So, as I say, the simplest option right now is to question the assumption itself. If an instance of consciousness is merely an instant of consciousness, with no persistence, just the illusion of being the same person by virtue of inheriting the memories of the last guy, all the problems disappear. — Mijin

No, they don't. I'm now going to talk about the Star Trek transporter. The question is whether you would allow yourself to be beamed and whether you would assume that you would be the target person. So the question arises before the beaming.

Why's that? What's special about the atoms? — Mijin

If all atoms are different, then there is no physical connection between the source person and the target person. The target person only claims to be the source person. Furthermore, they could happen to be created (for example, something like a Boltzmann brain) at a spacelike interval (-> relativity).

The issue of how, concretely, an instance of consciousness is determined turns out to be really problematic to answer. So, as I say, the simplest option right now is to question the assumption itself. If an instance of consciousness is merely an instant of consciousness, with no persistence, just the illusion of being the same person by virtue of inheriting the memories of the last guy, all the problems disappear. — Mijin

Is it not a problem that, despite there being no self beyond the instant, the "illusion of persistence" of more is the only thing none of us would give up? Is the end of the self, through death or lobotomy for example, anything anybody would try to avoid? If the self is the thing we all cherish above everything else, I'm not sure "the self is an illusion" is the way to look at it. I think maybe "this is what the self is" or "this is how the self comes about" makes more sense.

No, they don't. I'm now going to talk about the Star Trek transporter. The question is whether you would allow yourself to be beamed and whether you would assume that you would be the target person. So the question arises before the beaming. — SolarWind

You say "no they don't" in response to my point that the problems related to the transporter don't apply to the "no persistence" position. But then fail to say exactly what problem you think remains.
And I don't know why you are trying to clarify that you mean before the beaming.

So let me start over because I think there may be some confusion; I'll name the positions on star trek transporters as follows:

A: Sent -- The Kirk that walks out at Destination is one and the same as the one killed at Source, who in turn was one and the same with the Kirk that was born 30 years before.
B: Killed -- The Kirk at Source is one and the same with the Kirk that was born 30 years prior, but he is simply killed by this process. The Kirk that emerges at Destination is a new human, with a new consciousness, that just happens to be qualitatively the same as the Kirk that died.
C: Perpetual_Death -- The Kirk at Destination is completely new. But so was the Kirk at Source. As was the Kirk 5 minutes ago, and one second ago. Under this position, when consciousness arises in the mind it has the feeling of being one and the same entity due to having access to memories of prior events. But that's all it is. A persistent "instance" of consciousness simply isn't a real thing.

Now, the objections to A and B were not invented by me; this is a well-known philosophical problem and people a lot brighter than me have summarized the issues. I've just invented -- I think -- the "imperfect transporter" objection. The broad summary of the more standard objections are:

The issues with Sent concern why being qualitatively the same should equal being numerically the same, when we never do that with other objects. And what happens if the entity at Source is preserved?

The issues with Killed are what the person at destination lacks in order to be a continuance. If the same atoms are required...why? If the same atoms are used, does momentary separation of atoms matter? If so, why?
And this talk of atoms' history also implies that consciousness, uniquely, leads to facts about the universe that cannot be known even with a perfect knowledge of its current state.

I am not aware of any arguments against Perpetual_Death. Other than it's a very unpleasant option. You would be doing us all a favor if you could find some flaw with it.

I am not aware of any arguments against Perpetual_Death. Other than it's a very unpleasant option. You would be doing us all a favor if you could find some flaw with it. — Mijin

From the perspective of the beaming person, there are two possibilities: either (version plus) they see the destination after beaming, or (version minus) they are dead.

The whole thing is indistinguishable from a third-person perspective, but it is distinguishable from a first-person perspective.

Perpetual_Death does not say anything about this, but only that the destination person says they are the source person, which they do in both cases.

Thus, Perpetual_Death is not false, but meaningless.

I thought I already said what the issue is: there might be two entities that could call themselves Mijin, but stick a pin in one, and the other doesn't feel pain. There are two instances of consciousness. — Mijin

And what is the problem with that?

And I don't know why you keep raising souls. As I say, within this topic it seems to only be invoked by people trying to express incredulence about the other position to their own.
I don't think anyone in this thread has taken the position that souls exist, certainly not me. — Mijin

Whether or not people explicitly believe in souls, my position is that there is an implicit presumption of souls in the abstract, that is, the mental model whereby we are non-physical entities that inhabit bodies. It is this mental model which gives rise to all the confusion of the teleporter thought experiment. Even the idea that continuity is an illusion, that we really live only in the instant, relies on this, as it fails to imagine continuity in the absence of something like a soul. If you abolish this intuition, I don't think there are any problems with teleportation. Continuity simply is the idea of self over time, over time. As long as this maintains, continuity maintains. Souls were always an illusion.

It does though. Going back to the OP, what if the transporter makes so many errors that (an alive) Abraham Lincoln walks out at the destination? He's alive, but nothing at all like the person that stepped on the source transporter pad. This illiustrates that the line for suriving or not is not the same as whether the original instance of consciousness is preserved or not, as the two are independent. — Mijin

So by "It does though", you are claiming that this illustrates that the universe does decree that "X=12,371 means surviving with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you effectively die from the injury"?

Yes, absolutely. It seems you've got a great handle on the ins-and-outs generally. Thanks for the exchange!

I don't think this is a sensible position: whose illusion? — SolarWind

Baked into the position is that it is no one's illusion. Our experience, itself, may be illusory. That doesn't mean it doesn't obtain. We experience in the same sense an orange experiences being eaten. It happens to it. The illusion happens to us. 'I' doesn't need to be adequately defined for this. You can just say the experience is being had the body in question. Not to a 'self'. The qualia could be shared - we have no idea, really.

And what is the problem with that? — hypericin

They are not the same person. Obviously. I can't see how that's being missed?? If we're talking identity, you cannot have two people who are the same person. It violates both the law of identity, and all intuitions about the self. Though, I think those are a weak indicator, anyway, as you note - most people intuit some form of soul, which is totally unsupportable and is probably the only way to maintain identity obtains for a 'self'.

most people intuit some form of soul, which is totally unsupportable and is probably the only way to maintain identity obtains for a 'self'. — AmadeusD

I agree with you, although the religious connotations of "soul" leads philosophers to shy away from using that word. There's a good article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that discusses various approaches to defining "transworld identities", which seems to cover all the relevant ground. Terms that are used (instead of soul): "bare identity", "thisness", "haeccity". The section on haeccity seems the most relevant.

They are not the same person. Obviously. I can't see how that's being missed?? If we're talking identity, you cannot have two people who are the same person. — AmadeusD

If we are talking numerical identity, then clearly not. But personal identity is obviously not numerical identity.

This is most clear in death. When someone dies, their body is the same body as (numerically identical with) the body that was alive. But there is no personal continuity between them. Numerical identity is not what we are talking about.

What is relevant is personal continuity, not numerical identity. And it is (logically) possible for two people to be both non-identical with each other and personally continuous with the same ancestor individual.

B: Killed -- The Kirk at Source is one and the same with the Kirk that was born 30 years prior, but he is simply killed by this process. The Kirk that emerges at Destination is a new human, with a new consciousness, that just happens to be qualitatively the same as the Kirk that died. — Mijin

This is the one. Except Destination Kirk doesn't "just happen" to be the same. He's a copy. Of course he's the same. But Source Kirk was disintegrated.

Thanks for that! I was aware of some of this, but not in any detail. Good reading - thank you!

If we are talking numerical identity, then clearly not. But personal identity is obviously not numerical identity. — hypericin

I think perhaps, like many, this leapfrogs what we want to know: You believe personal identity can be 1:x. That's a big, big concession (not a negative one) in terms of reaching some conclusion. If you take this position, several outcomes of the transporter can be acceptable.

Most do not take this to be the situation. Most take personal identity to be, fundamentally, a 1:1 entity. I don't even think that obtains, but i digress. Whether or not personal identity requires identity is the open question. Once you have an intuition, the TE tests it.

This is most clear in death. When someone dies, their body is the same body as (numerically identical with) the body that was alive. — hypericin

There's a lot to unpack here, but possible. The dead body is not the same body from three months or so prior to death. So, that wont hold. This is how it works - you give an intuition, and we test it against examples and empirical facts. In this case, a dead body is not identical to the body previously known to be the alive person (other than at the moment of death, but clearly this isn't relevant as the change occurs while alive to give us a different body at times t1, t2, t3 etc.. etc.. if we pick sufficient distal times (three-four month increments should do).

We would then discuss whether it actually takes seven years to disclaim identity, as hte skeleton takes longer to be replaced. Which change matters? At what point? To what degree?

In any case, it is not clear at all that the body is self-same across time.

What is relevant is personal continuity, not numerical identity. And it is (logically) possible for two people to be both non-identical with each other and personally continuous with the same ancestor individual. — hypericin

Again, it might be. There is no clear answer. Pretty damn self-evidently.

n this case, a dead body is not identical to the body previously known to be the alive person (other than at the moment of death, but clearly this isn't relevant as the change occurs while alive to give us a different body at times t1, t2, t3 etc.. etc.. if we pick sufficient distal times (three-four month increments should do). — AmadeusD

I'm not following your logic here.

At the moment of death, you agree the body is identical to the body immediately before death.
Yet, personhood is extinguished at the moment of death.
This shows that personhood is not bodily identity.
Moreover, the moment of death is the relevant time. It is the time when personhood drops to zero, while bodily continuity is still intact. What happens months later is of no interest.

We would then discuss whether it actually takes seven years to disclaim identity, as hte skeleton takes longer to be replaced. Which change matters? At what point? To what degree? — AmadeusD

You might discuss this. I would find it as useless as any other discussion of Ship of Theseus criteria.

You believe personal identity can be 1:x. That's a big, big concession (not a negative one) in terms of reaching some conclusion. If you take this position, several outcomes of the transporter can be acceptable.

Most do not take this to be the situation. Most take personal identity to be, fundamentally, a 1:1 entity. I don't even think that obtains, but i digress. Whether or not personal identity requires identity is the open question. Once you have an intuition, the TE tests it. — AmadeusD

I believe this, and I have provided a notion of self which supports it, and which avoids the usual metaphysical quandaries of the TE. In real life, personal identity is indeed 1:1, it takes fantastic, futuristic scenarios for it not to be. Given that 1:1 is our actual, default experience, the fact that people also believe that personal identity is intrinsically 1:1, despite the quandaries in the TE this entails, carries vanishingly little weight.

At the moment of death, you agree the body is identical to the body immediately before death.
Yet, personhood is extinguished at the moment of death. — hypericin

"possible". I certainly give that some air, but I do not think that's right. We lose weight at the moment of death, certain functions cease, capabilities of the body essentially extinguish etc.. etc... and so there is (to my mind) no way to uphold identity of the body through the death process (again, this matters not to my takes here, im just working through things). I think I can see where this was going, but I don't agree with the premise so I'm not sure I need to go further.

You are, again, importing an intuition. Personhood may not be extinguished at death. That "person" remains in the annals of history for all time, once they have existed. For many, that's enough. You need to test these positions rather than assume them, and charge other positions with them as challenges, I think. I'm not even saying you're far off the mark or anything like that - you might be right. But plenty of people will disagree with you, and it is in fact working out which of the possible answers is most reasonable that we're doing.

Moreover, the moment of death is the relevant time. It is the time when personhood drops to zero, while bodily continuity is still intact. What happens months later is of no interest. — hypericin

You will see as clear as day that this is not a workable response in light of the above. It is several of your intuitions presented as an objective timeline. I will comment, thought, that the bold is clearly the wrong answer. If this were true, any changes that happen to the body during life have nothing to do with personal identity, and yet the retention of one singular state of the body at death somehow indicates personhood, and its extinguishment. This is absurd (in the way of being essentially senseless, not that you're being silly or anything). In any case, it is obvious that the body does not remain as it was at the exact moment of death for any time. It is a literal instant. Again, i see where that's going, but in light of the above explications this is either just a description of what you like, in terms of an answer to the personal identity problem, or you are perhaps not quite accounting for some of the empirical facts about the body at death. Either way, your position is fine, but its your position. Not something whic is evident, and usable as reasons for other people to abandon theirs. There answers will simply differ from yours, and then you'll need to test them. I do, roughly, agree that what happens months later isn't of interest - but it is, given its the same processes occurring as in life, as regards 'changes' being relevant to identity.

I would find it as useless as any other discussion of Ship of Theseus criteria. — hypericin

Then you are refusing to test your intuitions. I can't do much with that...

Given that 1:1 is our actual, default experience, the fact that people also believe that personal identity is intrinsically 1:1, despite the quandaries in the TE this entails, carries vanishingly little weight. — hypericin

Its a perception, i can grant that. It is not an 'experience'. If that were the case, we would have clear lines about what constitutes identity. We don't, and your positions don't get us closer. This is why i reject that identity obtains at all. There's no argument under which is survives scrutiny. To illustrate what this means, Parfit's final tome/s was called "On What Matters". This refers to what he calls 'Relation R' which is just the psychological continuity. It could be your mind implanted in another body, but if your wishes, desires, dispositions, goals and ambitions are all continued on, unabated, by someone, then that someone may as well be you. "may as well be" seems the best I can trace up to. Relation R matters, rather than identity. THe problem is this is some pretty damn cold comfort.

The TE shows us that on pretty much any intuitive conception of identity, it is absurd when challenged. I am unsure that anything you're saying changes that.

From the perspective of the beaming person, there are two possibilities: either (version plus) they see the destination after beaming, or (version minus) they are dead. — SolarWind

I was describing the three positions on continuity of consciousness and I don't see what is gained by
pre-emptively taking one off the table.

If you want to say it's important that we reduce it just to the thoughts of the person going into the transporter then sure: the person going into the transporter is me, and I think there are three scenarios to consider.

I thought I already said what the issue is: there might be two entities that could call themselves Mijin, but stick a pin in one, and the other doesn't feel pain. There are two instances of consciousness.
— Mijin

And what is the problem with that? — hypericin

Because the pronoun "I" refers to this instance of consciousness. In the stick a pin example, I might say "I am in pain". What would two "I"s mean?

Whether or not people explicitly believe in souls, my position is that there is an implicit presumption of souls in the abstract, that is, the mental model whereby we are non-physical entities that inhabit bodies. It is this mental model which gives rise to all the confusion of the teleporter thought experiment. Even the idea that continuity is an illusion, that we really live only in the instant, relies on this, as it fails to imagine continuity in the absence of something like a soul. — hypericin

Not really; it just takes the null position. If you wish to claim there is continuity, then it's on you to say continuity of what, and then, of course, I will come back with hypotheticals about moving atoms around or boltzmann brains or whatever. Because simple intuitions about bodily continuity only work in our world where we don't yet have tech for doing things like splicing brains; at the very least bodily continuity needs to be defined much more concretely / formally to make clear claims about such situations.

B: Killed -- The Kirk at Source is one and the same with the Kirk that was born 30 years prior, but he is simply killed by this process. The Kirk that emerges at Destination is a new human, with a new consciousness, that just happens to be qualitatively the same as the Kirk that died.
— Mijin
This is the one. Except Destination Kirk doesn't "just happen" to be the same. He's a copy. Of course he's the same. But Source Kirk was disintegrated. — Patterner

It's meaningless just taking a position. What's the argument?

If you want to say it's important that we reduce it just to the thoughts of the person going into the transporter then sure: the person going into the transporter is me, and I think there are three scenarios to consider. — Mijin

Of course, I'm interested in the first-person perspective; the third-person perspective is well-known and boring.

You go into the transporter. Please describe your three possible experiences.

I already did, in my second to last post.

But I'll try a rephrasing specifically within the "calculating what I'll do" framing:

The three positions are:
1. My consciousness will persist even if I take the transporter; I may as well enjoy a nice holiday on Mars
2. My consciousness will only persist if I *don't* take the transporter. It's a murder box.
3. Nothing I do could possibly make my consciousness persist. Even if I don't take the transporter, consciousness doesn't have persistence, only the illusion of it, because it inherits memories.
I may as well let the next guy holiday on Mars.

3. Nothing I do could possibly make my consciousness persist. Even if I don't take the transporter, consciousness doesn't have persistence, only the illusion of it, because it inherits memories.
I may as well let the next guy holiday on Mars. — Mijin

That's not something you experience when you get into the transporter.

Incidentally, the illusion is also confusing in the “Total Recall” scenario. If person X has the memories of person Y implanted, are they then the continuation of person X or person Y?

That's not something you experience when you get into the transporter. — SolarWind

No-one said it was. I don't follow the point you're making.

If person X has the memories of person Y implanted, are they then the continuation of person X or person Y? — SolarWind

If you're asking my opinion specifically on memories, no, I don't consider memories to be the critical factor in determining instances of consciousness.

Because the pronoun "I" refers to this instance of consciousness. In the stick a pin example, I might say "I am in pain". What would two "I"s mean? — Mijin

"I" would mean the individual who was stuck. There are two numerically distinct individuals who claim continuity with the same individual in the past. I see nothing problematic.

"I" would mean the individual who was stuck. There are two numerically distinct individuals who claim continuity with the same individual in the past. I see nothing problematic. — hypericin

The problem is firstly, you brought up the concept of multiple "I"s and now you're conceding that "I" refers to an individual because there is not a shared consciousness.
But secondly, this whole thing has deflected us from talking about the problems. Call whoever you want, whatever you want. Call it the Ship of Theseus or Boaty McBoatface. The critical thing is if we have a model for understanding what happens to instances of consciousness.

It's meaningless just taking a position. What's the argument? — Mijin

The position is the argument. Source Kirk is killed. That's what happens when someone's atoms are dispersed.

Destination Kirk is a duplicate. Destination Kirk doesn't even know he's not the original. But the original's atoms were dispersed, so...

But I'll comment on #3:

3. Nothing I do could possibly make my consciousness persist. Even if I don't take the transporter, consciousness doesn't have persistence, only the illusion of it, because it inherits memories. I may as well let the next guy holiday on Mars. — Mijin

Inheriring memories is how the persistence of consciousness is accomplished. It's not an illusion. It's just not what people generally think it is if they haven't thought or read/heard much about it. But even after all the thought, reading, and discussion anybody has had, it's still what defines us more than anything else, and it's the last thing anyone would give up. How many body parts would you give up before it's not worth it any longer, and you would give it up? Million Dollar Baby and Whose Life Is It Anyway? are both movies about people paralyzed from the neck down who want to die.

Put a delay of five seconds into the scenario. Five seconds after Destination Kirk materializes, Source Kirk dematerializes. Who's going for a ride?

Incidentally, the illusion is also confusing in the “Total Recall” scenario. If person X has the memories of person Y implanted, are they then the continuation of person X or person Y? — SolarWind

There's a fun show called Blindspot.

The problem is firstly, you brought up the concept of multiple "I"s and now you're conceding that "I" refers to an individual because there is not a shared consciousness. — Mijin

I didn't realize I was conceding anything. When the hell did I say there was a shared consciousness?

The critical thing is if we have a model for understanding what happens to instances of consciousness. — Mijin

I gave a model. You said, but wait, there is a problem, what about two clones, and one sticks itself with a pin? I await a demonstration of any actual problem.

Inheriring memories is how the persistence of consciousness is accomplished. — Patterner

The position is the argument. Source Kirk is killed. That's what happens when someone's atoms are dispersed. — Patterner

Do you not see how those statements are in conflict? Because this conflict (and related issues) is exactly the point of the transporter problem.

I didn't realize I was conceding anything. When the hell did I say there was a shared consciousness? — hypericin

No, I mean you conceded the words before that: that "I" refers to the individual subject of conscious experiences, in conflict with when you earlier claimed that both me and a duplicate would be two "I"s.

I gave a model. You said, but wait, there is a problem, what about two clones, and one sticks itself with a pin? I await a demonstration of any actual problem. — hypericin

This is conflating two things. I was speaking there about how, in general, the time to handwave a problem and claim we understand it, is when we can make useful predictions and inferences about it. That's not the case here. No-one's model seems to give a direct answer about the imperfect transporter, or why it matters which atoms are used for example.

In terms of the "stick a pin" point, that is part of my answer to you when you asked "What exactly is the problem with multiple "I"s?"
The problem is that they are separate entities, as you've conceded. There's no reason to call them multiple "I"s, they are just multiple people, as separate as you and I are right now.

Inheriting memories is how the persistence of consciousness is accomplished.
— Patterner

The position is the argument. Source Kirk is killed. That's what happens when someone's atoms are dispersed.
— Patterner

Do you not see how those statements are in conflict? Because this conflict (and related issues) is exactly the point of the transporter problem. — Mijin

If my atoms are dispersed, I have no memories. Or life.

Building a replica of me means it has my memories, and everything else. But it's still a replica, and I am gone. The facts that the replica feels exactly like I would feel if I had not been disintegrated, and no conceivable test could tell the difference, don't matter.

I ask again. If you are the Source, and there is a 5 second delay between the duplicate materializing and you being disintegrated, would you do it? If the continuation of your memories and characteristics was all that mattered, you would. But I don't think you would go for it.

No, I mean you conceded the words before that: that "I" refers to the individual subject of conscious experiences, in conflict with when you earlier claimed that both me and a duplicate would be two "I"s. — Mijin

I don't understand why you think these statements conflict.

A duplicate means two "I"s. Two people, each referring to themselves as "I", each individual subjects of conscious experience. Each with psychological continuity to the original. I haven't changed on this.

In terms of the "stick a pin" point, that is part of my answer to you when you asked "What exactly is the problem with multiple "I"s?" — Mijin

Ah, I see the confusion.

But this seems to be taking the position that I alluded to upthread as "Locke's conception"; that the critical thing is the pattern of memories, characteristics etc.
This also has issues; e.g. what if we don't delete the original, does it mean we have multiple "I"s? And how can that be, when the experiences of those I's is separate? — Mijin

If we don't delete the original, there will be multiple people with psychological continuity to the original. Each with distinct experiences. "I" only ever refers to the one that is speaking. What is wrong with this state of affairs? I still don't see the issue you were referring to originally.

ilding a replica of me means it has my memories, and everything else. But it's still a replica, and I am gone — Patterner

But when I said that memories are irrelevant to determining whether something is the same instance of consciousness, you disagreed with me. And now you're making exactly the same point

I ask again. If you are the Source, and there is a 5 second delay between the duplicate materializing and you being disintegrated, would you do it? — Patterner

And I answered, so I don't know why you're asking again.

Once again: from the principled point of view, from my current best understanding of instances of consciousness, I may as well hop in, because persistence of consciousness does not seem to be a thing regardless of whether I take the trip or not.
Pragmatically, I wouldn't take the trip because I would want near certainty before doing anything life or death.

I don't think the question "What would you do in real life?" tends to be very helpful for these kinds of philosophical questions. In real life, we are cautious, and frequently default to taking no action...I'm sure that in real life most people probably wouldn't redirect a trolley towards killing fewer people, for example.
A "God's eye view" is better for drawing out our best understanding and principles.

If we don't delete the original, there will be multiple people with psychological continuity to the original. Each with distinct experiences. "I" only ever refers to the one that is speaking. What is wrong with this state of affairs? I still don't see the issue you were referring to originally. — hypericin

By "I" we are referring to an instance of consciousness. Otherwise we could just use normal grammar e.g. there are two people. If you're saying that there are two separate people if we make a duplicate and their experiences diverge...yes, everyone on every side of this debate believes this.

And if by "psychological continuity" you mean they have memories of the person who stepped on to the source pad...again, every side of the debate agrees with this, it's part of the set up of the problem.

ilding a replica of me means it has my memories, and everything else. But it's still a replica, and I am gone
— Patterner

But when I said that memories are irrelevant to determining whether something is the same instance of consciousness, you disagreed with me. And now you're making exactly the same point — Mijin

I'm not. Consciousness A can be identical to Consciousness B. But A is not B. Identical things are not the same thing. That applies to consciousnesses as much as it applies to mass produced items that are so precisely manufactured that they are indistinguishable. It's easy to understand this. You only need to count.

Once again: from the principled point of view, from my current best understanding of instances of consciousness, I may as well hop in, because persistence of consciousness does not seem to be a thing regardless of whether I take the trip or not.
Pragmatically, I wouldn't take the trip because I would want near certainty before doing anything life or death.

I don't think the question "What would you do in real life?" tends to be very helpful for these kinds of philosophical questions. In real life, we are cautious, and frequently default to taking no action...I'm sure that in real life most people probably wouldn't redirect a trolley towards killing fewer people, for example.
A "God's eye view" is better for drawing out our best understanding and principles. — Mijin

If you are looking at your duplicate, with a consciousness identical to yours, then there are two consciousness. When you are disintegrated, only one will remain. You will be dead.

If a "God's eye view" tells you otherwise, then perhaps philosophical questions are better answered by combining it with "What would you do in real life?".