If you wouldn’t mind, I’d like to hear what you believe ‘substance’ means.
— Wayfarer
A substance is something that objectively exists. — MoK

So does this substance called mind have a molecular structure?

I don't know at what point of complexity I think an entity must attain before its subjectively experience can be casual
— Patterner

That's a pretty big problem. Everything else fundamental is also fundamentally causal. It's not fundamental now, causal later - it's causal at a fundamental level. If consciousness isn't causal at a fundamental level, but it is causal at a microscopic scale... I think the whole idea, in my opinion, crumbles — flannel jesus

Bad wording on my part. I think consciousness is always the same, and can always be causal. But the conscious thing in question has to be up to the task.

The thing is, consciousness is causal. It wasn't physics and interacting particles that wrote Beethoven's string quartets, flew people to the moon, manufactured computers, contemplated the nature of consciousness, built the Sphinx, on and on. None of that would have ever happened without the thoughts and intentions that come with consciousness.

That's what we have to explain. So how could it have happened? Let's say physicalism. Through purely physical interactions, life begins, and evolves. There's no such thing as consciousness. Then, a certain physical complexity comes into being. And, though consciousness was not planned, and consciousness had no role in bringing that complexity about, for no reason, that physical complexity just happens to be perfect for the existence of this entirely new thing that it has nothing to do with.

What an extraordinary, bizarre turn of events. And a happy turn, at that, since it is the thing that defines us all. It's the thing none of us would willingly give up. Want to become an automoton? Lose an arm, or your consciousness? Lose an arm and a leg, or your consciousness? How much if your physical self would you give up before thinking consciousness is no longer desirable?

That scenario is just too bizarre. One thing has nothing to do with the other. Then, holy cow, look at that!

I find it easier to believe that consciousness was always there, and, with the aid of consciousness at every opportunity, the system developed greater complexity to be subjectively experienced.

A particle can't do anything other than interact with other things according to the laws of physics. It doesn't have systems for movement. It doesn't have systems for choosing between options. It can subjectively experience, but what is that like for a particle?

An archaea acts. But it's entirely physics and chemistry. There's information processing, which is what I suspect is needed for groups of individual particles to subjectively experience as a unit. There is information processing in protein synthesis, in the series of reactions between photons hitting the eyespot and the archaella moving, and whatever other systems it has. The consciousness is of a much more complex thing than just particles. Still, there's no possibility of choosing between actions, or not acting. This may be the beginnings of thinking, but it's just the bare beginnings. There's not enough going on.

By the time we get to humans, we can choose between any number if things. We make choices between conflicting motivations. no longer purely physical factors determining which option you take. The subjective experience of our selves plays a role in our decision-making. As is evidenced in our creations all around us.

I think you're not taking the emergent possibility seriously enough personally. The possibility that consciousness really does emerge from certain large scale physical arrangements and interactions. I think the idea seems alien to you - which is fair, it's by no means easy to grasp - and so your reflex is to go for something that's at least apparently more intuitive.

So does this substance called mind have a molecular structure? — Wayfarer

The mind is irreducible, so it does not have any structure. It, however, can be even omnipresent.

↪Patterner I think you're not taking the emergent possibility seriously enough personally. The possibility that consciousness really does emerge from certain large scale physical arrangements and interactions. I think the idea seems alien to you - which is fair, it's by no means easy to grasp - and so your reflex is to go for something that's at least apparently more intuitive. — flannel jesus

Without having ever read anything on the topic, I was a physicalist up until several years ago. I had never heard of the terms physicalism or materialism, but that's what I was. Never occurred to me there was another option, so what was my default position. A guy on another site wanted to pull his hair out because of my stubbornness, but, eventually, turned me around. It wasn't intuitive. Everything is physical particles, and everything, even consciousness, reduces to particles, was intuitive.

But physicalism had nothing to offer. I have yet to hear a theory, or even a wild guess, about how Chalmers' Hard Problem is explained with physicalism. Nobody who believes physicalism is the answer knows what that answer is, and people like Eagleman, Hoffman, Greene, and Crick say we don't have the vaguest idea how to look for it. A lot of people, like Greene, say physicalism must be the answer, and, even though we have no clue at the moment, we'll figure it out at some (possibly very distant) point in the future. They say that as though it's proven that that is what's going to happen.

A particle can't do anything other than interact with other things according to the laws of physics. It doesn't have systems for movement. It doesn't have systems for choosing between options. It can subjectively experience, but what is that like for a particle? — Patterner

I can't see why you keep insisting that a particle, or a crystal, is a subject of experience. The rationale seems to be that if all that really exists are particle and forces, and we as subjects are also particles and forces, then particles and forces must also be subjects. But what if the assumption about the nature of us as subjects is mistaken and we're something other than particles and forces?

An archaea acts. But it's entirely physics and chemistry. There's information processing, which is what I suspect is needed for groups of individual particles to subjectively experience as a unit. There is information processing in protein synthesis, in the series of reactions between photons hitting the eyespot and the archaella moving, and whatever other systems it has. The consciousness is of a much more complex thing than just particles. Still, there's no possibility of choosing between actions, or not acting. This may be the beginnings of thinking, but it's just the bare beginnings. There's not enough going on. — Patterner

If it were entirely physics and chemistry, there would be no separate discipline of organic chemistry. And any biological unit displays observable attributes which differentiate it from inorganic substance. it metabolizes, seeks homeostasis, and maintains a boundary between itself and the sorrounding environment. In addition to that, it retains information and is able to transmit it through reproduction, none of which are necessarily reducible to physics and chemistry.

According to physicalism, biological information and the genetic code are mere metaphors. They are like those computer programs that allow us to write our instructions in English, thus saving us the trouble of writing them in the binary digits of the machine language. Ultimately, however, there are only binary digits in the machine language of the computer, and in the same way, it is argued, there are only physical quantities at the most fundamental level of Nature. ...

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. This is the chemical paradigm, a view that is very popular today and that is often considered in agreement with the Darwinian paradigm, but this is not the case. The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life—biological information and the genetic code—that are totally absent in the inorganic world, which means that information is present only in living systems, that chemistry alone is not enough and that a deep divide does exist between life and matter. This is the information paradigm, the idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’.

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of biological thought [15], p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — What is (Biological) Information

This is not panpsychism, but biological naturalism - psyche is not in inanimate matter, only begins to manifest with the advent of organic life. It is what differentiates life from non-life.

A lot of people, like Greene, say physicalism must be the answer, — Patterner

There's actually quite a simple reason for this: if not physicalism, then what? And the alternatives are very hard to defend, and outside the scope of physics. As Abraham Maslow said, if the only tool you have is a hammer, then the only problems you will consider involve nails.

"Supervenience already implies a function from micro-configurations to macro-properties: if two systems are identical in all micro respects, they must be identical in their macro-properties. But this function need not be definable in purely micro-level terms. The criteria that fix the mapping may depend on high-level structures or capacities that cannot themselves be specified without invoking macro-level concepts." — Pierre-Normand

If you are trying to describe macro-level functions in micro-level terms, then the macro-level description is also indispensable. Otherwise what would it be that you are trying to describe in micro-level terms?

This just seems obvious. But the complaint that seems to be commonly made is that the macro-level description is lost in the micro-level description, and that the micro-level description is thus not a true description. But how could it be otherwise?

I think this problem is what constitutes the so-called "hard problem". No micro-level description will be acceptable to those who demand that physicalism should be able to explain subjective experience, if it eliminates the macro-level description. but it must eliminate the macro-level description (Sellars "manifest image" of human experience and judgement) otherwise it would not be a micro-level description.

So does this substance called mind have a molecular structure? — Wayfarer

And here is a fine example of this conflation of paradigms.

It's all about molecules, atoms, proteins and electrons, but it's not just about those things. As proper parts of living organism, those constituents are caught up into functionally organized anatomic structures (such as cell membranes) and channeled through the finely tuned and regulated metabolic pathways that Brian Greene provides striking descriptions of. Those are indeed processes that arise in far from equilibrium thermodynamic conditions such that relatively low-entropy forms of energy (such as incident solar radiation or energy-dense molecules like glucose) get harnessed by the molecular machinery to produce work in such a way as to sustain and reproduce this machinery. What is being sustained and reproduced isn't the parts, but the form: that is, the specific functional structure of the organism. The parts, and the proximal interactions between them, don't explain why the organism is structured in the way it is, or why it behaves in the way it does. Rather, the high-level norms of functional organization of the organism, characterised in the higher-level terms of anatomy and physiology, explain why the individual atoms, electrons, protons, and organic molecules are being caught up and channeled in the specific way that they are to sustain processes that are geared towards maintaining the whole organism (at least for awhile) away from complete decay and thermodynamic equilibrium. — Pierre-Normand

Nicely said. So it's functional structure that is emergent? Top-Down causation?

But physicalism had nothing to offer. I have yet to hear a theory, or even a wild guess, about how Chalmers' Hard Problem is explained with physicalism. Nobody who believes physicalism is the answer knows what that answer is, and people like Eagleman, Hoffman, Greene, and Crick say we don't have the vaguest idea how to look for it. — Patterner

It's funny that this is how I think about anti physicalism. There's not even a single wild guess as to a model about how the non physical mind works, operates, evolves from the past into the future. Nobody who believes in non physicalism even tries to come up with one, and they don't have the vaguest idea how to find one or even begin performing experiments on the non physical mind to test their ideas.

It's all exclusively a refuge from the hard problem. But it's an illusory refuge in my estimation. The hard problem doesn't just exist for physicalism, it would in principle exist for any explanation of consciousness that we understand well enough. The reason why people seek refuge in nonphysicalism is because we have such a great understanding of fundamental physics, and such poor understanding on consciousness, that it feels impossible to explain the latter with the former. I posit this: that the only reason you think non physicalism is the explanation is because we have no understanding of non physicalism (there's no model after all), and a thing we don't understand in the slightest magically seems like it might be the best explanation for a phenomenon we're struggling to understand (consciousness). But that train of thought is an illusion, you can't cure a lack of understanding by posting more crap you don't understand and can't even test.

I don't think it's an accident that LLMs, based on neural nets, are so effective at being simulcra of human linguistic interaction. We imitate our physical neurons and we get a turing test passing machine out of it. That's a huge deal, and it's the strongest tangible evidence we have one way or the other.

I posit this: that the only reason you think non physicalism is the explanation is because we have no understanding of non physicalism... — flannel jesus

I think non physicalism is the explanation because physicalism is not. Consciousness is non physical. That's why, despite having learned some pretty impressive things about the physical, we're struggling so hard to understand consciousness. We can't begin to study it with our physical sciences, and can't see any connection between physical properties and subjective experience.

To refuse to consider that something might exist outside of the scope of our physical sciences, to think that we are certain there can be nothing to reality other than what is within the scope of our physical sciences, when the most important thing to any of us, our consciousness, is outside the scope of our physical sciences, is a very illogical mindset, imo.

it's yet to be proven that consciousness is outside the scope of the physical world though, so...

There's not even a single wild guess as to a model about how the non physical mind works, operates, evolves from the past into the future. Nobody who believes in non physicalism even tries to come up with one, and they don't have the vaguest idea how to find one or even begin performing experiments on the non physical mind to test their ideas. — flannel jesus

Can I suggest that this is a result of the way the 'physical versus non-physical' has been framed after Descartes? His philosophy, which was strongly connected to the emergence of modern science post Newton and Galileo, proposed a model comprising res extensa (extended matter) and res cogitans (literally 'thinking thing'). From the time he proposed it, Descartes had difficulty explaining how res cogitans affects matter, suggesting that the rational soul operated through the pineal gland.

Subsequently, the whole model of mind and matter became less credible as a model, on account of these and other conceptual problems. Meanwhile the physical sciences went strength to strength with huge progress in physics, chemistry, materials science and so forth. Descartes res cogitans ended up being described as the wan 'ghost in the machine' by Gilbert Ryle.

Might this be how you're thinking of the 'non-physical'?

Might this be how you're thinking of the 'non-physical'? — Wayfarer

I'm not thinking about it at all, because there's no model to think about. It's a placeholder thought, not a rich thought. There's no attempt to understand how it works - and that's exactly why it's so appealing, I think, as an explanation for consciousness. Because it's mysterious, and consciousness is mysterious. The more mysterious it remains, the more it remains a valid explanation for consciousness to these people. The second it loses it's mystery and we get some kind of real understanding of it, the "hard problem" comes back.

It's like an anti explanation, more than an explanation. It's a mystery substance to un-explain a mystery phenomenon.

What about abstract objects like numbers and logical rules? Do you think there are physical explanations for them?

I think that our understanding of them probably happens in our brains. So your only interaction with those concepts is from a physical basis, yes.

But that's all beside the point anyway. My point really is the non physical is merely a realm of mystery, a realm of ignorance, and so it seems natural to place mysterious phenomena into a mysterious realm - but I think that natural reflex is mistaken, it's anti explanatory.

I'm not thinking about it at all, because there's no model to think about. It's a placeholder thought, not a rich thought. There's no attempt to understand how it works — flannel jesus

I am attempting to have conversations about it, in the hopes of gaining any degree of understanding.

and that's exactly why it's so appealing, I think, as an explanation for consciousness. — flannel jesus

It is appealing because, despite being able to detect and measure unimaginably small and large physical phenomena, we cannot so much as detect consciousness with our physical senses or sciences, there is no apparent connection between consciousness and the physical properties of the universe, and there is no physicalist guess as to how it might work. That makes a non physicalist approach speaking.

The weak emergence vs strong emergence is a bit misleading. It suggests that we have an intuitive understanding of the resultant effects of a given process - say molecules giving rise to water. We may have a theory of liquidity, but we have no intuitions about it.

But if someone says I think all emergence is "strong", they think you are being a mystic. I think that's just what nature does.

there is no physicalist guess as to how it might work. That makes a non physicalist approach speaking — Patterner

Well it's fine if you think that, but you should equally hold it against non physicalism that there's no non physicalist guess as to how it might work. It's not like you're abandoning a non working idea for a working idea - you're abandoning a lack of an idea for another lack of an idea.

That doesn't mean non physicalism is false, but it certainly shouldn't leave anybody with extreme confidence that it's true.

We know that materialism fails since it cannot explain how ideas emerge and how they can be causally efficacious in the world, given that ideas are irreducible and have no parts. I have an argument for "physical cannot be the cause of its own change" as well. Idealism also fails since it cannot explain how the contents of our experiences are related. It also cannot explain how we could possibly have memory. A model with two substances, the mind and the object, can explain some phenomena but not all, especially when it comes to the creation of new ideas, which is very important when it comes to thinking. The object is required for perception, where the mind perceives the content of the object, what you are looking at for example. I am currently thinking about how we are able to create new ideas, though.

The weak emergence vs strong emergence is a bit misleading. — Manuel

I don't think so. Consider a set of words, let's call this set SW, which has a minimal number of words for creating only one meaningful sentence, let's call the meaningful sentence MS. Now consider the set of all sentences, let's call this set SS, that you can build with arranging the words randomly. Only one sentence in SS has a meaning. SS is a weak emergence. The idea that MS is referring to is strong emergence for two reasons: 1) It is more than SS, and 2) It is irreducible.

It suggests that we have an intuitive understanding of the resultant effects of a given process - say molecules giving rise to water. We may have a theory of liquidity, but we have no intuitions about it. — Manuel

We have good intuition about what water is: Liquid is a state in which the material is almost incompressible, and it can take different shapes. We have a theory for it, too.

But if someone says I think all emergence is "strong", they think you are being a mystic. I think that's just what nature does. — Manuel

Or maybe there is a model, including the mind, that can explain the strong emergence.

we know that materialism fails since it cannot explain how ideas emerge and how they can be causally efficacious in the world, given that ideas are irreducible and have no parts — MoK

Maybe that's a given for you. Idk what "we" you're referring to, there's no expert consensus that that's the case.

Matter has extension, shape, even at its fundamental level, the string. Ideas are irreducible; they don't have any shape, or extension. So, the first question is how you could get something like idea emerges from the process in the mater. Matterial process also are causaly closed according to materialism so ideas cannot be causally efficasious even if we accept that ideas are strong emergence.

We have good intuition about what water is: Liquid is a state in which the material is almost incompressible, and it can take different shapes. We have a theory for it, too. — MoK

Do you have the intuition that prior to combination a particle contains water in it? I don't. We have a theory yes, but I don't know someone who says that it was evident all along that particles have water in them, you can't see it, touch it, etc. until the experiment comes about.

Or maybe there is a model, including the mind, that can explain the strong emergence. — MoK

Some emergence is more shocking to us that others, consciousness out of matter vs. liquidity in particles. But what do you gain by saying one is strong and the other is weak, if you lack intuitions (not theories) for both?

Do you have the intuition that prior to combination a particle contains water in it? I don't. We have a theory yes, but I don't know someone who says that it was evident all along that particles have water in them, you can't see it, touch it, etc. until the experiment comes about. — Manuel

I don't understand what you mean by particles have water in them! Water refers to a system of H2O molecules. We have a good intuition on why water changes its behavior in terms of the properties of its parts. We even have good intuition on why parts have these and those properties, such as speed, mass, spin, etc. These properties are the result of the string vibrating in different forms.

Some emergence is more shocking to us that others, consciousness out of matter vs. liquidity in particles. — Manuel

Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience.

But what do you gain by saying one is strong and the other is weak, if you lack intuitions (not theories) for both? — Manuel

Think of a meaningful sentence. The sentence is weak emergence. An idea, however, emerges once you complete reading the sentence. The emergence of the idea is strong since the idea is more than the sentence, and it is irreducible.

In the essay “Panpsychism” in his book Mortal Questions (1979) Thomas Nagel argues that the usual examples of emergence, such as the liquidity of water or the transparency of glass, do not provide a good analogy for the emergence of consciousness from the brain.

Properties like liquidity or transparency are system-level effects of the arrangement and interaction of physical components. Water molecules are not themselves liquid, but when arranged in certain ways they behave collectively in a manner we call “liquid.” This kind of emergence is fully explicable in terms of the physical properties of the components and the laws governing them. There is nothing mysterious left over once we understand the physics and chemistry.

By contrast, Nagel points out, the relation between physical brain processes and conscious experience is not like that. Even if we knew everything about the physical constituents of the brain and how they interact, the fact that these processes give rise to subjective experience—the “what it is like” aspect—would remain unexplained. Emergence in the physical sense does not bridge the gap between objective physical descriptions and subjective conscious experience.

But Nagel also sees this as an argument in support of panpsychism: If consciousness really arises from matter, then the mental must in some way be present in the basic constituents of matter. On this view, consciousness is not an inexplicable product of complex organization but a manifestation of properties already present in the fundamental building blocks of the world.

In his later work (Mind and Cosmos, 2012) Nagel doesn't pursue panpsychism as an option, advocating instead for a kind of naturalistic teleology.

I don't understand what you mean by particles have water in them! Water refers to a system of H2O molecules. We have a good intuition on why water changes its behavior in terms of the properties of its parts. We even have good intuition on why parts have these and those properties, such as speed, mass, spin, etc. These properties are the result of the string vibrating in different forms. — MoK

A system is composed of its parts. A single H20 molecule does not have the properties of water. And we don't understand how, by combining them together water could arise, because each individual molecule shows no "wetness".

You are correct that we have good theories on speed, mass, spin. I doubt they are intuitive. If they were, we would have figured out the chemistry behind them much earlier than we did. At least, that's how it looks like to me.

Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. — MoK

Yes. But does it float apart like a soul or a second substance, or is it grounded in something that is unlike it (a brain)? If you are a dualist then that's perfectly fine.

If you are a monist, then the issue is explaining how non-mental matter could give rise to experience. It seems hard to believe, but we have decent reasons for believing it is true.

Think of a meaningful sentence. The sentence is weak emergence. An idea, however, emerges once you complete reading the sentence. The emergence of the idea is strong since the idea is more than the sentence, and it is irreducible. — MoK

Is the sentence "Think of a meaningful sentence" meaningful? If it is, the meaning seems to be emergent on the order of the words.

Now you say an idea is something that emerges once you complete reading the sentence.

How is the idea more that the sentence, if you say that a completed sentence is an idea? I'm trying to understand.

This kind of emergence is fully explicable in terms of the physical properties of the components and the laws governing them. There is nothing mysterious left over once we understand the physics and chemistry. — Wayfarer

Correct, you can explain the phenomena in theoretical terms. But the phenomenal property of water is untouched even knowing the theory. The mystery is how could apparently liquidless molecules give rise to the phenomena liquidity?

Likewise, if what some assume is true that experience merges from a combination of non-mental physical stuff, we have no intuition as to how the mental could emerge from the non-mental.

But I know you don't believe this, just putting the thought out.

I don't see a fundamental difference in how puzzling these things are.

On this view, consciousness is not an inexplicable product of complex organization but a manifestation of properties already present in the fundamental building blocks of the world. — Wayfarer

And this may be true (or not, we don't know). But if it is, the claim is weak, because everything would be emergent on combination of physical stuff: solidity, stars, cells, bipedalism, apples, pain, etc.

We happen privilege experience in philosophy now. But before the problem was motion, then thought. That was clear to Locke and many others.

Correct, you can explain the phenomena in theoretical terms. But the phenomenal property of water is untouched even knowing the theory. The mystery is how could apparently liquidless molecules give rise to the phenomena liquidity?

Likewise, if what some assume is true that experience merges from a combination of non-mental physical stuff, we have no intuition as to how the mental could emerge from the non-mental.

...
I don't see a fundamental difference in how puzzling these things are. — Manuel

Liquidity is a structural–functional property: once you know the arrangement and interactions of H₂O molecules at given temperatures and pressures, you can see why the liquid state arises (and remember H₂O is not the only liquid) . There’s no explanatory gap between the micro-description and the macro-property; the physics and chemistry just are the liquidity.

Consciousness, by contrast, is not a structural–functional property in the same way. You can give a complete account of the neural correlates of an experience — the brain states, the patterns of activation — and still have said nothing about the first-person nature of the experience. That quality is what is not captured by the physical description, and we have no analogue of the H₂O → liquid derivation for it. In other words, it's a false equivalency.

If you are trying to describe macro-level functions in micro-level terms, then the macro-level description is also indispensable. Otherwise what would it be that you are trying to describe in micro-level terms?

This just seems obvious. But the complaint that seems to be commonly made is that the macro-level description is lost in the micro-level description, and that the micro-level description is thus not a true description. But how could it be otherwise? — Janus

Yes, that's very much my argument against MoK "functional" definition of weak emergence. Either the existence of the relevant "function" (i.e. the mapping from micro-level descriptions of the system to macro-level ones) is simply posited to exist on ground of supervenience (and hence is obvious or trivial, unless one is a dualist) or this function is stated with ineliminable reference to high-level concepts, in which case it doesn't establish the sufficiency of low-level descriptions for purpose of causal explanations.

I think this problem is what constitutes the so-called "hard problem". No micro-level description will be acceptable to those who demand that physicalism should be able to explain subjective experience, if it eliminates the macro-level description. but it must eliminate the macro-level description (Sellars "manifest image" of human experience and judgement) otherwise it would not be a micro-level description.

I think the so called hard problem is usually construed as applying to any conception of human beings (or other conscious creatures) that views them as being entirely materially constituted of physical stuff (that obeys something like the known the laws of physics). It's a conception according to which p-zombies are conceptually coherent. Such proponents of the hard-problem would likely maintain that the problem remains applicable to accounts of strong emergence. My own view is that a naturalistic account of the strong emergence of mental properties, (that incorporates concepts from ethology and anthropology), including consciousness, can be consistent with a form of non-reductive physicalism or Aristotelian monism (i.e. hylomorphism) that excludes the conceivability of p-zombies and hence does away with the hard problem. Form in addition to matter is ineliminable in the description of our mental lives, but form isn't something standing over and above matter as something separate or immaterial.

Well it's fine if you think that, but you should equally hold it against non physicalism that there's no non physicalist guess as to how it might work. It's not like you're abandoning a non working idea for a working idea - you're abandoning a lack of an idea for another lack of an idea.

That doesn't mean non physicalism is false, but it certainly shouldn't leave anybody with extreme confidence that it's true. — flannel jesus

Fair enough.

But Nagel also sees this as an argument in support of panpsychism: If consciousness really arises from matter, then the mental must in some way be present in the basic constituents of matter. On this view, consciousness is not an inexplicable product of complex organization but a manifestation of properties already present in the fundamental building blocks of the world. — Wayfarer

I think panpsychism fails to explain the unity of experience; therefore, it is not acceptable.