The reason we can't know what its like to experience it, is we have no way of knowing what a 'thing' experiences without being 'that thing'. — Philosophim
It's not a matter of not being able to experience what someone/thing else experiences. The puzzle is why anything has any subjective experience at all. That's the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Why does the physical activity of moving ions, signals moving through neurons, neurotransmitters jumping the gap between neurons, and any and all other physical activity, have a subjective experience?The answer is simple. We are not the particles. We don't know how to have the experience of those particles without being those particles. — Philosophim
It's not a matter of not being able to experience what someone/thing else experiences. The puzzle is why anything has any subjective experience at all. — Patterner
Causation requires an understanding of consistent and repeatable logical states. — Philosophim
Is there something else you were trying to get at? I feel like there is and I'm missing it. — Philosophim
It's not a matter of not being able to experience what someone/thing else experiences. The puzzle is why anything has any subjective experience at all. — Patterner
Why does the physical activity of moving ions, signals moving through neurons, neurotransmitters jumping the gap between neurons, and any and all other physical activity, have a subjective experience? — Patterner
What I think is perdurable is the mind as the 'tool' — Danileo
Coming back I exposed how we can have actually non-physical thoughts and asked you why they are formed in a physical determinant brain — Danileo
There is no logical reason why there may not be two substances (Substance Dualism). — I like sushi
In terms of Property Dualism you seem okay with this as you say it makes sense to demarcate between a slap in the face and the desire to slap someone in the face as two different states. — I like sushi
It would then follow that you are saying mental states supervene over phsyical states, meaning if the physical state changes so to must the mental state, but not vice versa. — I like sushi
It then follows that these mental states (you refer to as physical) have no causal effect. So now we have a physical state (neural state of mentality) that is non-causal. — I like sushi
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? — Patterner
Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical. — Galen Strawson
Strawson is among many within the analytic community who have been unable to make the leap to a post-Nietzschean way of construing objectivity, causality and subjectivity. They don’t see that the problem is their reliance on an inadequate formulation of the physical, and an inadequate biological model. As a result, Strawson finds subjective experience to be so qualitatively alien with respect to his understanding of the non-experientially physical that he has no choice but to create a new category of the physical to make room for it. — Joshs
In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, ed. Dermot Moran, p144
We can answer these questions. We can explain these things, at least in terms of properties of particles. Negatively charged electrons, electron shells, positively charged protons, etc. Because of all that, atoms are formed, molecules are formed, graphite is formed... We can't explain how/why electrons have negative charge, protons have positive charge, electron shells have the specific numbers of atoms they have... But we can explain down to that level.Why does hydrogen and two oxygen in combination at a certain temperature become a water? This question applies to the entirety of existence. Why is a rock hard? Why from carbon can we construct graphite and all living things? — Philosophim
No, they're both physical states. So they can affect each other. There is no logical reason they wouldn't. Now IF they are two substances, who knows? Maybe its only the mental substance affecting the physical, and its a meat puppet being strung along from something we don't fully understand. Maybe the physical has a one way influence on the mental instead. We don't know. We wouldn't be able to tell because we don't even know how these two substances would interact. We need more. — Philosophim
No, I don't think that's the way it works. Physical interactions always affect what is being interacted with. — Philosophim
We cannot do any of that with consciousness. Nobody has any idea how it can come about from the properties of particles. There's nothing. What does it have to do with mass, charge, the nuclear forces, gravity, or any other physical thing that can be named? There aren't even guesses. Nobody can make any connection. — Patterner
Now this is cleared up, the point I am making may possibly get around taking some kind of Eliminative argument to avoid this contradiction (Possibly). So put aside any disagreement with substance dualism and put some thought into what this could mean for the problem at large in terms of different types of causality or the absense of causality. How does this strengthen or weaken more physicalist positions?How does this reframe the problem? — I like sushi
Not necessarily, as I suggested, experiential worlds are and can only be this way. The different kind of something, (if it’s there) uses the experiential world as a vehicle. Utilises the structure for some reason.And focus on the above well-known argument is that if we assume a different kind of something then we are met with a problem of not being able to understand Causation as we have one unknown entity interacting with another without knowing anything about its basic workings.
The other stuff could be atemporal* and as you say talk of causation (as we see it) would make little sense. Unless we posit a demiurge training baby demiurges through the experiential worlds. As I suggested in my first post.To jump into highly speculative territory the mental stuff could be atemporal and therefore to talk of 'causation' would make little to no sense.
As far as I can see, you are talking about how gravity works. Well Einstein gave an explanation, that in the fabric of spacetime there is an effect like a gradient between masses drawing them together. Yes there may be something immaterial about that, but the theory doesn’t suggest it.Certainly. How I define non-physical is, 'That which is not comprised of something physical.' For me there is a strange notion in science that has not been answered yet. It very well could be that this is an opportunity for something non-physical, but then again it can also be a placeholder until we figure out more.
For me it is 'attraction'. And I don't mean the love kind. Weak force, strong force, gravity...there is something so counter to the idea of what is physical in this. Let me explain.
I understand your thought process here, but I fall in behind Bob Ross and Timothy on that discussion. Although personally I would say how we and the universe came into existence is a deep mystery and it’s pointless trying to work it out until someone (who knows) comes along to tell us how it works.Another is an uncaused reality, and this one I'm much more certain on. This is mostly attributed to a god, but I mean the reality that the universe ultimately, must be uncaused.
We've seen the results from property dualism, now you want to imagine IF substance dualism exists. I already mentioned that there is absolutely nothing we could glean about causality because we don't know what the properties of something non-physical would be. Would it appear to interrupt physical causality? is it the same? We don't know. — Philosophim
Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'. — Philosophim
As far as I can see, you are talking about how gravity works. Well Einstein gave an explanation, that in the fabric of spacetime there is an effect like a gradient between masses drawing them together. — Punshhh
I understand your thought process here, but I fall in behind Bob Ross and Timothy on that discussion. — Punshhh
Although personally I would say how we and the universe came into existence is a deep mystery and it’s pointless trying to work it out until someone (who knows) comes along to tell us how it works. — Punshhh
For Supervenience -- focusing on the physical stuff of Brain States causing another State -- the problem is the distinction made for different States, with The Mental/Brain State (Idea to Slap) supervenes the Physical State (Motion of Hand to Slap). This means that one state changes the other but not vice versa. — I like sushi
So either the Brain State plays no causal role in this OR this is physical reductionism — I like sushi
Do you think there is a good reason to distinguish between me moving my hand and me thinking about moving my hand? If your answer is yes, then we have Property Dualism and it needs explaining. — I like sushi
If we are looking at this form a phsyical reductionist perspective it looks a more like Epiphenomenalism is a reasonable explaination of such Mental States. — I like sushi
Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'.
— Philosophim
Well, this is where the line of thinking takes us. — I like sushi
The HPoC is explaining why the altered brain states alter the person's subjective experience. Why do brain states have subjective experience at all? There is no physicalist theory, or even a guess. As Hoffman and Greene said about the physical properties off the universe:We can clearly see brain states influencing behaviors and responses from individuals that demonstrate altered brain states alter the person's subjective experience. — Philosophim
Why do brain states have subjective experience at all? — Patterner
Hoffman and Greene said about the physical properties off the universe:
"is utterly different in nature than conscious experience". — Patterner
"there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate." — Patterner
"seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience." — Patterner
If I rubbed two sticks together and a geyser of water shot out of it, you would ask how that happened. You would not be satisfied if I answered that it came from the wood — Patterner
The label not wanting to be owned here is Physical Eliminativism. — I like sushi
Philosophim does not believe there is a Hard Problem. — I like sushi
↪Philosophim I suggest you use this term (Eliminativism) to describe your position in the future and perhaps look it up and address the arguments against it. — I like sushi
I suggest you not pull a fast one and try to label a poster as holding a position they clearly do not hold without explaining why. — Philosophim
I suggest you not pull a fast one and try to label a poster as holding a position they clearly do not hold without explaining why.
— Philosophim
Look it up. I am not stating you hold this rigidly (at least I hope not). The point is you need to understand the counter arguments involved. — I like sushi
If you are just going to get all defensive because you do not understand the contradictions you are articulating — I like sushi
please do leave the thread and start your own. — I like sushi
Should I continue to? — Philosophim
It is your job to point out the contradictions in what I'm stating and demonstrate why. I see only accusation, no articulation why. "You're wrong because I say so," does not work. — Philosophim
Should I continue to?
— Philosophim
No. I think not. — I like sushi
If you hold to there being a difference between Properties of items under discussion AND hold that there is no Substance Dualism then it does not logically follow that you can have this both ways due to the condition of Supervenience — I like sushi
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