↪Philosophim maybe even the brain could have something non-physical?
Otherwise how do you explain dreaming about flying? — Danileo
Why does a physical determinant brain produce non-physical products. — Danileo
The only explanation could be that the mind is independent of the world. — Danileo
For me it is 'attraction'. And I don't mean the love kind. Weak force, strong force, gravity...there is something so counter to the idea of what is physical in this. Let me explain.
Another is an uncaused reality, and this one I'm much more certain on. This is mostly attributed to a god, but I mean the reality that the universe ultimately, must be uncaused.
Apologies, that’s just how you came across to me. I did say that a “proof” (which is what you were asking for) was not going to be possible, though.A little ironic considering I've been asking for a clear definition of non-physical and an example of its existence that does not entail the physical. I'm not arguing to just argue, I'm discussing with you and will happily agree if what is being said is clear and logical.
So if a fairly competent physicist doesn't know what a couple of important physical properties are - properties that we know certainly exist because of the effects they have on things, effects that we have measured with incredible precision - then I'm not going to worry that we can't do more for a non-physical property. — Patterner
You create a definition of a song that follows a general pattern of tone and melody. A copyright, is literally the right to copy a work. A copy, like a twin, is a unique but similar emulation of something else. A 'song' is a category of different similar physical expressions of melody. — Philosophim
The meaning of a sentence is not the squiggles used to represent letters on a piece of paper or a screen. It is not the sounds these squiggles might prompt you to utter. It is not even the buzz of neuronal events that take place in your brain as you read them. What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.
where's the clear definition of 'non-physical'? Is it just concepts? Definitions the human brain constructs? — Philosophim
But we know from neuroscience that this is all an action of the brain — Philosophim
Not so. A melody can be reproduced in any number of media, but remain the same melody. Not 'similar', not 'like', but 'the same'. — Wayfarer
Likewise, a story, a recipe, a formula - it can be reproduced in any number of languages or media or formats, but still retain the same information or meaning. — Wayfarer
What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.
The more general a term is, the harder to define. — Wayfarer
But very broad terms, like physical (or non-physical), will, intention, purpose - these are very hard terms to define. But acknowledging that, doesn't mean they're not real. — Wayfarer
As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer
As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer
Some say they're constructs of the brain, but I say they're perceived by reason. — Wayfarer
But among non-physical things are theories of the physical. These include mathematical constructs and hypotheses which are in themselves not physical. — Wayfarer
But what if what we think if the 'physical world' is also an action of the brain? And that this is what makes it non-physical. — Wayfarer
You're going to have to explain to me how the physical variations of the song being played at different locations resolve to 100% equality and not simularity. Without explaining that, your point is simply false. — Philosophim
I am by pointing to the brain, which is matter and energy, being the source. Can you demonstrate a counter that allows meaning to exist apart from a brain? — Philosophim
A perfect translation is almost impossible — Philosophim
many words we use to point to real things are no more than a sign post. "This" is 'that'. What is that? Well 'that' is over there. Again, very useful for general sign pointing and broad ideas. A big part of philosophy is dissecting these generic words down and pariing them down to the core specifics that unify the multiple objects the generic word will lump together. — Philosophim
I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis.I don't think we're all that separate from one another. I just view subjective experience as the experience of being physical being over time. In other words, its simply an aspect of the physical, not something separate.
I am curious in terms of motivation, what is the push to make consciousness something non-physical? — Philosophim
There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says “I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene”, then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entitythat performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake.
This is a nontrivial further question. This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on “in the dark”, free of any inner feel? Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers
Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Greene
Your other question is, why does it feel like something? That we don't know. and the weird situation we're in in modern neuroscience, of course, is that, not only do we not have a theory of that, but we don't know what such a theory would even look like. Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman
It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman
We don't have a clue. Even those who assume it must be physical, because physical is all we can perceive and measure with our senses and devices, don't have any guesses. Even if he could make something up to explain how it could work, Crick couldn't think of anything.“Can you explain,” I asked, “how neural activity causes conscious experiences, such as my experience of the color red?” “No,” he said. “If you could make up any biological fact you want,” I persisted, “can you think of one that would let you solve this problem?” “No,” he replied, but added that we must pursue research in neuroscience until some discovery reveals the solution. — Donald Hoffman
I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself.Lets say for example that consciousness was something non-physical, but it could never be separated from the body and would cease to be forever when your brain dies. Would you accept that! Or would there be no an insistence that consciousness had some other aspect that made it last beyond bodily death? — Philosophim
His point is that, although the properties can be measured with Precision, but we do not know what that are. We could not know what proto-consciousness is, either, even if we know what it does. Of course we won't be able to measure it with our physical ways of measuring things. What are the measurements of consciousness according to your idealism?But Brian Greene's point is, the physical properties of an electron can be measured with precision. — Wayfarer
I don't need to respond to a false distinction. Two instances of the same song are of the same song. If you put out a version of a Beetles song that you created in GarageBand, you would be sued for infringing copyright. — Wayfarer
This is the question of nature of identity that has occupied philosophers for centuries. But you won't find it in neuroscience, as neuroscience doesn't need to consider these kinds of questions. — Wayfarer
To say that meaning is reducible to brain activity is to confuse the physical substrate that enables cognition with the semantic content of thought. That's a category mistake. Neural activity may correlate with thought, but it isn't identical to meaning. Meaning belongs to the realm of intentionality—aboutness—which isn’t captured by physical properties like mass or charge or ion transmission. — Wayfarer
Consider: “The cat is on the mat” can be expressed in English, French, Morse code, or binary. The physical forms are completely different, but the meaning is the same. So clearly, the meaning isn't reducible to any particular physical configuration. It’s multiply realizable—something that’s deeply problematic for strict identity theory. — Wayfarer
You seem to assume that unless a word can be pared down to a physical or operational definition, it lacks explanatory value — Wayfarer
So yes, we should clarify our terms—but not by reducing them to what can be physically pointed at. — Wayfarer
I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis. — Patterner
But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake. — David Chalmers
Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers
Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. — Greene
Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman
It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman
I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself. — Patterner
I think the thread is about 'mental causation' - can mind, if it is non-physical, cause physical effects? — Wayfarer
Which is why its much simpler when you realize its just a physical act. — Philosophim
I have seen no indication that this is a false distinction besides you just insisting that it is — Philosophim
I wrote an entire paper on knowledge and identity here if you're interested. — Philosophim
That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. — I like sushi
Two tokens of the same word, say “cat” typed twice, aren’t the same instance, but they are instances of the same word. — Wayfarer
So it's nonsense to say that different versions of the same song are not the same song. They're numerically different instances of the same idea - which is the point! — Wayfarer
Your 'papers' contain no references to any other philosophers or philosophies - yet you seem to believe that they should be regarded as authoritative sources for any reader. — Wayfarer
Donald Davidson who has been mentioned and about whom Banno knows a lot, is an example of non-reductive physicalism. — Wayfarer
I think there is something else going on, but that the causal relationships in our experiential world are the way they are because that is how experiential worlds work. That the other thing going on works with that as a vehicle, or structure.That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong (I know you are familiar with IF questions) and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. If so then obviously there is a problem when then framing a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal stream.
It'd require it's own thread. For Davidson, while mental events are identical to physical events, there are no strict laws governing mental events in the way there perhaps are for physical events. It's to do with their being different descriptions of the very same thing. There's a lot of background.Donald Davidson who has been mentioned and about whom Banno knows a lot, is an example of non-reductive physicalism. — Wayfarer
the prerequisites of long life, which are exceptional slowness of molecular change, and a low rate of expenditure in energy, were the cause of his meagre diet He was not at liberty to eat a small or a great amount. His frugality was not the result of free choice, he would have been ill had he eaten more. He who does not happen to be a carp, however, is not only wise to eat well, but is also compelled to do so. — Nietzsche, ToI
You do seem to be conveying a Dualist approach in term of Properties, meaning you have stated that there is a good reason to distinguish between Physical and Mental Acts. So maybe looking at this metaphysical delineation would help in expressing how Causation could differ? — I like sushi
I could use your logic and say that because there are non physical occurrences in the mind and mind is attached to physical world then all the world is non-physical. — Danileo
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