Well, in predicate logic you have individuals that have/satisfy a property/predicate. I propose that the property is the set of these individuals. — litewave
For thousands of years mathematicians would have said that set theory is illogical. It flies directly in the face of Aristotle's finitism, but it solves problems that are otherwise unsolvable. Don't look for an intuitive basis for set theory down in your noggin. It's not there. — frank
litewave's response was that, when we have different sets, we have different properties (i.e., different justices, plural); however I think one could retain the notion of a property as a set without necessarily having to be committed to this clarification. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Even the extravagant set that Moliere has mentioned above is something in addition to the pebble and the sentence, and this something is a property that the pebble and the sentence share. It is an unimportant property for which we have no word, and being in that set means having that property. — litewave
There are reasons why snake oil isn't taken seriously as a nostrum -- reasons that have little to do with knowing how todefine health
For me, "snake oil" is another way of talking about "nonsense" or "anything goes," so my response is the same.
Why not? Why doesn't "anything go"? Why doesn't aporia lead to intellectual anarchy? See the Republic.
Can you think of a discipline in which that actually occurs?
Well, no, you're not, since as explained, the use you make of "property" is circular, except for the bit where having a property is attributed - something people do.I am just explaining how the term is used in metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is red herring, like the "definition of justice in the Great Dictionary of Philosophical Terms." I said "knowledge of health" (or "knowledge of justice") not "the definition." Do advances in medicine and the development of medical skill not involve knowledge of health and disease? — Count Timothy von Icarus
There are, however, professional philosophers or scientists who publish in philosophy who make claims and counter claims about how each other's traditions are nonsense and sophistry — Count Timothy von Icarus
Why not? Why doesn't "anything go"? Why doesn't aporia lead to intellectual anarchy? See the Republic.
Which part exactly? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Positions like "might makes right" were popular enough to warrant in depth responses from figures like Hegel (when he was already famous). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Indeed, agreeing that the proffered definitions of justice are inadequate presupposes agreement concerning what is just and what isn't.No one in the Republic suggests that "Justice is really a fish." Why not, if they don't know what justice is? Why doesn't their ignorance open the door to nonsense? — J
I thought we didn't want set membership to count as a property. — J
Part of the problem here is that properties are taken as fundamental, when they are better understood as one-place predications, set amongst a hierarchy starting with zero placed predicates and working on up - or a hierarchy of individuals, groups of individuals, groups of groups of individuals, and so on
The love of reification. We have a predicate - red - so there must be a thing - redness. Why?How are there "predictions" without anything to predicate? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Well, you will."we will invariably just end up reinventing properties." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Indeed, agreeing that the proffered definitions of justice are inadequate presupposes agreement concerning what is just and what isn't. — Banno
Really? In those words? I'd say that was comparatively rare. Good philosophers tend to be much more interested in understanding and, sometimes, refutation, than in name-calling. Is there some publication or passage you have in mind?
No one in the Republic suggests that "Justice is really a fish." Why not, if they don't know what justice is? Why doesn't their ignorance open the door to nonsense?
Yes, and look what happened: We no longer consider such a position viable.
That's how intellectual investigations operate, over time. Less plausible, less defensible positions are weeded out, and newer, stronger possibilities are broached. And the discussion goes on.
Indeed, agreeing that the proffered definitions of justice are inadequate presupposes agreement concerning what is just and what isn't.
We already had what Socrates was looking for...
Only the elements are apart of the set. — Banno
This is interesting but confusing. Is "Being in that set means having that property" different from "'Being in that set' is a property of the pebble"? I thought we didn't want set membership to count as a property. — J
I don't think the difference substantial. Again, after Davidson, I'd suggest that we have overwhelmingly agreement as to what things are just and what are not, developed over time and use, but that we focus on our differences because they are more interesting.I would put it differently. — J
Yes. Contrast that with the way Tim sticks to stipulated definitions...It's all very "building your boat on the ocean," isn't it? — J
PI §201 yet again: there's a way of understanding justice that is not found in stipulating a definition but is exhibited in what we call "being just" and "being unjust" in actual cases.You think "might makes right" is nonsense but not Thrasymachus' claim that justice is "whatever is to the advantage of the stronger?" What about Cleitophon's claim that "justice is just whatever the stronger thinks (appears) is to their advantage?" Or, in other dialogues, Protagoras' claim that whatever one thinks is true is true for that person (a position I am pretty sure you have called nonsense before) and Gorgias' claim that rhetoric is the master art because it can convince powerful people and assemblies to agree with you over experts? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I suppose one issue might be circularity. How do you know what belongs in a set? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes. Contrast that with the way Tim sticks to stipulated definitions
PI §201 yet again: there's a way of understanding justice that is not found in stipulating a definition but is exhibited in what we call "being just" and "being unjust" in actual cases.
You don't seem to be addressing the critique. IS there a way for syllogistic logic to recover here?
Why doesn't aporia lead to intellectual anarchy? — J
Oh, sorry. I thought that's what you were looking for in set theory. — frank
Really? In those words?
Have you read the New Athiests? . . .et al — Count Timothy von Icarus
You think "might makes right" is nonsense but not Thrasymachus' claim that justice is "whatever is to the advantage of the stronger?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
But then why do traditions that put forth nonsense not recognize this then [an innate knowledge of what is nonsense]? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Who is "we?" That particular take has had a great resurgence on far-right circles that have a good deal of sway these days. I imagine that Bronze Age Pervert has sold a good deal more copies than any academic philosopher in the past decade. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That's how intellectual investigations operate, over time. Less plausible, less defensible positions are weeded out, and newer, stronger possibilities are broached. And the discussion goes on.
Is this something like a "law of history," inexorable in the long term? — Count Timothy von Icarus
J's usual straw man to the effect that if one mentions knowledge of the relevant subject (i.e., justice, health) as the measure of expertise or wisdom, one must necessarily be appealing to a "Great Philosophical Definition in the Sky." — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't think the difference substantial. Again, after Davidson, I'd suggest that we have overwhelmingly agreement as to what things are just and what are not, developed over time and use, but that we focus on our differences because they are more interesting — Banno
But that's just it -- I don't think it's nonsense. It's a position that needs refutation, unlike the position that justice is a fish.
But, to anticipate your objection, that doesn't mean that anything goes, that some nonsense from Tom deserves to be taken as seriously as "justice(Rawls)."
By "we," I meant philosophers of repute, those who know the history, the questions, and the difficulties.
It depends how literally one means "nonsense," I think -- whether it's shorthand for "views I don't find defensible."
I truly believed you were focused on definitions rather than knowledge, and claiming that without a definition of, say, the good, we wouldn't know how to recognize good things.
the set of all things that have this property. — litewave
a set is a single thing too and its elements can be said to participate in or share the character of this thing. — litewave
the set of not only its presently existing instances but also of its past and future instances and of all its possible instances (existing in possible worlds) — litewave
Can we agree that only one possible world actually exists (the actual world)?
In that case, your set includes "things" that do not exist, never have existed, and never will exist (they are non-actual possibilities). Let's focus on this subset of your big set. Does it have any members? Are the members things? If so, what is a thing? — Relativist
My point is rather that there seems to me be some significant daylight (sometimes a great deal) between "who is currently said to be wise (in our preferred context presumably)" and who might actually be wise. It does not seem to me that the two must coincide, or even that they must inexorably progress towards coinciding. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So then the standard would really be "what philosophers of repute" take seriously. But I wonder if this really works well for all contexts. — Count Timothy von Icarus
a standard based on the opinions of those with current repute seems to rule out, by definition, any radical critique until that radical critique has already been accepted by those of repute. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If nonsense is limited to statements on a level of "justice is a fish," then it seems to keep out very little though, right? But "nonsense" was originally the criteria for what deserves to be taken seriously, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I can see the confusion in context. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is interesting but confusing. Is "Being in that set means having that property" different from "'Being in that set' is a property of the pebble"? I thought we didn't want set membership to count as a property. — J
On further thought, I find this confusing too. The property of "being in set X" may seem to be the property of members of set X, but perhaps it is actually the property of the set membership relation instead. (A member is in set X but "being in set X" is not the property of the member but of the set membership relation between the member and set X.) Similarly, the property of "having property X" may seem to be the property of instances of property X, but perhaps it is actually the property of the instantiation relation instead. (An instance has property X but "having property X" is not the property of the instance but of the instantiation relation between the instance and property X.)
Since I equate set with property, members of set are equated with instances of property, and set membership relation is equated with instantiation relation. — litewave
For example, let's take property red or redness (X = red): The property of "being in set red" is the same as the property of "having property red", which is the same as the property of "being red", which is the same as property red. So, the property of "being in set red" and property red are one and the same property. — litewave
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