Apply what you said to an example. Suppose I have a microchip (or series of microchips wired together) with x amount of switches. Are you saying that if I flip enough switches a certain way, consciousness will emerge? Are you saying it's possible that electronic switching operations AB...C can give rise to the conscious experience of seeing a sunset? Switching operations XY...Z can give rise to the pain of stubbing a toe? But switching operations AK...E, might not give rise to any conscious experience?

Apply what you said to an example. — RogueAI

Consider each experience you may have right now, like reading my reply, tasting a little tea, etc. Each of these experiences is unique to you in the sense that it represents something to you, the content of my reply means something to you, tasting tea feels something to you, etc.

Suppose I have a microchip (or series of microchips wired together) with x amount of switches. Are you saying that if I flip enough switches a certain way, consciousness will emerge? — RogueAI

I think you are talking about strong emergence here. I am, however, arguing that we are dealing with weak emergence when it comes to almost all mental phenomena, excluding the creation of a new idea.

Are you saying it's possible that electronic switching operations AB...C can give rise to the conscious experience of seeing a sunset? Switching operations XY...Z can give rise to the pain of stubbing a toe? But switching operations AK...E, might not give rise to any conscious experience? — RogueAI

I am saying that there is a correlation between my experience and the neurobiological processes in my brain.

* An example of weak emergence is like aniferomagnetism in which the system is reducible to atoms and there is a function that describes the property of the system, specific arrangement of the spins of atoms, in terms of the property of its parts, namely locations and the direction of spins of atoms.
** Strong emergence is defined as when a system is irreducible to its parts. This also means that there is no function that can describe the property of the system in terms of the properties of its parts as well. On the contrary, if there is a function that describes the property of the system, then the system must be reducible to something. — MoK

The condition that the macro-property, or holistic property, be a function of the properties of the parts of a system (including, presumably, relational properties) seems too weak to preclude strong (irreducible) emergence and also too weak to guarantee weak (reducible) emergence.

It's too weak to preclude strong emergence since strongly emergent properties like (arguably) consciousness often are granted to supervene* on lower-level properties (such as physical states of individual neurons) despite not being reducible to them. However, supervenience alone guarantees that there is a many-to-one function from the set of possible low-level configurations to the high-level properties that they realize, but it doesn't guarantee that this function can be given independently of the high-level, or formal, principles that govern the mapping. That is, what it is that determines that some given configuration, as expressed in low-level terms, instantiate the high-level property that it does may be high-level features of the system, such as its molar capabilities, that can't be described using the low-level concepts.

(*Supervenience already implies a function from micro-configurations to macro-properties: if two systems are identical in all micro respects, they must be identical in their macro-properties.)

It's too weak to guarantee weak emergence (i.e. guarantee reducibility) for the same reason. The satisfaction of this functional condition merely guarantees supervenience, but doesn't guarantee reducibility.

The condition that the macro-property, or holistic property, be a function of the properties of the parts of a system (including, presumably, relational properties) seems too weak to preclude strong (irreducible) emergence and also too weak to guarantee weak (reducible) emergence — Pierre-Normand

I wasn't entirely sure what op meant by "a function of" in this context, so I (perhaps embarrassingly) asked ai:

In the context of the provided text, saying one thing is "a function of" another thing means that the property of a system can be mathematically or logically described and derived from the properties of its constituent parts [textual content].

If the macro property is directly derivable from the properties and interactions of its parts - as in, it can analytically be confirmed to be a necessary consequence of the interactions of the parts - I would say that that IS what weak emergence is. It's not too weak to guarantee weak emergence, it's basically the definition of weak emergence.

If the macro property is directly derivable from the properties and interactions of its parts - as in, it can analytically be confirmed to be a necessary consequence of the interactions of the parts - I would say that that IS what weak emergence is. It's not too weak to guarantee weak emergence, it's basically the definition of weak emergence. — flannel jesus

I agree but here it's the idea of "derivability" that does the heavy lifting guaranteeing weak emergence. But, in his OP, @MoK, derived the conclusion that there ought to be such a "function" from the premise that there ought to be a "reason" why the system has the emergent property that it has. But this inference isn't valid. When some mental state M of an organism supervenes on the micro-physical configuration P of the parts of this organism, the reason why it is M specifically that is being realized by P may be that M non-accidentally satisfies some high-level biological or psychological features that characterise organisms of this specific kind, and not be derivable from the physical features of P alone. Or, as ChatGPT o3 phrased it: "Supervenience already implies a function from micro-configurations to macro-properties: if two systems are identical in all micro respects, they must be identical in their macro-properties. But this function need not be definable in purely micro-level terms. The criteria that fix the mapping may depend on high-level structures or capacities that cannot themselves be specified without invoking macro-level concepts."

But, in his OP, MoK, derived the conclusion that there ought to be such a "function" from the premise that there ought to be a "reason" why the system has the emergent property that it has. But this inference isn't valid. — Pierre-Normand

Yeah it definitely seems like op is more just assuming it's weak emergence. I mean I agree with that assumption, but I agree with you that he kinda leaps in with that assumption rather than making a good case for it.

The condition that the macro-property, or holistic property, be a function of the properties of the parts of a system (including, presumably, relational properties) seems too weak to preclude strong (irreducible) emergence and also too weak to guarantee weak (reducible) emergence. — Pierre-Normand

Could we agree on the definition of weak emergence, which occurs when the property of the system is a function of the properties of its parts? That, of course, requires that the system be reducible to its parts. Please let me know what you think, and we can go to the next step.

For those who think consciousness is an example of strong emergence, are there any other examples?

The only avalaible properties are the properties of parts though. — MoK

I agree. But I don't think all properties are physical.

I agree. But I don't think all properties are physical. — Patterner

Yes, there exist metal properties as well, which are related to the existence of another substance that I call the object. So, the question is whether mental properties are always a function of the properties of parts? If the answer is yes, then we are dealing with weak emergence, which is the case for the perception. There is a big set of mental phenomena, such as new abstract ideas, that are not a function of the properties of parts, I think.

For those who think consciousness is an example of strong emergence, are there any other examples? — Patterner

If consciousness is a strong emergent thing, then it cannot be causally efficacious in the world where physical objects obey the laws of nature. We, however, observe constantly that mental phenomena are causally efficacious, in a discussion, for example. I think, I write, I informe others. You do the same.

I'm asking if anyone has an example of strong emergence. For those who think consciousness is, I'm wondering if there are others.

I'm asking if anyone has an example of strong emergence. For those who think consciousness is, I'm wondering if there are others. — Patterner

I view the objects and phenomena of pretty much all the special sciences (e.g. biology, ecology, psychology, economics, etc.) to be strongly emergent in relation with the the objects and phenomena of the material sciences such as physics or chemistry. Some, like our @apokrisis argue (and I would agree) that even within physics, especially when the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium processes is involved, many phenomena are strongly emergent in the sense that they aren't intelligible merely in light of, or deducible from, the laws that govern their smaller components.

even within physics, especially when the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium processes is involved, many phenomena are strongly emergent in the sense that they aren't intelligible merely in light of, or deducible from, the laws that govern their smaller components. — Pierre-Normand

Would you say they need to take context into account in a way that classical physics did not?

Could we agree on the definition of weak emergence, which occurs when the property of the system is a function of the properties of its parts? That, of course, requires that the system be reducible to its parts. Please let me know what you think, and we can go to the next step. — MoK

This definition would be more precise if we would substitute "is deducible from" or "is grounded in" for "is a function of". That's because, as I've suggested, many proponents of strong emergence, who we may call "compatibilists" (by close analogy with the corresponding stance in the philosophy of free will and determinism) grant both the causal closure of the micro-physical domain and the thesis of the supervenience of high-level phenomena such as mental acts over the physical domain. That is, once the physical state of a person is fully specified, then this person's mental properties also are fully specified as a function of this physical state, if you wish. What is denied, however, from the strong emergent stance, is that the mental properties of the person can be deduced or derived solely from those physical properties. And likewise for the higher-level (e.g. psychological) principles that govern those high level phenomena. Rather, one must consider normative, functional and/or organisational principles that arise from the specific interactions of those parts and that can't be deduced from the low-level (i.e. physical) laws governing them.

Would you say they need to take context into account in a way that classical physics did not? — Wayfarer

Yes, one might say this, appealing to the pragmatic context of the theoretician, observer or experimentalist who is dealing with high-level phenomena. Out of equilibrium (and irreversible) processes are characterised by a drop in local entropy whereby the classes of possible microphysical states get coarse-grained, as it were, into equivalent classes of macroscopically equivalent states. Carlo Rovelli has convincingly argued that this process of coarse-graining, and hence the local lowering of entropy, can only be defined in relation with an observer that, by means of interacting with the system, gathers memory traces of it (whereby the direction of the arrow of time gets defined).

I think Rovelli's lesson can be generalized, and made intuitive, beyond the rather technical case of non-equilibrium thermodynamical processes. Whenever strongly emergent features of a material process can be identified, observers non only select in accordance with their allegedly "parochial" interests what high-level features of a material system they are interested in. Weak emergentists would claim that it's merely due to epistemic limitations that the high-level explanations of the phenomena are being appealed to, while, as they argue, low-level material laws determine everything that happens. But our decisions to group low-level states into macroscopic equivalence classes, defined with the concepts that belong to economics, biology, psychology, etc., don't merely reflect our ignorance of the micro-physical details. Rather, they often are part of the process whereby we contribute to sustaining or creating the very high-level phenomena at issue, chief among them insuring our survival and flourishing as the high-level entities that we ourselves are, and those of the other organisms that we share our ecosystems with.

If consciousness is a strong emergent thing, then it cannot be causally efficacious in the world where physical objects obey the laws of nature — MoK

I don't think this is correct. I don't believe in strong emergence, but if there were strong emergence it would be casual - arguably more casual than weak emergence. With weak emergence, one can argue that it's the lower levels that are casual, and the higher levels of abstraction are noncausal. With strong emergence, that fundamentally changes. With strong emergence, high level objects have a sort of fundamental existence to them that they don't have in weak emergence

That’s well taken, and I appreciate the elaboration. What I was aiming to highlight—perhaps somewhat obliquely—was a structural contrast between classical physics and the perspectives emerging in complexity science. Classical physics, as Nancy Cartwright says, tends to abstract away context by focusing on isolated, idealized systems—leading to the formal time-reversibility of its laws, which abstracts from the temporally asymmetric character of actual processes. But in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the study of complex systems, contextual factors are not just boundary conditions; they are essential to the system’s dynamics. I’m studying that through Alicia Juarrero.

But in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the study of complex systems, contextual factors are not just boundary conditions; they are essential to the system’s dynamics. I’m studying that through Alicia Juarrero. — Wayfarer

That's interesting. I didn't know Juarrero. I'll look her up. In general, I view essentially relational metaphysical and phenomenological stances as correctives for God-eye-view stances. With Hilary Putnam, this takes the form of criticism of "metaphysical realism," in favor of a "realism with a human face" that draws inspiration, in part, from the American pragmatist tradition of Pierce, Dewey and James. With Michel Bitbol, it stems from bringing Kant's "Copernican revolution" to the interpretation of quantum mechanics while, with Carlo Rovelli, it stems from drawing similar insights from the analysis of thermodynamical concepts. So far, those all are reactions to the excesses of the modern mechanistic conception of the world. But I think a more perennial tradition that draws on Aristotle's hylomorphism and on Wittgenstein and Ryle's "philosophical behaviorism," as exemplified in the work of, for instance, Elizabeth Anscombe, David Wiggins, Anthony Kenny and Peter Hacker, simply sidesteps those excesses.

Jaurrero’s Dynamics in Action begins with Aristotle.

Jaurrero’s Dynamics in Action begins with Aristotle. — Wayfarer

Neat! I'll start with watching this and then perusing her Dynamics in Action. I'm always interested in looking into detailed accounts of downward-causation by philosophers who have produced one.

Logically speaking, first-order quantification refers to quantifying over atomic terms (i.e. constants) that satisfy a first-order proposition, namely a boolean function whose domain only consists of such terms. So is a set that is described purely in terms of first-order quantification the logical expression of "weak" emergence? Compare to the more ambiguous concept called "second-order quantification", that quantifies over arbitrary sets of terms, as opposed to just terms. Can that be considered the logical expression of "strong" emergence?

More generally, consider a functor in Category Theory that is used in Tarskian fashion to interpret a category (i.e. a deductive system) that is treated as an object language, in terms of another category that is considered to be a distinct meta-language that bears no causal or functional relationship to the former, in spite of the former being isomorphic to a (proper) subset of the latter.

Although natural language is semantically closed, and hence not formally divisible into separate object and meta ontologies, I suspect that philosophers have a tendency to misconstrue emergence-as-grammar with macroscopic empirical phenomena.

In my view, "Consciousness is strongly emergent" is a contestable linguistic proposal that the term "consciousness" should be formally treated as being part of a functionally closed mentalistic language that is being used as a meta-language, or object language, for interpreting (or being interpreted by) a separate physical language, that is formally expressible in terms of the functorial model of semantics as provided by category theory.

This definition would be more precise if we would substitute "is deducible from" or "is grounded in" for "is a function of". — Pierre-Normand

I am happy with my definition. I also gave the example of antiferromagnetism, which clearly demonstrates what I mean by function. So, I won't accept your definitions unless you demonstrate what you mean by those terms. I have to stress that in the example of antiferomagnetism, the property of the system is only a function of the properties of parts. There is nothing more left when it comes to the property of the system to demonstrate it with something else.

That's because, as I've suggested, many proponents of strong emergence, who we may call "compatibilists" (by close analogy with the corresponding stance in the philosophy of free will and determinism) grant both the causal closure of the micro-physical domain and the thesis of the supervenience of high-level phenomena such as mental acts over the physical domain. — Pierre-Normand

I think that we can describe the behavior of proteins in terms of the properties of parts since we can simulate them. The scientists in the link that I provide do approximation here and there, though, since we cannot perform a full simulation. A cell is a more challenging thing to simulate. Etc. So, scientifically speaking, we have to make an approximation here and there to describe the property of any system in terms of simplified parts at the end. We have had great success by now, scientifically speaking, but we have a long way to go to understand how different complex systems function. We can understand and explain things that function somehow. So, philosophically speaking, if the property of any system is not a function of the properties of parts, then what is the missing thing in the system that cannot be explained in terms of the properties of parts?

I don't think this is correct. — flannel jesus

It is correct. If matter moves on its own, and experience is the result of how matter moves, then how could experience be causally efficacious? Experience is not a real thing in itself, yet it exists. Experience is a mental event only and cannot be a direct cause of change in matter.

If matter moves on its own, and experience is the result of how matter moves, then how could experience be causally efficacious? — MoK

that's not what "strong emergence" is saying. I think you might have strong and weak emergence mixed up.

I view the objects and phenomena of pretty much all the special sciences (e.g. biology, ecology, psychology, economics, etc.) to be strongly emergent in relation with the the objects and phenomena of the material sciences such as physics or chemistry. Some, like our apokrisis argue (and I would agree) that even within physics, especially when the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium processes is involved, many phenomena are strongly emergent in the sense that they aren't intelligible merely in light of, or deducible from, the laws that govern their smaller components. — Pierre-Normand

We cannot account for every molecule of air in a room, but we do fine measuring things like temperature and air pressure. And the temperature and pressure are, and are specifically what they are, because of individual molecules.

Other things might be the result of, or dependent on, the properties or behavior of some kind of structures, rather than individual molecules or atoms. But those structures have the properties they have to the atoms and molecules that they are comprised of.

Does anything you have in mind not fall into the category of either directly dependent on/caused by the particles, or due to structures that have their properties because of the particles? Here is what, for me, is a great description of some of the awesome stuff that's happening in our cells. I think it's truly mind-blowing. One aspect of metabolism, from Brian Greene's Until the End of Time: Mind, Matter, and Our Search for Meaning in an Evolving Universe:

Evidence for the unity of life grows even more convincing as we follow the subsequent journey of the energy released by electrons hopping from one redox reaction to another. That energy is used to charge up biological batteries that are built into each and every cell. In turn, the biological batteries power the synthesis of molecules particularly adept at transporting and delivering energy wherever and whenever it is needed throughout a cell. It is an elaborate process. But across life, it is the same process.

In broad outline here is how it goes. As an electron jumps into the outstretched molecular arms of a given redox receptor, the receiving molecule twitches, causing it to shift its orientation relative to other molecules closely packed around it, much like a gear ratcheting one step forward. When the fickle electron subsequently jumps to the next redox receptor, the first molecule clicks back to its original orientation, while the new molecular recipient experiences the twitch. As the electron executes further jumps, the pattern continues. Molecules receiving an electron twitch, ratcheting their orientations forward; molecules losing an electron twitch too, ratcheting their orientations back.

In a living cell we encounter an analogous situation, with pent-up protons replacing pent-up electrons. But it’s a distinction that hardly makes a difference. Protons, like electrons, all carry the same electric charge, and so they also repel one another. When cellular redox reactions pack protons closely together, they too stand at the ready waiting for the chance to rush away from their enforced companions. Cellular redox reactions thus charge up biological proton-based batteries. In fact, because the protons are all clustered on one side of an extremely thin membrane (just a few dozen atoms wide), the electric field (the membrane voltage divided by the membrane thickness) can be enormous, upwards of tens of millions of volts per meter. A cellular bio battery is no slouch.

What, then, do cells do with these mini power stations? Here’s where things get yet more astounding. Attached to the membrane are a great many nanoscale-sized turbines. When the packed protons are allowed to flow back across specific sections of the membrane, they cause the tiny turbines to rotate, much as flowing gusts of air cause windmills to rotate. In centuries past, such wind-powered turning motion was used to crush wheat or other grains into flour. The cellular windmills undertake an analogous grinding project but instead of pulverizing structure the process builds it. As they turn, the molecular turbines repeatedly cram together two particular input molecules (ADP, adenosine diphosphate plus a phosphate group), synthesizing one particular output molecule (ATP, adenosine triphosphate). Forced together by the turbine, the constituents of each resulting ATP molecule are in a tense arrangement: mutually repelling charged constituents are clasped together by chemical bonds, and so, much like a compressed spring, they strain to be released. That’s extraordinarily useful. Molecules of ATP can travel throughout a cell, releasing that stored energy when needed by snapping the chemical bonds and allowing the constituent particles to relax into a lower energy, more comfortable state. It is that very energy, released by the dissociation of ATP molecules, that powers cellular functions.

The tireless activity of these cellular power stations becomes clear when you consider a few numbers. The functions that keep a typical cell alive for just a single second require the energy stored in about ten million ATP molecules. Your body contains tens of trillions of cells, which means that every second you consume on the order of one hundred million trillion (10^20) ATP molecules. Each time an ATP is used, it splits up into the raw materials (ADP and a phosphate), which the proton battery-powered turbines then cram back together into freshly minted, fully rejuvenated ATP molecules. These ATP molecules then hit the road again, delivering energy throughout the cell. To meet your body’s energy demands, your cellular turbines are thus astoundingly productive. Even if you’re an extremely fast reader, as you scan through this very sentence your body is synthesizing some five hundred million trillion molecules of ATP. And just now, another three hundred million trillion more. — Brian Greene

It's all about the molecules, atoms, and proteins and electrons.

It's all about the molecules, atoms, and proteins and electrons. — Patterner

It's all about molecules, atoms, proteins and electrons, but it's not just about those things. As proper parts of living organism, those constituents are caught up into functionally organized anatomic structures (such as cell membranes) and channeled through the finely tuned and regulated metabolic pathways that Brian Greene provides striking descriptions of. Those are indeed processes that arise in far from equilibrium thermodynamic conditions such that relatively low-entropy forms of energy (such as incident solar radiation or energy-dense molecules like glucose) get harnessed by the molecular machinery to produce work in such a way as to sustain and reproduce this machinery. What is being sustained and reproduced isn't the parts, but the form: that is, the specific functional structure of the organism. The parts, and the proximal interactions between them, don't explain why the organism is structured in the way it is, or why it behaves in the way it does. Rather, the high-level norms of functional organization of the organism, characterised in the higher-level terms of anatomy and physiology, explain why the individual atoms, electrons, protons, and organic molecules are being caught up and channeled in the specific way that they are to sustain processes that are geared towards maintaining the whole organism (at least for awhile) away from complete decay and thermodynamic equilibrium.

I think that we can describe the behavior of proteins in terms of the properties of parts since we can simulate them. The scientists in the link that I provide do approximation here and there, though, since we cannot perform a full simulation. A cell is a more challenging thing to simulate. Etc. So, scientifically speaking, we have to make an approximation here and there to describe the property of any system in terms of simplified parts at the end. We have had great success by now, scientifically speaking, but we have a long way to go to understand how different complex systems function. We can understand and explain things that function somehow. So, philosophically speaking, if the property of any system is not a function of the properties of parts, then what is the missing thing in the system that cannot be explained in terms of the properties of parts? — MoK

Simulating a process merely is to reproduce some high-level features of this process in a different medium. It can be an easier way for researchers to test hypotheses about the process being simulated when it is hard to observe in vivo. But merely generating a simulation of a process, or complex phenomenon, falls short from providing an explanation of it. The success of such a simulation, in point of accuracy, may constitute a demonstration that the elements that have been explicitly modelled in the simulation are sufficient to guarantee that the parts (or their simulation) are suitably organized to reproduce the emergent behaviors. But that doesn't produce a proof of weak emergence unless the principles that would have enabled the researchers to predict the success of the simulation would have been articulated beforehand (or identified post facto by means of analysis and experimentation) and, furthermore, had been shown to be deducible from the low-level laws that govern the local interactions between the parts.

Baring that, we're merely shown that the very same high-level phenomena that can strongly emerge in vivo can also strongly emerge in a simulation. If anything, such a success suggest that the emergent behaviors are multiply-realizable, and hence, to some degree, substrate-independent, which goes some way towards suggesting that high-level formal explanations of the emergent phenomena might be autonomous from low-level laws.

But in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the study of complex systems, contextual factors are not just boundary conditions; they are essential to the system’s dynamics. I’m studying that through Alicia Juarrero. — Wayfarer

I wanted to add some more reflections about that, agreeing, I think, with Juarrero on the significance of context. The dynamical structures at issue, in the case of living organisms, are autopoietic in the sense articulated by Maturana and Varela. The whole is structured in such a way as to ensure the production of the parts, and the parts (e.g. the organs, or cellular organelles) are structured in such a way as to sustain the organization of the whole.

I've seen Juarrero refer to Kant's discussion in The Critique of Practical Reason of the sort of circular causality appealed to in the explanation of the activity of teleologically organized systems: the tree produces its leave and the leaves produce the tree. In Life and Action, Micheal Thompson likewise highlights the close formal similarity between three sorts of teleologically organized things: living organisms, human actions and social practices. In those examples, the parts themselves usually have some sort of internal structure and function, although those functions can only be intelligibly described in relation to the context provided by the whole (e.g. the specific organism).

But then I was also reminded of a funny event that occurred a couple decades ago when we were visiting friends who had two young children. I had begun playing a game of chess with the ten-year-old boy while his six-year-old little sister was sitting besides us and watching. At some point during the game, she accidentally (but also rather carelessly) knocked over some pieces located on the side of the board. We picked the pieces on the floor and proceeded to put them back on the board where they had been but wondered briefly where one particular pawn had been (h4 or h5?). The little girl who had been watching more closely than we had thought intervened and removed this pawn from the board to replace it with another one (recognizable because chipped) that had previously been captured and laid on the side of the chess board. She was insistent that it was this slightly chipped pawn, and not the other one, that was originally on that square.

The example of chess and its playing pieces is interesting because a pawn, in chess, is an example of a functional artifact that has one single material part: the wooden figurines used to track the position of the pawn on the chess board. The little girl wasn't making this distinction. She was tracking the movements of the figurines, not the functionally significant chess moves marked by them. It's only in relation to the social context of the game that the distinction between the wooden object and the functional role that it plays arises. Physical forces, provided by gravity, by the (reaction) contact force of the chess board, and pressures from the fingers of the players, explain why the wooden figurines move in the way they do. But the wider context provided by the norms/rules of the game, and the intentions of the players, explain why the chess figurines move in such a way as to realize significant chess moves such as attacking the opponent's queen, etc. And this, in turn, provides a relevant distal explanation of the specific movements of the wooden object, in this particular context.

If one would rather trace back in the empirical causal chain the movements of the fingers of the players to material/physical causes such as uninterpreted patterns of neural excitation in the motor cortex, etc., then one would never arrive at the explanation why, for instance, black pawns move in one unique direction, bishops remain on squares of the same color, etc. Even if one would identify explanatory relevant "patterns" of norm-following in the brains of the players, that would still not explain why those patterns exist until one displaces one's attention fully from physics and neurophysiology to significant social practices and what they mean from the perspectives of the social agents. The causal-explanatory chain that goes from (strongly emergent) social practices to particular movements of wooden figurines on chess boards is an instance of downward-causation where the emergent phenomena regulate, and/or provide significance to the low-level ones, and can't be derived from them.

That’s a marvelous anecdote—almost a miniature case study in how meaning emerges through social practice. It nicely illustrates the distinction between the physical substrate of the pawn (as a wooden object subjected to forces) and its role within the normative structure of a game. The chipped pawn becomes a functional sign within a shared rule-governed space, which the young observer grasped in her own intuitive way – but without even knowing the rules!

It brings to mind Alicia Juarrero’s insistence that causation in complex systems can’t be understood solely in terms of efficient causes. (This is the subject of Part One of her book 'Why Action Theory Rests on a Mistake'.) Constraints—especially those arising from intentional and socially embedded contexts—play a formative role. They shape not only how things unfold, but also determine which patterns of behavior are recognized as meaningful actions within the system. The 'downward causation' you describe is not merely an influence from “macro” to “micro,” but a change in the frame of reference for explanation—from physical movement to meaningful action. It's a different kind of 'why'.

Another essay on the topic says

We commonly explain occurrences by saying one thing happened because of — due to the cause of — something else. But we can invoke very different sorts of causes in this way. For example, there is the because of physical law (The ball rolled down the hill because of gravity) and the because of reason (He laughed at me because I made a mistake). The former hinges upon the kind of necessity we commonly associate with physical causation; the latter has to do with what makes sense within a context of meaning. — Steve Talbott, What do Organisms Mean?