But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. — JuanZu
I don't think we can make this conclusion. The flow of time itself appears to be continuous, as a continuous activity, but consider what is happening. Future time becomes past time. August 29 will change from being in the future to being in past. In the meantime, it must traverse the present. What I propose is that the present acts more like a division between past and future, than as a union of the two. Therefore the relation between past and future is discontinuous. — Metaphysician Undercover
The difference between the deterministic world view, and the free will world view, is that the deterministic perspective assumes a continuity of existence, from past, through the present, to the future. This is what is supposed to be a necessary continuity, stated by Newton's first law. Things will continue to be, in the future, as they have been, in the past, unless forced to change. Any change is caused by another thing continuing to be as it has been, so that any change is already laid out, determined. That support a block type universe.
The free will perspective allows that as time passes, there is real possibility for change, which is not a continuity of the past. This violates Newton's first law. But in order to allow, in principle, for the possibility of this 'real change', we must break the assumed continuity of existence, past through present, into future. We must allow that at any moment of passing time, Newton's first law, the determinist premise, may be violated. This means that the idea of a thing having equal existence on the future and past side of present, would have to be dismissed as wrong. What this implies is that an object's existence is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is the only principle which will allow that a freely willed act can interfere in the continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of existence is false. Of course, this is not difficult to accept, for those who believe that objects are a creation of the mind, anyway. The mind can only create the object as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do we need to guarantee such a unity? From the free will perspective this proposed unity makes no sense. Experience is entirely past. We have no experience of the future. We think of the future in terms of possibilities, but it is irrational for me to think that all possibilities will come to pass, and be a part of my experience. Only those possibilities which are actualized will be experienced. Therefore we cannot say that the future and past are united in experience. Only the past has been experienced, and future possibilities always remain outside of experience. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree with this, except there is one big problem. The problem is that we understand the non-present to consist of two parts which are radically different, the past and the future. We know that with respect to the future there is real possibility in relation to what we will do, and what will come to pass. And, we also know that with respect to the past there is an actuality as to what we have done, and what has come to pass. So, if we accept this as a reality, that the past consists of actuality, and the future consists of possibility, dualism is unavoidable — Metaphysician Undercover
Now in this way our understanding acquires a negative expansion, I.e. it is not limited by sensibility(influence of the senses), but rather limits it by calling things in themselves(not considered as appearances) noumena. But it also immediately sets boundaries for itself, not cognising these things through categories, hence merely thinking them under the name of an unknown something.
Are you familiar with the book Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon, a biological anthropologist. He develops the idea of absentials, which are ‘constitutive absences’ - a purpose not yet achieved, such as a seed aiming to become a plant, or the absence of a specific structure, like the cylinder in an engine that channels force, which gives it causal power. or the axle hole which allows the wheel to spin. — Wayfarer
From my point of view, the division between past, present, and future is like a painting where three colors are differentiated without there being a clear division. — JuanZu
There is a difference between past and future, but the difference is not clear. — JuanZu
The discontinuous view of time requires punctuality in which each moment stops, and we would see how everything stops at each moment. But experience shows us the opposite — JuanZu
I speak of guaranteeing the unity of experience simply because I am talking about consciousness and how time passes through it. In this sense, the time of consciousness is analogous to that of the world, but it is not strictly that of the world; it is only a point where a little time flows, so to speak. A small number of events compared to the vastness of all events in the universe. — JuanZu
For me, the past and the future do not belong to being, so I cannot say that they are substances and therefore I cannot say that there is any dualism. Ousia is precisely present, and this can be found in Aristotle's physics. And when I speak of non-presents, I am speaking of something that is neither ousia nor substance. As I see it, we must opt for a category other than being and substance. Something other than substantialism. Derrida calls them traces, as things that are not present, but never totally absent, since we come into contact with them and they constitute us. According to this, we are made up of traces of the past and the future. — JuanZu
I call a concept problematic that contains no contradiction but that is
also, as a boundary for given concepts, connected with other cognitions,
the objective reality of which can in no way be cognized. The concept
of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an ob-
ject of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure un
derstanding), is not at all contradictory; for one cannot assert of
sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. Further, this con-
cept is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in
themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition
(for the other things, to which sensibility does not reach, are called
noumena just in order to indicate that those cognitions cannot extend
their domain to everything that the understanding thinks). In the end,
however, we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and
the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e.,
we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility prob
lematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible
intuition, through which objects outside of the field of sensibility could
be given, and about which the understanding could be employed as-
sertorically. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a bound-
ary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and
therefore only of negative use. But it is nevertheless not invented arbi-
trarily, but is rather connected with the limitation of sensibility, yet
without being able to posit anything positive outside of the domain of
the latter. — CPR B310
The division of objects into phaenomena and noumena, and of the
world into a world of sense and a world of understanding, can therefore
not be permitted at all, although concepts certainly permit of division
into sensible and intellectual ones; for one cannot determine any object
for the latter, and therefore also cannot pass them off as objectively
valid. If one abandons the senses, how will one make comprehensible
that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for
noumena) still signify anything at all, since for their relation to any ob-
ject something more than merely the unity of thinking must be given,
namely a possible intuition, to which they can be applied? — CPR, B311
Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer
CPR, B311 — Paine
I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. — Janus
Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily. — Janus
What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it. — Janus
You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement? — Janus
It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. — Wayfarer
What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God. — Janus
Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? — Janus
Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby". — Janus
Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation. — Janus
That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism. — Janus
But without allowing such hypotheses, one can remark generally that
if by a "soul" I understand a thinking being in itself, then it is already in
itself an unsuitable question to ask whether or not it is of the same
species as matter (which is not a thing in itself at all, but only a species
of representations in us); for it is already self-evident that a thing in it
self is of another nature than the determinations that merely constitute
its state. But if we compare the thinking I not with matter but with the intel-
ligible that grounds the outer appearance we call matter, than because
we know nothing at all about the latter, we cannot say that the soul is
inwardly distinguished from it in any way at all. — CPR A360
Kant is something of a cornerstone in philosophical history so it makes sense to point out mistakes when they occur -- especially when repeated by more than one person. — I like sushi
This misses the mark because he does not talk of a noumenal world in any physical sense. Anything physical is phenomenonal, not merely known through out limited 'senses' as he uses the terms 'intuitions' and 'sensibility'.
You seem to be confusing the 'noumena' with 'transcendental objects'. That is my guess — I like sushi
In reality, the activities of the living being are caused by the being itself, not some external forces. Perception is an activity of living beings. Therefore, we have a very strong reason to "deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects".
That is why your interpretation of Kant is like Sushi says, "flat out wrong". Kant proposes that the a priori intuitions of space and time are put to work by the human being, like tools in its production of the phenomenon you call "perception of physical objects", rather than perception being caused by what you call "physical objects". — Metaphysician Undercover
The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. The latter might have an action in us, which we can’t measure, or isolate as a property.I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.
Quite, but as I say, it’s presence in our lives might just be inobvious, or orthogonal to our preoccupations.The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.
this is nothing like the "hylomorphism" presented by Aristotle and others. — Paine
I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relationsa I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation. — B34-A20
What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” — Wayfarer
Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
— Janus
The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.
You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you. — Mww
The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. — Punshhh
I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example. — Punshhh
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