.... We examine "conceptual space" and discover that, let's say, "Universals, numbers, and the like, are . . . relationships that can only be grasped by the rational mind." (Notice that for the time being I omitted your word "real".) If this is true, then we've learned something important about a category of being which we encounter. — J

Actually, there's a surprising amount of consensus about the "categories" of being, amongst those philosophers who have ventured into this territory. Meinong, Peirce, Popper all come up with three categories - the physical, the abstract, the mental. There are variations, but there's a lot of overlap and the surrounding framework differs. But the overlap is significant.
One reservation I have is that this arrangement can be characterized in different ways. It can be characterized as "categories of being" or "modes of existence" or as "categories of objects" or categories of language. It may be that this is less important than the approach.

My challenge is, What is added to our knowledge by describing this category as "real"? Is there any non-circular, non-question-begging way of teasing out more information from "real"? … And we can go on to give names to other elements of ontology -- perhaps including names for ways of existing. (Quantification!) We'd end up, ideally, with a clear and organized metaphysic that can still speak about grounding, structure, and epistemology, thus covering what most of us want from terms like "real" and "exist," but without the contentious, ambiguous baggage. — J

I've been thinking about this a lot. The same word is used, so there is a great temptation to give a general characterization of all the uses. There may not be one, in which case we simply designate the word as ambiguous. "Bank" as in river and "bank" as in financial institution and "bank" as in "you can bank on that" is a stock example. However, in the case of real, I wondered whether we could say that "real" is the concept that enables us to distinguish between misleading and true appearances.

I have busy days (again) tomorrow and Tuesday. So I doubt if I will reappear here before Wednesday.

scholastic realism was a very different animal from modern scientific realism. . . . Scholastic realism, by contrast, affirmed the reality of universals—forms or structures apprehended by the intellect—and saw them as essential to the very architecture of reason. — Wayfarer

That's right, and the philosophical structure that results from this is intricate and, for me, often persuasive. My beef, if I have one, is with terminology. I'm looking for ways to talk about these things that promote mutual insight rather than disagreement over what words to use. The scientific realist and the scholastic realist disagree -- but about what, exactly? Is there a way to frame their disagreement without each insisting on one view about how to use the word "real"?

I'm trying to be careful, and not say ". . . about what is real." I'm arguing that there isn't a fact of the matter here; all we have is more or less useful ways of using the word. That doesn't cede any ground to either camp. Clearly there's something important that the scientific realist is pointing to, by drawing the line where they do. Equally clearly, that's the case for the scholastic realist as well. What can we do to encourage conversation about what might lie on either side of that line, without having to call the line "the boundary of reality" or some such?

One reservation I have is that this arrangement can be characterized in different ways. It can be characterized as "categories of being" or "modes of existence" or as "categories of objects" or categories of language. It may be that this is less important than the approach. — Ludwig V

Yes. Again, the wrangle over how to name the elements of the arrangement -- what counts is the approach, the arrangement itself.

The same word ["real"] is used, so there is a great temptation to give a general characterization of all the uses. There may not be one, in which case we simply designate the word as ambiguous. . . . However, in the case of real, I wondered whether we could say that "real" is the concept that enables us to distinguish between misleading and true appearances. — Ludwig V

That's a good way to use "real." And if we adopted it, notice what would follow: A disagreement about whether an appearance is misleading or true would be settled, if it can be settled at all, on the merits. We would not be looking in the Great Dictionary under "real" and saying, Ahah, this appearance over here is real, because it's true. Rather, we'd examine the conceptual territory of "misleading" and "true," make what determination we can, and then, having decided that "real" is a good word to use for the true appearances, we use it. If someone doesn't like that use of the word, no big deal: What we want to be talking about is misleading and true appearances, not "reality."

Caution needed here, though. Again there's a sense in the back of that of the 'there anyway' reality, which will supposedly carry on regardless. But that too is a mental construct, vorstellung, in Schopenhauer's terms. — Wayfarer

Yes, yes, our concept of reality is our concept - who else's would it be? In the same way, our concepts of a unicorn or a swan are our concepts. Whether such creatures exist is another matter. More accurately, our concepts are not arbitrary, but the result of a negotiation with Reality, with how the world is. Actually, it's not really a negotiation because the world doesn't do give-and-take. It's more a question of trying a suite of concepts on to see if they fit with what we want.

As Kant put it, “time is the form of our intuition” — we cannot picture a pre-human past except as a temporal sequence ordered in the way our minds structure it. The scientific account is entirely valid within that framework, but it doesn’t erase the fact that the framework itself is ours. — Wayfarer

This is one of the moments that I think we may agree about at least some of this. The catch comes in when I want to say that framework is what reveals the world to us. You seem to have difficulty with that.

Now you may ask what this detachment is that is so noble in itself. You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honour, shame or disgrace, as a mountain of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. … — Meister Eckhart, On Detachment

We talked about this. I do think that the door/hinge analogy is more helpful.

The scientific realist and the scholastic realist disagree -- but about what, exactly? Is there a way to frame their disagreement without each insisting on one view about how to use the word "real"? — J

I'm not at all clear what you mean by scholastic realism. Can you explain, please?
I'm more familiar with idealism vs realism, but I'm pushing at the same door. At the very least, even if actual agreement can't be reached, mutual understanding would be deepened.

"categories of being" or "modes of existence" or as "categories of objects" or categories of language. — Ludwig V

I can live more easily with any of these than with Being or Existence or Objects or Language.

What we want to be talking about is misleading and true appearances, not "reality." — J

Absolutely.

Notice in the paragraphs above, the experiment is directed by the hypothesis, and the hypothesis is directed by the underlying assumptions or attitude. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's perfectly true. But what makes the system work is that the experimental results are not directed by the hypothesis - it wouldn't be an experiment if they were. So what are they directed by? Reality or Nature or the World - take your pick. That's what I was trying to say. I'm sorry if I was not clear.

I'm not at all clear what you mean by scholastic realism. Can you explain, please? — Ludwig V

I was picking up @Wayfarer's term -

You’re aware that scholastic realism was a very different animal from modern scientific realism. Scientific realism, as it’s commonly understood, is rooted in an exclusively objective and empirical framework that sidelines or brackets the subjective elements of judgement, reasoning, and conceptual insight. Scholastic realism, by contrast, affirmed the reality of universals—forms or structures apprehended by the intellect—and saw them as essential to the very architecture of reason. — Wayfarer

I thought it might be something like that. "the reality of universals" is the litmus test for platonism.

Clearly there's something important that the scientific realist is pointing to, by drawing the line where they do. Equally clearly, that's the case for the scholastic realist as well. What can we do to encourage conversation about what might lie on either side of that line, without having to call the line "the boundary of reality" or some such? — J

But it really is a debate about the nature of reality—and also about the corresponding change in consciousness that follows from how we draw that line. Universals are fundamental to how the mind 'constructs' reality. Thoughts are real—but not because they are “brain activity” (as perhaps 90% of the participants here would have it). They belong to a different order - one that due to these historical changes, is no longer recognized.

Historically, nominalism shifted the sense of what is real from universals to particulars, from ideas to objects, and thence the presumption that the sensable world is real independently of the mind. Whereas, as we've seen, the perception of material objects is necessarily contingent on sense-perception (per Kant). But principles such as those of geometry, maths, and logic which are constantly deployed to fathom the so-called mind-independent world are themselves things that can only be grasped by a mind. The result is, as Bob Dylan put it, 'there's too much confusion' ('All Along the Watchtower').

The empiricist tendency is to think about ideas as if they were objects, but that is to confuse what is intelligible with what is perceptible. And if the question is asked, in what sense are they physical? the answer will be that as they’re grasped by the mind → the mind is the brain → the brain is physical → therefore ideas must also be (or supervene on the) physical. But the claim “mind is brain” is itself conceptual. It relies on the conceptual architecture of science.

Everything is ass-about and upside down.

"the reality of universals" is the litmus test for platonism. — Ludwig V

One of the books I read just as I began posting on forums was The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie. 'Gillespie turns the conventional reading of the Enlightenment (as reason overcoming religion) on its head by explaining how the humanism of Petrarch, the free-will debate between Luther and Erasmus, the scientific forays of Francis Bacon, the epistemological debate between Descarte and Hobbes, were all motivated by an underlying wrestling with the questions posed by nominalism, which, according to Gillespie, dismantled the rational God / universe of medieval scholasticism and introduced (by way of the Franciscans) a fideistic God-of-pure-will, out of a concern that anything less than that would undermine divine omnipotence'.

Nothing I've seen since has caused me to doubt his account. Not that it's the final word but it set the direction for my subsequent research.

But the claim “mind is brain” is itself conceptual. It relies on the conceptual architecture of science. — Wayfarer

It all depends on your perspective. For the physicalist the claim "mind is brain" is physical, as reasoning is a physical process. Concepts themselves (as conceived) are hypostatized physical processes for the physicalist.

The problem for you is that you think there is a "slam dunk" way of debunking physicalism. There is no slam dunk way of debunking physicalism or any other metaphysical view because everything depends on what assumptions you begin with.

With metaphysics the best you can hope for is consistency and plausibility, you are not going to get any proof.

Historically, nominalism shifted the sense of what is real from universals to particulars, from ideas to objects, and thence the presumption that the sensible world is real independently of the mind. — Wayfarer

I'm very sceptical about that. But I don't know enough to argue the point properly. Nominalism was clearly part of what was going on, but something as complex as the Renaissance/Reformation must have involved many interacting factors. The idea that a single part of the movement caused everything seems highly implausible to me. I also suspect that our problem was not really a problem for pre-Enlightenment philosophy. The explanation I'm looking for is how the problem originated. I don't recall Aristotle worrying about our problem. Plato's philosophy is more complex, but still doesn't align with our debates, IMO. Yet, there were important ideas in the older philosophy. It should not be dismissed wholesale.

'Gillespie turns the conventional reading of the Enlightenment (as reason overcoming religion) on its head by explaining how the humanism of Petrarch, the free-will debate between Luther and Erasmus, the scientific forays of Francis Bacon, the epistemological debate between Descartes and Hobbes, were all motivated by an underlying wrestling with the questions posed by nominalism, which, according to Gillespie, dismantled the rational God / universe of medieval scholasticism and introduced (by way of the Franciscans) a fideistic God-of-pure-will, out of a concern that anything less than that would undermine divine omnipotence'. — Wayfarer

It sounds like a very good read and might fill in some of the many blanks in my historical understanding. Yet - No spark setting off an explosion. Many factors combining in a storm.
I'm really interested in the information that there was a real (!) theological concern behind to the development of fideism. I had the impression that it was simply a resort of the faithful under the assault from the Enlightenment. Thanks for that.

The problem for you is that you think there is a "slam dunk" way of debunking physicalism. There is no slam dunk way of debunking physicalism or any other metaphysical view because everything depends on what assumptions you begin with. — Janus

I would go further and suggest that there are no "slam-dunk" arguments anywhere in philosophy. If there were, they would demolish ideas without understand them properly, and in metaphysics all ideas deserve a proper understanding .There is something in all of them that deserves our respect and attention.
However, your argument proves too much. It is always the case that conclusions depend on what assumptions are made at the start. But that applies to good arguments as much as to bad ones.
I do agree that there is no fact of the matter that will determine the truth or falsity of any metaphysical view. But that doesn't necessarily mean that all views are equal. I think of them as alternative ways of looking at, thinking about the world and our lives in it. What I don't yet know is how to evaluate them. Yet, I can't help having views about some of them.

something as complex as the Renaissance/Reformation must have involved many interacting factors. The idea that a single part of the movement caused everything seems highly implausible to me. I also suspect that our problem was not really a problem for pre-Enlightenment philosophy. The explanation I'm looking for is how the problem originated. I don't recall Aristotle worrying about our problem. Plato's philosophy is more complex, but still doesn't align with our debates. — Ludwig V

It's not a single issue, though. Of course there are many interacting factors involved but the decline of Aristotelian realism really was a momentous shift in culture. That's what Gillespie's book is about, as well as an earlier book called Ideas have Consequences, Richard Weaver. (He was an English professor who's book became an unexpected hit in the post-war period. )

Yet, there were important ideas in the older philosophy. It should not be dismissed wholesale. — Ludwig V

That's what is motivating this study: the decline of Platonic or Aristotelian realism. Lloyd Gerson's most recent book addresses a similar area: Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy. 'Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world. and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.' And the 'intelligible world' is precisely the domain of universals and Platonic realism, generally.

I also suspect that our problem was not really a problem for pre-Enlightenment philosophy. — Ludwig V

The other thread I've posted 'Idealism in Context' talks about this very point. It is that modern philosophical idealism beginning with Berkeley, began with the decline of the 'participatory realism' of scholastic philosophy.

How is this relevant to the original post? It is because I see 'ideas' in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense as essential to the structure of reasoned inference - they’re formal structures in consciousness . 'As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body. That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort' ~ Ed Feser. So not surprisingly, the advocates for scholastic realism are mainly Catholic, as they're mainly Thomist.

What can we do to encourage conversation about what might lie on either side of that line, without having to call the line "the boundary of reality" or some such?
— J

But it really is a debate about the nature of reality — Wayfarer

This exchange gives us a good view of the issue, I think. (And thanks for hosting the discussion, and being so willing to hear how it strikes others.)

My position is that there can't be a debate that "really is" about the nature of reality, because "reality" and "real," when used in this kind of philosophical context, don't have definitions or references that can be clearly agreed upon, outside of some specific tradition. Your position is (and of course correct me if this is wrong) that we do know what "reality" refers to, or at least we know what we mean when we use it in this context. This knowledge is tradition-independent. Thus, a philosopher can be right or wrong about what is real, and can be shown to be so.

I'm further saying that we can still talk about all the topics we want to talk about -- structure, grounding, primacy, causality, knowledge -- without insisting first on agreement about what is real, or how to use the terms "real" and "reality."

As a next step, I think that it's appropriate for me to ask you how you're using "reality" when you say that we can have a debate about the nature of reality. Is it something close to @Ludwig V's suggestion?: "'real' is the concept that enables us to distinguish between misleading and true appearances." Perhaps even more importantly, can you tell us why you believe that your use is correct?

Nominalism was clearly part of what was going on, but something as complex as the Renaissance/Reformation must have involved many interacting factors. — Ludwig V

That's right, it is just one thread within the whole tapestry. The attempt to characterize nominalism as 'where we went wrong' is a tendentious, "just-so" story. There are many points in history, right back to the advent of agriculture and land ownership where it could be said we "went the wrong way". The polemic between nominalism and realism of universals is a minor philosophical issue which is of concern only to (some) of the intellectual elites. There are also more nuanced views which avoid this very polemic.

I would go further and suggest that there are no "slam-dunk" arguments anywhere in philosophy. If there were, they would demolish ideas without understand them properly, and in metaphysics all ideas deserve a proper understanding — Ludwig V

Right, I'm obviously not going to disagree (except that you are "going further") since I said as much myself in the very passage you are responding to.

However, your argument proves too much. It is always the case that conclusions depend on what assumptions are made at the start. But that applies to good arguments as much as to bad ones.
I do agree that there is no fact of the matter that will determine the truth or falsity of any metaphysical view. But that doesn't necessarily mean that all views are equal. — Ludwig V

It is strange that you seem to think you are disagreeing with me somehow, when I have already said pretty much what you are saying here. Recall that earlier I said it comes down to what seems most plausible. Of course I agree that there are good arguments and bad arguments, and assuming that we are referring to consistent (with their premises) arguments, then evaluation must comes down to plausibility. It is a little like aesthetics―we all know there are good and bad artworks, but a precise and determinable measure of aesthetic value , just as a precise and determinable measure of plausibility, is not possible.

My position is that there can't be a debate that "really is" about the nature of reality, because "reality" and "real," when used in this kind of philosophical context, don't have definitions or references that can be clearly agreed upon, outside of some specific tradition. — J

Let’s go back to the starting point. The world we see, with objects arrayed in space and time, is constructed by the brain on the basis of sensory inputs received by our cognitive apparatus in light of existing knowledge and conceptions (‘synthesised’ in Kantian terminology). This is something which has been validated by subsequent cognitive science (per the example of Charles Pinter ‘Mind and the Cosmic Order’) . It does not mean that the world is ‘all in the mind’, a figment, or an illusion in a simplistic sense. It means that cognition has an ineliminably subjective aspect or ground, which has generally been ignored or ‘bracketed out’ by science. (This ‘ignoring’ is subject of the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ and ‘the blind spot of science’ arguments.) Awareness of the subjective ground of experience is the starting point in phenomenology.

Hence the argument of the OP that this validates some insights of idealism. It also challenges what Husserl describes as ‘the natural attitude’. According to Husserl, this is our everyday, unreflective stance toward the world in which we simply accept the existence of objects and facts around us without questioning or examining the underlying structures of consciousness that make such experience possible.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Becoming aware of these processes is meta-cognitive insight - to be critically, self-reflectively aware of cognition. Awareness of the way that the mind constructs its world, on the basis of its dispositions, faculties, and so on, is, as I see it, fundamental to philosophy proper, as implied in the maxim ‘know yourself’.

The second part of this thread began with the argument about the ‘history of ideas’ and the decline of classical metaphysics. I’m of the view that the Greek philosophers were critically self-aware in the sense described above, but of course this wasn’t (and couldn’t be) expressed in the modern idiom. It was expressed in terms appropriate to that (now very distant) cultural milieu. The tradition of classical metaphysics arose out of the meta-cognitive insights of the founders of that tradition (subject of a book not mentioned in the OP, ‘Thinking Being: Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition’, Eric Perl).

These metacognitive insights in one form or another were conveyed or preserved in Aristotelian philosophy and also in the other elements of Greek philosophy which were absorbed by subsequent culture and are part of our ‘cultural grammar’. So it was with the ascendancy of nominalism and the subsequent ascendancy of empirical philosophy, that these foundational philosophical insights were lost or submerged. They have been preserved to some extent by modern Thomists - mainly Catholic, (although I’m not Catholic and am not making these arguments as a covert appeal to Catholicism). It is more that I see in Aristotelian-Thomism a strain of the philosophia perennis.

Is it something close to Ludwig V's suggestion?: "'real' is the concept that enables us to distinguish between misleading and true appearances." Perhaps even more importantly, can you tell us why you believe that your use is correct? — J

I believe there’s validity in the concept of the philosophical ascent - that there are degrees of understanding, lower and higher, and that these have been traversed and described by philosophers and sages (and not only in the West.) I think it is reflected in the Allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line of the Republic. In that allegory, the vision of the Sun as an allegory of the ascent from the cave symbolizes the noetic apprehension of ‘the real’. The hoi polloi, representing those uneducated in philosophy, are prisoners in the cave, entranced by shadows.

All of this has to be interpreted, of course, which is the role of hermenuetics. But that's the general drift of the second part of the argument. Idealism in Context is another facet of that.

The fact that 'real' and 'reality' don't have 'agreed upon definitions' is actually symptomatic of the cultural problem which the OP is attempting, in its own way, to address.

The fact that 'real' and 'reality' don't have 'agreed upon definitions' is actually symptomatic of the cultural problem which the OP is attempting, in its own way, to address. — Wayfarer

You mean the "problem" that we don't all think the same, that we can have different viewpoints?

You would have us all return to living "under the aegis of tutelage"?

How conservative, how dogmatic, of you.

No, I think the issue is that if we don't even agree on what's 'real' then we cannot discuss anything other than speculations. That is absolutely a cultural problem. It's not an issue of having differing views, it's about having different standards for things like claims, evidence and rationality.

Consider the phrase "my truth". You cannot discuss with someone who claims this phrase. They are not open to discussions of what is real. They are hung up (almost literally) on their sense of self-hood, to the point that other considerations beyond "what I think right now" are not relevant.

Those of us who reject this are now in a different world it seems. That's a massive problem that faces anyone from any walk of life, if instantiated in their interactions with the world. The charge of this being conservative is unsubstantiated and possibly self-serving, me thnks.

We can agree, and do, agree on what's real in most contexts of ordinary usage. When it comes to metaphysics it's a different matter.

So, what do the theists mean when they say that God or Heaven is real? Mostly when we say something is real, we mean empirically real, that is that it is part of the shared environment of things, processes and events.

When it comes to metaphysics, if one wants to occupy a position, "my truth" is all that can be had. I've said elsewhere that the only criterion for veracity of metaphysical claims is plausibility. Good luck trying to get everyone to agree on what's plausible.

Wayfarer specifically has metaphysics in mind (although he might also have in mind the different ethics that might be thought to accompany different metaphysics), and if we all agreed on what "is real" meant in that context, then I can't see how we would not all be agreeing not merely on the meaning of the term but also as to what is real.

In the past in the West let's say for argument's sake everyone believed in God (or at least paid lip service to the belief out of fear). Can you imagine any context other than an authoritarian one, where everyone would agree (about abstruse as opposed to merely everyday matters?

thread began with the argument about the ‘history of ideas’ and the decline of classical metaphysics. I’m of the view that the Greek philosophers were critically self-aware in the sense described above, but of course this wasn’t (and couldn’t be) expressed in the modern idiom. It was expressed in terms appropriate to that (now very distant) cultural milieu. — Wayfarer

I am speaking outside an area in which I feel any confidence. My own feeling is that some were doing something close to "critical" philosophy - misleading because it suggest people like Descartes and Hume weren't "critical".

But the little I understand was not, for example Aristotle asking what is a house? That was posed as a serious question as to what kind of things are houses in the mind-independent world. He argued that it was a combination of matter and form.

Today, a house is just overwhelmingly complicated to define in anything remotely like metaphysics. We have trouble with atoms, never mind houses. So you'd say that Aristotle was critically self aware like say, Kant or Hume?

I think the issue is that if we don't even agree on what's 'real' then we cannot discuss anything other than speculations. That is absolutely a cultural problem. It's not an issue of having differing views, it's about having different standards for things like claims, evidence and rationality. — AmadeusD

I agree. But there's no easy solution. It's part of living in a pluralistic culture with innummerable perspectives, views, opinions and cultural backgrounds. But we can at least discuss it. It is natural, in the secular world, to regard science as the arbiter of fact, but when it comes to values and the search for meaning, it isn't so clear cut.

It is true that exponents of the 'perennial philosophy', which I referred to, are often conservative to the point of being reactionary. One of the better books on the intellectual clique of that name is called Against the Modern World (Mark Sedgewick.) I'm not 'against the modern world' but I understand the rationale. While the modern world has brought untold benefits and improvements to the human condition it also has its shadow side. The technological culture which has provided so much can also destroy us. This is exemplified daily in the many crises of addiction, alienation, loneliness, and depression which plague modern culture.

I was discussing with my learned friend Chuck the fact that there's an inherent tension between Platonic or traditionalist philosophy and liberal political philosophy. This is why Karl Popper called Plato an enemy of the open society. Liberal thought, especially in its modern egalitarian form, places a premium on equal dignity, autonomy, and the right to participate in discourse. This tends to deprecate any perceived intellectual hierarchies because if truth is dependent on purportedly superior insight, then those without it may be depicted as less capable or qualified. There’s also a cultural wariness about allowing claims of “higher truth” to serve as justifications for social or political domination - echoes of aristocracy, theocracy, or authoritarianism. We see that demonstrated egregiously in some Islamic theocracies. But then, there are populist autocracies appearing in the West.

In contrast, much of the pre-modern and classical tradition—from Plato’s “knowledge of the Forms” to Aristotle’s sophia—assumes that there are degrees of cognitive and moral refinement. They see philosophy as a transformative discipline: you don’t just have an opinion, you become the sort of person who can apprehend deeper truths. The idea of a “higher” truth here isn’t about exclusion but about cultivation—requiring moral and intellectual virtues to access. (One definitive recent text on this is The Degrees of Knowledge, Jacques Maritain, a French Catholic thomistic philospoher, and one on the left of the political spectrum.)

Accordingly in a liberal setting, saying that an understandingor insight can be qualitatively better can sound like an assault on equality. But in the older model, it’s almost definitional that philosophy involves progression from superficial opinion (doxa) to deeper knowledge (epistēmē), with not everyone at the same place on that path at the same time.

Liberalism’s strength is inclusiveness and the prevention of abuses of authority. But Its blind spot can be a reluctance to acknowledge that some perspectives are not just different, but genuinely more coherent, integrated, or profound.

I don't think that's quite true, anymore. I will resile, though, as I have given ample reason to take that seriously ("my truth").

So, what do the theists mean when they say that God or Heaven is real? — Janus

When I've asked, they mean what you go on to posit: it is an empirically real place one's soul ascends to after death (or, God, similar pseudo-physical terms get used). Not all, but that's the most common response I get.

Good luck trying to get everyone to agree on what's plausible. — Janus

I posit that thre is still going to be a 'pregnant middle'. Think of a balloon - pinch opposite sides, and stretch. The top and bottom tapers are those who hold views outside of what most consider reasonable, rational or indeed 'real'. That middle section (pregnant middle) is most people. I agree that getting everyone to agree is a fools errand. That doesn't mean that we can't at the very least, sort out which sense we mean to use the word in, and then discuss, based on that, whether we are making reasonable assertions. I do, also, agree, it's going to end up with "Yes, that's plausible" or not. This is a problem.

Can you imagine any context other than an authoritarian one, where everyone would agree — Janus

I presume the following was to indicate you want to ask about abstract, esoteric matters rather than "is gasoline running my car". I can. I can imagine a society in which there are less variant views generally. This is simply a temporal issue. in 2000 B.C it was probably quite easy, without force, to instantiate certain abstract beliefs in others, if you had a streak to do so. By that, I mean you are energized, articulate and willing to engage, no that you want to force yourself on others.

Liberal thought, especially in its modern egalitarian form, places a premium on equal dignity, autonomy, and the right to participate in discourse. — Wayfarer

This seems empirically wrong. As I see, and seems to be playing out, Liberal thought in it's modern, egalitarian form places a premium on equal outcomes and any disparity in outcome is automatically considered a result of unequal opportunity (this seems the 'woke' take though, so perhaps you're purposefully trying to shunt that off for discussion purposes. If so, that's good. Sorry I've wasted time).

then those without it may be depicted as less capable or qualified — Wayfarer

Definitely. Epistemic injustice is real, despite my extreme discomfort in ever applying it to a situation's description.

The idea of a “higher” truth here isn’t about exclusion but about cultivation — Wayfarer

You've hit the nail here. I think the problem is that there are dumber, and smarter people. Those dumber people who might actually be precluded from employing the mental techniques required for this type of refinement are going to argue that they aren't dumber, and it's you (whoever, whatever) who has prevented their achieving success. This is patent nonsense, but goes to the issues i'm speaking about I guess: If they think "real" means what they interpret their Lot as, then we can't argue with them. There's no refinement to be had.

Accordingly in a liberal setting, saying that an understandingor insight can be qualitatively better can sound like an assault on equality. — Wayfarer

I see you covered that already. :sweat:

Liberalism’s strength is inclusiveness and the prevention of abuses of authority. But Its blind spot can be a reluctance to acknowledge that some perspectives are not just different, but genuinely more coherent, integrated, or profound. — Wayfarer

Yes. I think further, though, it lends itself to not just not acknowledging this, but actively resisting any type of discussion which might describe, in rational terms, why it is true.

The idea that punctuality is racist, as an example. Fucking - no - arrive on time. Bigotry of low expectations seems the order of the day, for this particular mode of activity.

…but actively resisting any type of discussion which might describe, in rational terms, why it is true. — AmadeusD

I’ve noticed that.

So you'd say that Aristotle was critically self aware like say, Kant or Hume? — Manuel

The Platonic tradition was itself critical — the Dialogues show Plato testing every proposition from multiple angles, leaving many questions unresolved. They’re not a compendium of answers so much as of questions. In that sense, philosophy has always been “critical” — not just of others’ views, but reflexively aware of its own assumptions.

By the late Middle Ages, however, much of Aristotelian philosophy had ossified into scholastic dogma. In the first philosophy of science lecture I ever attended (Alan Chalmers’ What is this Thing Called Science?), the lecturer recounted a story of monks debating how many teeth a horse has. They consulted Aristotle’s works, found no answer, and threw up their hands — ridiculing the one monk who suggested checking an actual horse. Anecdotal perhaps, but also quite likely true.

The Enlightenment’s philosophes rebelled against that mindset. (Remember the famous trial?) Their motivation was to look at nature with fresh eyes, stripped of inherited authority. That turn is the beginning of modern science as we know it — but in rejecting the scholastic framework wholesale, something else was lost: the kind of critical self-awareness about the act of knowing itself that we see in Greek sources.

That question re-emerges in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Brentano’s doctoral work on Aristotle’s On the Several Senses of Being seeded his concept of intentionality, which in turn became foundational for Husserl. Heidegger, who lectured extensively on Aristotle, re-engaged the question of Being from a different angle. And Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences can be seen not as a nostalgic return to pre-modern metaphysics, but as a re-interpretation of those ancient questions in light of modern science, and as a critique of the unexamined “naturalism” that has become the default. That’s also why it’s central to the OP

Their motivation was to look at nature with fresh eyes, stripped of inherited authority. That turn is the beginning of modern science as we know it — but in rejecting the scholastic framework wholesale, something else was lost: the kind of critical self-awareness about the act of knowing itself that we see in Greek sources. — Wayfarer

How so? I mean Descartes was responded to the reigniting of Pyrrhonian skepticism, trying to find an objective foundation for knowledge, but Descartes was always clear that our ideas were constructions of sense data, not objects themselves.

Hume took Pyrrhonian skepticism to its limits. Both were very much critically self aware about the act of knowing.

Unless you have something more specific in mind, which you probably have, as I've said, it's not an area in which I have a lot of confidence yet.

Heidegger, who lectured extensively on Aristotle, re-engaged the question of Being from a different angle. — Wayfarer

He is very tricky though. I mean you can read him as being critical, but you can also read him as not being critical, because by being critical philosophy lost touch with being, or something like that.

When I've asked, they mean what you go on to posit: it is an empirically real place one's soul ascends to after death (or, God, similar pseudo-physical terms get used). Not all, but that's the most common response I get. — AmadeusD

I've also struck theists who think that way. But it's not really defesnible since 'emprical' refers to the shared world of phenomena.

I presume the following was to indicate you want to ask about abstract, esoteric matters rather than "is gasoline running my car". I can. I can imagine a society in which there are less variant views generally. This is simply a temporal issue. in 2000 B.C it was probably quite easy, without force, to instantiate certain abstract beliefs in others, if you had a streak to do so. By that, I mean you are energized, articulate and willing to engage, no that you want to force yourself on others. — AmadeusD

Yes, esoteric matters. I did say I think there is general agreement about the nature of the perceived world. I even think there is general agreement when it comes to the "serious" moral issues like murder, rape, theft, assault, exploitation and so on. Admittedly some of the "agreement" may be lip service only.

That there would have been a greater degree of agreement in authoritarian and theocratic societies is no surprise I would say.

You've hit the nail here. I think the problem is that there are dumber, and smarter people. Those dumber people who might actually be precluded from employing the mental techniques required for this type of refinement are going to argue that they aren't dumber, and it's you (whoever, whatever) who has prevented their achieving success. This is patent nonsense, but goes to the issues i'm speaking about I guess: If they think "real" means what they interpret their Lot as, then we can't argue with them. There's no refinement to be had. — AmadeusD

I can't agree with you here. Of course there are smarter and dumber people, but if we allow that philosophers in general are among the smartest people, the great degree of disagreement among them when it comes to metaphysics at least shows that what people believe is more driven by emotion and upbringing than by intelligence.

Expertise is far easier to determine in science, technological pursuits, trades and crafts, and even in the arts technical expertise, if not aesthetic quality, is relatively easy to determine.

As to agreement about the meaning of 'real' I haven't seen a good definition emerge from the context of idealist and anti-realist metaphysics. For example when Platonists say universals and numbers are real, they cannot explain what they mean, because the usual understanding of what is real involves physical existence somewhere and/or the ability to act on other things. So when asked as to where the numbers and universals are to be found if somewhere other than in human thought, no answer is forthcoming.

the Dialogues show Plato testing every proposition from multiple angles, leaving many questions unresolved. They’re not a compendium of answers so much as of questions. In that sense, philosophy has always been “critical” — not just of others’ views, but reflexively aware of its own assumptions. — Wayfarer

This is a critical point so often overlooked,

So when asked as to where the numbers and universals are to be found if somewhere other than in human thought, no answer is forthcoming. — Janus

It's not a matter of 'locating' them. That depiction is only because of the inability to conceive of anything not located in time and space. The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences and the abilities that it provides to discover facts which otherwise could never be known, indicate that numbers are more than just 'products of thought'. They provide a kind of leverage (that also being something discovered by a mathematician, namely, Archimedes). Which lead to many amazing inventions such as computers, and the like, which all would have been inconceivable a generation or two ago (as previously discussed.)

Their motivation was to look at nature with fresh eyes, stripped of inherited authority. That turn is the beginning of modern science as we know it — but in rejecting the scholastic framework wholesale, something else was lost: the kind of critical self-awareness about the act of knowing itself that we see in Greek sources.
— Wayfarer

How so? I mean Descartes was responded to the reigniting of Pyrrhonian skepticism, — Manuel

Among other things. But Descartes was taught to me as 'the first modern philosopher', and the point was stressed about his efforts to free himself from the scholastic authorities and Aristotelian dogma. Hence the whole exercise of locking himself away and forgetting all that he had been taught so as to arrive at his apodictic insight cogito ergo sum.

This is a critical point so often overlooked, — Tom Storm

Something often stressed by Fooloso4.

In any case, in the context, I am trying to make the argument for philosophical insight as a means to a higher truth, which is often depicted as 'an appeal to dogma', for the reasons I've tried to explain above.

Let’s go back to the starting point. . . — Wayfarer

What follows is an excellent summary of the epistemological story, and how it has changed over time. You really do have the gift of concision. And . . . not once did you use the terms "real" or "reality"! Was this deliberate? I rather hope not, because it demonstrates, better than any persuasion on my part, that those terms really aren't necessary in order to say what we want to say, philosophically.

I believe there’s validity in the concept of the philosophical ascent. — Wayfarer

I know you do. I was asking why -- and specifically, how we could determine whether the concept is valid or not.

In that allegory, the vision of the Sun as an allegory of the ascent from the cave symbolizes the noetic apprehension of ‘the real’ — Wayfarer

Again, how can we examine this idea? If you say, "What is real can be apprehended noetically," and I say, "What is real is strictly physical" (which I would not!), what are we disputing about? Are we disagreeing about how to use the word "real"? How does that sort of disagreement get resolved, philosophically? Or are we disagreeing about a fact of the matter, not just the terminology? In that case, don't we need to investigate and analyze the characteristics of (in this case) noetic apprehension and physical sensations, in order to learn how they differ, and whether one might indeed be more basic, or reliable, or grounded, etc.? Having done this, what additional work do we want the word "real" to do?

The fact that 'real' and 'reality' don't have 'agreed upon definitions' is actually symptomatic of the cultural problem which the OP is attempting, in its own way, to address. — Wayfarer

This is a very interesting point. The implication, I think, is that "real" could have a definition, in philosophy, that is just as solidly based as, say, "elephant". Indeed, such a definition was in place for the Classical philosophers, and its disappearance is a cultural problem. That makes sense, if we did indeed have a piece of knowledge that has been lost.

I wonder whether there's a way to describe what happened, culturally, that doesn't require this set-up. Another account might be something like: "The Greeks and Scholastics had a view of what constituted the 'real' or 'reality,' and this view was widely accepted, leading to a relatively unambiguous use of the term. But then challenges began to be posed to this view, with the result that, today, there are competing understandings of how to use and interpret 'real'."

On that account, what happened was not a "problem." Rather, it was found that the Classical view of reality could be questioned, and that rich philosophical questions and viewpoints resulted from this questioning. At a minimum, philosophers found themselves forced to do analysis, to discover what these competing versions of "reality" actually entailed. It could even be the case that this movement away from the agreed-upon definition of reality was an improvement, a benefit, freeing us from a frankly incorrect or inadequate understanding -- not so different from what happened in the physical sciences.

I don't exactly think this account is correct, because I think there are ways of knowing that are outside the scope of philosophy. I'm continuing to urge us, as philosophers, to think twice about "dying on the hill" of what is real and what isn't.

We can agree, and do, agree on what's real in most contexts of ordinary usage. When it comes to metaphysics it's a different matter. — Janus

This is important. "Real" is perfectly clear and useful in most contexts, because we know how to use it.

But it's not really defesnible since 'emprical' refers to the shared world of phenomena. — Janus

This is where I think the problem lies. They will say "I have direct knowledge of this, as do other Christians" (or whatever sect). You and I would largely reject this, but we also do not know their phenomenal experiences. Maybe they have... (this is unserious, but hopefully illustrates).

Admittedly some of the "agreement" may be lip service only. — Janus

Yeah. Even then, I think there are some good reasons to reject this position (meaning, it seems more people are serious about it). There are, on many reliable accounts, billions who do not find rape, murder, child abuse etc.. objectionable, when posited by a religious doctrine (or, rather, required by it). I suggest this is probably more prevalent than most in the West want to accept (and here we also need take into account the types within the West who perhaps feel these ways. We have enough abusers around for whom the Law is not a deterrent it seems).

but if we allow that philosophers in general are among the smartest people — Janus

If this is just a claim to an average, I think it's empirically true. I do not think your next claim follows. Among the 'smartest' people, you're likely to get more disagreement as each can bring more nuance and see different things in the same sets of data (or, different relations). I don't think this has much to do with feeling, though I am not suggesting we can avoid feelings when deciding on theories, for instance. But assessing theories is the job of the minds which can move beyond feelings into "whether or not the feelings are reasonable" type of assessments. Plenty of people appear to be incapable of this. But we may simply have different expectations here. I'm unsure there's an answer.

So when asked as to where the numbers and universals are to be found if somewhere other than in human thought, no answer is forthcoming. — Janus

Huh. I've had several give me what I think is a satisfactory answer. Something like:

"real" in relation to Universals obtains in their examples. The same as "red" which is obviously real, "three" can exist in the same way: In three things. Red exists in red things. I don't see a problem?

This is important. "Real" is perfectly clear and useful in most contexts, because we know how to use it. — J

I think this is an assumption based on a curse of knowledge type thing. What is 'real' is hotly debated socially (if you have a diverse social group, anyway). That's my experience, and my experience in the online world too. I think more and more people think "metaphysically" when assessing 'the real' these days. Not very good fundamental education anymore.

What is 'real' is hotly debated socially (if you have a diverse social group, anyway). — AmadeusD

Clearly I need to improve my social group! :wink: It's been a long time since I've been part of a debate about "what is reality" that didn't involve green leafy substances. But I take your point. The usefulness of "real" waxes and wanes, but the idea that something is real if it's genuine and not real if it's a fake is robust. This idea will work fine in a lot of situations, and children learn it quickly.

but the idea that something is real if it's genuine and not real if it's a fake is robust — J

I think that's true, but uses of genuine and fake are various. I know you've taken my point, I just want to be clear that these concepts are not as cut-and-dried as they may seem to all.

You really do have the gift of concision — J

Thank you. I have been a tech writer but I don't know if that career has any mileage left in it. Also I realised the other day (somewhat gloomily) that I've probably well and truly done my 10,000 hours on philosophy forums. I'm closing in on 25k posts on this one. I think I'll change my avatar to Sisyphus.

Real" is perfectly clear and useful in most contexts, because we know how to use it. — J

Real is authentic, not fake, the real deal. Reality is distinguished from delusion, illusion or duplicity.

Following on from the point about the Enlightenment rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. When the scientific revolution and Enlightenment thinkers pushed back against the Church’s intellectual monopoly, they weren’t just rejecting theology — they were also rejecting the philosophical apparatus that had been co-opted to support it. Historically, that included most of what was best about the broader Platonic tradition, which provided much of the philosophical framework of Christian theology,

In the polemics of the time, “metaphysics” became associated with religious dogma. The fact that Aristotle’s physics was outdated made it easier to dismiss his metaphysics as likewise obsolete.

Naturalism then positioned itself as a clean break — methodologically bracketing or excluding anything that smelled of theology, which meant also sidelining large swathes of classical philosophy.

The Enlightenment liberated science from theological oversight — but at the cost of severing the link between natural philosophy and questions of meaning, purpose, and being. This is the origin of the meme of life as a kind of cosmic fluke.

Much of the critical self-awareness discussed earlier— the Greek insights about the conditions of knowledge — was lost in the rush to rush a purely empirical and mechanical worldview.

All these factors are still evident in almost every discussion on this forum.

This is the origin of the meme of life as a kind of cosmic fluke. — Wayfarer

I don't see that this is a problem. If you weren't suggesting so, sorry. It seems so..

It was, I admit, a flippant remark, but it does refer to a serious cultural issue.

There is an influential school of thought or philosophical undercurrent, that natural science has done away with the Biblical creation myth and with it, any idea of purposefulness or inherent meaning in the Cosmos (subject of another thread On Purpose.)