I take Berkeley to be arguing that we can do without the concept of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems that way, in that for Berkeley "matter" does nothing for us.

See SEP - Occasionalism

Berkeley (1685-1753) may have been influenced by the Occasionalism of the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715).

Consider a moving white billiard ball hit a stationary red billiard ball, which then starts to move.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God

For Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, there is not a material world, where objects exist independently of any mind or perception, but there is a physical world, where objects are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

So if the interaction between the white ball and red ball does not depend on the material within the billiard balls but does depends on the mind of God, then the actual material billiard balls are redundant.

The material world adds nothing if nothing is determined by the material world but is determined by the mind of God.

What Newton did, is replace the concept of "matter" with "inertia", as the defining feature of a body. We can understand a body as having inertia, instead of understanding it as having matter. So the emerging physics, which understood the principal property of a body as inertia, rather than as matter, rendered the concept of matter as redundant. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not something that Newton himself would have said. It’s true that his discovery of inertia fundamentally changed the conception of matter, but I don’t think Newton had any doubt that physical objects were really physical. Newton didn’t eliminate “matter” from his vocabulary or ontology — he simply avoided metaphysical speculation about it.

The material world adds nothing if nothing is determined by the material world but is determined by the mind of God. — RussellA

You’re right that Berkeley denies a material substratum and sees the order of events as sustained by God’s will — so in that sense, “matter” in the Lockean sense is indeed redundant. But his view isn’t quite the same as Malebranche’s occasionalism. Malebranche held that no finite cause has any real efficacy — every change is a direct act of God. Berkeley, by contrast, accepts that there are regular sequences among ideas (what we might call “natural causes”), which God has ordained as the stable framework of experience. These patterns aren’t illusions; they’re effective causes in the world as God presents it to us.

Don’t overlook the quotation in the OP:

I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ‘matter’ or ‘corporeal substance’. — Berkeley

Whereas, I think, for you, the idea that objects are not physical means that they must be in some sense illusory. Would that be true?

Don’t overlook the fact that Berkeley also wrote a treatise on optics, and was quite scientifically literate in the context of his historical period.

Is matter, stripped of all the perceptible qualities and can only exist parasitically on other objects, a perceptible object? — L'éléphant

I am unclear as to the meaning of "perceive" in "esse est percipi", "to be is to be perceived".

Does it mean perceive through the sense, as in "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise" or does it mean perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive she is bored" or "I perceive the cause of the smoke was a fire"?

Today, my understanding of reality is described by Physicalism, where particles and forces are fundamental to the reality of the world.

As you say, things like quarks cannot be directly perceived but only indirectly perceived.

Berkeley did not believe in what today we call Physicalism, as he believed that everything in the world, whether fundamental particles, fundamental forces, tables, chairs or trees are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

This is why I think in another context he could have been something like a logical positivist. — Apustimelogist

It is not surprising IMO. Logical positivists actually are the result of a tradition that goes back to the Empiricists in the Enlightenment, especially David Hume. But Hume was inspired by Berkeley and Locke before him. Then, of course, we have the 19th century positivists like Mach and, finally, the logical positivists.

But note that empiricists, idealists and positivists till the 19th centuries were inspirations of many physicists in the 20th century who weren't logical positivists. These include the 'fathers' of QM but also someone like Einstein.

The OP mentioned that 'idealism' has been influential and a source of inspiration for recent scientific discoveries (even when criticized). I would say that on this point the OP isn't wrong.

Berkeley did not believe in what today we call Physicalism, as he believed that everything in the world, whether fundamental particles, fundamental forces, tables, chairs or trees are bundles of ideas in the mind of God. — RussellA

I think that Berkeley would have accepted physical explanations, but as being semantically reducible to talk of private sensations, perhaps by arguing that subjective semantics must underpin physical semantics in order to logically relate physical theory to observation.

One obvious issue with his position is the question of how multiple observers are possible; for if Berkeley isn't a solipsist and accepts the existence of other minds, then presumably those minds access or constitute the same world and therefore the same sets of ideas. Which is presumably where hiis appeal to God comes in, amounting to an axiom that a persistent world exists regardless of whether a particular individual is observin or interacting with it - but isn't this more or less the same as the axiom of a persistent world under materialism?

Conversely, how can materialism justify belief in a mind-independent physical world without appealing to a likeness principle and a "master argument", in order to ground a theory of evidence relating subjective observations to the material world?

Berkeley, by contrast, accepts that there are regular sequences among ideas (what we might call “natural causes”), which God has ordained as the stable framework of experience. These patterns aren’t illusions; they’re effective causes in the world as God presents it to us. — Wayfarer

One might ask, however, how one that endorses an 'idealist' position that flatly denies the existence of some kind of material substratum can explain the regularites (and 'intersubjective agreement') without assuming the existence of God or some God-like being. Of course a theist would not have much problems but a non-theist would perhaps see this as a problem of idealism.
For instance, I always found Kant's arguments to explain intersubjectivity and regularities without appealing to some 'reality beyond phenomena' as insufficient. Of course, Kant posited some kind of unknowable reality beyond phenomena. But still IMO Berkeley at least gives an account on how we might explain the 'order' of phenomena.

One might ask, however, how one that endorses an 'idealist' position that flatly denies the existence of some kind of material substratum can explain the regularites (and 'intersubjective agreement') without assuming the existence of God or some God-like being. — boundless

Indeed. Berkeley was both empiricist - all knowledge from experience - and nominalist - there are no universals. This is where Berkeley’s idealism shows a thinness - It’s effective at undermining the representationalist picture of perception (ideas as representation of objects), but if offers little by way of an ontology of structure, pattern, and necessity beyond “God’s will.” His rejection of “abstract general ideas” was part of his polemic against Locke. He thought Locke’s account — that we form general ideas by abstracting common features from particulars — was incoherent, because he could not imagine an “idea” that was neither fully determinate nor fully concrete. For him, all ideas are singular and specific; generality comes only from the way we use them (via signs or words). That’s why his Introduction to the Principles treats universals as nothing but linguistic convenience. This is where his nominalism shows through. By designating universals purely mental or linguistic, Berkeley undercuts the possibility of a robust theory of lawlike regularities within his immaterialism.

I always found Kant's arguments to explain intersubjectivity and regularities without appealing to some 'reality beyond phenomena' as insufficient. Of course, Kant posited some kind of unknowable reality beyond phenomena. — boundless

Kant does acknowledge that there is a domain beyond our knowledge - so there is a reality beyond, or in a sense other than how it appears to us. But he avoided the weakness in Berkeley's argument by allowing that the forms of thought (categories) and of intuition are universal structures of cognition, not mere names — though still mind-dependent in his transcendental sense. That universality is what underwrites the necessity and universality of Newtonian physics in Kant’s time — his “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” explicitly tries to show why physics has the same kind of a priori grounding as mathematics (something which has since been superseded somewhat by the discovery of non-euclidean geometery.) But it certainly doesn't suggest outright scepticism about the reality of the objective domain (in the way that Hume also did with his denial of causality..)

//also consider that the ‘material substratum’ is nowadays regarded as being of the nature of fields in which particles are ‘excitations’. I think this is why Berkelian idealism keeps being mentioned in this context.//

Thank you for the excellent essay! I'm so glad to read a contemporary author who doesn't succumb to the trendy currents that proclaim the "death of the subject," which is typical of movements like Object-Oriented Ontologies or Meillassoux's correlationism. On the contrary, you defend the subject, and I completely agree with your position.

It seems to me that today, the subject has become an incredibly fragile construct that is frequently under attack, and therefore, it needs philosophical protection now more than ever.

In this regard, I have an idea I'd like to share. What if we were to view this historical path not as a change of participants (subject-God-object in premodernity, then subject-object in modernity), but as a change in the methods of knowledge acquisition?

In premodernity, the primary method of knowledge was religion: knowledge was given through divine revelation.

In modernity, this method was discarded and replaced by objectivism—the belief in an independent reality knowable by reason. As Nietzsche said, "God is dead, and we have killed him."

Today, when we see the limitations of objectivism but can't return to religion, we find ourselves at an impasse. This is where radical ideas like the "cancellation" of the subject arise.

What are your thoughts on whether this view of the history of philosophy is justified?

Berkeley, by contrast, accepts that there are regular sequences among ideas (what we might call “natural causes”), which God has ordained as the stable framework of experience — Wayfarer

As I understand it:

For Malebranche, God controls every interaction, such as when a white snooker ball hits a red snooker ball.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly.

But is it the case that for Berkeley the Laws of Nature exist independently of God?

However, ‘esse est percipi’ = "to be is to be perceived" and not only de we perceive objects such as tables and chairs, which therefore must exist in the mind of God, but we also perceive the Laws of Nature, which therefore must also exist in the mind of God.

For Malebranche, God must be involved in every interaction, such as determining how the red ball moves. But also for Berkeley, God must be involved in every interaction, in that to every interaction God must apply the appropriate Law of Nature. Even though it is this Law of Nature which then determines how the red ball moves.

One can conclude that even though God has ordained a framework of experience, such as the Conservation of Momentum, God still has to apply this framework of experience to every interaction.

Malebranche's view may be slightly different to Berkeley's view, but they both require God to be involved in every interaction.
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Whereas, I think, for you, the idea that objects are not physical means that they must be in some sense illusory. Would that be true? — Wayfarer

As regards definitions, I believe in what today is called Physicalism, being fundamental particles and forces. Berkeley did not believe in a world of material substance, such as today's Physicalism, but he did believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

Therefore, even though my concept of "chair" is not physical, I don't think of it as an illusion.

By all accounts, Berkeley was an instrumentalist. So Berkeley would have "believed in physics" - but not in realist metaphysical interpretations of physical posits as denoting hidden entities that are irreducible to observations.

As stated earlier, Berkeley's ideas are passive, hence ideas cannot literally cause other ideas, implying that causal agency and free will are not observable for Berkeley as they are not for Hume. So if the existence of agency, free-will, moral choices etc, are to be assumed, then Berkeley must introduce some additional ontological entity (active spirits) that are not reducible to patterns of passive ideas. The resulting dualism looks to me, rather ironically, as a somewhat cleaner version of physicalism, if we assume that Berkeley's "God" refers only to the assumed existence of moral agency, which physicalists seem to accept, at least judging by their actions.

Berkley's occasionalism reminds me of the computation of virtual worlds, in that the real cause of a change of state in a virtual world are the hidden actions of CPU and GPU instructions, as opposed to the on screen graphics presented to the player. Indeed, virtual worlds remind us that we don't see causal necessity; the only non-controversial applications of the word "necessity" refer to normative speech acts. Perhaps a materialist's metaphysical appeal to physical necessity can even be considered a form of occasionalism in denial.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God — RussellA

This is the inevitable conclusion when we take the reality of free will, final cause, to its extreme. To allow the reality of choice, we must allow for real possibility at each passing moment of time. This implies that there is no necessary continuity from the past, through the present, into the future. The observed continuity is supported by the Will of God. The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice.

For example, consider that the white ball is moving toward the red ball, and by physical projections will cause the red ball to move in the future. Let's assume that the hand of a human being (analogous to the Will of God), can interfere at any moment to prevent that occurrence. And if we look to the source of the movement of that hand, we might consider energies in the human body, but ultimately it is the free will, a free choice without any prior efficient cause. In this way "final cause" puts an end to any proposed chain of causation, as an action which begins without prior causation. Now, we have a source of activity which theoretically, at any moment in time could interfere with the inertia or momentum of any existing object, at any moment in time. If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future.

This supports the mystical perspective that each and every existing physical object, and the entirety of the physical universe must be recreated at each moment of passing time. From this perspective, the continuity, and consistency which we observe as inertia, mass, and momentum, cannot be taken for granted. If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. In the theological metaphysics, the recreation is supported by the Will of God. God willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment, in the consistent way that we observe, allowing us to predict from past to future.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly. — RussellA

This is what naturally followed from Newton's project of the laws of motion. Newton was able to describe the observed continuity and consistency of temporal existence, in the form of laws, "what is given", thus creating the illusion of necessity. Therefore instead of understanding the consistency in the passing of time as dependent upon the choice of God, to choose from future possibilities, we actually exclude real possibility with "Laws of Nature", and end up with a determinist physical world. Hume is very helpful toward understanding this lack of necessity which the idea of "Laws of Nature" negates with imposed necessity.

That is not something that Newton himself would have said. It’s true that his discovery of inertia fundamentally changed the conception of matter, but I don’t think Newton had any doubt that physical objects were really physical. Newton didn’t eliminate “matter” from his vocabulary or ontology — he simply avoided metaphysical speculation about it. — Wayfarer

I did read somewhere, that Newton himself declared that his first law of motion depended on the Will of God. Newton was religious. Newton had no doubt that physical objects were physical, just like Berkeley had no such doubt. But Newton did eliminate "matter" from his ontology. He replaced it with 'the Will of God', which is the mystical perspective described above. He then represented the effects of the Will of God, for the purpose of physical understanding, as inertia and momentum. Effectively, God as a loving, caring supreme being, has a Will which we can depend upon. This provides for us the necessity of inertia and momentum, which is not an absolute necessity but dependent on God's choice.

So, what he did was quantify matter as "mass", and this is not consistent with Aristotelian "matter", as quantity is formal, and there is a categorical separation between form and matter.. Therefore he gave matter itself, a fundamental quantifiable property, "mass", which effectively supplants "matter". The one must replace the other as the two are inconsistent with each other. This is why today, "matter" is just a philosophically and scientifically useless, ambiguous term, without any rigorous convention.

Conversely, how can materialism justify belief in a mind-independent physical world without appealing to a likeness principle and a "master argument", in order to ground a theory of evidence relating subjective observations to the material world? — sime

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the world even when not observed by any human, because they exist in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that tables and chairs exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

This raises the problem of inter-subjectivity. How can two people talk about tables and chairs if no table or chair exists in the world?

For me, tables and chairs exist in language and language exists in the world.

Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words.

To the concept I have in my mind of a table, I can attach the label "table", thereby linking something in my mind to something in the world.

Someone else can do the same thing. They can have a concept in their mind, and attach the label "table" to it, thereby linking something in their mind to something in the world.

Intersubjectivity then becomes possible. There is a link from my concept to the label "table" and from the label "table" to a concept in someone else's mind, thereby linking a concept in my mind to the concept in another person's mind.

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the mind of God, enabling inter-subjectivity. For me, tables and chairs exist in language, also enabling intersubjectivity.

This is where his nominalism shows through. By designating universals purely mental or linguistic, Berkeley undercuts the possibility of a robust theory of lawlike regularities within his immaterialism. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I agree. That's one of his weak points. But I would also say that his 'immaterialism' by no means implies nominalism. In fact, I would even say that - at least for certain concepts (e.g. mathematics) - Berkeley's own system would actually make more sense with a 'realism about universalism' - as concepts present eternally in the mind of God.

Kant does acknowledge that there is a domain beyond our knowledge - so there is a reality beyond, or in a sense other than how it appears to us. But he avoided the weakness in Berkeley's argument by allowing that the forms of thought (categories) and of intuition are universal structures of cognition, not mere names — though still mind-dependent in his transcendental sense. — Wayfarer

The problem is that in order for our own categories and intuition to 'ordain' the empirical world, I believe you need to posit some structure onto the noumenal and this suggests that we do have some knowledge of the noumenal, i.e. one ends up to a form of 'indirect realism' or something like d'Espagnat's view.

//also consider that the ‘material substratum’ is nowadays regarded as being of the nature of fields in which particles are ‘excitations’. I think this is why Berkelian idealism keeps being mentioned in this context.// — Wayfarer

Well, 'excitations' could not be 'ideas', however. On the other hand, contemporary physics tells us that physical reality is quite different from what it seems to us at the most fundamental level anyway.

The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

The deterministic perspective equates to my previous experiences.

All things being equal, if on a snooker table I saw a white ball hit the red ball a 1,000 times, I would expect that the red ball would react in exactly the same way. This is my experience of the world. From my personal experiences, my belief is that we live in a deterministic world.
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If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future — Metaphysician Undercover

Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.

Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.

Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.

In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.

In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.

In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present.
===============================================================================

If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

God could be the reason for consistency. A God who willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment.

This raises the question, why does God behave consistently. Why doesn't God behave in a random way. He could if He wanted. Perhaps one time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball stays where it is. Perhaps the next time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball shoots off at 90 metres per second.

Logic could also be the reason for consistency. For example, The Law of Identity states that each thing is identical to itself. Logic could be at the heart of reality. Even though logic is internal, a natural by-product would be a universality.

For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B.

The two clocks will maintain the same time, even though there is no external connection between them, but because each clock is identical to itself.

A by-product of the Law of Identity that something is identical to itself is a universal truth. A universal consistency.

but isn't this more or less the same as the axiom of a persistent world under materialism? — sime

Yes, but when you belueve in God, you don't have to justify it! Perfect solution.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts. — RussellA

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective?

I can't see how idealism is able to explain three things - or perhaps better, in offering explanations it admits that there are truths that are independent of mind and so ceases to be different to realism in any interesting way.
Novelty.
We are sometimes surprised by things that are unexpected. How is this possible if all that there is, is already in one’s mind?
Agreement .
You and I agree as to what is the case. How is that possible unless there is something external to us both on which to agree?
Error.
We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if there is not a way that things are, independent of what we believe? — Banno

Depends on how idealism is interpreted. — Wayfarer

Banno's questions seem to be based on an Either/Or dichotomy between Realism/Idealism or Subject/Object ; in which reasonable people must accept one perspective and reject the other. Hence, if you are an Idealist, then for you (the subject) there is no (objective) Reality. Berkeley did seem to imply that material reality is a figment of human imagination, since the non-self world is a figment of God's imagination.

Since I don't know how to read the mind of God, I must take for granted that sensable phenomena (appearances) are signals from something (material) out there (Johnson's stone). From my BothAnd perspective, the world/mind (real/ideal) go-between is Energy (Information ; EnFormAction). So, Johnson's stone is not an invention of his imagination. But the pain in his foot is.

The bottom line is that my worldview is not Either/Or, but Both/And. What do you think? Is there a Real world out there that is independent of my mind? Or is there a Great Gulf (dichotomy) between God-mind and Man-mind, that we observers cross only by a leap of Faith? As Banno seems to interpret Idealism. :smile:


Both/And Principle :
My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html
Note --- For Berkeley, the "whole system" would be the Mind of God. For others, it may be simply everything in the post-Bang world, including Mind and Matter.

BTW, even Bohm's*4 "realistic perspective" is typically labeled as a form of Idealism — Gnomon
Bohmian mechanics is just straightforward realism that happens to involve non-locality. — Apustimelogist

Unfortunately, for quantum pioneers, trained in classical physics, non-locality was not as "straightforward" as you imply. :smile:

*1. Is reality not locally real? :
“Local” means that objects can be influenced only by their surroundings and that any influence cannot travel faster than light. Investigations at the frontiers of quantum physics have found that these things cannot both be true.
https://dangaristo.com/portfolio/the-universe-is-not-locally-real-and-the-physics-nobel-prize-winners-proved-it/
Note --- That's why common-sense classical physics is no longer the standard model for 21st century physicists.

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective? — Relativist

There are many different definitions of "truth" - see SEP - Truth

In the absence of humans there would be no truth. For example, is a rock "true"?

"Truth" only exists in the presence of humans, and therefore is entirely subjective.

For me the statement "objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world.

"Objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true IFF objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

As it is a fact that tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts, this must be a true statement.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world. — RussellA

What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular.

In premodernity, the primary method of knowledge was religion: knowledge was given through divine revelation.

In modernity, this method was discarded and replaced by objectivism—the belief in an independent reality knowable by reason. As Nietzsche said, "God is dead, and we have killed him."

Today, when we see the limitations of objectivism but can't return to religion, we find ourselves at an impasse. This is where radical ideas like the "cancellation" of the subject arise. — Astorre

I'm pleased you like the OP and can see that you get the gist. But I wouldn't want it to rely on revealed truth. I can recognise the significance of revealed truth, but in philosophy it's also important to give reasons. And it's a red flag for many readers.

The point I see about pre-modernity was the sense of participation. Religious narratives created a story of the world, in which we were participants. The purpose of ritual and liturgy was to re-create the sacred. They provided a context and background against which existence was meaningful.

...myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play.

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd. — Karen Armstrong, Metaphysical Mistake

Of course it is a truism that the advent of modernity shattered this sense - this is what Max Weber described as the disenchantment of the world. So we need to understand the tectonic shifts, so to speak, that underlie all of these massive changes. It is no easy task, especially as we ourselves are both its proponents and its casualties.

But Newton did eliminate "matter" from his ontology. He replaced it with 'the Will of God', which is the mystical perspective described above. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't believe so. Newton like others of his period was deist. Deists believed that God 'set the world in motion' but that thereafter it ran by the laws that Newton discovered. Hence LaPlace's declaration (LaPlace being 'France's Newton'), when asked if there were a place for the Divine Intellect in his theory, that 'I have no need of that hypothesis'.

Banno's questions seem to be based on an Either/Or dichotomy between Realism/Idealism or Subject/Object ; in which reasonable people must accept one perspective and reject the other. Hence, if you are an Idealist, then for you (the subject) there is no (objective) Reality. — Gnomon

There is a dialectical relationship between materialism and idealism. Materialism stands on the object, the objective, what is independently existent, as the truly so. Idealism on the knowing subject, the mind. Philosophy tends to vacillate between these two standpoints over time. But there is an escape from this cycle, a standpoint which does not cling to one or the other side of this equation.

As regards definitions, I believe in what today is called Physicalism, being fundamental particles and forces. — RussellA

I figured!

Of course it is a truism that the advent of modernity shattered this sense - this is what Max Weber described as the disenchantment of the world. So we need to understand the tectonic shifts, so to speak, that underlie all of these massive changes. It is no easy task, especially as we ourselves are both its proponents and its casualties. — Wayfarer

Yes, it’s interesting. Historically, I've gotten a lot of satisfaction from the idea that life is meaningless, that there’s no intrinsic purpose and that the world is disenchanted and pointless. It's generally cheered me up and helped me make sense of things. In the end, games of reasoning aside, we tend to select and hold views that appeal to our aesthetic sense, our cultivation of meaning, and our cultural experiences. But either view; that the world is magical or meaningless, can be used in terrible ways. I don’t subscribe to the various nostalgic projects, the kind of “woke MAGA” (or should that be Make Awareness Great Again?) projects of people like Vervaeke or McGilchrist, who seek to recapture lost traditions (or however they choose to market these notions).

These days, I’m more temperate. I don’t really mind either way about interpretations of the world as inherently anything in particular. I'm more interested in what others think and why to try to understand what's informing the choices around me.

As an idealist, what impact does this have on your day to day living?

What point would there be in explaining it to someone who thinks it's meaningless?

Gobbledygook.

Sure - I entirely agree, it should be trivial. Some people might disagree, as with everything else in philosophy.

Now the only issue is if you are OK with saying some versions of idealism entail mental mediation or if you think idealism must entail something else. — Manuel

I'm not sure what your are asking here Manuel. I think all worldviews must entail mental mediation insofar as they are worldviews. And I think virtually all worldviews must acknowledge that human experience, perception, cognition entail mental mediation.

Perhaps one exception might be a view that the things we perceive are given to our minds fully formed by God, and this would be a kind of direct realism. Perhaps Berkeley has something like this in mind.

By "something else" do you mean 'something independent of the individual mind'? If that is what you mean then I do think any coherent idealism must entail something else, whether that be an entanglement of all minds, all minds being connected to a collective or universal mind like the Buddhiust ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) or God.

So, we need some way of connecting or independently informing individual minds in order to explain the undeniable commonality of experience. For physicalism or materialism that "something else" is the world of mind-independently existing things.


The meaning of life is all about proselytization. :wink:

Or being a drive-by shooter! Whatever floats you boat, eh?

non-locality was not as "straightforward" as you imply. — Gnomon

I was implying the realism was straightforward (specifically in the Bohmian mathematical description). The non-locality may not be given that it is problematic for relativity under naive understanding. But maybe alternative understandings can come up? Who knows.

What point would there be in explaining it to someone who thinks it's meaningless? — Wayfarer

That's an odd quesion. As I've said many times, I am interested in what others believe and why. No need for antipathy. As you have seen, I am generous towards your contributions and think highly of your approach. So my quesion is genuine. I find idealism fascinating, just as I find Sufi mysticism or Kabbalah fascinating. Doesn't mean I'm a follower.

So, according to you it is out of bounds for anyone to join in by expressing their opinion unless it is accordance with yours?

You won't dare to engage with my arguments directly because you know you have no answers for them, so I conclude you are not a genuinely open-minded interlocutor, but are an ideologue, a dogmatist, who reacts defensively by casting aspersions on those who present counterarguments and critiques they cannot deal with.

I am unclear as to the meaning of "perceive" in "esse est percipi", "to be is to be perceived". — RussellA

The claim "esse est percipi", to perceive is defined and explained clearly in many of the philosophers' passages. Berkeley's is no different -- to perceive is to use the 5 senses and of course the understanding of this perception.

Does it mean perceive through the sense, as in "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise" or does it mean perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive she is bored" or "I perceive the cause of the smoke was a fire"? — RussellA

Yes, in all of those senses. For example, in I perceive she is bored, you can correctly make this claim because you have interacted with this person multiple times and you've seen how this person acted in different ways. We show and hide our emotions.

Today, my understanding of reality is described by Physicalism, where particles and forces are fundamental to the reality of the world. — RussellA

There is no violation of perception in this case. I agree.

Berkeley did not believe in what today we call Physicalism, as he believed that everything in the world, whether fundamental particles, fundamental forces, tables, chairs or trees are bundles of ideas in the mind of God. — RussellA

I don't know if that's the correct interpretation of Berkeley's understanding of perception. I believe @Wayfarer has covered this multiple times already.
I think you must be conflating physicalism with "matter" which we call substance that is independent of tangible things and perceptible qualities. It's been understood here in this thread by several posters that is the case with "matter". So, while matter is being included in the physical, its definition is what the contention is about.

You won't dare to engage with my arguments directly — Janus

I mostly won't engage because you are truculent and verbally aggressive. You've said that I'm 'full of shit' or that I'm 'intellectually dishonest', and many times in past when I've tried to explain something you've accused me of 'being evasive' or 'changing the subject', when, from my perspective, you simply don't understand what's being said. So don't expect any further responses from me. In a public forum, sometimes one has to choose which comments to respond to.