or throw darts into dark and hope to hit something?

I think you are probably approaching this in a similar manner to me.

I think there is an issue of language use invovled in what we are saying. When I read philosophical arguments involving the issue of causation, they terms are always framed in a specific manner -- often highly abstracted -- so as to be almost non-appliable to daily human life. Such framing makes perfect sense when it comes to the hard sciences that do not involve biological messiness, but less so when we talk of subjective experience and individual acts.

What bothered me was a reading a while back regarding how a mental state causes me to move my arm. The author framed the mental act as effecting the muscles, yet this is obviously an arbitrary point in the chain of events, as we could instead say 'No! That is too far down the line. The mental act to physical act begins at the neuronal level where the muscles received the signal," and then someone else may say "Wait a minute! The mental to phsyical act happens in the Brain".

The phsyical reductionist argument obvious suffers and it seems that a kind of elimitivism makes more sense from a physicalist perspective.

As for Mental to Mental, my position is we cannot say anything about such as it does not realy exist other than by way of using physical sensory data to progress the thought (real or imagined) as in the case of believing it will rain or not.

My view is that when people talk of Mental to Mental causation they are really talking about some mental state (physical or otherwise depending on your philosophical perspective) connected to another mental state by physical states.

To use a loose ananlogy, as Gazzaniga talked about split brain patients showing that the hemisphere effectively communicated in the physical world through sensory perception completely unbeknowst to the subject of the brain. If you are familiar?

Please extrapolate. That is ONE work of his I have not read through cover to cover yet.

It is not my intention to cause any disruption to your thread, so I will not take this any further. — T Clark

I reject it too. Not that I claim to be a philosopher, it is just something I have had doubts about via my understanding of physics from an early age; and has since been reinforced by whimsical musings and more profound ineffiable experiences too.

I have yet to find any means of framing this in a rational context though :D

How do you contend with arguments against physical reductionism and elimitivism?

Basically I am asking what convinces of this?

I was not aware Russell had said that. Thanks :)

Quote from book or essay?

Both are abstract contents that only have meaning in the physically embodied world.

Basic Kantian stuff ;)

well one side has something to do - the physical side has literally every bit of research they've been doing and are continuing to do. They obviously don't have all the answers, but they're also obviously trying and progressing.

The other side hasn't made a single inch of progress in thousands of years.

I know that might sound unfairly dismissive, but I also believe there's at the very least a big dose of truth in it.

supervenience — J

Yes please! Complicated concept but a could be well worth getting deep into here :)

I know that might sound unfairly dismissive, but I also believe there's at the very least a big dose of truth in it. — flannel jesus

The current paradigm is the current paradigm. As long as we are not going backwards.

There is a reason I get aggravated when discussing philosophical ideas and people seem wholly unaware of scientific evidence that can help them refine or rethink the question/s they are playing with.

Note: Philosophically physicalism (as a rational position) does not hold all the answers and it is more than reasonable, in many ways, to take other positions seriously even if they are also left wanting. I am not really in favour of a utilitarian approach that clumsily weighs abstract proofs against physical evidence. I think it this issue that causes the biggest misunderstandings across all fields of human knowledge.

Maybe.

Yet, we are aware of things that do not exist for us through abstractions. We are 'aware' of abstractions.

I think there is nothing particularly faulty in planting yourself in a strong physicalist position, but at the same time there are limitations to physical reductionism. No knowing something still leaves the possibility of something.

By this I mean that our concept of the 'physical world' has shifted with broader understanding across human history -- and pre-history no doubt! the physical world used ot be something more about Mass, but now Fields and such have altered what it is we are referring to as 'physical'.

It could be imagined that someone could make the faulty assumption that all white powder is the same because it is white simply because they have yet to discern any difference beyond aesthetic appearences. Once interacted with consistently people can slowly but surely come to understand that beyond appearances things are not always what they seem to be.

Of course the onus is on non-physical positions to help physicalist positions rethink what 'physical' means now and coudl mean under a cognitive paradigm shift.

Cop out! :D

@Leontiskos What are your views on Mental to Physical and Mental to Mental causation?

My interest does extend beyond philosophy of mind, but would like to keep things related to this area if possible.

Philosophically physicalism (as a rational position) does not hold all the answers and it is more than reasonable, in many ways, to take other positions seriously — I like sushi

I think they should be taken seriously too! I'm not implying otherwise.

I do see a lot of people not talking physicalism seriously, which I think is odd and getting even more odd every day now that we live in a world where computer simulacrum of neurons are capable of speaking to us.

- The physical causes the mental but not vice versa - epiphenomenalism — bert1

One thing that may explain a lot is that Language is an epiphenomenon and we use it to explain its own existence and practically everything else.

Not sure if you get what I mean, but hope to start another thread on this one day once I have hashed it out more thoroughly.

Maybe

Well I can’t think how else something would be caused.

That is an interesting approach. Not sure I buy into it though as there is evidence enough that one physical event leads to another (physically) and this is quite easily observed. — I like sushi

Indeed. You can still have the intuitive 'physical' causation we ordinarily see all the time, say in machines. It's just it would be reducible to the mental causation happening at the micro-level on a panpsychist metaphysic.

If you push your view to the point you are I feel you are effectively end up arguing for solipsism?

Panpsychism might end up in a kind of cosmopsychism, which is arguably a kind of solipsism, but any theory which does not allow for some kind of plurality of points of view I would have thought has gone wrong somewhere. The evidence for other minds is overwhelming it seems to me. One challenge to a panpsychist cosmopsychism is how to account for plurality and privacy of points of view within the overall unity.

i mean most people dont want me to droll on and on about N's views.

If you want to feel free. I have been in the same position before whenever I mentioned Husserl I felt like I was banging a drum for him or something. Get it out of your system :)

Maybe we can say that like we sense water and then sense ice, causality is something we sense over time, it’s a name for the “and then” when we mix water with cold air over time. So like the other physical things causality isn’t just a mental relationship, but the motion of objects. Causality is a type of motion like icey or liquid are types of water depending on the temperature. — Fire Ologist

I think that's basically right. My point is not that Hume is correct in dismissing causality, but the Humean-like arguments apparently do suffice to show that causality is not physical.

But this was the very question that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. His famous “answer to Hume” was, paraphrased, that we do not infer causality from observed sequences; rather, we could not even recognize those sequences as such unless the category of causation were already present in the intellect. The freezing of water is experienced as a physical transformation precisely because we perceive the world through the perspective of causality Causality isn’t a physical object to be found so much as a necessary condition for the coherence of experience.

Hume argues that since we never observe causality directly—only sequences of events—then causality must be a mental habit or convention, not something real, as it can’t be observed. But Kant says the fact that we can experience sequences as ordered events already presupposes the possibility of causal relationships. What makes experience possible is not just sensory data - as the empiricists argue - but the conceptual framework through which we cognise it. — Wayfarer

Okay, but how does any of that help your thesis which holds that causality is physical? Kant's answer to Hume does not involve the idea that causality is physical.

This would suggest that the cause of the change in momentum of the two balls could be given to numerous different forces, held in various different points in the system. Depending on which perspective the observer is coming from. — Punshhh

Sure, I don't have any objection to that sort of claim. :up:

What are your views on Mental to Physical and Mental to Mental causation? — I like sushi

I don't really understand what you are asking. I'd say both are obviously true, and that 99.9% of all people accept both. To give two examples, the first occurs whenever someone forms a mental plan about the physical world and then executes it. The second occurs whenever some persuades someone else. Or if you want a stronger sense of 'cause', then the second occurs whenever a propagandist succeeds.

The idea that there is such a thing as Mental to Mental Causation is an overliberal use of the term 'Causation'. — I like sushi

What do you mean by "mental to mental causation"?

The term Causation is a physical term that describes types of temporal organisation. — I like sushi

Again, 99.9% of people are going to say that the builder's mental plan of the house causes (in part) the finished house. So I think you have an enormous burden of proof to show that mental causation does not exist and that "causation is a physical term."

So I think you have an enormous burden of proof to show that mental causation does not exist and that "causation is a physical term." — Leontiskos

If causation is the same for mental to mental as it is for physical to physical how can this be proven? There is physical evidence for physical causation but not for mental causation. Physical reductionism either ends in everything being physical or some point where physical acts move to or from mental acts.

The burden of proof is essential the Hard Problem. This is a problem for 100% of people not 0.1% last I heard.

There is physical evidence for physical causation but not for mental causation. — I like sushi

Why do you say such things? Do you have an argument?

Or rather, the reason 99.9% of people believe that there is mental causation is because there is evidence for it. That there is not physical evidence for mental causation may be true, and is probably a tautology. If one accepts only "physical evidence" then they are effectively a physicalist.

I reject it too. — I like sushi

I think the concept of causality can be a very useful one, depending on the situation. At other times, it can be misleading.