Yep.

What is a real metaphysical entity as contrasted with a real entity? What does the word "metaphysical" do here? — Banno

I was responding to your post in which you used the phrase "reified metaphysical entities". I understood them simply as real entities.

What does it mean to say they are real? What more can we do with real properties that we can't do just with properties? Or much better, with talk of sets or predicates? — Banno

It seems that we need real properties to explain in what ways things are similar to each other. The ways are the properties.

I interact with collections of objects all the time.
— litewave
Sure. Just not int he way you interact with chairs. — Banno

Chairs are collections too.

I was responding to your post in which you used the phrase "reified metaphysical entities". I understood them simply as real entities. — litewave

Cool. Too many words, too many crossed discussions. The aim might be to be clear about what the individuals we are talking about are.

So we can talk about a and b. And we can change the game a bit and talk about {a,b}. And in one way we have added a new thing to the conversation, yet in another way we are still just talking about a and b. We may be tempted to ask which way is real, but perhaps that question is irrelevant provided we talk clearly.

Chairs are collections too. — litewave

There's a whole new barrel of fish.

So we can talk about a and b. And we can change the game a bit and talk about {a,b}. And in one way we have added a new thing to the conversation, yet in another way we are still just talking about a and b. We may be tempted to ask which way is real, but perhaps that question is irrelevant provided we talk clearly. — Banno

a and b are sets too?

Chairs are collections too.
— litewave
There's a whole new barrel of fish. — Banno

I already talked about that here:

Still, a set (collection) is also treated as a single object in set theory that exists as a single element in other sets. And I don't regard sets as "abstract" objects but rather as objects I can see all around me - there are sets of sets of sets etc. everywhere around. If a set is not an object in its own right then what objects are there? Just non-composite objects (like empty sets) at the bottom? And what if there is no bottom? One may object that there is no order of elements in a set while the sets we see around us are often ordered in intricate ways, but there are various ways of constructing ordered pairs out of unordered sets, for example the Kuratowski definition of an ordered pair. — litewave

a and b are sets too? — litewave

No, but {a} and {b} are.

Chairs are collections too. — litewave

We'd have to look into Wittgenstien's analysis of simples here, and ask if the chair or the leg or the table set is the individual.

A step too far, I think, for this thread.

"abstract" objects — litewave

I spoke a bit about how we might define "abstract" here - that we have a and b and then add the abstract item {a,b} without adding anything to the domain - it still contains just a and b, but we can talk as if there were an abstract thing {a,b}.

a and b are sets too?
— litewave

No, but {a} and {b} are. — Banno

Well, in pure set theory a and b are sets too, because it's sets all the way down.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory#Ontology

Well, in pure set theory a and b are sets too, because it's sets all the way down. — litewave

Well, trivially, yes, since pure set theory is about nothing but sets of sets and the empty set.

"Being an instance of redness" seems to be a property of all instances of redness, yet it seems to be a different property than redness itself. — litewave

"Being an instance of redness" is not a property.

"Being an instance of redness" is referring to a particular instance, which is a single concrete thing, as in "the first instance of seeing a Northern Cardinal in the wild".

The Northern Cardinal may be red in colour, but "being an instance of redness" is referring to the instance not the colour.

"Being an instance of redness" is an element of the set.

The property redness = {being an instance 1 of redness, being an instance 2 of redness, being an instance 3 of redness}.

Note
Has anyone addressed the core problem of circularity. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set?

Has anyone addressed the core problem of circularity. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set? — RussellA

Noted. I think you mentioned the choice: extension/intension? I suppose the latter is a proposed solution to

we must know the set of red things before we can include an element in the set?

Which isn't a problem (requiring a solution) in natural language. Usage there is guided by exemplification. See Goodman's Languages of Art which cashes in on the theoretical economy of analysing properties (or sets) away as predicates.

In formalised languages, sure. The circularity is famous since Russell B. As plenty here have pointed out.

Yes, because my attempt to treat the set and the property as one and the same object seems to have failed.
— litewave

But I hope you see that your intuition - that having the property of being red and being a member of the set of red things say much the same thing - remains valid?
. . .
I think the intuition in the OP is quite right — Banno

Yes, this is what I was getting at, or trying to, when I said:

"There's an intuitive rightness to what you're proposing -- that our language for talking about something like "red" can be simplified through analysis and discovered to be largely redundant -- but is "property" the right flag under which to fly this idea?"

And I join @Moliere in appreciating the fact that you can pull back from your original position and freely acknowledge its defects. Not many can do that. Look how much we've all learned as a result!

but we can talk as if there were an abstract thing {a,b}. — Banno

The hallmark of rationality: speech.

I think you mentioned the choice: extension/intension? I suppose the latter is a proposed solution to: "we must know the set of red things before we can include an element in the set?" — bongo fury

My solution is that it is a feature of the brain that a person can discover family resemblances in different things. For example, a postbox and Northern Cardinal share a family resemblance, and this particular family resemblance has been named "red"
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1010119

Which isn't a problem (requiring a solution) in natural language. Usage there is guided by exemplification. See Goodman's Languages of Art which cashes in on the theoretical economy of analysing properties (or sets) away as predicates. — bongo fury

Suppose a person sees a postbox and a Northern Cardinal. Goodman says "red" doesn't name a universal redness, but just applies to an object. In ordinary language, I can understand a person applying the word "red" to a postbox emitting a wavelength of 650nm, but how do they know to apply the same word to a different object, a Northern Cardinal, emitting a different wavelength of 700nm?

In formalised languages, sure. The circularity is famous since Russell B. — bongo fury

In formal language, Russell's problem of sets of all sets that do not contain themselves can be formally resolved, such as by using the axiomatic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

But the same problem remains. In the set of red objects R = {postbox, Northern Cardinal}, we understand red by the elements in its set, but we must know that an element is red before putting it in the set.

Yea, but the OP wasn't saying that the set of red things is a definition of red. It was saying the set is redness because it has all the instantiations if it.

Yea, but the OP wasn't saying that the set of red things is a definition of red. It was saying the set is redness because it has all the instantiations if it. — frank

Yes, for the OP:
Property redness = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

Nelson Goodman proposed that "red" doesn't name a universal redness, but just applies to an object:
Red = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

But it seems that the same problem applies to both. We understand the LHS by the elements in the RHS, but the elements in the RHS are determined by the LHS.

Bertrand Russell's Type Theory does not seem to negate this circularity.

One solution is the brain's ability to find family resemblances in different objects. Necessarily a meta-linguistic solution (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations)

Are there other solutions to avoiding this circularity?

Nelson Goodman proposed that "red" doesn't name a universal redness, but just applies to an object:
Red = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset} — RussellA

I guess he isn't familiar with discussions about color itself, but they're pretty common. I think we just learn to associate a certain word with a certain range of visual experiences?

I think we just learn to associate a certain word with a certain range of visual experiences? — frank

Let the property of redness = {postbox, Northern Cardinal, sunset}

Suppose we are told to find another object, object X, that has the same property of redness and include it in an enlarged set.

All these objects emit different wavelengths.

How do we learn that object X has the same redness as a postbox, Northern Cardinal and sunset when it will be emitting a different wavelength.

All these objects emit different wavelengths.

How do we learn that object X has the same redness as a postbox, Northern Cardinal and sunset when it will be emitting a different wavelength. — RussellA

Because we don't learn to associate the word with one wavelength. We associate it with experiences, but those experiences reflect both physiological predisposition and cultural conditioning. Right?

I guess he isn't familiar with discussions about color itself, — frank

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Because we don't learn to associate the word with one wavelength. We associate it with experiences, but those experiences reflect both physiological predisposition and cultural conditioning. Right? — frank

That's how I see it.

We are physiologically predisposed to see a family resemblance in the wavelengths from 625 to 750nm.

We are then culturally conditioned to call this family resemblance "red".

There's a whole new barrel of fish. — Banno

Is the "of" relation an indication that the fish are a subset of the barrel?

:D

I think we just learn to associate a certain word with a certain range of visual experiences? — frank

This is basically what I mean by using "affordances" rather than "properties"

"Property" has the meaning that some thing external to myself has this or that regardless.

"Affordance" keeps the "regardless" part, but removes the "external to myself" part -- color blindness is my go-to example here.

That some people see an object differently due to being color-blind does not then mean that the object has multiple properties, but rather an affordance for perception such that people perceive it differently.

but rather an affordance for perception such that people perceive it differently. — Moliere

Yes, and as @Astorre has proposed, the affordance (or "mode", in their terminology) provides a realist-friendly link with the external world.

That said, we probably need to do some work on "affordance" or "mode" to make sure we're not just employing placeholders.

That said, we probably need to do some work on "affordance" or "mode" to make sure we're not just employing placeholders. — J

Definitely.

I tried to do so with the color-blind example, but it's just an example that I'm generalizing from to get at the idea -- maybe an "affordance" allows object-independence but disallows subject-independence to a certain point, while allowing it "somehow".

Just to make things murky, but it's my best first guess.

object/subject -- this has been a distinction I've wrestled with for a long time on these fora.

I tend to say "it's better to drop that notion", mostly indicating that there's nothing separating us from the world we are in. As @Joshs says we enact the world more than the world stands apart from us.

I feel like "affordance" fits better with that model, but I don't have it worked out very well.

Almost like I still comment on these fora because I'm still thinking about this stuff :)

Friday saw you and other participants in this thread ask me some interesting questions, but I wanted to take a short break before I answered. I'll get back to those questions later. But here's what I want to say right now.
My fascination with the processual approach to ontology is a kind of response to speculative ontology (object-oriented ontology and so on). I believe that the "subject" today needs philosophical defense more than ever before. If you're familiar with the works of us contemporaries, I think you'll understand what I'm talking about.
Harman, for instance, argues that the "hammerness" of a hammer is always withdrawn. "Hammerness" is the real being of the hammer as a unified object, which can't be reduced to its relationships with other things (e.g., a hand, a nail, or our thinking). We can't know it completely because:
Objects have "real qualities" that aren't exhausted by their "sensual" manifestations.
Any kind of knowledge is a relation that only reveals aspects of the object, but not its holistic essence.
This withdrawal occurs in three dimensions: the object transcends any attempts to grasp it; it retreats into the background during use; and as a tool, it's always on the verge of breaking, yet remains partially inaccessible.
Harman emphasizes that this isn't skepticism (objects are real) but rather realism: objects exist independently, but their depth is infinite and inaccessible. This distinguishes OOO from relational ontologies, where everything is reduced to connections.


What I Propose:
The modality (or the name can be changed to your liking) of a hammer is its "shadowy depth" (like Harman's), objective and inaccessible in isolation. But when the hammer is used, "hammerness" as a property emerges as an event—dynamic and contextual. This explains why we can't know hammerness statically: it doesn't exist "in the hammer" as a substance, but is born at the boundary of interaction, much like how for Harman, an object is only partially revealed in relationships.

For Harman, the hammer is revealed in its use—we see only one aspect. I propose to refine this: "hammerness" as a property is revealed in an act of participation, an act of encounter, and depends on the participants in the interaction (the hand, the nail, the task, the lighting). For another participant (e.g., a child playing with the hammer) or context (the hammer as a weapon), a different property is revealed, but the hammer's modality remains the same. This helps explain why complete knowledge is impossible: properties infinitely vary in processes, but they never exhaust the modality.

For Harman, the subject is a passive object, equal to others and withdrawn from access. The subject is unremarkable and unnecessary (why do we need it if everything is an object, and the method is objective). In my opinion, on the contrary, the subject (the observer or the "I") is a fully existent being with its own modalities (objective structures, such as the visual system or consciousness). It doesn't disappear or become fully flattened: the subject actively participates in the act of Participation, where properties are revealed. For example, in the case of a red apple, the subject (observer) is one of the participants in the interaction (along with the apple and light), and their modalities (cognitive structures) determine how the event of the property emerges. This overcomes Harman's radicalism, returning a role to the subject in reality, but without idealism: the subject doesn't create properties; it co-participates in their actualization.

I apologize in advance for any discrepancies that may arise due to the translator, as I am not a native English speaker.

I wanted to take a short break before I answered. I'll get back to those questions later. — Astorre

Of course, no hurry.

For Harman, the hammer is revealed in its use—we see only one aspect. I propose to refine this: "hammerness" as a property is revealed in an act of participation, an act of encounter, and depends on the participants in the interaction — Astorre

This is a welcome improvement on Harman, as I understand him. (I'm still balking at "hammerness as a property," but that's secondary.). Your version allows the observer to bring whatever concepts and agenda they may have to the encounter. As you say, it's not a one-dimensional "hammer or nothing" situation. Among other virtues, it gives us a way of understanding how an ordinary object like a hammer can become an art object. (See the "What Is a Painting?" thread.)

One question I would raise: This schema is Kantian in structure -- "the subject doesn't create properties; it co-participates in their actualization." How would you differentiate "modality" from "noumenon"? Can Kantian phenomena be understood as a series of co-created properties?

(Whatever translator you're using is doing a great job.)

I'm confused. I'd understood from your previous account that, as it were, being a hammer is something we do with that - an attribute, as put it.

But now you are back to talking about a somewhat mysterious notion of "hammerness".

...the hammer is revealed in its use... — Astorre

As if it were a hammer already, apart from our attribution.

You seem to have rid yourself of properties only to reintroduce them.

The spirit of my idea is close to the Kantian model, but it adds new layers. Kant’s noumenon can be compared to what I call the modus, and his phenomenon is similar to what I call a property. But note this small, crucial detail: properties are relational.
The property of redness or hammerness can be objective (for a carpenter, a hammer is a useful tool), or it may not be (someone who has been hurt by a hammer may see it as a source of pain). However, in my case, properties are more deeply relational; they are revealed in an act of participation, which can even occur between two objects without an observer present (for example, two rocks striking each other, revealing hardness).
Furthermore, the modus may be change over time. An apple is red, perhaps because this color is evolutionarily more attractive to animals that disperse seeds, who might have been more inclined to eat red apples. My modus is not a static thing-in-itself. So a car can be red because red cars were in demand earlier (and green cars weren't), and this became the result of earlier interactions.
I am defending the subject, but not to the degree of anthropocentrism seen in Kant, whose phenomena are an act of cognition.

Not at all, just try to read it all again. I understand that it's a bit boring

I did. You speak of "Hammerness". I don't think that helpful. You have the "hammerness" being "revealed" by its use. Better to drop "hammerness" all together and just have that thing being used to hammer as our reason for saying that it is a hammer.

It's not revealed, since that implies that it was a hammer apart from it's use as a hammer. Better to say attributed.

We include that in the set of hammers. It isn't in the set of hammers apart from our so including it.