You define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical, but then you also agree that philosophy has concerns that “lie outside the domain of physics.” That seems to pull in two directions: if philosophy really does deal with realities not derivative from physics, then physicalism can’t capture everything. — Wayfarer

By "outside the domain of physics", I was referring to Physics as a discipline, with a scope of study and research. As I've mentioned several times, Chemists do not directly utilize quantum field theory to do their work, even though this is theoretically possible. They utilize known properties of chemical reactions - aspects of their discipline. That this is done does not imply that chemistry is not reducible to physics

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”

Agreed, but so is the notion that there is something nonphysical involved with mental activities. This is the problem with many theories in philosophy, and it's why I suggest that the only reasonable option is to strive for an inference to best explanation (albeit that this will necessarily entail subjectivity).

So the tension is this: either physicalism covers all that is real, in which case philosophy reduces to physics; or else philosophy genuinely addresses irreducible realities, in which case physicalism does not cover everything that is real. Which is it?

Sure, physicalism implies philosophy is reducible to physics IN PRINCIPLE, but it seems to me that this would be computationally too complex - to the point of being physically impossible.

I'll again refer to the Chemistry-Physics reduction: it's absurdly impractical to do Chemistry on the computational basis of fundamental physics. Biology would be many orders of magnitude more complex. Philosophy would be still more complex.

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”
Agreed, but so is the notion that there is something nonphysical involved with mental activities. This is the problem with many theories in philosophy, and it's why I suggest that the only reasonable option is to strive for an inference to best explanation (albeit that this will necessarily entail subjectivity). — Relativist

But isn't it very simple to show that there is 'something nonphysical' involved in, for example, mathematics and rational inference (at the very least) ? You've already said that computers and calculators, which are physical devices, can perform these operations, to which the reply is, these are artifacts made by humans who already understand these subjects. They're not naturally occurring or self-assembling. And furthermore that these kinds of mental activites comprise the relations of ideas - 'if x is the case, then y must also be the case.' How can such operations be understood as physical? The analogy you give of chemistry is 'that chemistry has to be understood in its own right, but that doesn't mean it's not ultimately reducible to physics'. So why doesn't the same apply here?

It's the very fact that logical, mathematical and syntactical operations can be replicated by machines, and also represented in different media types or symbolic forms, that is itself an argument against physicalism. Why? Because it shows that the content of these operations - the symbolic form, what it is that is being described or depicted - is separable from the physical form in which it is encoded.

And you concede that any explanation will entail subjectivity (which I agree with). But this also undercuts Armstrong's style of materialism, for whom the mind independence of the physical is an axiom.

Sure, physicalism implies philosophy is reducible to physics IN PRINCIPLE, but it seems to me that this would be computationally too complex - to the point of being physically impossible. — Relativist

Right. So where does Armstrong’s materialist theory of mind stand in relation to this? If physicalism is only “in principle” and never in practice — because the domains of logic, mathematics, and meaning can’t actually be reduced — then isn’t his theory less an account of mind than an aspiration that everything ought to be reducible to the physical?

I think that the underlying aim is to declare that only the objects of the physical sciences can be said to exist - this is why you refer to the ontological side of the debate. But I think this view is very much anchored in the Galilean picture in which the subject and object are strictly divided, and the measurable attributes of objects are considered primary, while everything else must be derived from that. Science not only provides the paradigm but also the content - hence the ontology. But i think this has been very much undermined by 20th century physics in both science and philosophy.

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color. — Relativist

Okay thanks for explaining. I have a different take than you on this it seems. I think that conceiving the character of conscious experience in terms of "quales" is wrong-headed and based on "folk psychology".

As I asked a poster in another thread 'is there a difference between consciousness and being conscious?'. How could perceptions, functions of evolved sensory organs and neural structures, that reveal environments and open up the possibility of responding to signs from those environments, be effective if they were not experienced and carried no qualitative significance?

I think the sense and idea of being conscious has been reified into 'consciousness as real and non-physical', and that this reification is a natural artefact of our dualistic symbolic language. Mind, instead of being understood verbally as "minding", as an activity or process of a sentient physical being, has been hypostatized as a noun, and even considered to be an entirely separate substance.

Since we, as linguistically mediated beings with a sense of freedom of action, consider our thoughts, feelings and behavior in terms of responding to reasons rather than being causally forced, and since this seems natural, we develop an intuition that this characteristic shows that we are not merely physical beings, and I think this intuition is misleading. Also since we are so complex, understanding our behavior in terms of physics, although not impossible, would be such a laborious and counter-intuitive task that it is practically unfeasible.

But I don't think this unfeasibility lends any support to the idea that there is anything substantive in us beyond our physical natures. Anti-physicalist proponents will argue that mind is not a substance but that it is real and different from the physical nonetheless. The problem is that then they cannot say anything at all about what it purportedly is if not a separated substance―that is just how it could be real other than as an activity or process of a physical nature.

Of course I could be wrong, so this is just my own take on it. The problem is that it is not a question the answer to which can be empirically or logically demonstrated, and all things considered, it doesn't seem to be very important either, even if it is kind of fun to consider.

The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. — Relativist

If you are acquainted with skepticism, you'll understand that there is no such thing as uncontroversial facts of the world. So this proposal is a nonstarter.

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for. — Relativist

The point though, is that it answers your challenge, how we could possibly know something nonphysical when there is no empirical evidence for it.

In case you didn't understand, here's an example. Suppose piece of knowledge A is "2+2=4". For the sake of argument, this is taken to be something nonphysical. There is much empirical evidence for this, all we need to do is take two things and bring another two, and see that this makes four. Now, by applying nonphysical principles of logic, we can conclude piece of knowledge B, "2,000,000,000,000+2,000,000,000,000=4,000,000,000,000". At this point, it is not necessary that we put together 4,000,000,000,000 things, or even 2,000,000,000,000 things, we can know this thing B, without any empirical evidence of it.

So we can know B without any empirical evidence of B. If B is something nonphysical, that is an example of how we could know something which is nonphysical, when there is no empirical evidence for it. This is actually very common in mathematics, and in fact it is why applied math is so useful. With the application of mathematics, we can know many things without any empirical evidence of these things. Basically that is how successful prediction works. We know that things will occur, before there is any empirical evidence of the thing which will occur. You might prefer to call this magic, but it's really just the nonphysical in action. When we describe an event which has not yet occurred, isn't it accurate to describe this event as having no physical existence, i.e. nonphysical?

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. — Relativist

Actually there is a lot of such material already published, so no need for me to do that. The problem is that physicalists tend to be very closed minded, and don't bother studying, and learning, the things which disprove their physicalist beliefs.

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist. — Relativist

It's not a non-sequitur. The point is that physicalism cannot account for anything in completion. To "account" for a thing requires a complete description. If you cannot describe every aspect of the thing, you have not accounted for the thing. Otherwise "accounting for" would be completely subjective, and an arbitrary description of whatever aspect of the thing which one feels like describing.

The simple fact is that the human sensory system is somewhat deficient. The senses miss some aspects of everything. This means that empirical principles cannot provide for us a complete understanding.

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects. — Relativist

"45 degree angle" is a geometrical description. Yes, it is true that "It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects", but "reflects" does not mean "is". Therefore your supposed "account" provides no information about what "a 45 degree angle" actually is, just an account of what it reflects. Nice try Einstein.

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality. — Relativist

Yes, semantics is meaning, and meaning is nonphysical. Therefore, as I said, the relation is nonphysical.

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of. — Relativist

I am fully aware that there are views which differ from my own. Many of which are ridiculous. Most forms of physicalism fall into that category. I'm still waiting for you to produce something reasonable, in your claim of a view that differs from my own. Until you produce something reasonable, I'll continue to classify yours as ridiculous.

It seems obvious that all percipients have some kind of "first person perspective", so of course beings can be classed as living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, and even sapient and non-sapient. None of that has been forgotten or is even controversial, though. — Janus

Sure, we can propose a division between living and not living. But, by what principle do you propose that both are properly called "beings"? I believe that is the issue. What does "being" mean to you, and is it proper to call the moon a being?





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I think the sense and idea of being conscious has been reified into 'consciousness as real and non-physical', and that this reification is a natural artefact of our dualistic symbolic language. Mind, instead of being understood verbally as "minding", and activity or process of a sentient physical being, has been hypostatized as a noun, and even considered to be an entirely separate substance. — Janus

I agree with that, and I think this is very much the consequence of Cartesian dualism with its 'res cogitans'. That is literally translated as a 'thinking thing' ('res' being the Latin term for 'thing'). It is oxymoronic from the beginning, and one of the reasons we have been left with a worldview within which only the physical (res extensa) is understood to be real. This is very much the background of this whole debate.

anti-physicalist proponents will argue that mind is not a substance but that it is real and different from the physical nonetheless — Janus

That is why it is important to differentiate 'what is real' from 'what exists'. 'What exists' is the legitimate object of scientific analysis. But due to the constitution of post-Galilean science, this excludes the subject for whom the object is real, as a matter of principle. (This is what has been called into question by 20th century physics due to the 'observer problem.)

Another way to think of 'mind' is in terms of the Aristotelian 'nous'. This is the basis of his form-matter dualism, a very different beast to Descartes' dualism. in this philosophy, nous is what perceives the forms (intelligible principles) of individual particulars. 'In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For Aristotle, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way' - which is the basis of the discussion of universals' (source). But notice this is also much more commensurable with 'mind as activity' rather than as 'substance'.

So the 'rational intellect' is able to grasp what has been called 'intelligible objects' - although this term is also problematical, as numbers, laws, conventions, and the like, are not really objects except for in the metaphorical sense as 'objects of thought' or 'the object of the exercise'. From there, you can see how Kant recasts Aristotle’s insight: what Aristotle called nous, Kant reframed as the a priori categories of understanding.

So the mind is 'real and different from the physical' not as a kind of ghost in the machine, but as the medium through which and for which the whole conception of 'object' is meaningful.

Sure, we can propose a division between living and not living. But, by what principle do you propose that both are properly called "beings"? I believe that is the issue. What does "being" mean to you, and is it proper to call the moon a being? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not a believer in properness, but rather in consistency and coherency. We humans are so humancentric that we tend to think of human being as the paradigm. We don't use the term 'animal being' so much but simply 'animal'.

Of course 'being' gets extended to 'living being', and 'sentient being' and perhaps it has become more uncommon to speak of non-living or non-sentient beings. But since such entities are existents and to exist seems to be synonymous with 'to be' I see no inconsistency in referring to the moon as a being.

If we have all the appropriate conceptual distinctions is it really all that important what words we use to frame them?

It seems the nub of our disagreement is that I think of minding as being a real physical (that is embodied, neural) activity and for me 'to exist' and 'to be real' are the same (and I think this reflects the most common usages). Perhaps the difference lies merely in choice of terminology.

On further reflection though, I want to add that, for example, it might be said that Bilbo exists as a fictional character, but that since he is fictional, he is not real. This seems to introduce a wrinkle in the tidy fabric, and shows that these terms are more elastic than is often allowed.

Example: chemical reactions can (in principle) be explained in terms of fundamental physics. Chemistry is concerned mainly with the structure and reactions of atoms and molecules. These structures and reactions are a consequence of the properties of their components. The study of those components, and their properties, is fundamental physics. I doubt that anyone suggests there's some ontological emergence occurring when molecules interact that is not due to the properties of the components (as studied by physics). This relationship can be described as "Chemistry is reducible to Physics". This relationship between chemistry and physics is uncontroversial. — Relativist

I am not referring to the physical/ chemical sciences, which are indeed reducible to each other. I am referring to the vast array of sciences and disciplines that we possess and which, nevertheless, are not reducible to the physical and chemical sciences. I have mentioned some of them, such as phenomenology, mathematics/geometry, logic, psychology, economics, aesthetics, etc.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned.

This cannot be done. For example, you have concepts of speed, time, energy, mass, etc., and you have to use them to develop Pythagoras' theorem. It cannot be done. Therefore, there is no reduction. And physicalism has no place in science as a set of sciences. It could be said that physicalism is anti-scientific in this sense, since it does not respect the identity of many sciences and disciplines.

Now, you could argue that your intention is not to carry out that reduction but to establish that the properties of the world described by other sciences are emergent properties. But then emergence is not explanatory, and physicalism has no explanatory power. And if it has no explanatory power, then I don't know why anyone would choose physicalism as a general ontology of the world.

I'm not a believer in properness, but rather in consistency and coherency. — Janus

Properness is a requirement for consistency and coherency. Ambiguity produces equivocation. So if you really believed in consistency and coherency, you'd believe in grammar as well.

If we have all the appropriate conceptual distinctions is it really all that important what words we use to frame them? — Janus

Yes, obviously it is all that important. If we don't use the words required to frame the conceptual distinctions, having the distinctions is pointless. You can say for example, 'I can easily distinguish between a rock and a human being', but if you just always refer to them both as "beings", what good does your ability to distinguish serve?

But since such entities are existents and to exist seems to be synonymous with 'to be' I see no inconsistency in referring to the moon as a being. — Janus

It's generally not productive to say that two words are synonymous. This dissolves the difference between them making the choice of using one or the other insignificant, despite the fact that there is at least nuanced differences between all words.

The most common difference between two words which might appear to be synonymous, is a difference of category. Sometimes one word will define the other, and actually signify a broader category, while the inverse cannot be the case. This allows that there are others in that broader category, making the words not synonymous. For example, "man" and "human being", might at first glance appear synonymous. However, we know that "human being" is actually the defining term for "man", as the broader category, because "man" properly refers to the male members of the category, and there are also female members.

Since "being" is most often defined by existing, and "existing" is usually defined by something further, we ought to consider that "existing" is the broader term. This would imply that all beings are existing, but not all existents are beings, because "existent" could include things which are not beings. Subtle distinctions allow us to keep our categories clear, and categories are conducive to deductive reasoning.

Properness is a requirement for consistency and coherency. Ambiguity produces equivocation. So if you really believed in consistency and coherency, you'd believe in grammar as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have it arse-about. We only know that something is a "proper" expression if it is consistent and coherent. The latter are the criteria for the former, not vice versa. If there are sveral consietnt and coherent usages of a term . then there would not be just one "proper" usage.

Yes, obviously it is all that important. If we don't use the words required to frame the conceptual distinctions, having the distinctions is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but again there may be more than one way to frame the distinctions, and of course if they are not framed consistently and coherently then they are not really framed at all, and we could not be said to "have" the distinctions.

It's generally not productive to say that two words are synonymous. This dissolves the difference between them making the choice of using one or the other insignificant, despite the fact that there is at least nuanced differences between all words. — Metaphysician Undercover

The nuances of words vary with the different associations different people have of them, which is reflected in the different usages. You might not like a particular usage, but that would just be your personal preference and does not preclude the usage being perfectly consistent and coherent with common usage.

The most common difference between two words which might appear to be synonymous, is a difference of category. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree―I think that words can be synonymous within one context and not within another. In most general usage in English I think that to say that something is is to say that it exists, and to say that something exists is consistent with saying that it is be-ing (as a verb) or a being (as a noun).

But whatever you say, someone will disagree. For example I might say 'love is' meaning that there is love. Then if I say 'love exists', also meaning that there is love, someone will objects that love is not an existent object. I might then say, in accordance with a common usage "love is a thing"., and then the objection will be that love is not an object. And yet we say things (see what I did there) like "the thing is...".

You are never going to get away from the ambiguities of language, and playing though police or speech police is an unreasonable and unhelpful move. Wisdom is not to be found in teasing out some supposedly pure and perfect usage.

Since "being" is most often defined by existing, and "existing" is usually defined by something further, we ought to consider that "existing" is the broader term. This would imply that all beings are existing, but not all existents are beings, because "existent" could include things which are not beings. Subtle distinctions allow us to keep our categories clear, and categories are conducive to deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about "the most important thing is love" and "love being the most important thing". Love is being practiced every day. Love exists in the world? You know perfectly well what I'm saying there even thought the words used might not be consistent with your preferences.

You are not going to get everyone to share your preferences, because as I said earlier language is elastic and we all encounter differences emphases on "correct" usage as we grow up and throughout our lives.

In philosophy, as I see it, it's more important to focus on the consistency, coherency and plausibility of arguments than pedantically worrying about "proper" usage of terms. Whatever is serviceable for getting the ideas across will do.

I don't believe there is any hidden knowledge, to be found in word usage, there is just the knowledge of different usages in different contexts to be found.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned. — JuanZu

I accurately described what is meant by reductionism. It is a hypothesis in philosophy of science that an idealized, 100% correct, fundamental physics accounts for all things that exist, and how they interact and behave.

It does not entail a discipline-to-disciple translation recipe. The scientific disciplines you refer to are based on fit-for-purpose paradigms, and none are complete or perfect.

Do you acknowledge that everything in the physical world is composed of the same set of fundamental particles? The current best guess is the well-supported [url=http://Standard Model - Wikipedia https://share.google/JK7t11rDJgDJRJZOg]standard model of particle physics[/url]. The standard model accounts for the both the composition of matter, and the forces that result in their behavior. It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy. But it does account for everything that exists on earth: all objects are made of atoms; atoms are made of quarks and electrons. No exceptions. So clearly, the composition of everything on earth is reducible to these particles.

In light of this. what do you think would make reductionism false? You mentioned speed, time, energy, mass. The nature of time is controversial in both science and metaphysics, but speed, energy, and mass are accounted for in the physics behind the standard model: quantum field theory. While the nature of time is controversial, whatever it is doesn't have bearing on reductionism - because whatever it IS, is the same for everything- no reduction is needed.

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy. — Relativist

And numbers.