↪Philosophim maybe even the brain could have something non-physical?
Otherwise how do you explain dreaming about flying? — Danileo

Just a bit of science about it. https://biologyinsights.com/the-neuroscience-of-dreams-what-happens-in-the-brain/

My advice as always with philosophy of mind is do neuroscience first, philosophy second.

Why does a physical determinant brain produce non-physical products. — Danileo

This is begging the question. A dream is a physical experience of the brain.

The only explanation could be that the mind is independent of the world. — Danileo

If the mind were independent of the world then we would not be tied to viewing or experiencing the world from our body and perspective. I cannot move my experience of the world outside of my head. I cannot suddenly have a viewpoint of the world through my feet, or from the other side of the room. This should be obvious.

If the mind were independent of the world, then no drugs, illness, or damage to the brain would cause any change to your mind. Yet it does. This is basic medical knowledge and the entire foundation of psyche drugs.

No, the only rational conclusion from decades of scientific research and medical knowledge is that your 'mind' is a process of the brain. Its a physical reality, not something outside of it. A question for you. What is your motivation for it being non-physical? What would that give you that you do not have now? For example, lets say the mind was 'non-physical' but it still died forever once your brain died. Would you be ok with that?

For me it is 'attraction'. And I don't mean the love kind. Weak force, strong force, gravity...there is something so counter to the idea of what is physical in this. Let me explain.

Another is an uncaused reality, and this one I'm much more certain on. This is mostly attributed to a god, but I mean the reality that the universe ultimately, must be uncaused.

Thanks, I’ll give it some thought and get back to you.

A little ironic considering I've been asking for a clear definition of non-physical and an example of its existence that does not entail the physical. I'm not arguing to just argue, I'm discussing with you and will happily agree if what is being said is clear and logical.

Apologies, that’s just how you came across to me. I did say that a “proof” (which is what you were asking for) was not going to be possible, though.

So if a fairly competent physicist doesn't know what a couple of important physical properties are - properties that we know certainly exist because of the effects they have on things, effects that we have measured with incredible precision - then I'm not going to worry that we can't do more for a non-physical property. — Patterner

But Brian Greene's point is, the physical properties of an electron can be measured with precision. The alleged 'consciousness' that pan-psychism says is also a property of an electron can neither be measured nor described. Ask where or what it is, you get a shrug, 'it must be there'. Why? Because we're conscious, and we're physical. That's all it is, in a nutshell.

You create a definition of a song that follows a general pattern of tone and melody. A copyright, is literally the right to copy a work. A copy, like a twin, is a unique but similar emulation of something else. A 'song' is a category of different similar physical expressions of melody. — Philosophim

Not so. A melody can be reproduced in any number of media, but remain the same melody. Not 'similar', not 'like', but 'the same'. Likewise, a story, a recipe, a formula - it can be reproduced in any number of languages or media or formats, but still retain the same information or meaning. This shows that the information being embedded or represented, is separate from the physical form.

The meaning of a sentence is not the squiggles used to represent letters on a piece of paper or a screen. It is not the sounds these squiggles might prompt you to utter. It is not even the buzz of neuronal events that take place in your brain as you read them. What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.

where's the clear definition of 'non-physical'? Is it just concepts? Definitions the human brain constructs? — Philosophim

The more general a term is, the harder to define. 'Hammer' and 'nail' are easy to define, they have a particular purpose and form. But very broad terms, like physical (or non-physical), will, intention, purpose - these are very hard terms to define. But acknowledging that, doesn't mean they're not real.

As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. Some say they're constructs of the brain, but I say they're perceived by reason. It follows that the rational mind is the faculty which can make distinctions and represent facts abstractly and conceptually. What the physical is, is what resists our will or requires energy to move or change. But among non-physical things are theories of the physical. These include mathematical constructs and hypotheses which are in themselves not physical.

But we know from neuroscience that this is all an action of the brain — Philosophim

But what if what we think if the 'physical world' is also an action of the brain? And that this is what makes it non-physical. Within that mind-constructed world, the physical is what resists our touch, what is physically tangible. But the ideas we have about that are not themselves physical. Have a look at this video presentation, Is Reality Real, which features neuro- and cognitive scientists talking about the way 'mind constructs reality'.

Not so. A melody can be reproduced in any number of media, but remain the same melody. Not 'similar', not 'like', but 'the same'. — Wayfarer

Lets be very clear here. 'Same' means 'identical'. Identical meaning. Equivalent means that something is the same besides its existent location. If I had two letter 'a's that were identitical to the pixel, then they would be equivalent. You're going to have to explain to me how the physical variations of the song being played at different locations resolve to 100% equality and not simularity. Without explaining that, your point is simply false.

Likewise, a story, a recipe, a formula - it can be reproduced in any number of languages or media or formats, but still retain the same information or meaning. — Wayfarer

This is also untrue. A perfect translation is almost impossible. Here's a small primer. https://dalgazette.com/opinions/lost-in-translation/

"No one will interpret a book in the same way, and this shows in books like The Vegetarian. Kang’s Korean-speaking readers did not read the book as Smith did.

The fact that there are infinite ways to interpret a book makes us wonder if a translation in the literal sense is even possible. We’re left with this question of: must something inevitably change in translation?

Yes, something will always be lost or added. "

What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.

Nice quote, but it doesn't counter the point I've made. He's claiming it has no mass etc., I am by pointing to the brain, which is matter and energy, being the source. Can you demonstrate a counter that allows meaning to exist apart from a brain?

The more general a term is, the harder to define. — Wayfarer

This is a clear indicator that you have a poor word that is often used for general situations and not specifics. General words are typically cultural, emotive, and based on a collective subjective experience and not objective analysis. It being difficult to define does not excuse one from not defining it in a conversation that digs into specifics and attempts a more objective analysis.

But very broad terms, like physical (or non-physical), will, intention, purpose - these are very hard terms to define. But acknowledging that, doesn't mean they're not real. — Wayfarer

It doesn't mean that the intent of these words is to point to something real. But many words we use to point to real things are no more than a sign post. "This" is 'that'. What is that? Well 'that' is over there. Again, very useful for general sign pointing and broad ideas. A big part of philosophy is dissecting these generic words down and pariing them down to the core specifics that unify the multiple objects the generic word will lump together. It goes from an emotional indicator, to one of more careful analysis. By consequence, the definition of the word should become more narrow and clear. If one can do so, then they have a valuable word to use in rational communication. If one cannot pare the word down from a generic to a specific, this is evidence that the word needs more work and shouldn't be considered in serious discussion yet.

As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer

But if you can't define what non-physical is, then all it is, is a general negation word. "Not-physical." If this is all it is, then it is on the person to then clearly demonstrate why something they claim is not physical by demonstrating that it is impossible that it can be physical, and demonstrating its existence apart from the physical.

As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer

You can't just claim that Wayfarer, you have to prove that. I've asked you several times to demonstrate why these things, by necessity, cannot be physical. I've tried to create several scenarios for you go with. "If there was no human brain to think of these concepts of identity, would these concepts of identity exist somewhere else in reality?" I have never heard you say yes, and then point out where.

The idea of something being physical is falsifiable. I mentioned a few of my own possible non-physical ideas a few posts up. They can work as possibilities because they attempt to show that they are true negations of what is physical. What is physical is matter and energy. Something non-physical would need to defy what matter and energy do. The problem is, is that I have clear examples of numbers, laws, convention, and principles as expressions of matter and energy through brains. I have neuroscience on my side which indicates that thoughts come from a brain, which is made out of matter and energy. Unless you can provide examples of science which indicate, necessarily, that there is something to the brain that involves something that cannot be physical, then you can't claim its non-physical.

To be clear, you could say, "Maybe they're wrong." Perfectly acceptable. You can come up with wild and cool ideas. Perfectly acceptable. But just because you have an imagination or a desire that something is not physical, its perfectly unacceptable to claim that its non-physical without careful proof.

Some say they're constructs of the brain, but I say they're perceived by reason. — Wayfarer

And reason is a physical process that attempts to correctly apply representation to reality.

But among non-physical things are theories of the physical. These include mathematical constructs and hypotheses which are in themselves not physical. — Wayfarer

No, they are comprised of matter and energy. Again, to my mind the only way you could prove this Wayfarer is to demonstrate that these things would exists without any physical brains. Can I go to somewhere in the universe and say, "Here exists the non-physical mathmatical constructs and hypotheses of reality apart from matter and energy?" Whereas I can point to the brains of individuals, the physical books, etc and show where they exist.

But what if what we think if the 'physical world' is also an action of the brain? And that this is what makes it non-physical. — Wayfarer

I don't follow this. Can you go into a little more depth? If thinking is physical, and we think that the brain is physical, how is that non-physical?

I checked your video link, thank you. They would agree with me on this statement for sure: "Your subjective reality is objectively true." That meaning, the experience of that subjective reality, is real. Your interpretation of that subjective reality to the reality beyond your subjective may of course not be real. I can believe I'll live forever, and objectively, I believe that. It doesn't mean that my belief means that its actually true that I will live forever. I'm not seeing the video negating the points I've made, but feel free to point out if you think they do.

You're going to have to explain to me how the physical variations of the song being played at different locations resolve to 100% equality and not simularity. Without explaining that, your point is simply false. — Philosophim

I don't need to respond to a false distinction. Two instances of the same song are of the same song. If you put out a version of a Beetles song that you created in GarageBand, you would be sued for infringing copyright.

This is the question of nature of identity that has occupied philosophers for centuries. But you won't find it in neuroscience, as neuroscience doesn't need to consider these kinds of questions.

I am by pointing to the brain, which is matter and energy, being the source. Can you demonstrate a counter that allows meaning to exist apart from a brain? — Philosophim

Your response assumes the old identity theory—that “mind is what the brain does”—but that view has run into serious problems. To say that meaning is reducible to brain activity is to confuse the physical substrate that enables cognition with the semantic content of thought. That's a category mistake. Neural activity may correlate with thought, but it isn't identical to meaning. Meaning belongs to the realm of intentionality—aboutness—which isn’t captured by physical properties like mass or charge or ion transmission. Even to say that the physical state and the meaning are 'the same' is to rely on a non-physical concept, as such 'sameness' is an intellectual judgement, not a physical fact (a point recognised in Plato's dialogues).

Consider: “The cat is on the mat” can be expressed in English, French, Morse code, or binary. The physical forms are completely different, but the meaning is the same. So clearly, the meaning isn't reducible to any particular physical configuration. It’s multiply realizable—something that’s deeply problematic for strict identity theory.

And Deacon’s point stands: meaning isn’t a physical property, yet it makes a difference. That’s the real issue, and why so many philosophers have moved away from identity theories altogether. Neural correlates are not the same as semantic content—and neuroscience doesn’t claim otherwise. That leap—from correlation to identity—is your philosophical presumption, not an empirical fact. (That's from his book, Incomplete Nature, which attempts to provide an account of how mind emerged from matter, but it's nothing like your form of neural reductionism.)

A perfect translation is almost impossible — Philosophim

Agree for poetry or prose texts, in some ways, which rely on allusion, cultural context, and so on. But a recipe or a specification, for example, has to be consistent across different languages and media. In such cases, the information being conveyed is clearly separable from its physical form.

Tales like Aesop's Fables have been told in hundreds of languages over centuries. Surely, the details vary, a donkey in one version might be a mule in another, but they're still recognizably the same stories. Again, questions of identity - what makes a story unique and particular and recognizably the same story.

many words we use to point to real things are no more than a sign post. "This" is 'that'. What is that? Well 'that' is over there. Again, very useful for general sign pointing and broad ideas. A big part of philosophy is dissecting these generic words down and pariing them down to the core specifics that unify the multiple objects the generic word will lump together. — Philosophim

You're right that terms like “intention,” “purpose,” or “mind” are general. But that’s because they refer to universals, not particulars. And universals aren’t vague by nature—they’re abstract because they apply across many instances. That’s their function. Saying “tree” doesn’t point to one tree, but to a kind of thing; just as “intention” doesn’t refer to a lump of matter, but to a particular structure of thought.

You seem to assume that unless a word can be pared down to a physical or operational definition, it lacks explanatory value. But that’s a philosophical assumption—specifically, a nominalist one: the idea that only particulars are real and general terms are just verbal conveniences. That view has a long and controversial history, and it’s far from the only option.

Much of philosophy—going back to its roots —was precisely concerned with the reality of universals: forms, essences, and structures that are intelligible rather than physical. These are not “emotional indicators,” but necessary for any coherent account of meaning, logic, mathematics, and mind. And many of the hardest problems in contemporary philosophy of mind arise precisely because modern thought has largely abandoned this ontology.

So yes, we should clarify our terms—but not by reducing them to what can be physically pointed at. That would be like trying to explain arithmetic by pointing at pebbles. It misses the level at which the concept operates.

I don't think we're all that separate from one another. I just view subjective experience as the experience of being physical being over time. In other words, its simply an aspect of the physical, not something separate.

I am curious in terms of motivation, what is the push to make consciousness something non-physical? — Philosophim

I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis.

I present these three steps regarding it not being physical.

1)
Chalmers presents the problem in his famous Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers says:

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says “I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene”, then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entitythat performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake.

This is a nontrivial further question. This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on “in the dark”, free of any inner feel? Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers

2
A couple quotes that I think make the problem a little more clear. From people who I think know what they're talking about.

At 7:00 of this video, while talking about the neural correlates of consciousness and ions flowing through holes in membranes, Donald Hoffman asks:

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

In Until the End of Time, Brian Greene wrote:

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Greene

3
What exactly is the, or a, physicalist theory of consciousness?

David Eagleman in this video,

Your other question is, why does it feel like something? That we don't know. and the weird situation we're in in modern neuroscience, of course, is that, not only do we not have a theory of that, but we don't know what such a theory would even look like. Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman

Donald Hoffman in this video,

It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman

Donald Hoffman in The Case Against Reality Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes, when he was talking to Francis Crick:

“Can you explain,” I asked, “how neural activity causes conscious experiences, such as my experience of the color red?” “No,” he said. “If you could make up any biological fact you want,” I persisted, “can you think of one that would let you solve this problem?” “No,” he replied, but added that we must pursue research in neuroscience until some discovery reveals the solution. — Donald Hoffman

We don't have a clue. Even those who assume it must be physical, because physical is all we can perceive and measure with our senses and devices, don't have any guesses. Even if he could make something up to explain how it could work, Crick couldn't think of anything.

Lets say for example that consciousness was something non-physical, but it could never be separated from the body and would cease to be forever when your brain dies. Would you accept that! Or would there be no an insistence that consciousness had some other aspect that made it last beyond bodily death? — Philosophim

I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself.

But Brian Greene's point is, the physical properties of an electron can be measured with precision. — Wayfarer

His point is that, although the properties can be measured with Precision, but we do not know what that are. We could not know what proto-consciousness is, either, even if we know what it does. Of course we won't be able to measure it with our physical ways of measuring things. What are the measurements of consciousness according to your idealism?

I don't need to respond to a false distinction. Two instances of the same song are of the same song. If you put out a version of a Beetles song that you created in GarageBand, you would be sued for infringing copyright. — Wayfarer

Right because the copyright determines the level of similarity to the copyrighted version to say whether you have the legal right to profit off of making a copy. A copyright category does not make them identical songs, and I clearly laid out that the technical term for same in this instance is identical. I have seen no indication that this is a false distinction besides you just insisting that it is. If this is as far as you wish to go on this, I'm not going to agree that you've adequately answered the point I brought up.

This is the question of nature of identity that has occupied philosophers for centuries. But you won't find it in neuroscience, as neuroscience doesn't need to consider these kinds of questions. — Wayfarer

I wrote an entire paper on knowledge and identity here if you're interested. Epistemology has been my primary focus in philosophy. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

I mention 'distinctive knowledge' but identity is a form of this.

To say that meaning is reducible to brain activity is to confuse the physical substrate that enables cognition with the semantic content of thought. That's a category mistake. Neural activity may correlate with thought, but it isn't identical to meaning. Meaning belongs to the realm of intentionality—aboutness—which isn’t captured by physical properties like mass or charge or ion transmission. — Wayfarer

No, the category error is yours. Once again, you need to demonstrate, not simply claim, that meaning can exist somewhere out there in the universe apart from a physical brain. All you are doing here is asserting its not physical, but I'm seeing no example or reason demonstrating that it is necessarily non-physical. I can easily note that thought is physical, meaning is a thought, therefore meaning is physical. As I have evidence of meaning only coming from a physical brain, and not somewhere else not physically, by default you cannot necessarily demonstrate that thought is non-physical.

Consider: “The cat is on the mat” can be expressed in English, French, Morse code, or binary. The physical forms are completely different, but the meaning is the same. So clearly, the meaning isn't reducible to any particular physical configuration. It’s multiply realizable—something that’s deeply problematic for strict identity theory. — Wayfarer

No, this is both a category and vocabulary error. They are not 'the same' in the technical sense. They are different physical expressions of representation, and the intent is to get a person to imagine a similar concept. I noted what 'same' and 'equivalent' meant, and you are simply dismissing those terms without explaining why they should be changed to something else. What you described does not fit the terms I noted. If you would like to talk about social contextual identity, we can. Its a pretty simple issue once you get the basics down. I do not ascribe to strict identity theory, and they still aren't 'the same', but similar within an established identity context.

You seem to assume that unless a word can be pared down to a physical or operational definition, it lacks explanatory value — Wayfarer

No. It needs to be clear and falsifiable for a philosophical discussion. Meaning "X state is physical. Y state would not be physical." Same with non-physical. "Y state would be non-physical. X state would be physical." One of the main purposes of philosophy is to take words that we take for granted or have unclear meaning, and rationally shape them into clear and meaningful words that can be used rationally with the least amount of induction or uncertainty as possible.

So yes, we should clarify our terms—but not by reducing them to what can be physically pointed at. — Wayfarer

No, I never said it had to be physically pointed at. It needs a clear term and demonstration that the term exists in reality. Otherwise you're using made up emotional words that lack rational context. Its like the term 'good'. If I asked you why murder is wrong and you answered its difficult to define why its wrong, then I would ask how you could know its wrong. Its poor philosophy. Poor philosophy is what people go to either in ignorance, or an attempt to hide the fact that when more accuracy is demanded of their term, it starts to fall apart.

Regardless, if you cannot agree that two songs played at different locations are not identical, then we may have arrived at the end of our discussion. That does not strike me as logical, and if we cannot agree on such a simple point, we're unlikely to continue productive discussion. I appreciate your time regardless, I'm sure we'll chat again.

I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis. — Patterner

Poor word choice on my end then. "Identify" instead of 'make'.

But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake. — David Chalmers

Completely agree. But lets make sure we're on the same page here. The reason we can't know what its like to experience it, is we have no way of knowing what a 'thing' experiences without being 'that thing'. That doesn't mean we can't learn about its objective function or behavior. It simply means that when talking objectively about something, we can't include the act of being the thing itself.

To clarify even further. If we DID have the ability to experience a thing in itself, there would be no problem at that point. We would have the ability to create controls and variables to test and map out the brain with the experience of being. Its important not to confuse the fact that we can't know what its like to be something, with the idea that this means being a physical thing is not somehow physical.

Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers

A great question! But one that does not place doubt on the physical nature of the brain. For that, we would need some type of evidence of consciousness being non-physical. For example, not tied to a physical location. But it seems that when I walk around the room, my consciousness follows me in my head. You have to define what non-physical would entail, and you'll quickly realize consciousness in no way fits this.

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

I don't have your video link and I'm not sure how to interpret this out of context.

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. — Greene

The answer is simple. We are not the particles. We don't know how to have the experience of those particles without being those particles.

Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman

Just a repeat of the same issue I've noted.

It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman

Agreed. But does not at all imply consciousness does not come from the brain.

I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself. — Patterner

I agree with this. I think that there is at some type of level, the 'experience' of being something. Not like a complex human brain of course. But that 'thing' exists'. It is. There must be some type of feedback of 'being'.

Again, all of these are well known by me, but none of them come even close to indicating that consciousness is not physical. Even though we've reached a limit in knowing what its like to 'be' something else, 'being' is physical. And thus the subjective experience of 'being' is by consequent, also physical.

I think the thread is about 'mental causation' - can mind, if it is non-physical, cause physical effects? — Wayfarer

It is actually about the use of Causation across two different domains and how this may aggravate the Hard Problem even further. I know because I started this thread :)

Look here:

Which is why its much simpler when you realize its just a physical act. — Philosophim

This is besides the point. It is an IF question. That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong (I know you are familiar with IF questions) and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. If so then obviously there is a problem when then framing a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal stream.

Understand? I am not saying I one is or is not correct. I am putting forward a potential problem that has been overlooked.

Absolutely not interested in a back and forth argument about how this or that point of view is right or wrong (no one knows). I am asking people to assume Mental and Physical Acts are quite different and that this could possibly play a part in dissecting The Hard Problem a little further.

So the OP is addressing that IF there is some other obscure substance -- non-physical -- then assuming Causal Acts are the same for both substances could be a mistake. Therefore when talking about Mental to Mental causation we can only assume they play out as and when they manifest experientially, rather than physically (Libets experiments and other like it) which shows a disjoint between Acts where the Physical appears to be a precursor to Mental.

Perhaps the OP was too severely lacking in detail as to where I wanted to take this. I usually do miss things out just to see if someone comes up with something else interesting.

I have seen no indication that this is a false distinction besides you just insisting that it is — Philosophim

You’re equating sameness with numerical identity—i.e., “the same thing” must mean one and the same physical object. But this confuses the distinction between numerical identity and formal identity.

Two tokens of the same word, say “cat” typed twice, aren’t the same instance, but they are instances of the same word. Likewise, two trees aren’t the same specific tree but they share the same form. That’s what it means for a concept like “tree” to be meaningful in the first place—it refers not to a particular, but to a universal type, represented by many particulars.

So it's nonsense to say that different versions of the same song are not the same song. They're numerically different instances of the same idea - which is the point!

I wrote an entire paper on knowledge and identity here if you're interested. — Philosophim

Your 'papers' contain no references to any other philosophers or philosophies - yet you seem to believe that they should be regarded as authoritative sources for any reader. But you don’t get to define basic philosophical terms in the way that suits your purposes.

Done talking to you.

That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. — I like sushi

Thanks for clarifying. I wouldn't even say could be different, it absolutely would be different. Physical and non-physical things, even if we didn't know exactly what they were, would have to be different in the way they exist. It wouldn't be just the hard problem, all of physics would need a readjustment.

Two tokens of the same word, say “cat” typed twice, aren’t the same instance, but they are instances of the same word. — Wayfarer

No disagreement. But the word does not only represent one instance. It allows a multitude of similarities that pass the bar to fit that label. Different physical expressions of a general identity only have to pass certain thresholds before they are matched. A name does not do this. There is only one Wayfarer, you.

But if you didn't physically exist, there would be no Wayfarer out there to discover. If we can't find one unicorn, we surely can't say 'unicorns' (plural) exist. And even if more than one unicorn exists, it physically exists by similar category, not as some non-physical entity out there.

So it's nonsense to say that different versions of the same song are not the same song. They're numerically different instances of the same idea - which is the point! — Wayfarer

To be more specific in reference to physical vs non-physical. Physically, they are different songs and not the same/identical. We say they are similar enough based on a category that we create that we group them together as 'a song'. But this is a process of the brain, not that there is something out there that does not involve matter and/or energy that is 'the song'. If you like reference to other Philosophers, look up Plato's forms and its critiques.

Your 'papers' contain no references to any other philosophers or philosophies - yet you seem to believe that they should be regarded as authoritative sources for any reader. — Wayfarer

No. They are constructed to be able to be understood by any person without a philosophy background as they are posted on a general philosophy forum that is open to all backgrounds. At one time I did reference other philosophers, and the ideas blew up to hundreds of pages. Eventually I realized anyone with a philosophy background should be familiar with the general themes, and no one was going to read a 200 page novel to get to the point I was trying to make. The point of philosophy is to logically craft language that can be used both rationally and practically in the world. I have attempted to do just that. You should try reading the knowledge paper at least. Maybe you'll find a new perspective, or maybe you'll be able to point out a flaw in the argument and I'll have something new to look at. Either way, we both win.

I am not interested in how scientific approaches woudl have to readjust. My concern is with the Metaphysical question of Causation.

You do seem to be conveying a Dualist approach in term of Properties, meaning you have stated that there is a good reason to distinguish between Physical and Mental Acts. So maybe looking at this metaphysical delineation would help in expressing how Causation could differ?

Donald Davidson who has been mentioned and about whom Banno knows a lot, is an example of non-reductive physicalism. — Wayfarer

I have a decent grasp of Davidson's approach. If @Banno has something to add regarding the possibel descrepencies with the term Causal between Physical and Mental acts I would love to hear. Donaldson's position is especially relevant here so would be nice to hear from someone who has a better indepth understanding of his points.

That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong (I know you are familiar with IF questions) and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. If so then obviously there is a problem when then framing a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal stream.

I think there is something else going on, but that the causal relationships in our experiential world are the way they are because that is how experiential worlds work. That the other thing going on works with that as a vehicle, or structure.
Although, another option might be that our experiential world is an artificial construct. Rather like a play, in which the causal relationships are determined by the narrative chosen by the playwright. Take A Mid Summer Nights Dream for example. Where the world is reinterpreted as a world of fairies and fairylore explains why and how things happen the way they do.

I agree that is attached with physical processes but that does not fully define the properties of it, It just mean both are connected.
I could use your logic and say that because there are non physical occurrences in the mind and mind is attached to physical world then all the world is non-physical.
Being connected does not give the power to reduce everything to the elements.

Donald Davidson who has been mentioned and about whom Banno knows a lot, is an example of non-reductive physicalism. — Wayfarer

It'd require it's own thread. For Davidson, while mental events are identical to physical events, there are no strict laws governing mental events in the way there perhaps are for physical events. It's to do with their being different descriptions of the very same thing. There's a lot of background.

More precisely, there is no mental substance, but there are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events to detail these mental states and events.

What I find hilarious is how the modal ontologist believe they've revitalized modal ontology... when half of the garbage they say is literally in Aristotle's bit "On Interpretation." Like come on guys thats 2400 years old known already... example: Kripke says "uhh yeah we gotta ground our definitions!" :lol:

‘Thought operates according to different rules than matter, but that shouldn’t cause us to conclude that the world is anything other than physical.’

I think so long as something plays by physics it will be considered physical.

What does ‘plays by physics’ mean?

You'll figure it out, I'm sure.

But if you need a hint... look to the stars, the trees, the grass, or the poo from your ...

Thought isn't metaphysical. It's not metaphysics.

You are being far from clear. But grass is considerably more complicated than are stars, although admittedly there would be no grass if there had not been stars. But more is involved and required than physics to understand grass, otherwise biologists would only have to study physics.

If you're the spiritual type, so be it. Though, I can't say much about the spirit world, never believed in it. I used to believe in free will, but I realized the concept was odd when someone kicked me in the teeth with the question "free from what?" And perhaps that may relate to your quandary here.

I am familar with this area. Go for it. No need to dumb-down.

It'd require it's own thread. — Banno

THIS is the thread for it ;)

Nietzsche on the Intrinsic Perversion of Reason...
The example he gives is a man who details his long life was due to his light diet...

On the other hand Nietzsche details:

the prerequisites of long life, which are exceptional slowness of molecular change, and a low rate of expenditure in energy, were the cause of his meagre diet He was not at liberty to eat a small or a great amount. His frugality was not the result of free choice, he would have been ill had he eaten more. He who does not happen to be a carp, however, is not only wise to eat well, but is also compelled to do so. — Nietzsche, ToI

We often attribute an effect as a cause due to a belief in free will.

You do seem to be conveying a Dualist approach in term of Properties, meaning you have stated that there is a good reason to distinguish between Physical and Mental Acts. So maybe looking at this metaphysical delineation would help in expressing how Causation could differ? — I like sushi

So what causation is, "A prior state which necessarily lead to the current state" itself would not change. But we just don't know how something non-physical would interact with and change the physical. All of physics is built on physical causation at this time.

There's really nothing else to say. You would need to know what non-physical things were, and how they interact with the physical. Causation requires an understanding of consistent and repeatable logical states. Is there something else you were trying to get at? I feel like there is and I'm missing it.

I could use your logic and say that because there are non physical occurrences in the mind and mind is attached to physical world then all the world is non-physical. — Danileo

No because you have to have a clear definition of non-physical, and then clear evidence that exists as something not actually physical. We're putting the cart before the horse. Saying the mind is 'non-physical' is not a claim of truth or reality. It is a belief or supposition. Considering you did not answer my question about whether you would still have an interest in seeing the brain as non-physical if it was still permanently destroyed on brain death, am I safe to assume this is a bit of faith or belief system to give yourself hope that you'll survive in some way after death?