material and immaterial — RussellA

So give me an example of something material.

You said

"photon" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract.

So give me an example of something that I can't say that sort of argument about please.

Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something.

So give me an example of something material. — flannel jesus

If the meaning of the concept "table" is about something material, then the meaning of the concept "thought" is about something immaterial.

This fits in with the Merriam Webster definition of material as "relating to, derived from, or consisting of matter" and immaterial as "not consisting of matter".

Sorry for the delay! Been busy!

I made the same point myself earlier in the thread but it received no response―which is probably understandable. — Janus

For me the problem with this 'variant' of Kantianism is that it can only explain the form of appearances, not that there are appearances at all. If Kant's 'idealism' asserted that appearances are mere mental contents then, it would be subjective idealism. However, Kant also asserts that there is 'something' about phenomena that it is not 'mental'. However, we are left with no clue on how that 'something' is related to appearances.

I do believe that the great merit of Kant (and epistemic idealism in general) is his view that mind isn't a 'passive' recorder of 'what happens' but that it actively interprets phenomena. I also believe that we can't easily differentiate what is 'mind-dependent' from what is 'mind-independent', an antinomy if you will.

Anti-realists, anti-materialists, anti-physicalists have a vested interest in denying the reality of things in themselves, because to allow them would be to admit that consciousness is not fundamental, and, very often it seems, for religious or spiritual reasons they want to believe that consciousness is fundamental, especially if they don't want to accept the Abrahamic god. One can, without inconsistency, accept the Abrahamic god and be a realist about mind-independent existents. — Janus

Well, I am sympathetic to theism, in fact. IMO, our mind can 'produce' the representation because the 'external reality' is itself intelligible. However, we can only know it by interacting with it and producing a representation of it, which is the 'phenomenal world'. It's not a 'deceptive' veil - at least, if we remember that it is also the result of the interpreteation that our mind makes of the 'external reality'. In fact, I think that the act of 'knowing' is always mediated. The 'external reality' is the 'known', our mind is the 'knower' and the 'phenomenal world' (or the 'representation') is the medium by which our mind can know the external reality. Such a knowledge, however, is imperfect and this is why we make mistakes. To make an analogy, when I read your post, I (the knower) imperfectly know your thoughts (the 'known') via the written texts I read and my own previous knowledge about the English language, what I have studied in philosophy etc (the medium).

Note, however, that I am positing that the 'external reality' itself is intelligible. And as I said elsewhere, I don't think that physicalism alone can explain that intelligibility. Its presence suggests to me that there is at least a 'fundamental mental aspect' of reality, which isn't my mind, our mind, or the 'human mind' in general.

Better to say D’Espagnat developed a more complete epistemic idealist theory grounded in transcendental realism, than to say Kant developed a less complete epistemic theory because it wasn’t. — Mww

Not sure what is your point here. I meant that I prefer d'Espagnat's view than Kant's because I find the latter's view lacking in a way the former's view isn't. So, yeah, d'Espagnat's view perhaps is better described as a (subtle) form of 'transcendental realism'. But despite preferring the view of d'Espagnat I think that Kant's has its merits.

But "interaction-free measurements" work because there is a physical change in the system behavior due to a change in the experimental context, analogous to closing a slit in the double slit experiment. — Apustimelogist

Agreed with that. But this doesn't change the fact that it seems quite different from the classical case. In fact, I believe that your example is perfect here. In de Broglie-Bohm, changing the experimental context has a nonlocal effect also on the measured system. In this, it is quite similar to Copenaghen. Bohm himself acknowledged that Bohr with his 'indivisiblity of the quantum of action' was quite close to his view. Of course, according to Bohm, Bohr's model was incomplete but not 'completely wrong'.

A classical analogy for interaction free measurements, as in the quantum Zeno Elitzur–Vaidman_bomb_tester, can be given in terms of my impulsive niece making T tours of a shopping mall in order to decide what she'd like me to buy her for her birthday.
... — sime

Ok, but IMO the classical analogy you propose misses the fact that the there is a change in the 'state' of the system by not detecting it. This is quite bizzarre from a classical viewpoint.

Of course, you can interpret the 'state' of the system as 'what we know' (or even 'what we believe') of the system. However, this isn't exactly like the classical case because there are no hidden variables in the epistemic interpretation of QM

OR you say that the 'state' is in some way real. But if that is the case, then, you have to introduce some kind of nonlocality or some other 'weirdness' like MWI.

sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract.

sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract. — flannel jesus

But then again, the concept of a table may be an abstract thing, but the content of the concept is a concrete thing, a table.

and you think that's not true of a photon?

I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. A table is emergent at best. A photon has fundamental causal real-ness to it. A table is half way towards being a figment of the imagination.

Agreed with that. But this doesn't change the fact that it seems quite different from the classical case. In fact, I believe that your example is perfect here. In de Broglie-Bohm, changing the experimental context has a nonlocal effect also on the measured system. — boundless

Yes, ofcourse. Interestingly, you can produce bombtester-like behavior in baths of fluid: e.g.


https://share.google/images/jaVQyTd1htud4odMt

For me, a mechanism like this is the most attractive explanation of quantum theory, something already postulated in the stochastic mechanical interpretation and some versions of Bohm. It sounds weird but it seems quite compatible with the ontologies of quantum field theory imo, which additionally also seems to tell us that there is no truly empty space, i.e. vacuum energy and fluctuations.

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something. — RussellA

Sorry RussellA, but I'm not able to follow you. The concept of nothing is quite a bit different from the concept of zero. Sure you could use "zero" to mean nothing, and be using it metaphorically, but that would be to give "zero" a meaning outside of mathematics. But that's not to use mathematics metaphorically. When someone says "the rabbits are multiplying", that is to use the word "multiplying" metaphorically, not to use mathematics metaphorically. It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics.

Cheers, I found Matt Strassler's article about matter and energy very interesting, as it casts doubt on the assumption that matter is energy. Perhaps the equation of the two is simplistic. I need to explore this question further.

For me the problem with this 'variant' of Kantianism is that it can only explain the form of appearances, not that there are appearances at all. — boundless

Yes, and I would say that it can only explain the general forms that our experiences take, and not the commonality of experiences of particular forms (which we might call the content of experiences).

I do believe that the great merit of Kant (and epistemic idealism in general) is his view that mind isn't a 'passive' recorder of 'what happens' but that it actively interprets phenomena. I also believe that we can't easily differentiate what is 'mind-dependent' from what is 'mind-independent', an antinomy if you will. — boundless

For me the fact that the mind is not "passive recorder" is uncontroversial. We are affected by what is external to our bodies via the senses, and the ways those effects are processed are endogenous functions, and not subject to interpretation right up until conscious awareness occurs. Of course part of that process would seem to consists in processing by neural networks which have been established by past experiences.

So, it is hard to say what we might mean by 'mind-dependent' in distinction to 'body/brain dependent'. When we talk about "mind-independency' (or we might say 'body/brain-independency') the meaning is plain―it simply refers to whatever exists, has existed or would exist if there were no percipients.

That there are such existents is strongly suggested by science and even by everyday experience. Of course as soon as we perceive something it no longer strictly qualifies to be placed in that category.

Well, I am sympathetic to theism, in fact. IMO, our mind can 'produce' the representation because the 'external reality' is itself intelligible. However, we can only know it by interacting with it and producing a representation of it, which is the 'phenomenal world'. It's not a 'deceptive' veil - at least, if we remember that it is also the result of the interpreteation that our mind makes of the 'external reality'. In fact, I think that the act of 'knowing' is always mediated. The 'external reality' is the 'known', our mind is the 'knower' and the 'phenomenal world' (or the 'representation') is the medium by which our mind can know the external reality. — boundless

I agree with most of what you say here, although I'm not clear on how you have related it to theism. In Kant was the problem that the senses might thought to be deceptive veils, and I think Hegel effectively dealt with that error in his Phenomenology.

If we do away with the external world we are left with a mere Phenomenalism, which seems to explain nothing. By "external world" I simply refer to what lies outside the boundaries of our skins. I cannot see any reason to doubt the existence of external reality defined that way. What the ultimate nature of that external reality might be is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It might be ideas in the mind of god, or it might simply be a world of existents.

You seem to allude to the idea that without god the intelligibility of the external world is inexplicable. I don't see that―I think our brains are highly evolved pattern-recognition organs, as are the brains, to a much less sophisticated degree, of simple embrained organisms. I conjecture that once a pattern is cognized a requisite number of times, a neural network that enables re-cognition is established. We can recognize a vast array of forms and regularities encountered in our everyday perceptual experience. That this process is not fully understood is down to the enormous complexity of the brain, and I don't see the fact that it is not comprehensively understood as disqualifying it as the best explanation.

The alternative idea that the things we perceive are ideas in God's mind or some universal mind of collective storehouse of mind and that their intelligibility is thus simply "built in" seems far less comprehensible to me, and also implausible given the unimaginable complexity of the world that God or universal mind or "storehouse" would have to "hold in mind".

But, as I've said many times, what different folk find most plausible comes down to their basic presuppositions, so it seems to me to be almost a "matter of taste". That doesn't mean I don't think those who hold very different views are wrong―I do, but I acknowledge that they likewise think I am wrong. Given the gulf between basic presuppositions I often wonder whether fruitful dialogue between people whose basic worldviews differ radically is even possible. Perhaps the best we can hope for is a polite agreement to agree to disagree.

If Kant's 'idealism' asserted that appearances are mere mental contents then, it would be subjective idealism. However, Kant also asserts that there is 'something' about phenomena that it is not 'mental'. However, we are left with no clue on how that 'something' is related to appearances. — boundless

Don't forget that the categories of the understanding and our sensory abilities are factors that we all share. They're not particular to individuals, although individuals 'instantiate' those capacities. I have just responded in the mind-created world discussion to further points along these lines.

I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. — flannel jesus

My belief is in Nominalism, in that "table" only exists as the name of a concept.

My belief is also in Realism, in that there is something in the world that caused us to see a "table", and this something is real, and is made up of elementary particles, such as electrons.

right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? Our mental facilities are set up to receive tables as concrete objects, whereas it takes a lot of work for us to even learn that photons are a thing, but that's a human limitation and not a fact about the world.

Yes, ofcourse. Interestingly, you can produce bombtester-like behavior in baths of fluid: e.g. — Apustimelogist

Interesting, will read!

For me, a mechanism like this is the most attractive explanation of quantum theory, something already postulated in the stochastic mechanical interpretation and some versions of Bohm. It sounds weird but it seems quite compatible with the ontologies of quantum field theory imo, which additionally also seems to tell us that there is no truly empty space, i.e. vacuum energy and fluctuations. — Apustimelogist

Perhaps. I know that there are some technical difficulties for de Broglie Bohm's extensions to QFT but I am not competent enough to comment.
I do not recall if I already shared with you this link about the Thermal interpretation of Arnold Neumaier. It is explicitly nonlocal, 'holistic' (in the sense that there are nonlocal properties of extended systems that can't be explained in terms of local properties) and the author claims that it is Lorentz invariant and can explain also QFT.

The main non-classical feature seems to be the presence of those nonlocal fundamental properties.

The universe also exists as a concept. We can talk about a hypothetical world in a conceptual universe. We can even begin to imagine a conceptual world from its genesis to the modern era. Does this world exist beyond perception? It can exist as a concept in so far as there is a conscious mind.

Can anything exist without a conscious mind? Presumably it's possible because I have experienced the universe and I have registered that it can exist without conscious minds. We wouldn't be discussing it, but beyond this ineffable predicament it's still possible for a universe only to exist.

I have seen that some parts of the universe do not rely on consciousness logically though it may be a superficial part of its simulation, if any.

It's also likely that something that isn't a conscious mind predates conscious minds.

Yes, and I would say that it can only explain the general forms that our experiences take, and not the commonality of experiences of particular forms (which we might call the content of experiences). — Janus

Well, if the structure of our cognitive faculties share a lot of properties, then the structure of pur experience is similar. But it is a bit of a stretch to say that all 'formal' properties of experience depend on the regulative faculties of our minds.

So, it is hard to say what we might mean by 'mind-dependent' in distinction to 'body/brain dependent'. — Janus

To be honest, I am not even sure that we can make a hard distinction between 'body' and 'mind'. I do not see them as different substances, although I admit that even from a phenomenological point of view we can distinguish mind and body*. To me the problem is trying to make sense of the mind in purely 'physical' terms, once you assume that the 'physical' is completely devoid of any quality that pertains to mind.

*Interestingly, in Buddhist scriptures you find the teaching of six senses. The first five senses are what we take as senses. But the sixth is the 'inner' sense of the mind. So, to a Buddhist when we are aware of a mental content, it's like being aware of a sense object.

That there are such existents is strongly suggested by science and even by everyday experience. Of course as soon as we perceive something it no longer strictly qualifies to be placed in that category. — Janus

I don't think that even Wayfarer reject that. However, the way things appear to us is conditioned by the cognitive faculties of our mind. Even our emotional states, biases and so on condition the way we process 'reality'. There is something external but we have a mediate knowledge of it and this knowledge in our case is imperfect. Can we be certain on how the 'external reality' is? I would say no, because our knowledge is limited and imperfect (and not strictly speaking becuase it is mediated). Note, however, that the epistemic idealist is right in suggesting that we do not have a direct knowledge of 'reality' and our 'phenomenal world' is our 'best guess' of it, so to speak (to borrow a phrase from St. Paul, 'we know as if through a glass, darkly'). Given that we do not have a possibility to 'check' how our 'interpretation of reality' corresponds to 'reality', we IMO should grant the epistemic idealist that we cannot make certain claims on the noumenal. The epistemic idealist might say that the 'noumenal' is beyond concepts, beyond intelligibility and we should be silent on it (and you find quite similar claims in some Buddhist and Hindu tradition, to be honest). I believe that it is a bit too far, even if partially correct, in a way. But, again, in a way everything we assert without an 'infallible guarantee' on the validity of our statements about the 'noumena' ('external reality') is in a way pure speculation. We can, however, debate on which picture of the 'noumenal' seems more reasonable.

I agree with most of what you say here, although I'm not clear on how you have related it to theism. In Kant was the problem that the senses might thought to be deceptive veils, and I think Hegel effectively dealt with that error in his Phenomenology. — Janus

Ok, but note what I said in the previous paragraph. I address the point about theism later.

If we do away with the external world we are left with a mere Phenomenalism, which seems to explain nothing. By "external world" I simply refer to what lies outside the boundaries of our skins. I cannot see any reason to doubt the existence of external reality defined that way. What the ultimate nature of that external reality might be is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It might be ideas in the mind of god, or it might simply be a world of existents. — Janus

I think we agree on this!

You seem to allude to the idea that without god the intelligibility of the external world is inexplicable — Janus

Honestly, I can't make sense of intelligibility without mind. If physicalism were right, intelligibility of 'the world' seems to that has no explanation at all. Just a brute fact, that allowed our minds to navigate in the world. Note, however, that mathematical and logical laws (the 'laws of reasons' in general) seem to have a character of 'eternality' (or 'time independence') and 'necessity', which both do not seem to be compatible with a view that mind isn't in some sense fundamental. Now, of course our minds can't be fundamental - we are born, we grow, we die etc. But the 'laws of reason' seem to be irreducible. And, in fact, if you try to explain them as derivative to something else you have to assume them in the first place!

So, I am inclined to think that there is really a fundamental mental aspect of reality. Perhaps a 'Mind' that is the source of the intelligibility of everything. I acknowledge that this is a form of 'theism'. It seems to me that it is a more parsimonious explanation of intelligibility than considering it as an unexplicable 'happy' accident or 'brute fact'. Although, admittedly, I don't think that there are absolutely compelling arguments one can make on these things.

Don't forget that the categories of the understanding and our sensory abilities are factors that we all share. They're not particular to individuals, although individuals 'instantiate' those capacities. I have just responded in the mind-created world discussion to further points along these lines. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. This might explain intersubjectivity. But IMO this is only part of the story. I believe that we are in good agreement that the 'phenomenal world' is not 'reality in itself'. It is an interpretation of it, our 'best guess', that is however the way we can know 'reality in itself'. Now, I do not claim any 'sure knowledge' about 'reality in itself', but I do think that, at least for the contents (not the form), of our 'phenomenal world' it is necessary to postulate it.
In a way, I agree with epistemic idealism that all 'views' about the 'noumenal' are speculative. But to me this is because we have imperfect congnitive faculties ('we see as through a glass'...) and we can't adequately know the 'external reality', which is nevertheless intelligible in principle. To me it seems the most reasonable hypothesis here.

It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

As with Berkeley's Absolute Idealism, ideas exist in the mind and the material world only exists as ideas in the mind.

You mentioned multiplication. Addition is also a fundamental concept in mathematics, and as a concept only exists in the mind.

What does "+" mean?

It doesn't literally mean +, as this would be a tautology. It must mean something other than it is. The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets.

Even the word "set" in set theory is a metaphor. In set theory a set is a collection of distinct objects considered as a whole.

As a metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, a collection of distinct objects refers to these distinct objects being considered as a whole.

The concept of addition can be used outside mathematics, as in "it doesn't add up" but can also be used within mathematics, as in addition is the combining of sets.

The only way a set of distinct objects can be thought of as a whole is metaphorically.

right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? — flannel jesus

I'm trying to distinguish between the word "table" which exists in language and a table which I don't believe exists in the world.

I believe that what does exist in the world are fundamental particles and forces, such as electrons and photons.

Similarly, I believe that the word "photon" exists in language and photons exist in the world.

do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything...

I would suggest that the forces are immaterial and the particles are material. It's what makes it so we can perceive the higher order products; otherwise we'd be conjoined or everything would be a solipsist.

Matter and fields. Consciousness lay above the fields, and matter lays below the fields.

I found Matt Strassler's article about matter and energy very interesting, as it casts doubt on the assumption that matter is energy. Perhaps the equation of the two is simplistic. I need to explore this question further. — Janus

Energy is taken to be equivalent to mass, and mass is taken to be the fundamental, essential property of matter. There is a difference, because it is only by removing "matter" from the conception, that "energy" is allowed to be the property of a bodiless substance, light. This allows the essential property of matter, mass, to be equivalent to bodiless motion, making energy and light the same thing, bodiless substance.

The problem is that the concept of matter disallows the possibility of assigning to it an essential property. Therefore the energy-mass equivalence simply evades the issue of "matter" altogether.

For me the fact that the mind is not "passive recorder" is uncontroversial. We are affected by what is external to our bodies via the senses... — Janus

Far more than this, living beings are active, as self-moving. This is the big difference between the determinist perspective and the free will perspective. The determinist perspective sees the actions of living beings as effects of external causation. The free will perspective sees an internal cause of action which has an effect on what is external.

Presumably it's possible because I have experienced the universe and I have registered that it can exist without conscious minds. — Barkon

But didn't you just say that the universe is a concept? Unless this concept is a true concept, by what means would you say that the universe can also exist without conscious minds? If you claim that you "have registered that it can exist without conscious minds", this means that you have judged it to be a true concept. How would you justify this judgement?

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets. — RussellA

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical?

do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon

If fundamental particles and forces did not exist in the world, there would be no concept of "table" in our mind.

Our mind projects our concept of "table" onto the material of the world, as you project the concept of the letter "E" onto a set of points.

The letter "E" does not exist in these points, though you would not see the letter "E" if it were not for these points.

Similarly, the table does not exist in the fundamental particles and forces, but you would not see the table if it were not for these fundamental particles and forces.

I meant that I prefer d'Espagnat's view than Kant's…. — boundless

Which is your prerogative. My point was simply that the two views are distinct enough from each other that they should be considered as different theories altogether.
—————-

Kant also asserts that there is 'something' about phenomena that it is not 'mental'. However, we are left with no clue on how that 'something' is related to appearances. — boundless

There is something about intuition that is not mental; there is nothing of phenomena that is not mental. The relation between the non-mental of intuition and appearance, is sensation.

For us, the non-mental of a real existent, is appearance;
The non-mental of appearance, is matter;
The non-mental of matter, is sensation;
All subsequent to sensation as intuition, is mental.

Of what there is no clue, is how the non-mental matter of appearance transitions to its mental component of intuition. That it is transitioned is necessary, so is given the name transcendental object, that which reason proposes to itself post hoc, in order for the system to maintain its speculative procedure.

Science, of course, gives this to us as the information exiting the sensory apparatuses, then traversing the respective peripheral nervous system to the brain. We have no metaphysical clue regarding such transition insofar as we are consciously oblivious to it.

Even if there is a transcendental realist epistemological theory which explains Kant’s missing clue, it remains the case no human is ever conscious of all that which occurs between sensation and brain activation because of it, which just is Kant’s faculty of intuition whose object is phenomenon.

there's something fundamental about the way seeds work, that could propagate without a conscious mind. Seeds are a true concept, their concept is stand alone and/or fundamental. And just as a concept too, if I had infinite simulation power, I could make a seed and then leave the boundaries of that simulation so only a seed existed there. It is right under our noses, something fundamental can exist without a conscious mind.

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover

The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5.

Perhaps. I know that there are some technical difficulties for de Broglie Bohm's extensions to QFT but I am not competent enough to comment. — boundless

Yes it does. Stochastic mechanics doesn't have the same problems for QFT other than the fact that it is explicitly non-local. However, there is a version of stochastic mechanics which is completely local so this doesn't seem inherently problematic. The thermal interpretation by Neumaier is not really consistent with my perspective.

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5. — RussellA

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. Maybe some mathematicians will tell you that "=" means "the same as", but that is misunderstanding.

Energy is taken to be equivalent to mass, and mass is taken to be the fundamental, essential property of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you read what Russell linked earlier: https://profmattstrassler.com/articles-and-posts/particle-physics-basics/mass-energy-matter-etc/matter-and-energy-a-false-dichotomy/ you'll find that energy is thought to come in two forms 'mass-energy' and 'motion-energy'. When a massive particle and its antiparticle are converted into two photons (photons are understood to be their own antiparticles) then mass energy is converted into motion energy (as photons move at the the speed of light).

The determinist perspective sees the actions of living beings as effects of external causation. The free will perspective sees an internal cause of action which has an effect on what is external. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not true―in the determinist picture there are both exogenous and endogenous causes of action.

But it is a bit of a stretch to say that all 'formal' properties of experience depend on the regulative faculties of our minds. — boundless

More than a bit of a stretch I'd say, there would seem to be no way this could be possible. We see the same things at the same times and places, and since as far as we know our minds are not connected this is inexplicable in terms of just our minds.

To me the problem is trying to make sense of the mind in purely 'physical' terms, once you assume that the 'physical' is completely devoid of any quality that pertains to mind. — boundless

I don't see why we should assume that of the physical. The world shows lawlike patterns and regularities. I think the old image of dead, brute matter died a long time ago, but it still seems to live in some minds.

But the sixth is the 'inner' sense of the mind. So, to a Buddhist when we are aware of a mental content, it's like being aware of a sense object. — boundless

Today that sense is know as interoception―the sense of what is going on in our bodies. We also have proprioception―our sense of the spatial positions, orientations and movements of the body.

I don't think that even Wayfarer reject that. — boundless

He says that there cannot be such existents, that they are neither existent nor non-existent. I think that is meaningless nonsense.

Can we be certain on how the 'external reality' is? I would say no, because our knowledge is limited and imperfect (and not strictly speaking becuase it is mediated). — boundless

I'd say there is no certainty except in tautologies if anywhere. I agree our knowledge is imperfect, but it's all we have.

Note, however, that the epistemic idealist is right in suggesting that we do not have a direct knowledge of 'reality' and our 'phenomenal world' is our 'best guess' of it, so to speak (to borrow a phrase from St. Paul, 'we know as if through a glass, darkly'). — boundless

I don't see the phenomenal world as a guess. If we were all just guessing then the fact that we see the same things in the same places and times would be inexplicable. Perhaps you mean our inferences about the nature of the phenomenal world? Even there, given the immense breadth and consistency of our scientific knowledge, I think 'guess' is too strong.

Given that we do not have a possibility to 'check' how our 'interpretation of reality' corresponds to 'reality', we IMO should grant the epistemic idealist that we cannot make certain claims on the noumenal. The epistemic idealist might say that the 'noumenal' is beyond concepts, beyond intelligibility and we should be silent on it (and you find quite similar claims in some Buddhist and Hindu tradition, to be honest). — boundless

I think it is a kind of artificial problem. We experience a world of phenomena. It seems most plausible (to me at least) that the ways phenomena appear to us is consistent with the real structures of both the external phenomena and our own bodies. We can recognize that this cannot be the "whole picture" and also that, while our language is inherently dualistic, there is no reason to believe nature is dualistic, and this means our understanding if not our direct perceptual experience is somewhat out of kilter with what actually is. I think it is for this reason that aporia may always be found in anything we say.

We can, however, debate on which picture of the 'noumenal' seems more reasonable. — boundless

We can, but experience on these and like forums tells me that people rarely change their opinion on account of debating about what seems most reasonable when it comes to metaphysical speculation.

If physicalism were right, intelligibility of 'the world' seems to that has no explanation at all. Just a brute fact, that allowed our minds to navigate in the world. Note, however, that mathematical and logical laws (the 'laws of reasons' in general) seem to have a character of 'eternality' (or 'time independence') and 'necessity', which both do not seem to be compatible with a view that mind isn't in some sense fundamental. — boundless

I agree. I think a physicalism that allows for the semiotic or semantic dimension to be in some sense "built in" is the most reasonable. However many people seem to interpret the idea that mind in fundamental to entail and idealist position that claims mind as fundamental substance or as some form of panpsychism which entails that everything is to some degree conscious or at least capable of experience and some kind of "inner sense". I don't think it is plausible to think that anything without some kind of sensory organ can experience anything.

Anyway we seem to agree on the major points.

He says that there cannot be such existents, that they are neither existent nor non-existent. — Janus

Context:

I am not arguing that… ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer