I guess I just don't accept the validity of what you are claiming as the context within which you make such statements. I've said before that I don't think it is the "existence of all such supposedly unseen" things that "relies on an implicit perspective". It is what we say about those things that relies on perspective, not the things themselves. I'm not sure why you added "supposedly" and "implicit", since there can be little doubt that there are always countless unseen things, and no doubt that what we say about them does explicitly rely on a perspective, it is the expression of a perspective. It simply does not follow logically that the existence of the things relies on perspective, explicit or implicit. To say that is just a case of invalid reasoning.

What their existence might be outside any perspective is not "meaningless and unintelligible"―it's a category error to apply those categories to existents, they rather pertain to what is said. We know their existence only via the senses, and what we know of their existence is mediated by the senses as well as by the things themselves. This is shown by the fact that there is always more to be discovered about them. This would be as true if the things are ideas in the mind of God (as Berkeley claims) as it would be if they are simply real existents. I believe that is why Berkeley says he does not all deny the existence of real material objects that do not depend on us for their being. He believes they depend on God for their being, as do we.

I don't know why you keep repeating the same mistaken conflation between the things and what we say about them, when it's been pointed out to you so many times. I put it down to stubbornness and closed-mindedness―it seems you just don't want the world to be a material world. Your position would be more coherent if you argued for the "mind of God" solution, but you just don't seem to want to embrace that either.

This leaves you with a position that has no explanatory power, because the similar constitution of our minds cannot alone explain the fact that we all, and even some animals, see the same things in the same places. That is the weakness in your position that you need to address, if you can. Continual mere assertion, pushing of stipulative definitions and marshalling of stock quotes are no substitute for cogent argument.

Which is your prerogative. My point was simply that the two views are distinct enough from each other that they should be considered as different theories altogether. — Mww

OK. IMO they share a lot in common, but you are right.

Of what there is no clue, is how the non-mental matter of appearance transitions to its mental component of intuition. That it is transitioned is necessary, so is given the name transcendental object, that which reason proposes to itself post hoc, in order for the system to maintain its speculative procedure. — Mww

Interesting. But isn't this a form of 'transcendental realism', though? I mean, if we can distinguish what in our experience is 'truly external' from us, it would be 'transcendental realism', right?

Even if there is a transcendental realist epistemological theory which explains Kant’s missing clue, it remains the case no human is ever conscious of all that which occurs between sensation and brain activation because of it, which just is Kant’s faculty of intuition whose object is phenomenon. — Mww

On this, I agree. That's why I think that our knowledge is imperfect. So, in a sense, we do not really know and Kant was right in saying that the mind has an active role. But denying knowledge of the external reality completely, I am not convinced of that.

More than a bit of a stretch I'd say, there would seem to be no way this could be possible. We see the same things at the same times and places, and since as far as we know our minds are not connected this is inexplicable in terms of just our minds. — Janus

Here you are assuming that space is mind-independent. There is no need to do that for a 'realist' IMO.

To make a crude analogy... think about the Matrix. Alice and Bob visit a city in the virtual reality of the Matrix. The buildings are not really there. When they compare their notes Alice and Bob find that a lot of agreement about the report of the city. Yet, there city is not 'really there'. But, their experiences, albeit deceptive, had been possible thanks to something external to them. So, there is no need to posit that the 'external reality' is 'like' the 'phenomenal world' we experience.

I don't see why we should assume that of the physical. The world shows lawlike patterns and regularities. I think the old image of dead, brute matter died a long time ago, but it still seems to live in some minds. — Janus

Ok. What are these laws and regularities in physical terms?

Today that sense is know as interoception―the sense of what is going on in our bodies. We also have proprioception―our sense of the spatial positions, orientations and movements of the body. — Janus

Not only that, however. When I, for instance, make a calculation I am not aware of any bodily processes. I am aware of a relation between concepts.

He says that there cannot be such existents, that they are neither existent nor non-existent. I think that is meaningless nonsense. — Janus

IMHO you (in the plural) are using 'existence' in a different way.
Let's take again the Matrix example, I wrote above. In a transactional way, the 'city' above is 'real'. Alice and Bob have to pay attention of 'what happens', there is interusbjective agreement in their reports and so on. However, the city's existence is merely virtual. 'Ultimately', there is no city. And 'the real world' 'outside' the Matrix can't be said to 'exist' in the same way the 'virtual world' exist.
Or, to make another example: think about dreams. If I dream about visiting a 'city', that 'city' might be said to exist in a sense - bumping into a wall might even give me painful sensations. However, it would be weird to denote with the same term 'existence' what is in the dream and what is 'in the waking world'.

So, is the 'mind-independent reality' more or less the same to the 'phenomenal world'? We do not a way of know. And we can't neglect the fact that our mind has an active role in shaping the 'phenomenal world'.

I'd say there is no certainty except in tautologies if anywhere. I agree our knowledge is imperfect, but it's all we have. — Janus

I almost agree with this. But I am open to the possibility of things like 'revelations', 'insights via meditative experiences' and so on that can allow us, in principle, to get a 'higher knowledge'. I do recognize that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these things, however.

I don't see the phenomenal world as a guess. If we were all just guessing then the fact that we see the same things in the same places and times would be inexplicable. Perhaps you mean our inferences about the nature of the phenomenal world? Even there, given the immense breadth and consistency of our scientific knowledge, I think 'guess' is too strong. — Janus

Well, pehaps 'guess' is a wrong word. Think about 'model' or 'map'. Just like a map is useful to understand a city. The map, however, doesn't necessarily give all that can be possibly known of the city. Nor, necessarily, the map is 'similar' to the city.
We might use the same map. But the fact that we use the same map doesn't imply that the city is like the map.
Note, however, that the map should share some structural similarities with the city. That's why I believe that the 'external reality' must be intelligible.

I think it is a kind of artificial problem. We experience a world of phenomena. It seems most plausible (to me at least) that the ways phenomena appear to us is consistent with the real structures of both the external phenomena and our own bodies. We can recognize that this cannot be the "whole picture" and also that, while our language is inherently dualistic, there is no reason to believe nature is dualistic, and this means our understanding if not our direct perceptual experience is somewhat out of kilter with what actually is. I think it is for this reason that aporia may always be found in anything we say. — Janus

Ok, I see. Not sure I agree, however. Think about the map in my previous paragraph.

We can, but experience on these and like forums tells me that people rarely change their opinion on account of debating about what seems most reasonable when it comes to metaphysical speculation. — Janus

:up: But even when we do not change our minds, discussion can help us to clarify our own positions. Changes in metaphysical positions also can require years.

I agree. I think a physicalism that allows for the semiotic or semantic dimension to be in some sense "built in" is the most reasonable. However many people seem to interpret the idea that mind in fundamental to entail and idealist position that claims mind as fundamental substance or as some form of panpsychism which entails that everything is to some degree conscious or at least capable of experience and some kind of "inner sense". I don't think it is plausible to think that anything without some kind of sensory organ can experience anything. — Janus

To me the problem with a 'physicalism that allows for the semiotic and semantic dimension' is a better position than a physicalism that doesn't and in which semiotics and semantics happen 'for no reason'. But IMO, I am not satisfied by this version of physicalism because the semiotic and semantic dimensions still seem to me a 'brute fact'. A fascinating 'brute fact', indeed, that can also be inspiring but still a brute fact.
Whereas, if one assumes that some kind of 'fundamental mental aspect' or 'Divine Mind' etc is fundamental, it's easier to understand why these properties are present even in matter.

Anyway we seem to agree on the major points. — Janus

Yes. And also we can have a fruitful conversation about our disagreements.

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5".

Berkeley's Absolute Idealism
"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Abstract perceptions in our minds, such as "I have an indescribable inchoate feeling", may be made concrete by perceptions through our senses, such as "I feel I am aimlessly drifting". Making the abstract concrete is a function of the metaphor.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low".

We understand the abstract concept of 2+3=5 by the concrete picture of 2 pebbles next to 3 pebbles and seeing a total of 5 pebbles. We can formalise the addition of pebbles on the ground using set theory, such that {2} + {3} = {2 + 3} = {5}.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor.

Not true―in the determinist picture there are both exogenous and endogenous causes of action. — Janus

Are you saying that the determinist perspective denies Newtons laws? Or, is it the case that "endogenous causes of action" are simply represented as interactions of internal parts, which are each external to each other. This would mean that the so-called "endogenous" causes are really just modeled as exogenous interactions. Therefore the "endogenous" is not true endogeny. Language police on patrol.

Interesting. But isn't this a form of 'transcendental realism', though? — boundless

This is what I mean by different theories.

The Kantian system of knowledge a posteriori, is twofold: sensibility, arrangement of the given, and, cognition, the logic in the arrangement of the given. The logic of the arrangement is determined….thought….. by the tripartite coordination of understanding, judgement and reason. All that which is produced by logical thought alone, is grounded in principles a priori; all principles arise transcendentally in pure reason, therefore the concept of “real” in transcendental logic is inappropriate, instead subsumed under the primary condition of logic writ large, which is correctly called “valid”. From which follows the notion that “transcendental realism”, is self-contradictory.

An alternative epistemic theory may be predicated on transcendental realism, but not within or even implied by, a Kantian system, but rather, by re-defining the predicates of an established method and/or constructing different relations between the components of that method.

Such is the fate of metaphysics in general: a guy adds to a theory in some way, shape or form, then accuses the original of having missed what was added. It may just as well have been the case it wasn’t missed in the former at all, so much as rejected. So the new guy merely cancels that by which the original rejection found force, and from within which resides the ground of accusation of the missing. Even without considering your particular instance of this, it is found in Arthur’s critique of Kant, and, ironically enough, Kant’s critique of Hume, a.k.a., The Reluctant Rationalist.
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…..it remains the case no human is ever conscious of all that which occurs between sensation and brain activation because of it…..
— Mww

On this, I agree. That's why I think that our knowledge is imperfect. — boundless

Dunno about imperfect, but even if it is, it has nothing to do with being unconscious of some operational segment of our intelligence, in which no knowledge is forthcoming in the first place. Perhaps you’ve thought a reasonable work-around, but from my armchair, I must say if you agree with the former you have lost the ground for judging the relative quality of your own knowledge.

Contingent, without a doubt. Imperfect? Ehhhhh……isn’t whatever knowledge there is at any given time, perfectly obtained? Otherwise, by what right is it knowledge at all? If every otherwise rational human in a given time knew lightning was the product of angry gods, what argument could there possibly be, in that same time, sufficient to falsify it? Wouldn’t that knowledge, at that time, be as perfect as it could be?

The system used to amend at some successive time the knowledge of one time, is precisely the same system used to obtain both. So maybe it isn’t the relative perfection of knowledge we should consider, but the relative quality of the system by which it is obtained.

And we’re right back where we started, re: any system in which a part is missing must be imperfect.

Do you see the contradiction? What would you do about it?

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5". — RussellA

As I told you "=" does not mean "is". Therefore your proposed analogy is false. We are not saying 2+3 is 5, we are saying that they are equivalent, and that is the literal meaning, not metaphorical.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low". — RussellA

I would agree with you, that many people use this technique, but I would not say that it constitutes understanding, rather I would say that it is misunderstanding. Likewise, I argue that people who understand "=" in mathematics as meaning "is", or "the same as", misunderstand. And, people who understand numbers as mathematical objects, are making them concrete, and misunderstand.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor. — RussellA

According to what i said above, I believe that set theory is based in axioms of misunderstanding. You call it metaphor, I call it misunderstanding. It is misunderstanding rather than metaphor, because the users of it understand it as literal, not metaphor. The terms "literal" and "metaphorical" apply to the way it is interpreted. The users of set theory do not interpret the axioms as metaphorical, they interpret them as literal, therefore rather than using metaphors in their work, they simply misunderstand.

Therefore your proposed analogy is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably. My basic idea is sound, but I am making a hash of explaining it. I will take a break and have a re-think. :smile:

I get your point, and your quotes support it. But I don't see things the same way, being more skeptical, or even cynical. Metaphor is an intentional 'misuse' (if you will) of words, to produce meaning in an unconventional way. That implies a sort of limited understanding. I apprehend your examples as unintentional misuse which annihilates meaning and misleads. And this implies misunderstanding.

The Kantian system of knowledge a posteriori, is twofold: sensibility, arrangement of the given, and, cognition, the logic in the arrangement of the given. The logic of the arrangement is determined….thought….. by the tripartite coordination of understanding, judgement and reason. — Mww

I see two unexplained assertions here: that there is a 'given' and that such a 'given' can be arranged. Now, it is one thing to say that we might not be able to know (with certainty) why these two assertions are true, another to say that speculating about these things is either meaningless or whatever. Honestly, I agree with the former but not the latter.

Such is the fate of metaphysics in general: a guy adds to a theory in some way, shape or form, then accuses the original of having missed what was added. It may just as well have been the case it wasn’t missed in the former at all, so much as rejected. So the new guy merely cancels that by which the original rejection found force, and from within which resides the ground of accusation of the missing. Even without considering your particular instance of this, it is found in Arthur’s critique of Kant, and, ironically enough, Kant’s critique of Hume, a.k.a., The Reluctant Rationalist. — Mww

I can hear you here, philosophy doesn't seem to 'progress'. However, I believe that is because philosophers sought certainty with their arguments. On the other hand, I believe that we can establish that some 'metaphysical theories' are more or less reasonable than others. Feel free to disagree.

Dunno about imperfect, but even if it is, it has nothing to do with being unconscious of some operational segment of our intelligence, in which no knowledge is forthcoming in the first place. Perhaps you’ve thought a reasonable work-around, but from my armchair, I must say if you agree with the former you have lost the ground for judging the relative quality of your own knowledge. — Mww

Our knowledge is imperfect in two ways: of many things we aren't conscious of and we can't have certain knowledge beyond the phenomena. But even if one disagrees with the previous phrase, in a more limited sense, it is imperfect in the sense that we do not know everything we can know.

Contingent, without a doubt. Imperfect? Ehhhhh……isn’t whatever knowledge there is at any given time, perfectly obtained? Otherwise, by what right is it knowledge at all? If every otherwise rational human in a given time knew lightning was the product of angry gods, what argument could there possibly be, in that same time, sufficient to falsify it? Wouldn’t that knowledge, at that time, be as perfect as it could be? — Mww

There is no need to 'invoke' ancient mythology. Even in science we made 'progress'. The Newtonian understanding of gravity is different from the understanding of the same phenomenon in General Relativity. The former theory has been 'falsified'. But I do not think that we can say that Newton was simply 'ignorant' of gravity because he didn't know General Relativity. There are degrees of (the quality of) knowledge. In fact, I believe that science itself shows us that our knowledge is limited, confuesed, imperfect etc even about 'phenomena'.

The system used to amend at some successive time the knowledge of one time, is precisely the same system used to obtain both. So maybe it isn’t the relative perfection of knowledge we should consider, but the relative quality of the system by which it is obtained. — Mww

In a sense, yes, I agree. But 'perfection' of knowledge is what is sought for. Plato and Aristotle famously said that philosophy begins in 'wonder' - we seek, we feel a need to improve the quality of knowledge.

Do you see the contradiction? What would you do about it? — Mww

IMO a good starting point is to differentiate between degrees of quality of knowledge, confidence about one's beliefs and so on.

I see two unexplained assertions here: that there is a 'given' and that such a 'given' can be arranged — boundless

Yeah, I can see that. My response to the first would be there is no need to explain it, and for the second, we simply don’t know how.
————-

…..philosophy doesn't seem to 'progress'. — boundless

Agreed. While it certainly changes, it doesn’t necessarily improve.
————-

Our knowledge is imperfect in two ways:…. — boundless

If you’re treating knowledge as a general human condition, I will agree our knowledge is imperfect, a least from those two ways. The next logical move, then, might just be it doesn’t matter if the kind of knowledge we end up with is imperfect if it is the only kind there can be. We’re stuck with it, whatever kind it is.

We might even be able to reflect this back on the lack of philosophical progress, in that regardless of the changes in the description of knowledge, we still cannot prove how we know anything at all. I think it a stretch that because we con’t know a thing our knowledge is imperfect.

What would perfect knowledge look like anyway?
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There are degrees of (the quality of) knowledge. — boundless

Again, the general, or the particular? The quality of knowledge in general remains constant regardless of the quantity of particular things known about. I’m not sure knowledge of is susceptible to qualitative analysis: a thing is known or it is not, there is no excluded middle. By the same token, I’m not sure that when first we didn’t know this thing but then we do, the quality of our knowledge has any contribution to that degree of change.

Even if your idea revolves around the possibility that because our knowledge is imperfect there may be things not knowable, which is certainly true enough, it remains that there are more parsimonious, logically sufficient….simpler……explanations for why there are things not knowable.

If object A is 1.8 metre in size and object B is 1.7m in size, then there is a relation between their sizes. Does this relation exist in the mind, the world or both? — RussellA

The answer depends on what you mean by your question. Each word needs dissection.
However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. If A and B exist in the world, it is hard to see what one might mean by saying that the relation exists in the mind. But saying that it exists in the world generates that puzzle question about where it is. Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?

If there were only 2 objects in the universe there is one relation. If there were only 3 objects in the universe there are 3 relations. If there were only 4 objects in the universe there are 6 relations. IE, in the Universe, there are more relations than objects. — RussellA

Look at this carefully: -

Each of A, B, C, D can be greater or smaller or equal to the size of each other object. So each object may be equal to itself. That gives numbers different from yours - much higher. So my question is where all those relations disappeared to?

You may not be counting A=A as a relation, and I grant you that there is something odd about that. We can just skip those cases for our purposes. In addition. since "smaller than" follows logically from "larger than", you may be treating them as the same.

(A,B) & (A,C) & (A,D)
(B,A) & (B,C) & (B,D)
(C,A) & (CB) & (C,D)
(DA) & (D,B) & (D,C)

Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks.

If relations do exist in an ontological sense in the world, then there are more relations than actual objects. Where did these extra relations come from? — RussellA

What were you expecting? That there would be fewer, as there are in the case of 2 objects? That there would be just as many relations as objects, as in the case of 3 objects? Your surprise is just the result of not thinking through the situation in detail.
Counting relations is much trickier than you might think. Counting objects is even trickier. Count the number of bricks in a house. Count the number of walls in that house. Add the house itself. I would say that's double counting, wouldn't you?
I doubt it is even possible to count the number of sub-atomic particles in anything - mainly because they aren't particles in the usual sense.
Is a rainbow an object separate from the rain-drops that generate it? What about shadows?
I don't think the project is sufficiently defined to be capable of being implemented - even in a thought-experiment.

Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world? Those lines are like boundaries, whether between nations or neighbours. Boundaries certainly have a location in the world - what is the point of them if they don't. But they are, let us say, one-dimensional - they have length, but not width or depth, unlike boundary markers, which have both. These objects are not objects like tables and chairs, which are three-dimensional (four, if you like), but what of that?
I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them.

We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if there is not a way that things are, independent of what we believe? — Banno

The wording here seems susceptible to equivocation.

Consider this argument:

P1. Only John's mind exists
P2. John believes that something other than his mind exists
C1. Therefore, idealism is true and John has a false belief

So that there is a "way things are, independent of belief" isn't necessarily that mind-independent objects exist.

You and I agree as to what is the case. How is that possible unless there is something external to us both on which to agree? — Banno

John and Jane both agree that God exists. It doesn't then follow that this agreement is made possible by the existence of some third thing, i.e. God. God might not exist.

Yeah, I can see that. My response to the first would be there is no need to explain it, and for the second, we simply don’t know how. — Mww

Ok, but for me unless it is 'proven' that we can't know, we should seek. YMMV

Agreed. While it certainly changes, it doesn’t necessarily improve. — Mww

Right! However, to philosophy's credit, in a sense, it is less easy to know if there is progress or not, given the nature of inquiry.

We might even be able to reflect this back on the lack of philosophical progress, in that regardless of the changes in the description of knowledge, we still cannot prove how we know anything at all. I think it a stretch that because we con’t know a thing our knowledge is imperfect. — Mww

In a sense, yeah. I believe that this in fact an aporia in philosophy, in general. We are not completely ignorant and unaware. We have some degree of knowledge and awareness but we also know that they need to be improved. So, how can we trust to improve our knowledge if our faculties are limited, not completely reliable and so on?

What would perfect knowledge look like anyway? — Mww

I don't know. But I do know thay my knowledge is imperfect.

Again, the general, or the particular? The quality of knowledge in general remains constant regardless of the quantity of particular things known about. I’m not sure knowledge of is susceptible to qualitative analysis: a thing is known or it is not, there is no excluded middle. By the same token, I’m not sure that when first we didn’t know this thing but then we do, the quality of our knowledge has any contribution to that degree of change. — Mww

Well, to make an example of a natural phenomena... consider, say, a plant. If we know that the plant is born from a seed and that it reproduces we know little of the plant. In fact, even if one studies all the biological knowledge we have about that plant, something is still missing. For instance, we do not know every single cause that brought ultimately to the existence of that particular plant. In a sense, all phenomena are mysterious for us. And yet, we do have some knowledge and our knowledge today of, say, biology is better than it was 3000 years ago.

Even if your idea revolves around the possibility that because our knowledge is imperfect there may be things not knowable, which is certainly true enough, it remains that there are more parsimonious, logically sufficient….simpler……explanations for why there are things not knowable. — Mww

My point is more like the above.

To make another example. Consider a table. Even if we knew its composition at its atomic level and how the 'table' emerges from that composition and the interaction between its atoms, it would still be the case that we do not 'fully' know the table in a sense.

Note that this is true even if you have a 'direct realist' view... of course, when one takes into consideration that there is also the interpretative and regulating role of the mind (with the term 'mind' here I include all our faculties: sensitive, intellectual etc), everything is in a sense even more 'deeper' and mysterious. But neglecting the presence of this mystery is actually knowing less well things.

The answer depends on what you mean by your question......................................However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. — Ludwig V

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Are the relations we perceive perceived only in the mind or perceived of the world through the senses?

Do relations exist in the mind, the world or both?

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world.

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up.

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs.

The Direct Realist needs the ontological existence of relations in the world, whereas the Indirect Realist doesn't.

If it can be shown that ontological relations don't exist in the world, then Direct Realism is no longer a valid belief.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations.

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind.

You ask "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?" The colour red exists as a subjective experience in the mind but not the world. Scientists point out that when someone says they see the colour red, in the world can be a wavelength of 700nm, and in a wavelength of 700nm no colour red can be found. A driver sees a red traffic light and stops. Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights.

You say "I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them." This raises one problem. How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces.

You are setting quite an agenda here.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it. — RussellA

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs. — RussellA

The concept of a table is not a table. Having a concept of a table does not mean that tables exist in your mind. Appropriate relations between the legs and top of a table are critical to its functioning.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world. — RussellA

I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. But I do think that thinking of our senses as if they were a biological kind of telescope or microscope or microphone is very misleading - and I think that's one mistake that being made here. I suspect that the model of direct experience is introspection and it is a truism to say that we do not experience the world by introspection. I don't see how it helps. (There is the further point that it turns out that we only "introspect" because we are physiologically equipped to do so and introspection is no more reliable that perception. )

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world. — RussellA

I can buy this, I think. But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist, because I have no idea what "direct" means here.

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them. — RussellA

I'm not sure about that. That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. An analogy. A machine can recognize a face from an image, or from the face itself. It does not need to form an image of the face in order to recognize it. The machine relates the face (or the image of it, as appropriate) to what needs to be done. An image in the machine would just get in the way. Why do you suppose that we need an image in our mind (apart from memory)?

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up. — RussellA

That's a bit convoluted. A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. In our minds, the organization is called a Gestalt.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations. — RussellA

Not all relations are the same. There are transitive and intransitive relations. But I won't pick at the bulk of this. What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? The "overpopulation" is, so to say, mathematical, not a feature that can be dispensed with. Are you thinking of relations as objects alongside all the physical constituents of the table? That's a mistake. Relations do not occupy space, any more than boundaries do. Why are you not concerned about the overpopulation of points in space and time, since there are an infinite n umber of them?

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind. — RussellA

If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. The mind is not a space - except metaphorically.

Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights. — RussellA

You are taking the description of the world in physics as "how the world really is". Can you justify that? I don't think that the description of the world as physics has chosen to see it is in any significant way different from out everyday description of the world. One could even argue that it is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc.

How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all. — RussellA

This is a category mistake. Where is the design of the table or chair? Where is the organization of our bodies? Where is a rainbow? Where is the age of our planet? You are trying to impose the framework of physical objects on something that isn't that kind of object.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces. — RussellA

I don't think your theory of perception is valid. I don't see why "overpopulation" is a problem. You can say that some of our differentiations in the world are arbitrary, like boundaries between nations or real estates, but it doesn't follow that all are. The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary. A relationshipt cannot exist independently of its relata. The fundamental particles are not particles in the same sense as molecules and atoms are. They are probability fields or something like that. Not objects of the same kind as tables and chairs.

What would perfect knowledge look like anyway?
— Mww

I don't know. But I do know thay my knowledge is imperfect. — boundless

Yikes!!! You done got yo’self in a whole heapa logical doo-doo. What are you judging the imperfect by, if you don’t know that by which imperfect can be measured?

I bet you’re familiar with complementary pairs: up/down, right/left, right/wrong, and so on. Which reduces to….for any conceivable thought the negation of it is given immediately. In simplest terms here, imperfect’s pair is perfect. You’d be correct in not knowing how perfect knowledge manifests in your consciousness, but you must know what the criteria for perfect knowledge is, in order to know yours isn’t that.

The only way out I can see, is to agree our knowledge isn’t perfect because it is true we do not know everything there is to know. But I’d argue that merely because we don’t know everything is not in itself sufficient reason for calling out the knowledge we do have, as imperfect. You know…..sorta like, just because water’s falling from the sky doesn’t mean it’s raining.
—————-

In a sense, all phenomena are mysterious for us. — boundless

Be that as it may, and I agree in principle, how do we get to imperfect knowledge from mysterious phenomena?

Now, I agree that the means by which humans acquire knowledge of things external to us, cannot be taken as proof those things could not possibly be otherwise. I won’t stand in your way if you wish to claim imperfect knowledge given that condition, but I’ll stick with maintaining it really is a moot point.
————-

Consider a table. Even if we knew its composition at its atomic level — boundless

Another logical mish-mash for ya: take that famous paradox, wherein if you cover half the distance to a wall at a time, you never get there. Using your atomic structure scenario, if you take enough half-distance steps, sooner or later you’re going to get into the atomic level of physical things, where the atoms of your foot get close to the atoms of the wall. Except, at that level there is no foot and there isn’t any wall. And as a matter of fact, there wouldn’t be any you taking steps, insofar as “you” have to be present in order for any half-step to be taken. So it is that talking about a table at the atomic level, isn’t talking about tables.

Incidentally, Kant calls this line of reasoning “…a lame appeal to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition of the existence of the conception**, but is far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility…”
(**herein, existence of the conception is existence of the paradox)

NOW we’re having fun. I don’t care who y’are, that right thar’s fun, as my ol’ buddy Larry the Cable Guy always says.

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Are the relations we perceive perceived only in the mind or perceived of the world through the senses?

Do relations exist in the mind, the world or both? — RussellA

There are some good instincts in what you’ve written, but I think a few key distinctions are blurred.

First, the direct vs. indirect realism debate is more nuanced than the picture you’ve set out. Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. Contemporary debates are about representationalism, disjunctivism, and enactivism, which all handle the mind–world relation in subtler ways.

Second, the issue of relations is an old and thorny one (it goes back to Plato). But to ask “where are relations located?” may itself be a category mistake. Spatial relations, for instance, are not “in” object A, or “in” object B, or floating in a third place in between. They are structural features of how we understand and measure A and B. So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether.

Third, your latitude/longitude and red examples are on the right track, but I think they show how conceptual frameworks structure our understanding of the world, not that relations exist “only in the mind.” Latitude and longitude are conventions, but they reliably map onto real features of the Earth. Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. This is where Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism is useful: empirically, we can say “the world is real,” but transcendentally, its knowability always presupposes the forms of our sensibility and understanding.

So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet.

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic

So I cannot depend on my understanding to know the true state of being in the world.

Therefore, "perceive" in "to be is to be perceived" cannot refer to the understanding but only to the sensibilities. — RussellA

I should say that this is not a good understanding of perception. Also, your conclusion doesn't follow.
Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. This moment, you thought she was bored, and it turned out she was not. But there are other things you perceived of Mary that you could be right.

Here you are assuming that space is mind-independent. There is no need to do that for a 'realist' IMO. — boundless

No that assumption is not necessarily entailed by what I said. I said the thing that calls for explanation is the undeniable fact that we see the same things in the same places and times, even down to the smallest details. The question is as to what is the most plausible explanation for that fact.

To make a crude analogy... think about the Matrix. Alice and Bob visit a city in the virtual reality of the Matrix. The buildings are not really there. — boundless

The you come up with―a fictional scenario, which it would not be implausible to think could not actually exist.

Ok. What are these laws and regularities in physical terms? — boundless

They consist in the patterns and behavior manifested in the things. What's the problem?

Not only that, however. When I, for instance, make a calculation I am not aware of any bodily processes. I am aware of a relation between concepts. — boundless

What, you are not writing down your calculation or being aware of thoughts within your body, manifesting as sentences or images?

Let's take again the Matrix example — boundless

Let's not―the Matrix is not a feasible scenario, and hence cannot serve as a relevant examples in my view. You would need to convince me that it warrants being taken seriously in order to interest me in it.

So, is the 'mind-independent reality' more or less the same to the 'phenomenal world'? We do not a way of know. And we can't neglect the fact that our mind has an active role in shaping the 'phenomenal world'. — boundless

Sure we and the other animals have somewhat different ways of perceiving the phenomenal world in accordance with the different structures of our sensory organs and bodies. But I think it most plausible to think it is one phenomenal world for all, even given different ways of perceiving due also to size differences, and animals' attention being directed at different things according to their needs.

Observing animal behavior shows us that they see the same thing in the environment, and any differences in ways of perceiving across the range of animals can be studied by science to gain a coherent and consistent understanding of those differences. We see dogs chasing balls, cats eating out of their bowls and climbing tress. We don't see animals or people trying to walk through walls.

I almost agree with this. But I am open to the possibility of things like 'revelations', 'insights via meditative experiences' and so on that can allow us, in principle, to get a 'higher knowledge'. I do recognize that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these things, however. — boundless

I see no problem in believing in such things, but they cannot serve as a foundation for clear and consistent rational discourse, since they are by general acknowledgement ineffable, and what people say about them is always interpretive, and generally interpreted in consonance within the cultural context in which people have been inducted into religious or spiritual ideas.

Whereas, if one assumes that some kind of 'fundamental mental aspect' or 'Divine Mind' etc is fundamental, it's easier to understand why these properties are present even in matter. — boundless

Okay, fair enough, but for me it is far more difficult to understand what a "fundamental mental aspect" or "divine mind" could be

Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

Presumably, "to be" is referring to the world

But there are two main meanings of "perceive". Something in the mind "I perceive that Mary is bored" and something through the senses "I perceive a loud noise". From Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" may mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of ii) to become aware of through the senses

Is "is to be perceived" referring to something in the mind or something through the senses?

Problems arise if "is to be perceived" is referring to something in the mind rather than through the senses.

Just because I perceive something in my mind doesn't mean that it is a fact in the world. I perceive that Mary is bored and I may be right or I may be wrong. There is no logical reason to believe that just because I perceive something in my mind then it must be a fact in the world .

It seems more likely that "is to be perceived" is referring to something through the senses.

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion. — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I would say that tables and chairs only exist as concepts in my mind. They are representations of something in the world, as the word "house" functions as a representation.

I agree that as we cannot compare a representation in our mind with the original in the world. There is no way of knowing whether tables and chairs do actually exist in the world.

You say "But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist"

If we don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them, how do we experience them?

Do you think that tables and chairs exist in a mind-independent world?
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The concept of a table is not a table. — Ludwig V

I agree.
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I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. — Ludwig V

But you said that "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?"

Doesn't that mean that navigators have "direct experience" of the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world?

How can the navigators know about the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world if they don't have "direct experience" of them?
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That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. — Ludwig V

Perceive can mean i) perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive Mary is bored" ii) perceive through the senses, as in "I perceive a loud noise".

I agree. For the Indirect Realist, that we can perceive through the senses appearances of things-in-the-world does not mean that these things-in-the-world exist in the world. For the Indirect Realist, the concept of tables exists in the mind even if tables don't exist in the world.

However, in order to perceive the appearances of things-in-the-world, something must exist in the mind.

This relates to the homunculus problem. A machine making an image of an image would lead into infinite regress. I agree that the machine does not need to form an image of an image in order to recognise it. Similarly with humans, in that I don't need to form a representation of a representation in order to perceive it.

Are you saying that can we perceive things-in-the-world without something needing to exist in the mind?
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To be continued:

A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. — Ludwig V

Does this not mean you can be thought of as a Direct Realist, in that objects such as tables exist in the real world.
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What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? — Ludwig V

If relations ontologically exist in the world, then between every single elementary particle and force in the Universe there is a metaphysical relation.

As four things give rise to six relations, there are more relations than there are things.

This means there is a vast number of metaphysical relations in the Universe. A significant over-population of metaphysical relations in the Universe.

I agree that over-population in itself is not problematic.

But what exactly are these metaphysical relations doing? What purpose do they serve? Are they needed? Wouldn't the Universe carry on equally as well if there were no metaphysical relations? By Occam's razor, let's get rid of the ontological existence of relations in the world.
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If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. — Ludwig V

As with Kant's things-in-themselves, if relations existed in the world but not the mind, how could we know about them?
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One could even argue that it (physics) is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc. — Ludwig V

Does the colour red exist in a mind-independent world?

How can the mind ever know what exists in a mind-independent world?

Physics is only a tool of the human mind. If the human mind cannot logically know what exists in a mind -independent world, then neither can physics.

It is not the case that physics is impoverished, but rather the fact that the mind cannot logically know what exists outside itself.
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Where is the design of the table or chair? — Ludwig V

In the human mind.

Are you saying that tables and chairs exist independently of the human mind?

Even if tables and chairs existed independently of the human mind, their design would still exist in the human mind that created them.
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The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary — Ludwig V

I agree. They have different functions.

But these functions are human functions,

Suppose a table and chair existed next to each other in a mind-independent world. Assume that they are made up of atoms (in the old sense of fundamental parts).

What in a mind-independent world would "determine" whether a particular atom belonged to the chair or the table?

Suppose an alien visited from Alpha-Centauri, how would they know that one set of atoms should be related together in what we call a table?

Suppose the table lost one atom, would it still be a table? Who would make the judgement in the absence of the human mind?

Yikes!!! You done got yo’self in a whole heapa logical doo-doo. What are you judging the imperfect by, if you don’t know that by which imperfect can be measured? — Mww

To make an analogy in physics. No measurement device is 'perfect' but we know that all of them are imperfect and we also know that some are more or less imperfect than others.
I also know that I have doubts, I vacillate and so on.

You’d be correct in not knowing how perfect knowledge manifests in your consciousness, but you must know what the criteria for perfect knowledge is, in order to know yours isn’t that. — Mww

I disagree. As I said, once you accept that knowledge can be of better or lesser quality, it's easier to accept that our knowledge can be imperfect, despite not knowing what 'perfect knowledge' would be.

(Until recently, I actually tended to deny we have 'knowledge' at all, precisely because I assumed that 'knowledge' must mean certain, inerrant etc knowledge).

Be that as it may, and I agree in principle, how do we get to imperfect knowledge from mysterious phenomena? — Mww

I would say that you should consider my example again. We now know a lot more about, say, an oak tree than 3000 years ago. Still, neither they were completely ignorant of it nor today we have complete knowledge of it.

Another logical mish-mash for ya: take that famous paradox, wherein if you cover half the distance to a wall at a time, you never get there. Using your atomic structure scenario, if you take enough half-distance steps, sooner or later you’re going to get into the atomic level of physical things, where the atoms of your foot get close to the atoms of the wall. Except, at that level there is no foot and there isn’t any wall. And as a matter of fact, there wouldn’t be any you taking steps, insofar as “you” have to be present in order for any half-step to be taken. So it is that talking about a table at the atomic level, isn’t talking about tables. — Mww

In a sense, yeah, there is no 'foot', no 'table' and so on at the atomic level. In fact, the very fact that we perceive a 'table' is a perfect example of the regulative activity of our mind. We pre-reflectively individuate the table as a distinct, substantial object. I believe that even scientific evidence suggests that table are mere appearances. There is this marvellous 5 minutes video where David Bohm quite brillantly says more or less the same thing.

However, I do not think that the same kind of reasoning holds for living beings. Living beings are IMO distinct and substantial entities. Yet, also in their case, like the oak tree above, they are also both 'knowalbe' and 'mysterious' for us.

No that assumption is not necessarily entailed by what I said. I said the thing that calls for explanation is the undeniable fact that we see the same things in the same places and times, even down to the smallest details. The question is as to what is the most plausible explanation for that fact. — Janus

Ok, thanks for the clarification! I agree that all evidence point to the fact that there is some kind of 'external reality'. Perhaps a veiled reality, as physicist Bernard d'Espagnat would put it.

The you come up with―a fictional scenario, which it would not be implausible to think could not actually exist. — Janus

Ok but IMO it isn't even impossible in the far future.
Let's then use the example of a dream. If you bump into a wall during a dream, the wall can cause you pain and so on. Yet there is no 'wall' and even pain in a sense it is illuosory. And yet it appears to be 'real'. In a sense, appearances in a dream do have a 'degree' of reality.

Now, of course dreams aren't shared. But they show clearly that the 'way things appear to us' do not necessarily correlate to 'what is truly happening'.

What, you are not writing down your calculation or being aware of thoughts within your body, manifesting as sentences or images? — Janus

Here you are suggesting that thoughts are bodily phenomena. But our phenomenological experience doesn't suggest that. I can distinguish an internal physical stimulus and an awareness to a concept.

Let's not―the Matrix is not a feasible scenario, and hence cannot serve as a relevant examples in my view. You would need to convince me that it warrants being taken seriously in order to interest me in it. — Janus

While I agree that the 'Matrix' literally isn't feasible, I do believe that, perhaps, in the future, we might be able to produce some virtual reality environment that 'looks like it is real'.
Anyway, think about dreams...

Observing animal behavior shows us that they see the same thing in the environment, and any differences in ways of perceiving across the range of animals can be studied by science to gain a coherent and consistent understanding of those differences. We see dogs chasing balls, cats eating out of their bowls and climbing tress. We don't see animals or people trying to walk through walls. — Janus

I see your point, but IMO this doesn't show that the 'reality beyond phenomena' is more or less equivalent to 'phenomenal reality'. It is possible, however, that both we humans beings and dogs 'represent' the phenomenal world in a similar way.

I see no problem in believing in such things, but they cannot serve as a foundation for clear and consistent rational discourse, since they are by general acknowledgement ineffable, and what people say about them is always interpretive, and generally interpreted in consonance within the cultural context in which people have been inducted into religious or spiritual ideas. — Janus

I believe things are even more complex than this. Let's say, for the sake of the argument, that Advaita Vedanta has the 'right' metaphysical view. But we can't IMO arrive at that conclusion by simply making philosophical arguments or by studying the empirical reality.
At the same time, if Advaita Vedanta is 'right', then, say, Buddhism and Christianity are wrong in their metaphysical systems at least. But, again, it is not something we can be certain of solely based on philosophical reasoning.

Then, of course, there is the problem of interpretation of certain 'transcendent'/'revalatory' etc 'experiences'. We do not live in a vaccum and our judgments are also mediated by the culture we are into. This certainly adds more complexity. But IMO we can't deny the possible cognitive validity of 'experiences' of this kind only because the experiencer is influenced by his or her culture. In fact, historically, these kinds of 'experiences' caused radical cultural changes.

It is certainly an extemely fascinating and complex topic.

Okay, fair enough, but for me it is far more difficult to understand what a "fundamental mental aspect" or "divine mind" could be — Janus

Ok. So do I. But, as I said, it seems to me the best class of metaphysical models.

Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. — Wayfarer

However, I do think that there is a distinct division between some people who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs do exist in the world, and who may be called Direct Realists, and some who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts, and who may be called Indirect Realists.

As an Indirect Realist I also fully support Enactivism, in that the human mind has evolved in synergy with the world. The human mind is not separate to the world, but is a part of the world. But even so, my Enactivism does not change my belief that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts.
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So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether. — Wayfarer

Even if we stop treating relations as if they were objects, how should we treat them?

Relations may be on a different plane, but where exactly is this plane?

Has anyone ever seen a relation existing independently of the human mind?

What do relations in a mind-independent world actually do? What purpose do they serve?
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Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. — Wayfarer

I agree with Kant's concepts of Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

We may have the subjective experience of seeing the colour red. The scientist may point out that when someone says that they see the colour red, they may be looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The situation is, as you say, a mind-world hybrid. If there was no wavelength of 700nm we would not see the colour red, and we would not see the colour red if there was no wavelength of 700nm.

But a hybrid mind-world does not mean that the colour red, as we subjectively experience it, exists in the world in any way.

We could define a wavelength of 700nm as being the colour red, but this does not mean that a wavelength of 700nm "is" the colour red, where "is" is that of identity.

What we know as the subjective experience of the colour red may exist in the world, but if it does exist in the world, it must exist as a thing-in-itself, and therefore in Kant's terms, unknowable to us.
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So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet. — Wayfarer

I agree that there is an interface where mind and world meet, but there are two different directions, from the world to mind and from the mind to world.

From the world to mind, I cannot know what is in your mind. I cannot know whether your subjective experience of the colour of a red postbox is the same as mine.

From the mind to world, I only know phenomenological appearances. I cannot know what caused those appearances.

There is an interface between mind and world, but it is an interface that blocks the passage of knowledge across it.

You may say, for example, that we have the knowledge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but this knowledge still exists in the mind, not in a mind-independent world.

As I said, once you accept that knowledge can be of better or lesser quality, it's easier to accept that our knowledge can be imperfect, despite not knowing what 'perfect knowledge' would be. — boundless

As I said, I won’t stand in your way of using perfection as a relative measure of knowledge quality. I’m satisfied with the amount we know about a thing in juxtaposition to the quality of our ways of finding out more about those things. From there, the jump to imperfect, from our knowledge being contingent on the one hand and incomplete on the other, is superfluous, insofar as calling it that doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t already know.

But that’s just me.

As I said, I won’t stand in your way of using perfection as a relative measure of knowledge quality. I’m satisfied with the amount we know about a thing in juxtaposition to the quality of our ways of finding out more about those things. From there, the jump to imperfect, from our knowledge being contingent on the one hand and incomplete on the other, is superfluous, insofar as calling it that doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t already know. — Mww

Fair enough. But I believe that, perhaps, the fact that our knowledge is 'contingent', as you say, means it is incomplete.
In a sense, we know nothing, because we do not have a complete knowledge of anything. But of course, this doesn't mean that we are completely ignorant.

There's an awful lot going on here. I have to be selective. I don't think swopping assertions about tables and chairs, or relations is going to help much. I think of this debate as not about some fact of the matter, but an interpretation, a way of understanding some things about how we relate to the world, how we fit in to it.

I'm further confused by the presence of concepts, experiences, appearances all playing a similar role - that of getting between us and reality and preventing us from grasping it. In my book, those are the ways in which we grasp reality and distinguish what's real from what is not.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. In other words, I can have no idea of these things without the idea of whatever the object is of the concept, experience or appearance they are linked to. Even the idea of perceptions as representations sends the same message.

Yes, of course we know that our senses are limited and appearances can be misleading. But we gain that knowledge from our senses and experiences. More important, when things have gone wrong, it is our senses and experiences that enable us to "see through" the misleadings and misdirections to what is actually real.

Let's think about representations.
If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. That applies to a physical map, and, presumably, to a mental map.
But I don't have to use a map. I can follow a set of directions, such as the directions that a route-finder app will give you. Again, those directions are no use to me unless I can understand them and apply them in the actual world.
But I can actually find my way without either a map or directions. I can follow the sign-posts, for example. But again, I have to be able to interpret them and apply them.
Or, I may memorize a set of cues - turn left by the church, then right by the lake, and so forth. Again, implementing the cues is essential.

What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything.

I think also that we are talking past each other most of the time. Perhaps the most radical example is that every time I read that the mind does this and that, what I hear is that people do this and that. We couldn't even have this debate if the question was whether people create the world or whether the world could exist without people in it.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. — Ludwig V

Where is this reality?

There are appearances in our five senses, such as seeing a circular shape. We have experiences through these five senses, such as seeing the colour yellow and feeling hotness.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side.

We can interpret these appearances and experiences and derive the concept of a sun.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun?

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference.

But you seem to be saying that we don't just infer but know for a fact that there is a sun in reality when you say "So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality."

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses?

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun".

As an Indirect Realist, I believe there is an unknown fact in reality that has caused these appearances and experiences in my senses, and this unknown fact in reality I simply name "sun". But this "sun" is no more than the name of the set of appearances and experiences in my senses.

But if you are saying that the sun is a fact of reality, how do you know?

The flow of information in a causal chain is directional. Forwards in time, a single cause determines a single effect. Backwards in time, a single effect may have multiple cases. Forwards in time, a stone breaks a window. Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke?

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent?

If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V

This is from the viewpoint of a Direct Realist, who looks at both the map and directly at the actual world and compares the two.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map.