I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave
I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave
I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property.
What exactly do you mean by "identify" here? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. This set would be the property, and the elements of this set would be the instances of the property. For example, the property of redness would be identified with the set of all red things, or the property of being a car would be identified with the set of all cars. — litewave
There are properties that exist that are not of a referent, like the property of being the King of France attaches to no object, yet being the King of France is a property nontheless. — Hanover
There are also no essences of objects that would dictate which set all examples belong, like whether a particular car belongs in the set of cars is contextually dependent. — Hanover
Is it possible (logically consistent) for the property of being the king of France to be instantiated? If yes, then it is instantiated in some possible world. If not, then it would be self-contradictory. — litewave
It depends on how "car" is specified. Usually it is specified as "self-propelled vehicle on four wheels". In that case, the property of being a car is the set of all self-propelled vehicles on four wheels. — litewave
So when you say everything must have a referent, you're speaking modally, meaning it has a hypothetical referent in a possible world? I didn't get that from your OP. — Hanover
Why can't a car have 3 wheels and why wouldn't a broken car still be a car? — Hanover
Identity can be defined extensionally using substitution, and without circularity. That's how it is done in modern logic.What exactly do you mean by "identify" here? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Identity can be defined extensionally using substitution, and without circularity. That's how it is done in modern logic. — Banno
A fine piece of work. Nice anticipation of objections, especially the modal objection. Are you studying logic? — Banno
Here's perhaps the classic reply. Having a kidney is not the very same as having a heart, and yet all animals with kidney also have hearts. We can say that the extension of "Having kidneys" and the extension of "Having a heart" are the very same. — Banno
I've expressed it as "a set is a collection of objects -- where objects are logical objects (any name whatsoever) -- that need not share anything in common other than being in that collection of objects" — Moliere
As long as it is possible (logically consistent) for an organism to have a heart without a kidney, or vice versa, then the set of all possible instances of having a heart is different than the set of all possible instances of having a kidney, and thus these two properties are differentiated. — litewave
Yes, you are basically correct.As long as it is possible (logically consistent) for an organism to have a heart without a kidney, or vice versa, then the set of all possible instances of having a heart is different than the set of all possible instances of having a kidney, and thus these two properties are differentiated. — litewave
Russel's "box" metaphor doesn't work becasue a set just is it's elements. — Banno
A set is a single object. — litewave
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