Sure, but in a mind-independent view, you bringing it to mind has zero effect on the thing itself. — noAxioms
From a purely speculative metaphysical perspective, bottom line is, one’s decision on his relation to himself follows necessarily from whether or not the volitions of his will justify his worthiness of being happy. Clear conscience on steroids, so to speak. — Mww
You'd have to show where QM says anything like that. QM does not contradict empirical experience. — noAxioms
Right. There's no cat experiencing superposition or being both dead and alive. There's (from the lab PoV) a superposition of the cat experiencing living, and of experiencing dying by poison. A superposition of those two experiences is very different than the cat experiencing both outcomes. Each experience is utterly unaware of the other. — noAxioms
'Definite states' sounds awfully classical to me. MWI is not a counterfactual interpretation, so is seems wrong to talk about such things. — noAxioms
Hard to read, lacking the background required, but it seems to say that there are no 'worlds' from any objective description of say the universal wave function. It has no 'system states', something with which I agree. There are no discreet worlds, which again, sounds like a counterfactual. I think the paper is arguing against not so much the original Everett paper, but against the DeWitt interpretation that dubbed the term 'worlds' and MWI and such. I could be wrong. — noAxioms
QM doesn't have a reduction postulate, but some of the interpretations do. Each seems to spin the role of measurement a different way.I meant something like 'QM without the reduction postulate'. — boundless
Yes, the latter two are, but the meaning of especially superposition is still interpretation dependent. Superposition itself is baked into the mathematics.If you do not accept collapse, you still have superposition and interference.
I suppose that explanation is interpretation dependent as well.So, you need to explain why we do percieve everything in a definite state.
It seems to be enough given an interpretation (MWI say) that explains it that way.But I was questioning if decoherence is enough for the appearance of collapse.
Interference is a statistical effect, so with no particle can interference be measured, let alone measured by the particle in question. But it can be concluded given hundreds of thousands of objects all being treated identically. So I suppose a really huge crowd of people (far more than billions) could collectively notice some kind of interference if they all did something identical. I cannot fathom what that experiment would look like or how any of those people could survive it.Interference terms remain, they become however very, very small. Is that truly enough to explain our 'definite' experience (same goes for the cat's experience)?
Basically, in MWI the branching is explained by saying that there is a superposition of definite states.
OK. They're post-measurement, so they are definite, sure, but post-measurement, they're not in superposition anymore, so it's only in superposition of definite state relative to a system that has not yet measured the lab doing the spin measurement.Definite means something like this. Consider a spin 1/2 particle. When we measure the spin (say) in the z-axis we obtain either '+1/2' or '-1/2'. So, '+1/2' and '-1/2' are 'definite states'. — boundless
Interpretation dependent obviously. Some interpretations have no concept of 'our' experience since there's no 'you' that satisfies the laws of identity and non-contradiction. Keep that in mind.Here things go tricky, however. Why, when we make a measurement, does the quantum state collapse or appear to collapse in one state of the 'basis 1' instead of 'basis 2'?
What is 'the mind' per MMI? It is some dualistic mind thing, sort of a moving spotlight which gets to pick which path it follows, with the other paths left as zombies? That sounds like uni-mind, so no, probably not that. You can tell I don't know much about MMI, especially the part about how they define 'mind'. Do trees similarly select their bases? Where do they draw the line between what has a 'mind' and what doesn't?This is a part of, as I understand it, the 'preferred basis problem'. MMI posits that 'basis 1' is selected by the mind.
There's no preferred basis in MWI. That much I know. Can't speak for MMI.Yeah, the paper is a bit technical and also beyond my paygrade. Basically, however, it tries to reject MWI by adducing that if a MWI supporter doesn't add some postulate to 'pure QM without the collapse postulate' you can't explain how the universe decompose in subsystems, how the preferred basis is selected etc.
We were discussing 'worlds', which is loosely referenced by the word 'thing' in my statement, despite not being an object. A world is unaffected by something elsewhere imagining one.What thing would that be? — Wayfarer
Cool article, compressing 100 years of quantum history into a few pages. It harps a lot on how Einstein really wanted a locally real universe, and perhaps never knew it was hopeless. His critique was critical to the development of quantum theory.Incidentally a nice Australian Broadcasting Corp feature on the 100 year anniversary of Heisenberg's famous paper
A world is unaffected by something elsewhere imagining one. — noAxioms
His [Einstein’s] critique was critical to the development of quantum theory. — noAxioms
"When people say, 'Oh, you showed Einstein wrong', I say, 'Come on, I showed Einstein was great,'" he said in response to the award.
Discover Magazine: In quantum mechanics an object can exist in many states at once, which sounds crazy. The quantum description of the world seems completely contrary to the world as we experience it.
Sir Roger Penrose: It doesn’t make any sense, and there is a simple reason. You see, the mathematics of quantum mechanics has two parts to it. One is the evolution of a quantum system, which is described extremely precisely and accurately by the Schrödinger equation. That equation tells you this: If you know what the state of the system is now, you can calculate what it will be doing 10 minutes from now. However, there is the second part of quantum mechanics — the thing that happens when you want to make a measurement. Instead of getting a single answer, you use the equation to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes. The results don’t say, “This is what the world is doing.” Instead, they just describe the probability of its doing any one thing. The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesn’t.
QM doesn't have a reduction postulate, but some of the interpretations do. Each seems to spin the role of measurement a different way. — noAxioms
It seems to be enough given an interpretation (MWI say) that explains it that way. — noAxioms
Interference is a statistical effect, so with no particle can interference be measured, let alone measured by the particle in question. But it can be concluded given hundreds of thousands of objects all being treated identically. So I suppose a really huge crowd of people (far more than billions) could collectively notice some kind of interference if they all did something identical. I cannot fathom what that experiment would look like or how any of those people could survive it. — noAxioms
So the cat is in superposition of the interior definite state of being dead and alive, but the cat is not in a exterior definite state, meaning it is still in superposition relative to the lab. And yes, they can measure interference in principle. — noAxioms
There's no preferred basis in MWI. That much I know. Can't speak for MMI. — noAxioms
I have shown that it is always possible to factorize the global Hilbert space into subsystems
in such a way, that the story told by this factorization is that of a world in which nothing
happens. A factorization into interacting and entangling subsystems is also possible, in
infinitely many arbitrary ways. But such a more complicated factorization is meaningful
only if it is justified through interactions with an external observer who does not arise as
a part of the state vector.
The Many World Interpretation is therefore rather a No World Interpretation (according to the simple factorization), or a Many Many Worlds Interpretation (because each of
the arbitrary more complicated factorizations tells a different story about Many Worlds
[7]).
(This has been explored by credible academic sources, moving beyond popular mysticism, to examine genuine philosophical parallels. Theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli, founder of loop quantum gravity, has written seriously about how Nagarjuna’s philosophy of emptiness—the idea that phenomena lack intrinsic existence—resonates with quantum mechanics’ relational ontology, where particles and properties exist only through measurement relationships rather than independently. Academic journals have published rigorous analyses, such as SpringerLink’s examination of “Two Aspects of Śūnyatā in Quantum Physics,” which argues that both quantum mechanics and (Middle-Way) Buddhism suggest there are no intrinsically existing particles with inherent properties, but rather that all phenomena arise through dependent relationships. This philosophical convergence centers on the idea that reality is fundamentally relational rather than consisting of purportedly mind-independent objects, challenging the classical scientific assumption that the objective domain has fixed, determinate properties independent of observation. It dovetails well with aspects of the Copenhagen and QBist interpretation, not so much with classical realism.) — Wayfarer
Notice that Rovelli IMO overstates the similarities. — boundless
Perhaps. It's been said he has a nihilist view of Nāgārjuna, and this kind of mistaken interpretation is not infrequent even amongst expert readers. — Wayfarer
Have you encountered the charming and ebullient Michel Bitbol? I learned of him on this forum and have read some of his articles. He is a French philosopher of science who has published books on Schrodinger, among other subjects. Also has an expert grasp of Buddhist philosophy. See for example It is never Known but Is the Knower (.pdf) — Wayfarer
There are convergences between Buddhism and physics, but they're nothing like what you would assume at first glance. It has to do with the ontology of Buddhism, which is not based on there being Aristotelian substances or essences, and also on the way that Buddhism understands the inter-relationship of 'self-and-world'. It has a relational, not substantial, ontology. Husserl sang high praises of it. — Wayfarer
A tempting argument. But you beg the question, which is whether speaking of something affects it. An obvious question is, "In what way is it affected".As soon as you name a ‘world’ or a ‘thing’ or ‘an unknown object’ which you claim is unaffected by or separate from your thought of it, you are already bringing it within the ambit of thought. The realist always has something in mind when he or she speaks of ‘something unaffected by thought’. It’s a Chinese finger trap - you can’t even say it without undercutting the point. — Wayfarer
But you beg the question, which is whether speaking of something affects it. — Ludwig V
As soon as you name a ‘world’ or a ‘thing’ or ‘an unknown object’ which you claim is unaffected by or separate from your thought of it, you are already bringing it within the ambit of thought. — Wayfarer
It may well be special because it is observed. But observing something doesn’t normally cause it to exist. So even if it is special because it is observed, it may exist for some other reason. You need to demonstrate that there is no other reason.Yes! The origin of the word is a relation, and yet over time it gets thought of as a property. Elephants existing to me slowly becomes elephants existing period. — noAxioms
If it doesn’t stand out to anything observing or caring about it, it’s not a relation. It’s like claiming to be a parent when you don’t have a child.Yes! The origin of the word is a relation, and yet over time it gets thought of as a property. Elephants existing to me slowly becomes elephants existing period. That which stands out to an observer seems observer dependent. So I'm looking for a definition where yea, it stands out, but not necessarily to anything observing or caring about it. Still a relation though. — noAxioms
I’m glad we agree on something. However, to establish the difference (or similarity) between A and B, you have to identify A and B. Suppose that A is the existing elephant. Your problem is that you have no non-existing elephant to take the place of B. You might find a partial solution in Meinong’s work, but you might not find his arguments persuasive.That sounds pretty objective. A thing either is or it isn't, a property that is true or false. But then how does an existing elephant differ from the nonexisting elephant, in any way that matters to it? That's a hard question since most dismiss the question before thinking about it. — noAxioms
I can see why you would see it like that. I maintain that the sense of a word now trumps the sense of a word 1,000 years ago.Well, it stands out to us, so it exists as a relation. There doesn't seem to be a test for the existence as a property. That's the problem with the word slowly changing meaning from its original definition. — noAxioms
I’m afraid I have been lazy in not giving you the variety of examples that was really needed and left you with the impression that “real” is equivalent to “genuine” as opposed to “counterfeit”. It is true that “real” can be equivalent to “existing” as opposed to “non-existing” as in “imaginary” or “proposed” or “rumoured” or “mythical”. But consider “real property” which means land and similar property as opposed to, for example, intellectual property, stocks and bonds, good will, &c. or “real earnings” as opposed to earnings before allowing for inflation, real cars as opposed to toy cars, real ghosts as opposed to pretend ghosts, real anger as opposed to simulated anger, a real murderer as opposed to an actor of a murdere, a real flower as opposed to an artificial flower. I could go on.Again, this topic is about ontology, not a completely different definition of the word that means genuine vs, counterfeit. — noAxioms
Some reservations. Your formulation has the consequence of limiting existence to things that have causal relationships with each other – that is, physical things. Materialists or physicalists would, no doubt be happy with that. But no-one else will. Plato clearly takes it in that sense, (which justifies the formulation you have) but then rejects it precisely because it denies existence to anything that is not physical – he cites the virtues and the soul. (See Sophist 246 – 7.) It could be made to work in other contexts, I think. Still, it’s a step forward for me. But then, I’m not even looking for a single definition of “exists”. I think that, like “real”, it has different meanings in different contexts. The existence of numbers is not the same as the existence of trees, and the existence of sensations is different again.Agree. I said that to show that it seems to be a valid mind-independent definition of existence, and an objective one this time, one that provides a test to pass or not. — noAxioms
I think that one cannot name something by merely thinking, because the name has to be shared to be meaningful. Hence I focused on the speaking rather than any preparatory thought..You said nothing is changed by speaking of it, which is true, but your comment referenced something which wasn’t claiming anything was spoken. I got confused, is all. — Mww
Too true. Though I think some people would argue that Geach's version of the point was rather different from Kant's.I bring this up only to show, once again, what seems new, mostly isn’t. — Mww
But you beg the question, which is whether speaking of something affects it. An obvious question is, "In what way is it affected". — Ludwig V
The Principle of Counterfactual Definiteness (PCD) asserts "the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured". Efforts have been made to demonstrate say the existence of a photon 'in flight', only to come up empty. Photons only exist in the past of the event at which they are measured.
So much wrong with that sentence. Nit: I didn't name any particular world. I didn't have a particular one in mind, especially since it's quite difficult to do so. Secondly, I didn't claim anything, but I am defending the stance of those that claim a mind-independent reality. In such a stance, there is no 'ambit of thought'. That term presumes a very different stance. Under the mind-independent view, somebody thinking about X (X not being something in his causal reach) has zero effect on X, and in particular, has zero contribution to whatever the ontological state of X is.As soon as you name a ‘world’ or a ‘thing’ or ‘an unknown object’ which you claim is unaffected by or separate from your thought of it, you are already bringing it within the ambit of thought. — Wayfarer
Arguably so, but being thought of doesn't change it to be affected by thought.The realist always has something in mind when he or she speaks of ‘something unaffected by thought’.
I haven't seen the point undercut, despite your implication of 'ambit'.It’s a Chinese finger trap - you can’t even say it without undercutting the point.
I know. I was relaying a couple snippets from the article since Einstein's realist leanings have been noted multiple times in this topic.[Einstein’s] critique was critical to the development of quantum theory. — noAxioms
Yes, but the article acknowledges that. — Wayfarer
Only in some interpretations, and not crazy, just unintuitive.Discover Magazine: In quantum mechanics an object can exist in many states at once, which sounds crazy. — Wayfarer
Schrödinger equation is deterministic actually. Penrose also seems to be a realist, which doesn't contradict QM, it just contradicts locality. Does he also disagree with say Bohmian mechanics?The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesn’t.
There are those interpretations as well, such as objective collapse.But what if physical reality is actually indeterminate on a fundamental level?
Preaching to choirTheoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli, founder of loop quantum gravity, has written seriously about how Nagarjuna’s philosophy of emptiness—the idea that phenomena lack intrinsic existence—resonates with quantum mechanics’ relational ontology, where particles and properties exist only through measurement relationships rather than independently.
Why would you want interference removed? It is seen. Even a realist interpretation like DBB has the photon going through one slit and not the other, yet interference patterns result. We experience that. Perhaps we're talking past each other.MWI was developed before decoherence. MWI supporters like decoherence because it seems to explain the branching. It doesn't IIRC remove interference however. — boundless
You don't know that, there being no evidence of it. Under MWI, there's no 'our', so every basis is experienced by whatever is entangled with that basis, with none preferred.Yes, but there is a preferred basis in our experience.
A realist might want to justify the existence of whatever he asserts to exist, but I don't count myself among them. I actually think its a big problem. I mean sure, the elephant exists because its parents got busy one day, but that's not a fundamental cause.It may well be special because it is observed. But observing something doesn’t normally cause it to exist. So even if it is special because it is observed, it may exist for some other reason. You need to demonstrate that there is no other reason. — Ludwig V
Nonsense. Two pebbles are (at a particular moment in time) a meter apart. That's a relation ('is a meter from') even without them ever being observed or known.If it doesn’t stand out to anything observing or caring about it, it’s not a relation.
Maybe I'm in the presence of elephant B and I've no relation to the existing A one. That would imply that I don't exist since such relations (in the presence of) tend to be between things with similar ontology.I’m glad we agree on something. However, to establish the difference (or similarity) between A and B, you have to identify A and B. Suppose that A is the existing elephant. Your problem is that you have no non-existing elephant to take the place of B. — Ludwig V
My prior topic was on exactly that. I am more open to Meinong than most. My focus was on his rejection of existence being prior to predication (EPP). Given that rejection, I can be in the presence (a predicate) of elephant B without either of us existing.You might find a partial solution in Meinong’s work — Ludwig V
I don't know Kant all that well, but doesn't his 'exist' boil down to 'I know about'? That is a predicate. Kant isn't exactly a ball of mind-independent opinions.However, Kant argued that “exists” is not a predicate, which means that existence is not a property.
There's plenty of causal structures that are not typically classified as physical. Conway's Game of Life (GoL) is one example. A medium spaceship is an object in that structure. It moves (at 0.5c), can be created and have causal effects. It exists by this EP definition. But it lacks mass, energy, etc, words that are meaningful to our particular physics.Some reservations. Your formulation has the consequence of limiting existence to things that have causal relationships with each other – that is, physical things.
PCD is not paradoxical, it just isn't classical.One of many such apparent paradoxes in quantum physics — Wayfarer
Why would you want interference removed? It is seen. Even a realist interpretation like DBB has the photon going through one slit and not the other, yet interference patterns result. We experience that. Perhaps we're talking past each other. — noAxioms
You don't know that, there being no evidence of it. Under MWI, there's no 'our', so every basis is experienced by whatever is entangled with that basis, with none preferred. — noAxioms
They are nowhere near sufficiently significant. I cannot think of a scenario, however trivial, where you'd see this. It would be the equivalent of measuring which slit the photon passed through, and still getting an interference patter. Interference comes from not knowing the state of the cat, ever.Anyway, my contention is that if the interference terms are too significant, in the Schrodinger's cat experiment, the version of the observers that sees the 'alive' cat should perceive in some ways the other 'world'. — boundless
Sure we do. You observe that by not measuring the spin, same as not measuring which slit.In my example of spins, for instance, we observe either '+1/2' or '-1/2', but we never observe the state 1/sqrt(2)('+1/2'+'-1/2').
They are nowhere near sufficiently significant. I cannot think of a scenario, however trivial, where you'd see this. It would be the equivalent of measuring which slit the photon passed through, and still getting an interference patter. Interference comes from not knowing the state of the cat, ever. — noAxioms
Sure we do. You observe that by not measuring the spin, same as not measuring which slit. — noAxioms
So what is more fundamental than that?A realist might want to justify the existence of whatever he asserts to exist, but I don't count myself among them. I actually think its a big problem. I mean sure, the elephant exists because its parents got busy one day, but that's not a fundamental cause. — noAxioms
Oh, I see. The criterion you are applying is simply "being in a relation with something that exists".Nonsense. Two pebbles are (at a particular moment in time) a meter apart. That's a relation ('is a meter from') even without them ever being observed or known. — noAxioms
I can make some sort of sense to your acceptance of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I need to pay more attention to him, (thanks for that) but so far I can't make any sense at all of your being in the presence of elephant B.I am more open to Meinong than most. My focus was on his rejection of existence being prior to predication (EPP). Given that rejection, I can be in the presence (a predicate) of elephant B without either of us existing. — noAxioms
Not really. Phenomena are dependent on minds for their existence (and properties). But noumena are not.I don't know Kant all that well, but doesn't his 'exist' boil down to 'I know about'? — noAxioms
That's not at all obvious to me. I'm lost.To reject objective existence as a predicate is to embrace EPP. — noAxioms
I won't quibble about that. It's a side-issue.There's plenty of causal structures that are not typically classified as physical. — noAxioms
Well, he lived in different times and thought with different concepts.Yes, Plato certainly used a different definition than EP. Plato cites the soul as something lacking in causal interaction? That seems contrary to how souls are often defined. — noAxioms
The cause of its parents of course.I mean sure, the elephant exists because its parents got busy one day, but that's not a fundamental cause. — noAxioms
So what is more fundamental than that? — Ludwig V
That would be a different relation than the one I listed. I mean, that's like 'being in a relation with something that's green', which begs the question 'what if it's a meter from something that's not green?'. It seems your relation asserts something in addition to the relation. Mine did not. That relation is a predicate, and if EPP is not accepted, only the relation 'is a meter from' is sufficient. Existence of neither object is required. With EPP, yea, they need to exist before they can be a meter apart.Two pebbles are (at a particular moment in time) a meter apart. That's a relation ('is a meter from') even without them ever being observed or known. — noAxioms
Oh, I see. The criterion you are applying is simply "being in a relation with something that exists".
No different than the two things a meter apart. Existence of either thing is not required if EPP is rejected, so I can be in the presence of a nonexistent elephant. Since related things often (not always) seem to share ontology, I probably wouldn't exist either. My suggestion is that since elephant A & B are identical except for A existing, nether A nor B has any empirical test to see which is which. For this reason, I find existence defined as an objective property to be useless. Hence my not being a realist. All the problems of realism are solved.I can make some sort of sense to your acceptance of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I need to pay more attention to him, (thanks for that) but so far I can't make any sense at all of your being in the presence of elephant B.
I really don't know Kant then. Those are not idealist ideas.doesn't [Kant's] 'exist' boil down to 'I know about'? — noAxioms
Not really. Phenomena are dependent on minds for their existence (and properties). But noumena are not.
I don't understand any of that. There is no right/wrong basis under MWI. They all share the same ontology, but some are more probable than others, whatever that means.I meant that the 'normal' basis is selected, after the measurement, due to the fact that our experimental apparatuses are structured in some ways. In other words, the reason why we observe things in the 'right' basis is that the the experimental apparatus has those properties it has. However, in principle, you could have that after the measurement the state vector 'collapses' to one of the vector in the 'wrong' basis. — boundless
Arguably so, but being thought of doesn't change it to be affected by thought. — noAxioms
I don't understand any of that. There is no right/wrong basis under MWI. They all share the same ontology, but some are more probable than others, whatever that means. — noAxioms
Yes, there's a real problem about EPP. The root of the problem is the idea that something can exist before any predicates apply to it, or that something can have a predicate applied to it before it exists. Neither works. Hence "prior" cannot mean "temporally prior" so it needs to be reinterpreted or abandoned. It could mean something like "more fundamental", but I can't make any sense of that either. The only position that makes any sense to me is "co-arising" or interdependence.That relation is a predicate, and if EPP is not accepted, only the relation 'is a meter from' is sufficient. Existence of neither object is required. With EPP, yea, they need to exist before they can be a meter apart. — noAxioms
Well, you're still left with the problems of idealism. For me, your suggestion demonstrates that predication without existence makes no sense. I already knew that existence without predication makes no sense. So I'm left with interdependence.My suggestion is that since elephant A & B are identical except for A existing, nether A nor B has any empirical test to see which is which. For this reason, I find existence defined as an objective property to be useless. Hence my not being a realist. All the problems of realism are solved. — noAxioms
First of all, 'prior' is their language, and it isn't a temporal reference. EPP says (without using that contentious word) that 'only existing things can have predicates', which is arguably self contradictory since a nonexistent thing would have no predicates, which is in itself a predicate. Meinong rejects that, so existence is not a requirement for predication.There's a real problem about EPP. The root of the problem is the idea that something can exist before any predicates apply to it, or that something can have a predicate applied to it before it exists. Neither works. Hence "prior" cannot mean "temporally prior" so it needs to be reinterpreted or abandoned. — Ludwig V
As I said, under idealism, the elephant's existence is due to its being observed, being a phenomenon. That phenomenal relation results in the existence of the elephant, hence predication is prior to existence under idealism. You disagree I take it.Well, you're still left with the problems of idealism.
If you define existence as 'standing out', yea, it can't stand out without predicates. Under idealism, that would mean existence despite not being perceived, which isn't really idealism then. 2-4 seem to require predication, yes. 5 (objective)? That one seems contradictory only because existence under def 5 is a property (not a relation), and a property is a predicate, as is the lack of the property.I already knew that existence without predication makes no sense.
Just calling it 'the world' seems to be an assumption that this world is preferred, presumably because it is perceived. This sounds like a very mind dependent stance to me.The question of mind independence that is of interest to me, is the sense in which the world exists independently of the mind. — Wayfarer
Everett's thesis had to dumb-down the number of bases due to the finite but inexpressibly large actuality of the actual figure. For instance, you (a physical object with extension, at a moment in time) is undergoing trillions of splits such that there is no one measured state except relative to some measuring event well after said moment in time. Hence Rovelli saying that a thing cannot measure itself, it can only measure something sufficiently in the past to have collapsed into a coherent state. Not sure if it's Rovelli's term, but an extended system (a person say) at an extended moment in time, is a sort of extended spacetime event called a 'beable'.Even if there is a counter-intuitive increase of number of 'bases' — boundless
Everett's thesis had to dumb-down the number of bases due to the finite but inexpressibly large actuality of the actual figure. — noAxioms
Hence Rovelli saying that a thing cannot measure itself, it can only measure something sufficiently in the past to have collapsed into a coherent state. — noAxioms
'beable'. — noAxioms
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