So is it the case that whenever this perspective is proposed, it invariably originated from a study of Eastern religious ideas? — Punshhh

No, I’m not suggesting that. The commonalities between German idealism and Eastern philosophy were a matter of convergent development. Schopenhuaer always insisted that he developed his main ideas and published the first edition of WWI before encountering the Upaniṣad, but he did say that he felt the common ground he found with them was due to a universal wisdom. That’s an idea I’m not averse to. (See Schopenhauer and Buddhism, Peter Abelson.) Kant never mentioned Eastern religions at all so far as I know, but there have been extensive comparisons of the Critique of Pure Reason and Buddhist Madhyamaka (‘Middle Way’) philosophy.

it seems we could never be certain about the ultimate or most basic constitution of physical things. — Janus

Right! Kant’s philosophy despite its enormous complexity and prolixity is really an acknowledgement of our limitations. He does manage to retain that Socratic sense of ‘knowing nothing’. Having that sense of not having it all worked out is a virtue. Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t.

You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different. — Punshhh

I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.

The noumena aren't necessarily esoteric, just as if they are in a room we can't access, so its not as 'mysterious' as one might think. But we can at least securely infer that they are there, or we'd not perceive anything. — AmadeusD

Yes, that's why I referred earlier to "bifurcation". If the things that appear have their own existence in some way (whether actual physical existents or ideas in a universal mind) they are nonetheless what lies behind our experience of phenomena. And about their nature as unperceived things we can only infer, which means that that nature is, in Kantian terms, ideal or noumenal for us.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling.

The idea of an "ultimate nature" seems to have troubled humanity from ancient times, and not only in the West.

Better to know we don’t know, than to think we know something we don’t. — Wayfarer

I can't argue with that, although in practice I think we generally all do cleave to one preferred hypothesis or another. That said I've always been attracted to the kind of suspension of judgement of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics― ataraxia has its definite attractions.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling. — Janus

By "actual" do you merely mean they as a matter of fact exist?

I meant as opposed to ideal. That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. Symbolic language seems to be inherently dualistic in orientation. It doesn't seem plausible that nature or reality itself could be anything but non-dual, so when we try to understand it in dualistic terms, we are always already "up against it".

The fact of the dualism of thought and language aside, if I think of phenomena as being the very same things as noumena, just thought about in different ways according to a natural distinction that arises in a dualistically oriented mind, then I am undercutting any substantive "bifurcation".

If I propose that the things are ideas, then I must imagine an unseen, unknowable entity―a "mind at large" to quote Kastrup, and that seems to bring in the inevitable ontological dualism involved in thinking there is a transcendent realm or reality over and above the one we know.

And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents — Janus

In good company - I agree, tentatively.

That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. — Janus

Very much agree with the material/ideal distinction, I would even go so far as to say that the issue is merely terminological, not substantive, unless it is reframed.

Sure, ideas vs what these ideas are about (objects) is a problem.

And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums. — Janus

The topic of things-in-themselves is just brutal. When I go down the rabbit hole, it's just total blindness.

But I think we can simplify a little, either things exist independently of us (in a manner we cannot at all conceive) or they can't.

If they cannot exist independently of us, then I can't make sense of reality. Granted both ideas are problematic, just that one is more coherent than the other to me.

:up: :up:

I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, — Janus

Might I suggest that this is another consequence of the Cartesian divide between mind and body?

Again, the definition of phenomena - the definition, not my idea of what it means - is 'what appears'. Nowadays there is a lazy tendency to describe everything and anything in terms of 'phenomena' but it's a misuse of the term. The 'phenomenal domain' is what appears to us through the senses and instruments. Mathematical theorems, however, are not phenomenal.

If I propose that the things are ideas, then I must imagine an unseen, unknowable entity―a "mind at large" to quote Kastrup, and that seems to bring in the inevitable ontological dualism involved in thinking there is a transcendent realm or reality over and above the one we know. — Janus

I address this in another Medium essay, Is there Mind at Large? This essay interogates Kastrup's expression and compares it with Berkeleyian idealism. But then it draws on Yogācāra Buddhism, the school colloquially known as 'mind-only', to argue that it is not necessary to posit any kind of super-mind or cosmic mind.

Although I also concede that if Kastrup simply means 'some mind' or 'mind in general', then I am in complete agreement with him. Why? I think the reification trap is associated with the tendency towards objectification, to try and consider anything real in terms of it being an object or an other. This is where Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology rings true.

The topic of things-in-themselves is just brutal. When I go down the rabbit hole, it's just total blindness. — Manuel

There's a lot of confusion caused by the question 'what is the "in itself"' - as if it is a mysterious thing, or a mysterious realm. Then the natural tendency is to try and work out what it is. As I've quoted a number of times already, "a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble."

Although I have also learned that Hegel replaced ding an sich with simply 'ansich' - the in itself. I am not the least perturbed by that idea, it is simply 'the world' (or object) as it is in itself. But to even designate it 'thing' is already to sow the seed of contradiction.

As I've quoted a number of times already, "a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble." — Wayfarer

Yes, that's one interpretation of it, called the "deflationary" one by Allais. And sure, that could well be what Kant meant. That's not how I read it, but that's marginal.

The point is not Kant - it was formulated before him. More richly, in my opinion, by Plotinus, as "the One". And also, Neo-Platonists (Cudworth, More, Burthogge, etc.)

The question is if things - objects - have a nature independent of our (a way of being or existence). I think they do, but if they do, the way they exist must be completely incomprehensible to us.

I understand some will think this even if true is pointless, but it obsesses me.

The question is if things - objects - have a nature independent of our (a way of being or existence). I think they do, but if they do, the way they exist must be completely incomprehensible to us. — Manuel

I think that by asking about "things", "objects", you've already assumed more than what is granted by the premise of "the in itself", or "the One". You've already assumed a multitude of distinct things. In effect, you've succumbed to the influence of sensation.

They're different formulations of the same issue. The way objects are (in themselves), absent the way they affect our sensation and intellectual capacities goes way beyond sensation, necessarily.

Now, you may think the premise does not follow the conclusion, but I don't see how I'm succumbing to the influence of sensation if things-in-themselves are intellectual posits.

The question is, why do you assume that absent the effects of sensation, there are "objects", plural. Division into distinct objects is a part of sense perception.

This is flat out wrong.

You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different.
— Punshhh

I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.

It was a joke, about people looking at the same thing from different perspectives.

:up:

Well I’ve had a look at what the Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy has to say about it;

From point 6.1;

If by a noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of then this is a noumenon in the negative sense. But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)

Noumena in a positive sense are simply noumena as Kant originally defined that notion in the A edition: objects of an intellectual (non-sensible) intuition. The negative concept of noumena, however, is simply the concept of objects that are not spatiotemporal (not objects of our sensible intuition, namely space and time). But then it follows that things in themselves are noumena in the negative sense, retrospectively clarifying the passage from the A edition quoted immediately above, where Kant seems to draw from the “Transcendental Aesthetic” the conclusion that there are noumena: the concept of appearance requires that something appears, and this must be a negative noumena.

From point 6.2;

Another way to appreciate this distinction is to consider the difference in why these notions of object (noumena, transcendental object) are unknowable by us. We cannot cognize things in themselves because cognition requires intuition, and our intuition only ever presents appearances, not things in themselves. We cannot cognize the transcendental object because the transcendental object is a purely schematic, general idea of empirical objectivity. Whenever we cognize a determinate empirical object we are cognitively deploying the transcendental concept of an object in general, but we are not coming to know anything about the object of that concept as such.

This is Kant’s point in “phenomena and noumena” when he writes:

This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible data, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought. It is therefore no object of cognition in itself, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general, which is determinable through the manifold of those appearances. (A250–1)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/

From this it looks like Kant saw noumena as intellectual concepts, referring to something entirely inaccessible to us, which is inferred. Being intellectual they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind. So we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t. But they are inferred because if we experience appearances, then they must be appearances of something. Something which is inaccessible to us, because if they were accessible to us, they would be appearances.

He is also saying that transcendental objects, our conception of appearances, cannot be separated from the appearances. So in a sense we are tied to the acceptance of appearances during the experiencing of them.

A double whammy, not only can’t we say anything about noumena, but we are confined within a world of appearances, so can’t say anything about anything else (apart from appearances), either.

I’ll try to find some time to study this the next few days.

Being intellectual they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind. So we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t. But they are inferred because if we experience appearances, then they must be appearances of something. Something which is inaccessible to us, because if they were accessible to us, they would be appearances. — Punshhh

I don't think the conclusions you make here are logical. First, if "they are entirely abstract and an invention of the human thinking mind", then we cannot conclude that "we cannot say anything about what they are, or aren’t". The proper conclusion is that we can say whatever we want about what they are or aren't. Next, we cannot initially make any conclusions about how they are related to our experience of appearances.

We might consider that our construction of mathematic concepts is an attempt by us to represent noumena as intellectual concepts (traditionally understood as independent Forms). Notice that the pure mathematician is free to use whatever axioms one wills. This is the act of saying whatever we want about the noumenon. At this point of production we cannot make any necessary statement about any relations between this proposed representation, and our experience of appearances. Then, after practise, experimentation, application of theory, we can start to make some conclusions about such a relationship. In this way, the field of practice, application, and the world of phenomenal appearances in general, always stands as medium between our representations of the noumenon and the noumenon itself.

The important point being that we cannot judge our representations of the noumenon by means of a comparison to the real noumenon, because of the inescapable brute fact that the world of phenomenal appearances forms an unsurpassable boundary between the two.

There's a lot of confusion caused by the question 'what is the "in itself"' - as if it is a mysterious thing…. — Wayfarer

It baffles me to no end, that the trivially obvious fact that there are no things as such between the ears, making representation of things a necessary predisposition of human intelligence, doesn’t thereby automatically make things-in-themselves a perfectly comprehensible explanatory device.

All those goofy lookin’ creatures in the depths of our own oceans? Must we say their existence is predicated on whether or not humans development the equipment by which their reality is given, or, do we merely grant they were already there beforehand?

And that ain’t even the fun part. If we insist things we haven’t experienced don’t exist unless we do, it follows necessarily, e.g., that the very equipment used to discover those creatures, would never be developed, insofar as that equipment has never yet been an experience for us.

To reconcile the absurdity, it is clear on the one hand humanity is not itself sufficient natural causality and the possible existence of things is affirmed by inference a priori without the experience thereof, and on the other, there must be an apodeitically certain duality in the manner of a real thing’s existence. And yet, somehow or another, that affirmation which any rational intellect surely grants, is refused the representation “thing-in-itself” by some of them.

The thing-in-itself is a thing, says so right there in the name. A thing in this manner or a thing in that manner, as the duality of its nature requires, insofar as a thing is an experience for us at one time or it is not at another, can have whatever name sufficient to distinguish one from the other, which is all and only what the “thing-in-itself” conception was ever intended to do.

On placeholders:

Hasn’t anyone noticed that there can be a whole boatload of spaces and times of any thing, but one and only one space and time of any one thing-in-itself?

The question is, why do you assume that absent the effects of sensation, there are "objects", plural. Division into distinct objects is a part of sense perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, individuation is something people do, hence why Schopenhauer speaks of the "thing-in-itsef", or Plotinus on the One.

It's tricky. Perhaps monism exists as a single substance, but its instantiation will be plural in some sense. This goes way back to the problem of the one and the many.

A double whammy, not only can’t we say anything about noumena, but we are confined within a world of appearances, so can’t say anything about anything else (apart from appearances), either. — Punshhh

Kant disagrees about there being nothing to say about either. He distinguishes our ignorance from a skepticism that would presume more than it can display. Here is Kant's argument with Hume on the matter:

On the impossibility of a skeptical satisfaction of pure reason that is divided against itself.

The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not at the same time
known to be necessary) should not end my inquiries, but is rather the
proper cause to arouse them. All ignorance is either that of things or of
the determination and boundaries of my cognition. Now if the ignor
ance is contingent, then in the first case it must drive me to investigate
the things (objects) dogmatically, in the second case to investigate
the boundaries of my possible cognition critically. But that my ignorance
is absolutely necessary and hence absolves me from all further investi
gation can never be made out empirically, from observation, but only
critically, by getting to the bottom of the primary sources of our cog
nition. Thus the determination of the boundaries of our reason can
only take place in accordance with a priori grounds; its limitation, how
ever, which is a merely indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that is
never completely to be lifted, can also be cognized a posteriori, through
that which always remains to be known even with all of our knowledge.
The former cognition of ignorance, which is possible only by means of
the critique of reason itself, is thus science, the latter is nothing but
perception, about which one cannot say how far the inference from it
might reach. If I represent the surface of the earth (in accordance with
sensible appearance as a plate, I cannot know how far it extends. But
experience teaches me this: that wherever I go, I always see a space
around me in which I could proceed farther; thus I cognize the limits of
my actual knowledge of the earth at any time, but not the boundaries
of all possible description of the earth. But if I have gotten as far as
knowing that the earth is a sphere and its surface the surface of a sphere,
then from a small part of the latter, e.g., from the magnitude of one de-
gree, I can cognize its diameter and, by means of this, the complete
boundary, i.e., surface of the earth, determinately and in accordance
with a priori principles;' and although I am ignorant in regard to the ob-
jects that this surface might contain, I am not ignorant in regard to the
magnitude and limits of the domain that contains them.

The sum total of all possible objects for our cognition seems to us to
be a flat surface, which has its apparent horizon, namely that which
comprehends its entire domain and which is called by us the rational
concept of unconditioned totality. It is impossible to attain this empir
ically, and all attempts to determine it a priori in accordance with a cer-
tain principle have been in vain. Yet all questions of our pure reason
pertain to that which might lie outside this horizon or in any case at
least on its borderline.

The famous David Hume was one of these geographers of human
reason, who took himself to have satisfactorily disposed of these ques
tions by having expelled them outside the horizon of human reason,
which however he could not determine. He dwelt primarily on the prin
ciple of causality, and quite rightly remarked about that that one could
not base its truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept
of an efficient cause in general) on any insight at all, i.e., a priori cogni
tion, and thus that the authority of this law is not constituted in the least
by its necessity, but only by its merely general usefulness in the course
of experience and a subjective necessity arising therefrom, which he
called custom. Now from the incapacity of our reason to make a use
of this principle that goes beyond all experience, he inferred the nullity
of all pretensions of reason in general to go beyond the empirical.

One can call a procedure of this sort, subjecting the facta of reason to
examination and when necessary to blame, the censorship of reason. It
is beyond doubt that this censorship inevitably leads to doubt about all
transcendent use of principles. But this is only the second step, which is
far from completing the work. The first step in matters of pure reason,
which characterizes its childhood, is dogmatic. The just mentioned
second step is skeptical, and gives evidence of the caution of the power
of judgment sharpened by experience. Now, however, a third step is still
necessary, which pertains only to the mature and adult power of judg
ment, which has at its basis firm maxims of proven universality, that,
namely, which subjects to evaluation not the facta of reason but reason
itself, as concerns its entire capacity and suitability for pure a priori
cognitions; this is not the censorship but the critique of pure reason,
whereby not merely limits but rather the determinate boundaries of
it - not merely ignorance in one part or another but ignorance in
regard to all possible questions of a certain sort - are not merely sus
pected but are proved from principles. Thus skepticism is a resting
place for human reason, which can reflect upon its dogmatic peregri
nation and make a survey of the region in which it finds itself in order
to be able to choose its path in the future with greater certainty, but it
is not a dwelling-place for permanent residence; for the latter can only
be found in a complete certainty, whether it be one of the cognition of
the objects themselves or of the boundaries within which all of our cog-
nition of objects is enclosed.

Our reason is not like an indeterminably extended plane, the limits of
which one can cognize only in general, but must rather be compared
with a sphere, the radius of which can be found out from the curvature
of an arc on its surface (from the nature of synthetic a priori proposi
tions), from which its content and its boundary can also be ascertained
with certainty. Outside this sphere (field of experience) nothing is an
object" for it; indeed even questions about such supposed objects con
cern only subjective principles of a thoroughgoing determination of
the relations that can obtain among the concepts of understanding in
side of this sphere. — CPR, A758 B786

The above quote also supports 's observations concerning the role of boundaries in rational activities.

I’m finding this almost unintelligible. Can you summarise in layman’s terms what is being said about these boundaries?
I’m new to Kant, so haven’t yet got a handle on his style.

I will try to approach the passage by comparing Kant's objections to Hume with Kant's arguments against Descartes and Berkeley:

Refutation of Idealism

Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the exis
tence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and in
-demonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the
problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical as-
sertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is the dog-
matic idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the
things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be some-
thing that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things
in space to be merely imaginary. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if
one regards space as a property that is to pertain to the things in them-
selves; for then it, along with everything for which it serves as a condi-
tion, is a non-entity. The ground for this idealism, however, has been
undercut by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Problematic idealism,
which does not assert anything about this, but rather professes only our
incapacity for proving an existence outside us from our own by means of
immediate experience, is rational and appropriate for a thorough philo-
sophical manner of thought, allowing, namely, no decisive judgment
until a sufficient proof has been found. The proof that is demanded must
therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagina-
tion of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove
that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible
only under the presupposition of outer experience. — CPR, B274

Immediately following the above text is the Theorem to support it. It is a set of paragraphs that are not included in the first (or A) edition. I read this addition as an attempt to clarify language used throughout the work. One can see how the terms are carefully developed through their use.

Kant's beef with Hume is not the skepticism the latter employed regarding the narratives produced by "reason". Kant agrees that much cannot be proved. But the limits are part of a larger understanding of experience. As quoted before:

Thus skepticism is a resting
place for human reason, which can reflect upon its dogmatic peregri-
nation and make a survey of the region in which it finds itself in order
to be able to choose its path in the future with greater certainty, but it
is not a dwelling-place for permanent residence; for the latter can only
be found in a complete certainty, whether it be one of the cognition of
the objects themselves or of the boundaries within which all of our cog-
nition of objects is enclosed. — CPR, A758 B786

No, thanks. It's quite correct.

A gloss on first the section Paine quotes ( A758 B786)

1. Ignorance as motive, not paralysis

Kant begins by distinguishing types of ignorance. Some ignorance is contingent (we simply don’t know some facts yet), which motivates empirical or dogmatic investigation. But there is also necessary ignorance — ignorance grounded in the very conditions of our knowing — which is revealed only by critique. That’s the crucial distinction between simply bumping up against the limits of what we happen not to know, and recognizing the boundaries of possible cognition itself.

He stresses: ignorance known critically becomes a kind of knowledge — a “science” — whereas ignorance known only empirically is merely a vague awareness that there’s more out there than we presently grasp.

2. The sphere vs. plane metaphor

The extended image is helpful. If reason’s domain were like a flat surface with an indefinite horizon, we could never tell how far our knowing might reach — ignorance would always be open-ended. But if reason is like a sphere, then from any part of its curvature we can (at least in principle) work out the total extent and boundary.

The analogy is drawn from mathematics: by knowing the curvature of a degree of arc, you can infer the whole globe. Likewise, by analyzing the structure of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant claims we can infer the scope of reason itself — where it has jurisdiction and where it does not.

This is why his project is not mere “censorship” (Hume’s skeptical rejection of claims beyond experience), but critique: not simply banning speculative metaphysics, but charting the precise boundaries of possible cognition.

3. Hume as halfway point

Kant explicitly positions Hume as a “geographer of reason” who erred by thinking that because causality could not be justified a priori, therefore no metaphysical principle could extend beyond experience. That’s skepticism as a resting place — useful for sobering us up from dogmatism, but not a permanent home. Kant’s third step is to give positive grounds for why certain a priori principles (e.g. causality as a category) apply within experience but not beyond it.

This is Kant’s classic “Copernican” move: reason is not authorized to legislate beyond the field of possible experience, but within that field, it has real and demonstrable authority.

4. The architecture of the Critique

You can see Kant here making explicit the shape of the CPR as a whole. It’s not merely destructive of metaphysics, nor is it skeptical in Hume’s vein. Instead, it seeks to establish metaphysics as a science by:

• identifying the legitimate use of pure reason (within experience), and
• sharply delimiting the illegitimate transcendent use (questions about “objects” beyond possible experience).

Thus the “sphere of reason” is bounded, but not indeterminate.


5. Resonances

• The passage echoes Socratic docta ignorantia — knowing that one does not know, but in a disciplined and productive way.
• It also resonates with Buddhist cautions about “objectifying the non-objectifiable”: the distinction between what can be known under conditions of cognition versus what lies beyond them.
• It is one of Kant’s strongest rebuttals to both reductionism and naive empiricism: the critical path is neither endless accumulation of data (dogmatism) nor permanent suspension of judgment (skepticism), but systematic self-knowledge of reason itself.

A further reflection: - Kant addresses the limitations, not the limits, of knowledge. There may be no limit to the discovery of further empirical facts, but there are limitations inherent to reason itself, regardless of the accumulation of facts.

@Janus - this is typical of how Kant says there is a 'determinable fact of the matter'. It relies on sophisticated arguments to be sure, but that is what he is claiming.

Thanks for linking to the text, I’ll have a look.

The edition Paine links to is the Cambridge Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, ed Guyer and Wood. The gold standard translation.

Thanks, I was just about getting my head around it. I’m there now. Sounds about right for how I treat the issue.

Oh man. In the A/B 700’s. You’re diggin’ waaaaayyy down deep in the weeds. Not many get that far, and of those, fewer stay for the rewards. One finding things-in-themselves hard to get past is going to seriously flounder with the “transcendental concept of reason is none other than the concept of the totality of conditions for any conditioned”. Took me more than a little while, I must say.

I’ve always been struck by the compositional structure of the critique: first is what happens for knowledge: perceive a thing, yaddayaddayadda, know a thing. Most just stop there. But fully half the book, roughly pg 297 through ~ pg 700, depending on the translator, tells all about the proverbial man behind the curtain, that by which it all works together, from the background, and what happens when attention is not properly paid.

Anyway….good stuff. ‘Preciate it.

deleted duplicate, sorry

Hey…these damn gadgets are almost too modern for me.