I point at a green one say, and that you also see me pointing at a green one shows that there must be something independent of both of us that explains that, provided we accept that our perceptual organs and minds are in no hidden way connected. — Janus

But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer. The entailment being that when we imagine or depict the Universe with no human observer in it, that depiction is still dependent on the perspective which only the mind can bring. But that we forget that, or suppress it, or bracket it out, such that we believe that our bare cognition of the world reveals it as it truly is, in itself.

There's no point in trying to 'explain' something to me in respect of something I haven't claimed in the first place:

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves. And although the unified nature of our experience of this ‘world-picture’ seems simple and even self-evident, neuroscience has yet to understand or explain how the disparate elements of experience , memory, expectation and judgement, all come together to form a unified whole — even though this is plainly what we experience.

By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums. — Mind-Created World

But I'm not denying that there is an external world. What I'm denying is that knowledge of that world is purely objective, that we can see it as it is or as it would be absent any observer. — Wayfarer

The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.

I had thought you took issue with the idea that we can speculate about what existed prior to humans, which just consists in imagining what we would have seen had we been there. The other point is that I don't accept the idea that things cannot exist outside of any perspective, and I'm pretty sure you disagree with that.

My point all along has been that there is no use in arguing about that because there can be no way of determining the truth regarding that. Of course take issue with any dogmatic assertions about it given that no one could know for certain.

So, I am not dogmatically asserting that things definitely existed prior to any percipients, or definitely exist absent any perception of them, but I do think that is the most plausible conclusion, most consistent and coherent with human experience and understanding of the world.

We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums. — Wayfarer

I don't know what conundrums you are referring to. I see more potential for conundrums in denying that things can exist absent percipients.

…..that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form…. — B34-A20

What might that be. That within which. Hmmmm…..

Usually known by the name of the ordering and placing in a certain form, rather than the name of that within which it occurs. Sorta like, only reason people know Joe the plumber is from his plumbing. And the term for the result of all that ordering and placing in a certain form, is as well-known as George Herman Ruth’s nickname.

Be careful, anyway. There’s two of them. Or one of them with the proverbial split personality. Everydayman himself …..all else being given…..admits he’s got one, and readily acknowledges he even uses it. But how it’s doing what it does when he uses it he cannot tell you. One of the anti-Kantian gripes…..he can’t tell you how either (A78), but incorporates it as a what that plays its part, not in one, oh HELL no, but BOTH!!!!! (Yikes) aspects of the very system transcendental philosophy prescribes, re: sensibility, where all that ordering and placing of empirical stuff, happens, and logic, where all the ordering and placing of rational stuff happens.

But still, it’s his philosophy, he invented it. Take it or leave it, right?

Way past the register of being (A247) for sure, but maybe not quite the register of knowing.

The dog and I both see something we call a wallaby. — Janus

Who’s we? You and the dog? It’s only you and the dog perceiving this thing, right then, right there, and that is one damn special dog telling you he sees what he calls a wallaby. Nahhhhh, there’s no one else there, so it’s you and the dog seeing what you call a wallaby.

You got the right idea, kinda, but your wording needs rewording. My opinion, of course. Maybe I’m missing the point here, dunno. Cuz the wording’s so….confusing.

I think it should have been obvious that I didn't mean to say the dog called it a wallaby―by "we" I meant to refer to English speakers. I'll grant the sentence on an immediate glance appears to be saying something absurd. The fact that it is absurd I think should have alerted you to look for alternative interpretations. That said, I acknowledge I should have been more careful with the wording.

You make it sound like my wording is generally obscure, but I think if it be compared with Kant's or even your own, I doubt it could be judged to be any more obscure, and if anything would probably be judged to be less obscure.

Anyway it's rare on these forums that anyone complains that they cannot understand what I've been saying.

I don't know if you're missing the point―which was just that the dog and I both see a wallaby, and judging by the dogs behavior towards it, he sees it as something to be eaten. I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again).

Ok, I’m done with this.

…not my car, the wallaby… — Janus

HA!!! Good one.

Okely dokely...well done, medium, medium rare or rare?

The other point is that I don't accept the idea that things cannot exist outside of any perspective — Janus

Name one.

Vacuous question!

Anything that appears presumably exists somehow independently of appearing. You contradict yourself when you say that you don't deny the existence of the external world, and then claim that anything that exists must be subject to a perspective. That is to conflate perception of something with its actual existence.

If you want to get away from bare phenomenalism― the idea that all that exists are perceptions ―then you must allow that there is something, not generated by the percipient, that appears, whether it is actual existents or ideas in God's mind. Either way when it is not appearing it cannot be subject to any perspective unless in the "God's mind' scenario, God is held to have a perspective.

Your anthropomorphism lacks credulity.

I don’t conflate them at all. I distinguish them. To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience. There is a difference between what is and what we can say about what is. My point is that when we speak of existence, we are always speaking from within the limits of our perspective. That doesn’t abolish the external world — it marks the difference between the world “as it is in itself” and the world as it is given to us.

To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

On one way of reading this: that 'existence' is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of immediate experience, what you are saying is, firstly, a dogmatic statement, since you are only entitled to say what is intelligible to you.

Secondly saying that the idea of existence is unintelligible under said conditions just is to deny that anything can exist that is not presently subject to a perspective, or that it cannot be said to exist outside of that perspective.

It's true that we cannot think the existence of something, in the sense of thinking what the existence is like, without applying a perspective to it, that is to say we cannot imagine what a totally perspective-less existence could be like.

But that is not to say that we cannot coherently imagine that things can and do exist absent any perspective―that they can and do exist completely independently of us and our imaginings. It's all about nuance.

Another possible reading is more sensible: you could be saying that we cannot say that anything exists or has existed which in principle we could not possibly experience or perceive. If that is all you are saying then I don't think I disagree, although I might need to think some more on that. Dark matter and energy come to mind, although admittedly their existence is speculative, even if supported by the physics.

Wouldn’t you agree it’s possible for a human and some other kind of intelligence to have a common perception? — Mww

No. I would say that a perception is unique to the being that perceives it. This is due to a multitude of factors, unique spatial temporal perspective, unique features of the perceiving body, etc.. So I believe it is impossible that two beings could have a common perception.

Your second paragraph is missing a crucial, unavoidable and clearly required aspect. That is the objects which engage our perception. — AmadeusD

Why do you assume that there is an object which engagers a person's perception. Like I said, the perception is a creation of the perceiver. Therefore the perceiver creates the object.

Otherwise, we are perceiving nothing. — AmadeusD

This is an unjustified conclusion. A person can be wrong in what they believe they are perceiving, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are perceiving nothing. So, a person can wrongly believe that they are perceiving objects, when in fact they are not perceiving objects, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are producing nothing. They might simply be perceiving something other than objects, and falsely believe that what is perceived is objects.

That's clear. — AmadeusD

As explained above, what appears to be clear to you is completely illogical.

Have bene over this several times with several people and it is, to me, obviously and somewhat incredibly, wrong. — AmadeusD

it's incredibly wrong to you, because you have an illogical thinking process.

He refers to Kant's transcendental hylomorphism, by which he means that Kant transposes Aristotle's form and matter relation to the register of cognition itself (where form is supplied by the a priori structures of sensibility and understanding, and matter by the manifold of intuition). — Wayfarer

This is exactly the crucial thing to understand about Kant. He brings the potential of matter (by Aristotle's principles) right into the conscious mind as "the a priori structures of sensibility". Accordingly, since "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect of reality, Kant makes the unintelligibility of reality a feature of the mind rather than a feature of the independent reality. A deficiency of the mind is the cause of the unintelligibility of the mind. Simply put, it is the minds dependence on the senses. This is distinctly different from the Neo-Platonic perspective which assigned perfection to the mind, as immaterial anmd independent, making the reason for unintelligibility something separate from the mind, matter. In a sense, for Kant, mind is already corrupted by the presence of matter, as the a priori intuitions.

I don't see wallabies as to be eaten but as to be preserved, but I have hit and killed one with my car ( on the road, not on the property I dwell on), which I subsequently ate (not my car, the wallaby, just in case I've been obscure again). — Janus

At the base level, there's nothing wrong with eating roadkill.

Kant's COPR is fairly complex.

If you think noumena is physical though you are completely and utterly wrong. This is not really a matter of opinion. It might be annoying to hear this, but there is nothing wrong with being wrong.

If you are still convinced your view is right then the onus is very much on you to reference and explain why, using his actual words; as the scholarly concensus on this is pretty much stacked completely against you. Note: When I say 'scholarly' I mean reputable scholarly work not amateur interpretations (which are rife with misrepresentation of Kant, due to his multifacted approach).

I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.

So what?

I can’t (Kant) see a disagreement between us, it’s more a difference of emphasis. That looking through different ends of the telescope thing again. You emphasise the importance of proof and the empirical. Me pretty much the opposite, the emphasis on what can’t be proved, or focussing on what can’t be quantified in the empirical. Although we both are concerned with sticking to the truth and not wondering down blind alleys.

Tread carefully, dog is God read backwards. What if dog’s read backwards?

Anubis anyone.

The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.

The title of the thread is* (in a nutshell), to tease out a blindness in the view that, supported by science etc. the physical world**is what exists and anything else is mere speculation. A view which is held by the majority of the population. That the overwhelming truth of this orthodoxy cannot in all seriousness be challenged, and that this (orthodoxy) results in a blinkered view.

*apologies Wayfarer, if I have misrepresented the tittle.

**I am simplifying the various physicalist perspectives into one phrase here.

:100:

I would say that a perception is unique to the being that perceives it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I imagine you meant each perception is unique to the being that perceives. Yours implies a perception is perceived. Nobody perceives a perception.

But I didn’t ask about the perception as much as its causal necessity.

So you don’t agree that a thing given by which dissimilar being’s senses are affected, is the same as the effect a given thing has on dissimilar beings perceiving it.

Ever notice, e.g., forest fires, where all sorts of critters are all running away from the same thing;
Creatures as dissimilar as whales and terns each treat bait balls as the same one thing;
You claim to see a horse’s head, I claim to see a lion’s head, but we are only perceiving a cloud.

Judgement of a perception is unique; perception itself, that by which various and possibly dissimilar sensibilities, are effected, is not.
————-

He brings the potential of matter (by Aristotle's principles) right into the conscious mind as "the a priori structures of sensibility" — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t read A20/B34 that way, which is where he first installs matter as such into the system.

….since "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect of reality…. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn’t; it refers to the undetermined aspect of reality. The undetermined is not necessarily the unintelligible.

What I am saying is that the idea that there is "a thing" which is perceived is a faulty idea. So, I'm saying that all these supposed "things", forest fires, balls, and clouds, could be better understood if we simply accept that the perception of them as things is mistaken and misleading. It doesn't matter that all types of critters act as if they are perceiving things, because they all evolved in a similar way, and that was in a way which conditioned them to act as if they are perceiving things, just like us. The claim that we all perceive the same "things" is just as effective to argue that we all make the same mistake, as it is to argue that it must be the truth, because it is common.

So here's an example. We describe the way that electromagnetic energy interacts with 'things', as the photoelectric effect. Because we understand electrons and atoms as things existing in spacetime, this forces us to conceive of electromagnetism as things, photons, in order that we can understand this interaction. However, much evidence indicates to us that electromagnetism actually exists in the form of waves, rather than as things called photons. Further, there is also much evidence which indicates that the interaction between the supposed 'things', photons and electrons, would be better understood, if we represent these things as waves in a substance, rather than as things in spacetime. Therefore the evidence indicates that we are moving in the wrong direction, toward misunderstanding rather than toward understanding, by representing the wave activity of electromagnetism as things, photons, instead of representing the supposed physical things as wave disturbances, to establish the required compatibility to understand interaction.

As an analogy, consider how we understand hearing. We know that when a supposed thing makes a noise, we don't sense the noise as physical particles of noise being emitted from the thing making the noise, and being received by the ear. We understand it as a wave activity of molecules. But then we must understand that the supposed thing emitting the noise, and the supposed thing receiving the noise, are not actually things at all, but a collection of particles, molecules. The idea that there is a thing which emits the noise, and a thing which receives the noise is very misleading because it does not allow the proper understanding, which requires that the supposed 'things' must be understood as really the activity of something else. The true understanding is that the supposed 'thing' is not a thing at all, but some other activity of something else, which appears to us as if it were a thing.

That's the key to understanding how the conception of 'things' is misleading. The supposed 'thing' is really a bunch of underlying activity, and insisting that it is actually a physical thing debilitates our capacity to understand the reality of it. That is the point of process philosophy in general. Modeling reality as consisting of things which are perceived by us is not an accurate representation, and very misleading to anyone who wants a true understanding.

I see that Pollock supports my statement that mind-independence is not a critical criterion for objectivity in Kant.
Pollock quotes the second edition preface:

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to
the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori
through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this pre
supposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not
get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the ob-
jects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the
requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to estab-
lish something about objects before they are given to us. — CPR B16

Pollock's Introduction ends with:

What Kant inherits from the Cartesian 'way of ideas' is the central role that the concept of consciousness, as the "mere subjective form of all our concepts," plays in metaphysical matters. This entails that objectivity becomes a crucial normative problem for his critical philosophy. But rather than inquiring into the objective reality of ideas, the vital question for Kant is: What are, and how can we arrive at, the fundamental norm of the objective validity of our judgements? — Pollock, Theory of Normativity

What I am saying is that the idea that there is "a thing" which is perceived is a faulty idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

Tell that to my thumb, after getting whacked by a mis-directed hammer.

Modeling reality as consisting of things which are perceived by us is not an accurate representation, and very misleading to anyone who wants a true understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn’t have to be an accurate representation; it is only necessary such representation not contradict either Mother Nature, at the same level, and not contradict antecedent experience on any level. Being flawed intelligences on the one hand, in that we get stuff wrong once in awhile, and being as we possess a purely speculative idea of our own intelligence on the other, it is forgivable that we may not have, nor is there sufficient reason to expect to ever have, a true understanding. And we may not even know true understanding, if it happens.

Your reasoning is exemplary; it just exceeds the criteria for empirical knowledge of things on a common everyday scale. I mean….when was the last time you approached the SOL in anything with which you were consciously engaged? We’ve all perceived the alignment of susceptible particles into the shape of a field, but none of us have perceived the field of which the particles assume the shape.

I guess I should say I’ve never perceived; perhaps others have, dunno.

Citations don't have a lot to do with this. For Kant's system to work (to transcend, that is) physical objects (or, a physical object) must be impressing our senses to achieve the impression of physical objects. Otherwise, its just idealism, right? That is, as best I can tell from anyone's commentary including hte several translators and other commenters like R.P Wolff, the most fundamentally implicit aspect of the CPR. Without this basis, it is not, in fact, a transcendental system.

Some commenters you could look at:

Henry Allison: Takes the dual-aspect argument on and imo compellingly.
P.F Strawson makes similar comments in Bounds of Sense
Lucy Alais doesn't commit, but is heading in this direction, from what I've read (but that could turn out to be embarrassingly unhelpful)
Schulting seems to presuppose the noumena as physical
the SEP on Qualified Phenomenalism seems to also support this, or at least run over why its reasonable.

Essentially, one of the 'limits' Kant seems to implicitly assume, and then explain, is that we must make this assumption about there being physical objects, even when we have literally no other reason to think so than appearances. They are required to ground the purpose of the entire Critique.

This could be wrong, but It seems to be entirely reasonable and a respectable, if not more compelling interpretation than one which says we must jettison the concept of the physical (required, if we reject Noumena as such - or at least, we are given no way to retain it).

Why do you assume that there is an object which engagers a person's perception. Like I said, the perception is a creation of the perceiver. Therefore the perceiver creates the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are two different things. I'm unsure how best to to get this across, but you cannot have a shadow without a physical object physically blocking light, even if we can never access that object. This how noumena must work for perception to do anything which gives us a physical impression. It seems a bit "edgy" to argue otherwise, to me.

This is an unjustified conclusion. A person can be wrong in what they believe they are perceiving, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are perceiving nothing. So, a person can wrongly believe that they are perceiving objects, when in fact they are not perceiving objects, and this does not produce the conclusion that they are producing nothing. They might simply be perceiving something other than objects, and falsely believe that what is perceived is objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't make much sense. A person is not perceiving if they are imagining, which seems to be what you're talking about. If you mean to make a delineation between perception-led impressions and imagination or ideas, then sure, that's highly relevant and complicates things. But it does not give me a counterexample to what I've said, that I can see.

As explained above, what appears to be clear to you is completely illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Sorry.

it's incredibly wrong to you, because you have an illogical thinking process. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no. Sorry. This seems a fairly standard response from people who like to argue about Kant and have rather precious interpretations. That;s not to denigrate you, or it. It is to say that I have come across this many times, and I am hearing nothing new.

Kant's COPR is fairly complex.

If you think noumena is physical though you are completely and utterly wrong. — I like sushi

1. Correct.
2. Not actually possible. If Kant is so complex, and I can find several notable and respectable writers who take the position I'm putting forward, you can't make this claim. Its exactly the same as I'm objecting to above. It is a standard response which is not actually capable of being made on the writings Kant left. The interpretive process gets us here, fairly squarely.

If you are still convinced your view is right then the onus is very much on you to reference and explain why, using his actual words; as the scholarly concensus on this is pretty much stacked completely against you. Note: When I say 'scholarly' I mean reputable scholarly work not amateur interpretations (which are rife with misrepresentation of Kant, due to his multifacted approach). — I like sushi

It seems you maybe have a twisted idea of what is going on in the work, and how people interpret it. I shall stick to reading those interpretations, thinking, and making reasonable inferences. Because this is simply not true. It is true, a consensus exists that the noumena act as a limting factor in human understanding. I've not argued this. There is a second aspect, though more fundamental to the system. I've been over this. It seems, from this, that you and others are not even understanding what's being said in my comments.

The fact is, if noumena do not represent, in an abstract phrasing, actual physical objects the system falls apart. That much is sound. I couldn't care less for quibbling over the fact there are two possible interpretations, and you think one is "flat out wrong" in the face of all I've said, and cited. I just can't take that all too seriously, though I appreciate the efforts everyone is making. You are simply not saying things that make my position incoherent, wrong on the words of Kant, or somehow way outside the reasonable interpretation window.

The fact is, if noumena do not represent, in an abstract phrasing, actual physical objects the system falls apart. That much is sound. — AmadeusD

I'm going to agree with in this regard. I don't think there is a phrase that translates as 'physical object' in the COPR. Kant is clear that noumena cannot be equated with physical objects. Physicality, for him, already belongs to the phenomenal realm (governed by space, time, and causality). Noumenon functions as a boundary concept (as you say), marking the limit of experience (or: hypothetically as an object of intellectual intuition). To say “noumena must be physical objects” is to import a post-Kantian usage of “physical” that he explicitly brackets out. The better way to put it is: noumena are required for the system, but precisely as non-physical and unknowable.

What I am saying is that the idea that there is "a thing" which is perceived is a faulty idea. So, I'm saying that all these supposed "things", forest fires, balls, and clouds, could be better understood if we simply accept that the perception of them as things is mistaken and misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fascinating line of thought. It reminded me of Heidegger's essay on the topic What is a Thing? where he says that our very notion of 'thing’ is not given once and for all but always interpreted in accordance with the domain of discourse in which it is understood.

(Incidentally, a line from the introductory paragraph of that essay: “If one takes everyday representation as the sole standard of all things, then philosophy is always something deranged.” Something which participants in this thread would be well advised to contemplate.)

There are all kinds of things which are commonly referred to as 'things', and not all of them objects of the senses. A thing is simply something which stands out for us.

That is the whole point of the Heidegger essay, which I've been re-reading.

If one takes everyday representation as the sole standard of all things, then philosophy is always something deranged. — Heidegger

Like the OP, right?

Tell that to my thumb, after getting whacked by a mis-directed hammer. — Mww

At the time of injury, I would never be thinking about ontology. What's your point here?

Doesn’t have to be an accurate representation; it is only necessary such representation not contradict either Mother Nature, at the same level, and not contradict antecedent experience on any level. — Mww

Speak for yourself. Some of us are interested in truth. That's what I believe philosophy is all about. And for truth accurate representation is necessary, lack of contradiction doesn't fulfil the the criteria for truth. That we don't have truth is forgivable, as you say, but that doesn't mean we ought not seek it.

Your reasoning is exemplary; it just exceeds the criteria for empirical knowledge of things on a common everyday scale. I mean….when was the last time you approached the SOL in anything with which you were consciously engaged? We’ve all perceived the alignment of susceptible particles into the shape of a field, but none of us have perceived the field of which the particles assume the shape. — Mww

I think i said already, that a key point in Plato's philosophy is the failings, or deficiencies of sensation as a guide toward truth. To find truth we must exceed empirical knowledge. The "common everyday scale" is the life of the cave dweller. Truth is about escaping that common everyday perspective.

I'm unsure how best to to get this across, but you cannot have a shadow without a physical object physically blocking light, even if we can never access that object. — AmadeusD

This argument is based on a specific assumption about what "a shadow" is. If that assumption is wrong, then the argument is unsound. I believe the assumption is wrong, therefore I believe your argument is unsound. I'm unsure how to best get this across to you.

This doesn't make much sense. A person is not perceiving if they are imagining, which seems to be what you're talking about. — AmadeusD

My argument is that a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing. That was to counter your claim that if a person is not perceiving objects one is perceiving nothing. It may be the case that the person judges oneself to be perceiving objects, but is not perceiving objects, yet still is perceiving.

Fascinating line of thought. — Wayfarer

It all relates to the distinction I make between past and future. "Things", as physical objects, are a product of sense knowledge, empirical evidence. However, despite the fact that people claim that sensation occurs at the present, all sensation is always in the past from the perspective of the sensing subject. This means that "things", or "physical objects" refers only to the past. And when we realize that the future consists of possibilities rather than things, or physical objects, this forces us to totally reconceptualize what exactly exists at the present, or more precisely, what is actually happening at the present.

Every so often, MU, you hit upon a vein. Anyway, I'm reading that Heidegger essay ('What is a Thing?') this morning, with able assistance from my friend Chuck, and it's really very interesting.

it's really very interesting. — Wayfarer

I believe that. But Heidegger is quite difficult. Good luck!