You define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical, but then you also agree that philosophy has concerns that “lie outside the domain of physics.” That seems to pull in two directions: if philosophy really does deal with realities not derivative from physics, then physicalism can’t capture everything. — Wayfarer

By "outside the domain of physics", I was referring to Physics as a discipline, with a scope of study and research. As I've mentioned several times, Chemists do not directly utilize quantum field theory to do their work, even though this is theoretically possible. They utilize known properties of chemical reactions - aspects of their discipline. That this is done does not imply that chemistry is not reducible to physics

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”

Agreed, but so is the notion that there is something nonphysical involved with mental activities. This is the problem with many theories in philosophy, and it's why I suggest that the only reasonable option is to strive for an inference to best explanation (albeit that this will necessarily entail subjectivity).

So the tension is this: either physicalism covers all that is real, in which case philosophy reduces to physics; or else philosophy genuinely addresses irreducible realities, in which case physicalism does not cover everything that is real. Which is it?

Sure, physicalism implies philosophy is reducible to physics IN PRINCIPLE, but it seems to me that this would be computationally too complex - to the point of being physically impossible.

I'll again refer to the Chemistry-Physics reduction: it's absurdly impractical to do Chemistry on the computational basis of fundamental physics. Biology would be many orders of magnitude more complex. Philosophy would be still more complex.

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”
Agreed, but so is the notion that there is something nonphysical involved with mental activities. This is the problem with many theories in philosophy, and it's why I suggest that the only reasonable option is to strive for an inference to best explanation (albeit that this will necessarily entail subjectivity). — Relativist

But isn't it very simple to show that there is 'something nonphysical' involved in, for example, mathematics and rational inference (at the very least) ? You've already said that computers and calculators, which are physical devices, can perform these operations, to which the reply is, these are artifacts made by humans who already understand these subjects. They're not naturally occurring or self-assembling. And furthermore that these kinds of mental activites comprise the relations of ideas - 'if x is the case, then y must also be the case.' How can such operations be understood as physical? The analogy you give of chemistry is 'that chemistry has to be understood in its own right, but that doesn't mean it's not ultimately reducible to physics'. So why doesn't the same apply here?

It's the very fact that logical, mathematical and syntactical operations can be replicated by machines, and also represented in different media types or symbolic forms, that is itself an argument against physicalism. Why? Because it shows that the content of these operations - the symbolic form, what it is that is being described or depicted - is separable from the physical form in which it is encoded.

And you concede that any explanation will entail subjectivity (which I agree with). But this also undercuts Armstrong's style of materialism, for whom the mind independence of the physical is an axiom.

Sure, physicalism implies philosophy is reducible to physics IN PRINCIPLE, but it seems to me that this would be computationally too complex - to the point of being physically impossible. — Relativist

Right. So where does Armstrong’s materialist theory of mind stand in relation to this? If physicalism is only “in principle” and never in practice — because the domains of logic, mathematics, and meaning can’t actually be reduced — then isn’t his theory less an account of mind than an aspiration that everything ought to be reducible to the physical?

I think that the underlying aim is to declare that only the objects of the physical sciences can be said to exist - this is why you refer to the ontological side of the debate. But I think this view is very much anchored in the Galilean picture in which the subject and object are strictly divided, and the measurable attributes of objects are considered primary, while everything else must be derived from that. Science not only provides the paradigm but also the content - hence the ontology. But i think this has been very much undermined by 20th century physics in both science and philosophy.

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color. — Relativist

Okay thanks for explaining. I have a different take than you on this it seems. I think that conceiving the character of conscious experience in terms of "quales" is wrong-headed and based on "folk psychology".

As I asked a poster in another thread 'is there a difference between consciousness and being conscious?'. How could perceptions, functions of evolved sensory organs and neural structures, that reveal environments and open up the possibility of responding to signs from those environments, be effective if they were not experienced and carried no qualitative significance?

I think the sense and idea of being conscious has been reified into 'consciousness as real and non-physical', and that this reification is a natural artefact of our dualistic symbolic language. Mind, instead of being understood verbally as "minding", as an activity or process of a sentient physical being, has been hypostatized as a noun, and even considered to be an entirely separate substance.

Since we, as linguistically mediated beings with a sense of freedom of action, consider our thoughts, feelings and behavior in terms of responding to reasons rather than being causally forced, and since this seems natural, we develop an intuition that this characteristic shows that we are not merely physical beings, and I think this intuition is misleading. Also since we are so complex, understanding our behavior in terms of physics, although not impossible, would be such a laborious and counter-intuitive task that it is practically unfeasible.

But I don't think this unfeasibility lends any support to the idea that there is anything substantive in us beyond our physical natures. Anti-physicalist proponents will argue that mind is not a substance but that it is real and different from the physical nonetheless. The problem is that then they cannot say anything at all about what it purportedly is if not a separated substance―that is just how it could be real other than as an activity or process of a physical nature.

Of course I could be wrong, so this is just my own take on it. The problem is that it is not a question the answer to which can be empirically or logically demonstrated, and all things considered, it doesn't seem to be very important either, even if it is kind of fun to consider.

The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. — Relativist

If you are acquainted with skepticism, you'll understand that there is no such thing as uncontroversial facts of the world. So this proposal is a nonstarter.

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for. — Relativist

The point though, is that it answers your challenge, how we could possibly know something nonphysical when there is no empirical evidence for it.

In case you didn't understand, here's an example. Suppose piece of knowledge A is "2+2=4". For the sake of argument, this is taken to be something nonphysical. There is much empirical evidence for this, all we need to do is take two things and bring another two, and see that this makes four. Now, by applying nonphysical principles of logic, we can conclude piece of knowledge B, "2,000,000,000,000+2,000,000,000,000=4,000,000,000,000". At this point, it is not necessary that we put together 4,000,000,000,000 things, or even 2,000,000,000,000 things, we can know this thing B, without any empirical evidence of it.

So we can know B without any empirical evidence of B. If B is something nonphysical, that is an example of how we could know something which is nonphysical, when there is no empirical evidence for it. This is actually very common in mathematics, and in fact it is why applied math is so useful. With the application of mathematics, we can know many things without any empirical evidence of these things. Basically that is how successful prediction works. We know that things will occur, before there is any empirical evidence of the thing which will occur. You might prefer to call this magic, but it's really just the nonphysical in action. When we describe an event which has not yet occurred, isn't it accurate to describe this event as having no physical existence, i.e. nonphysical?

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. — Relativist

Actually there is a lot of such material already published, so no need for me to do that. The problem is that physicalists tend to be very closed minded, and don't bother studying, and learning, the things which disprove their physicalist beliefs.

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist. — Relativist

It's not a non-sequitur. The point is that physicalism cannot account for anything in completion. To "account" for a thing requires a complete description. If you cannot describe every aspect of the thing, you have not accounted for the thing. Otherwise "accounting for" would be completely subjective, and an arbitrary description of whatever aspect of the thing which one feels like describing.

The simple fact is that the human sensory system is somewhat deficient. The senses miss some aspects of everything. This means that empirical principles cannot provide for us a complete understanding.

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects. — Relativist

"45 degree angle" is a geometrical description. Yes, it is true that "It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects", but "reflects" does not mean "is". Therefore your supposed "account" provides no information about what "a 45 degree angle" actually is, just an account of what it reflects. Nice try Einstein.

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality. — Relativist

Yes, semantics is meaning, and meaning is nonphysical. Therefore, as I said, the relation is nonphysical.

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of. — Relativist

I am fully aware that there are views which differ from my own. Many of which are ridiculous. Most forms of physicalism fall into that category. I'm still waiting for you to produce something reasonable, in your claim of a view that differs from my own. Until you produce something reasonable, I'll continue to classify yours as ridiculous.

It seems obvious that all percipients have some kind of "first person perspective", so of course beings can be classed as living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, and even sapient and non-sapient. None of that has been forgotten or is even controversial, though. — Janus

Sure, we can propose a division between living and not living. But, by what principle do you propose that both are properly called "beings"? I believe that is the issue. What does "being" mean to you, and is it proper to call the moon a being?





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I think the sense and idea of being conscious has been reified into 'consciousness as real and non-physical', and that this reification is a natural artefact of our dualistic symbolic language. Mind, instead of being understood verbally as "minding", and activity or process of a sentient physical being, has been hypostatized as a noun, and even considered to be an entirely separate substance. — Janus

I agree with that, and I think this is very much the consequence of Cartesian dualism with its 'res cogitans'. That is literally translated as a 'thinking thing' ('res' being the Latin term for 'thing'). It is oxymoronic from the beginning, and one of the reasons we have been left with a worldview within which only the physical (res extensa) is understood to be real. This is very much the background of this whole debate.

anti-physicalist proponents will argue that mind is not a substance but that it is real and different from the physical nonetheless — Janus

That is why it is important to differentiate 'what is real' from 'what exists'. 'What exists' is the legitimate object of scientific analysis. But due to the constitution of post-Galilean science, this excludes the subject for whom the object is real, as a matter of principle. (This is what has been called into question by 20th century physics due to the 'observer problem.)

Another way to think of 'mind' is in terms of the Aristotelian 'nous'. This is the basis of his form-matter dualism, a very different beast to Descartes' dualism. in this philosophy, nous is what perceives the forms (intelligible principles) of individual particulars. 'In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For Aristotle, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way' - which is the basis of the discussion of universals' (source). But notice this is also much more commensurable with 'mind as activity' rather than as 'substance'.

So the 'rational intellect' is able to grasp what has been called 'intelligible objects' - although this term is also problematical, as numbers, laws, conventions, and the like, are not really objects except for in the metaphorical sense as 'objects of thought' or 'the object of the exercise'. From there, you can see how Kant recasts Aristotle’s insight: what Aristotle called nous, Kant reframed as the a priori categories of understanding.

So the mind is 'real and different from the physical' not as a kind of ghost in the machine, but as the medium through which and for which the whole conception of 'object' is meaningful.

Sure, we can propose a division between living and not living. But, by what principle do you propose that both are properly called "beings"? I believe that is the issue. What does "being" mean to you, and is it proper to call the moon a being? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not a believer in properness, but rather in consistency and coherency. We humans are so humancentric that we tend to think of human being as the paradigm. We don't use the term 'animal being' so much but simply 'animal'.

Of course 'being' gets extended to 'living being', and 'sentient being' and perhaps it has become more uncommon to speak of non-living or non-sentient beings. But since such entities are existents and to exist seems to be synonymous with 'to be' I see no inconsistency in referring to the moon as a being.

If we have all the appropriate conceptual distinctions is it really all that important what words we use to frame them?

It seems the nub of our disagreement is that I think of minding as being a real physical (that is embodied, neural) activity and for me 'to exist' and 'to be real' are the same (and I think this reflects the most common usages). Perhaps the difference lies merely in choice of terminology.

On further reflection though, I want to add that, for example, it might be said that Bilbo exists as a fictional character, but that since he is fictional, he is not real. This seems to introduce a wrinkle in the tidy fabric, and shows that these terms are more elastic than is often allowed.

Example: chemical reactions can (in principle) be explained in terms of fundamental physics. Chemistry is concerned mainly with the structure and reactions of atoms and molecules. These structures and reactions are a consequence of the properties of their components. The study of those components, and their properties, is fundamental physics. I doubt that anyone suggests there's some ontological emergence occurring when molecules interact that is not due to the properties of the components (as studied by physics). This relationship can be described as "Chemistry is reducible to Physics". This relationship between chemistry and physics is uncontroversial. — Relativist

I am not referring to the physical/ chemical sciences, which are indeed reducible to each other. I am referring to the vast array of sciences and disciplines that we possess and which, nevertheless, are not reducible to the physical and chemical sciences. I have mentioned some of them, such as phenomenology, mathematics/geometry, logic, psychology, economics, aesthetics, etc.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned.

This cannot be done. For example, you have concepts of speed, time, energy, mass, etc., and you have to use them to develop Pythagoras' theorem. It cannot be done. Therefore, there is no reduction. And physicalism has no place in science as a set of sciences. It could be said that physicalism is anti-scientific in this sense, since it does not respect the identity of many sciences and disciplines.

Now, you could argue that your intention is not to carry out that reduction but to establish that the properties of the world described by other sciences are emergent properties. But then emergence is not explanatory, and physicalism has no explanatory power. And if it has no explanatory power, then I don't know why anyone would choose physicalism as a general ontology of the world.

I'm not a believer in properness, but rather in consistency and coherency. — Janus

Properness is a requirement for consistency and coherency. Ambiguity produces equivocation. So if you really believed in consistency and coherency, you'd believe in grammar as well.

If we have all the appropriate conceptual distinctions is it really all that important what words we use to frame them? — Janus

Yes, obviously it is all that important. If we don't use the words required to frame the conceptual distinctions, having the distinctions is pointless. You can say for example, 'I can easily distinguish between a rock and a human being', but if you just always refer to them both as "beings", what good does your ability to distinguish serve?

But since such entities are existents and to exist seems to be synonymous with 'to be' I see no inconsistency in referring to the moon as a being. — Janus

It's generally not productive to say that two words are synonymous. This dissolves the difference between them making the choice of using one or the other insignificant, despite the fact that there is at least nuanced differences between all words.

The most common difference between two words which might appear to be synonymous, is a difference of category. Sometimes one word will define the other, and actually signify a broader category, while the inverse cannot be the case. This allows that there are others in that broader category, making the words not synonymous. For example, "man" and "human being", might at first glance appear synonymous. However, we know that "human being" is actually the defining term for "man", as the broader category, because "man" properly refers to the male members of the category, and there are also female members.

Since "being" is most often defined by existing, and "existing" is usually defined by something further, we ought to consider that "existing" is the broader term. This would imply that all beings are existing, but not all existents are beings, because "existent" could include things which are not beings. Subtle distinctions allow us to keep our categories clear, and categories are conducive to deductive reasoning.

Properness is a requirement for consistency and coherency. Ambiguity produces equivocation. So if you really believed in consistency and coherency, you'd believe in grammar as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have it arse-about. We only know that something is a "proper" expression if it is consistent and coherent. The latter are the criteria for the former, not vice versa. If there are sveral consietnt and coherent usages of a term . then there would not be just one "proper" usage.

Yes, obviously it is all that important. If we don't use the words required to frame the conceptual distinctions, having the distinctions is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but again there may be more than one way to frame the distinctions, and of course if they are not framed consistently and coherently then they are not really framed at all, and we could not be said to "have" the distinctions.

It's generally not productive to say that two words are synonymous. This dissolves the difference between them making the choice of using one or the other insignificant, despite the fact that there is at least nuanced differences between all words. — Metaphysician Undercover

The nuances of words vary with the different associations different people have of them, which is reflected in the different usages. You might not like a particular usage, but that would just be your personal preference and does not preclude the usage being perfectly consistent and coherent with common usage.

The most common difference between two words which might appear to be synonymous, is a difference of category. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree―I think that words can be synonymous within one context and not within another. In most general usage in English I think that to say that something is is to say that it exists, and to say that something exists is consistent with saying that it is be-ing (as a verb) or a being (as a noun).

But whatever you say, someone will disagree. For example I might say 'love is' meaning that there is love. Then if I say 'love exists', also meaning that there is love, someone will objects that love is not an existent object. I might then say, in accordance with a common usage "love is a thing"., and then the objection will be that love is not an object. And yet we say things (see what I did there) like "the thing is...".

You are never going to get away from the ambiguities of language, and playing though police or speech police is an unreasonable and unhelpful move. Wisdom is not to be found in teasing out some supposedly pure and perfect usage.

Since "being" is most often defined by existing, and "existing" is usually defined by something further, we ought to consider that "existing" is the broader term. This would imply that all beings are existing, but not all existents are beings, because "existent" could include things which are not beings. Subtle distinctions allow us to keep our categories clear, and categories are conducive to deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about "the most important thing is love" and "love being the most important thing". Love is being practiced every day. Love exists in the world? You know perfectly well what I'm saying there even thought the words used might not be consistent with your preferences.

You are not going to get everyone to share your preferences, because as I said earlier language is elastic and we all encounter differences emphases on "correct" usage as we grow up and throughout our lives.

In philosophy, as I see it, it's more important to focus on the consistency, coherency and plausibility of arguments than pedantically worrying about "proper" usage of terms. Whatever is serviceable for getting the ideas across will do.

I don't believe there is any hidden knowledge, to be found in word usage, there is just the knowledge of different usages in different contexts to be found.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned. — JuanZu

I accurately described what is meant by reductionism. It is a hypothesis in philosophy of science that an idealized, 100% correct, fundamental physics accounts for all things that exist, and how they interact and behave.

It does not entail a discipline-to-disciple translation recipe. The scientific disciplines you refer to are based on fit-for-purpose paradigms, and none are complete or perfect.

Do you acknowledge that everything in the physical world is composed of the same set of fundamental particles? The current best guess is the well-supported [url=http://Standard Model - Wikipedia https://share.google/JK7t11rDJgDJRJZOg]standard model of particle physics[/url]. The standard model accounts for the both the composition of matter, and the forces that result in their behavior. It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy. But it does account for everything that exists on earth: all objects are made of atoms; atoms are made of quarks and electrons. No exceptions. So clearly, the composition of everything on earth is reducible to these particles.

In light of this. what do you think would make reductionism false? You mentioned speed, time, energy, mass. The nature of time is controversial in both science and metaphysics, but speed, energy, and mass are accounted for in the physics behind the standard model: quantum field theory. While the nature of time is controversial, whatever it is doesn't have bearing on reductionism - because whatever it IS, is the same for everything- no reduction is needed.

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy. — Relativist

And numbers.

I am a little disappointed with your response. You have simply reiterated what you already said, reaffirming your position but without providing any arguments against what I said.

In terms of composition, things do not improve. Imagine saying that the number pi is made up of hydrogen atoms. Or that the idea of justice is made up of the same atoms. These are categorical errors. If you talk about composition, you must necessarily talk about decomposition, and if we decompose the number pi and the idea of justice, we do not have atoms, we have more numbers (or ratios, circumferences and diameters) and more ideas (an idea is composed by more ideas).

It is said that a reduction by composition fails when the path of decomposition fails and we do not have the components we thought we had in the first place. This happens with most of the knowledge we have (the entire set of sciences and disciplines). Ethical principles cannot be broken down into atoms without losing all the meaning of what a principle means. Hence, physicalism by composition is also erroneous.

Even physics is not entirely physics. Do not forget the mathematical part that composes it and gives it its scientific and exact status. And that is despite the fact that mathematics is supposed to be a higher level in terms of composition. So it would have to be said that the universe has an ideal-objective aspect (Plato's realm) - (or ideal-subjective if you think mathematics is all mental, that will be funny, to think the universe with mental properties), as does mathematics. In that sense, it must be said that physicalism by composition is false even in the case of the universe.

We only know that something is a "proper" expression if it is consistent and coherent. The latter are the criteria for the former, not vice versa. If there are sveral consietnt and coherent usages of a term . then there would not be just one "proper" usage. — Janus

That is demonstrably incorrect Janus. And this is why you need to keep your categories clear, and ensure that you understand the broader category, being the defining feature of the narrower, as necessary for, therefore prior to, the narrower. In Aristotelian terms, the broader category, as the defining feature, is "within" the narrower. So for example, "animal" is within "human being" as a defining feature. This means that if it is a human being, it is necessarily an animal, but not vise versa because "human being" is not within "animal" as a defining feature. So "animal" is logically prior to "human being", meaning that "animal" can be understood independently from "human being", but "human being" cannot be understood independently from "animal". Animal is an essential, necessary, aspect of the concept human being while human being is contingent on animal.

In the case of your statement above, "proper" is the broader category from the narrower "logically coherent", or "logically consistent". "Proper" is a defining, essential feature, of "logically coherent". To be logically coherent, properness is necessary. So "proper" is logically prior to, as necessary for logical coherency. On the other hand, "proper", being the broader category, affords all different types of properness, which do not necessarily involve logical coherency. So we have many different types of social norms, mores and morals, rules and regulations, which describe different types of properness, and we can place "logical forms" as one type of properness. If we follow those specific rules of logical properness, we have logical coherency. So properness is clearly prior to logically coherent, as necessary for logical coherence. But logical coherence is not necessary for properness as there are other forms of properness. In relation to each other then, properness is independent from, but necessary for logically coherent, while logically coherent is contingent, as dependent on properness.

Therefore the exact contrary of what you say here is what is really the case. Since there are many forms of properness, a "proper expression" does not require logical consistency or coherency. It may be "proper" in the sense of following a moral principle, or some other form of correctness, properness being determined by that context. On the other hand, a statement must be proper in the sense of following logical rules, for it to be judged as logically consistent, or coherent. Therefore, contrary to what you say, we know that the statement is consistent and coherent, by judging it to be proper. That is, we refer to that specific type of properness, found in logical forms, and if the statement conforms to that type of properness, we judge it as consistent and coherent.

I disagree―I think that words can be synonymous within one context and not within another. — Janus

This makes no sense at all. It is impossible that two words appear in the very same context. the person would be using both words at the same time. Instead, the person must chose one word or the other. And if one word is chosen over the other because it has different meaning from the other, in a different context, then that difference carries into the new context, by the very fact that it was chosen for that reason.

I addressed your issue in a reply to Janus:

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color.

As a computer guy, I also think about these things in terms of whether or not a machine could be programmed to exhibit the same qualities that our minds exhibit. I'm stumped, and it seems that most physicalist philosophers are, as well.

This does not prove physicalism is false - that would entail an argument from ignorance. It could very well be that in the future, these issues will be resolved - and we'll be able to construct robots that have subjective experiences of qualia. But arguments from ignorance can often be cast as inferences to the best explanation, and I think one could argue that the hard problem is better explained by assuming some non-physical aspect is required. That's what I'm calling the "good reasons". — Relativist

The "good reasons" are not established facts that falsify physicalism, as you seem to be implying. Rather they are reasonable possibilities that SOME might consider strong enough to sway their own abductive analysis (choosing a metaphysical theory that best explains all available uncontroversial facts). I still judge physicalism the best overall metaphysical theory that I've seen.

If you are acquainted with skepticism, you'll understand that there is no such thing as uncontroversial facts of the world. So this proposal is a nonstarter. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not take the objections of extreme skeptics seriously.

If one considers there to be no uncontroversial facts, then one has no basis for selecting a metaphysical theory. I'm an epistemological pragmatist.

epistemological pragmatist — Relativist

It seems I'd never considered that phrase before.

Google's AI overview was very close to my intuitive notion of what is suggested by the phrase. Is there a definition you particularly like?

I think it's unlikely that there are other intelligent life forms near enough to us, for them to impact us. But we clearly have different perspectives. — Relativist

If there are any, they obviously aren't near enough to have any impact on us. We have seen no sign of them, after all. But, if there are others, as we all go farther from home, we will interact. All speculation, of course.

But isn't it very simple to show that there is 'something nonphysical' involved in, for example, mathematics and rational inference (at the very least) ? — Wayfarer

There are 2 related and relevant aspects of mathematics:
1. The portion that is grounded in the actual world. This includes things like numericity: two-ness, three-ness, four-ness... each is a physical property that is held by certain groups of objects. By applying the "way of abstraction" we discern the natural numbers as abstractions of these physical properties. We then notice various relations between numbers and establish basic arithmetic.
2. Axioms: statements we make to define an abstract mathematical system, and from which we draw inferences using logic.

Rational inference may be epistemologically grounded in cause and effect (observed pattern): If x occurs then y will happen. Then extended by semantics and abstraction. Formal logic is clearly nothing more than semantics: precise meanings attached to words (e.g. "and", "or", "not", "if...then..."). The precise meanings are typically defined in truth tables.

You've already said that computers and calculators, which are physical devices, can perform these operations... — Wayfarer

My point is that any behavior that can be described algorithmically is consistent with the behavior of something physical- hence it's consistent with physicalism.

It's the very fact that logical, mathematical and syntactical operations can be replicated by machines, and also represented in different media types or symbolic forms, that is itself an argument against physicalism. Why? Because it shows that the content of these operations - the symbolic form, what it is that is being described or depicted - is separable from the physical form in which it is encoded. — Wayfarer

You seem to be bundling the easy and hard problems of consciousness together. Easy: Machines can identify patterns, and could utilize those patterns in new ways. Attaching meaning to words or patterns is even straightforward (to a point): words represent memories (learnings, experiences).

The hard part pertains specifically to the elements of consciousness that we can't even envision a means of duplicating in a machine: qualia. This includes the minor thrill of completing a task, the sense memories we attach to words; the way we perceive things.
Example: "red" can be defined to a computer as a range of wavelengths, but we know red as the memory of a particular sensory experience.

Right. So where does Armstrong’s materialist theory of mind stand in relation to this? If physicalism is only “in principle” and never in practice — because the domains of logic, mathematics, and meaning can’t actually be reduced — then isn’t his theory less an account of mind than an aspiration that everything ought to be reducible to the physical? — Wayfarer

To put it simply (and a little imprecisely): "In principle" is a way of expressing the metaphysical claim that everything is composed of the same set of particles, that in each case they have achieved their arrangement as a consequence of laws of nature, and that every action taken by these complex objects is also entirely due to these laws of nature.

The "in practice" problem: we don't have a perfect physics, and even if we did, it would be computationally impossible to describe the behavior of complex objects using only the computstional methodology of fundamental physics. That's all it means. It does not mean it's impossibly difficult for the fundamental particles and forces to do what they do (which is what I think you may be inferring). Analogously: consider the effort needed to calculate the position the moon from a point on earth at some specific time vs the moon simply behaving per gravity.

I think that the underlying aim is to declare that only the objects of the physical sciences can be said to exist - this is why you refer to the ontological side of the debate. — Wayfarer

That's close, but you word it in a way that sounds like it is excluding something. Rather, it's a parsimonious view of what exists: it's unparsimonious to believe things exist that can't be detected or observed to exist + the observation that everything that is observed or inferred to exist is physical.

Consider the early universe: what we know about it is inferred; there is no basis to infer anything existing other than the physical objects we've inferred to have existed.

Science not only provides the paradigm but also the content - hence the ontology — Wayfarer

No. We believe our senses: that the objects we perceive actually do exist. We believe reliable sources, such as historians, archaeologists, and parents who tell us about what existed in the past. Science happens to give us a means to infer additional existents, but any reliable means would be fine.

The "good reasons" are not established facts that falsify physicalism, as you seem to be implying. — Relativist

No, that's not at all what I am implying.

I am wondering why you think physicalism, which holds that all is physical, is the best ontology, when you also see good reason to believe that there is something nonphysical. Your beliefs seem self-contradictory to me.

Here's an example for comparison. You believe that all the problems of the world will be resolved. But you also see good reason to believe that some problems will never be solved. How can you hold these two beliefs at the same time?

This includes things like numericity: two-ness, three-ness, four-ness... each is a physical property that is held by certain groups of objects — Relativist

It is in no way 'a physical property'. One can count the members of a set of concepts, none of which is physical. Counting is an intellectual act which can be applied to both physical and non-physical entities.

My point is that any behavior that can be described algorithmically is consistent with the behavior of something physical- hence it's consistent with physicalism. — Relativist

But the issue is, can insight be described algorithmically?

To put it simply (and a little imprecisely)... — Relativist

Thanks for clarifying. But notice what you’ve said: the “in principle” part of physicalism is a metaphysical claim — that all things are ultimately just arrangements of particles under natural laws. That’s not a finding of science but a philosophical commitment hiding behind the skirts of science.

The “in practice” problem (computational impossibility) doesn’t really address the deeper issue I raised. With the moon, the problem is only one of calculation — we know what it is to be a moon, and the math just gets messy. But with mind, the issue is different: truths, meanings, logical relations, and intentions are not computationally intractable physical behaviors. They are not physical categories at all. And furthermore, Albert Einstein had good reason for asking the rhetorical question 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it.' Do you appreciate why he would ask that question?

So I come back to Armstrong: if physicalism is only “in principle,” then his theory remains more an aspiration than an account. It assumes that what is mental must be reducible, even though what makes the mental what it is (logic, normativity, meaning) has never been captured in physical terms, and in fact we rely on logic to ascertain what physical means.

I think that the underlying aim is to declare that only the objects of the physical sciences can be said to exist - this is why you refer to the ontological side of the debate.
— Wayfarer

That's close, but you word it in a way that sounds like it is excluding something. Rather, it's a parsimonious view of what exists: it's unparsimonious to believe things exist that can't be detected or observed to exist + the observation that everything that is observed or inferred to exist is physical. — Relativist

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is - you basically gloss over it or ignore it. And what is that 'something'? Why, it is the subject to whom a theory is meaningful, the mind that provides the definitions and draws the conclusions.

And this 'ignoring' is constitutional to materialist philosophy. Why? Because, as I'm sure I've already said, it is built into Galilean science, which divides the world into objective (primary) and subjective (secondary) attributes. It then tries to explain everything in terms of those primary attributes- which is the essence of materialism - including the very subject who is doing the explaining. This is the subject of an essay an Aeon, which has now become a book, called 'The Blind Spot of Science is the Neglect of Lived Experience', which spells out this same criticism.

So what your philosophy leaves out is actually the human being. That is what is not included in the account - which you then try and retroactively construct on the basis of a science from which it has been methodically excluded from the outset. So much so, that you no longer can notice that you don't notice it. Hence, a blind spot.

I am wondering why you think physicalism, which holds that all is physical, is the best ontology, when you also see good reason to believe that there is something nonphysical. Your beliefs seem self-contradictory to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm being consistent, and pragmatic.

Remember I'm making an inference to best explanation (IBE), and that requires taking all information into account. If all else were equal in the analysis of theories, and there were a tie, then this issue would tip the scale. That makes it a "good reason": it's relevant and worthy of consideration.* But this issue is just one factor in my overall IBE exercise, and I judge it insufficient to counter all the virtues of physicalism.

I am also pragmatic. The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs - but it's impractical to withhold judgement on everything that is possibly false. IMO, most of our rational beliefs are the product of (at least rudimentary) IBE, and it would be intellectually crippling to try and muddle through life while withholding judgement on everything that could possibly be false.

________<
* an example something not worthy of consideration would be allegations of miracles.

But this issue is just one factor in my overall IBE exercise, and I judge it insufficient to counter all the virtues of physicalism. — Relativist

I think your judgement is unreasonable then. Since you have "good reasons" to believe something which is contrary to the essential nature of a specific principle, it's irrational to maintain that principle. What did you think of my example? If I have good reasons to believe that some of the world's problems will never be solved, don't you think it's irrational for me to also believe that all the worlds problems will be resolved.

Here's what I think. I think that you really do not believe that there is good reasons to believe that some aspects of mind are not physical. You really believe in physicalism, but to avoid having to face issues like "the hard problem", you simply say 'well maybe the mind is not physical'. So you really do not believe that there are any good reason to accept that something is not physical, you just say that there is good reasons, in contradiction to what you truly believe, to avoid the problems which arise from what you truly believe.

The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs — Relativist

That directly contradicts what you said before, when you rejected extreme skepticism. You said there is uncontroversial facts. Now, you take the position of extreme skepticism, claiming "there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs". If there is reason to doubt all your beliefs, how can you say that any of them represent "uncontroversial facts"? If you judge something as uncontroversial fact, then you are judging that there is no reason to doubt it.

What do you take to be the difference between "always some reason to doubt one's belief", implying extreme skepticism, and "good reasons" to believe in something? i assume you do recognize a difference.

It is in no way 'a physical property'. One can count the members of a set of concepts, none of which is physical. Counting is an intellectual act which can be applied to both physical and non-physical entities. — Wayfarer

You're conflating the mental act of counting with four-ness. A group of 4 geese has a property in common with a group of 4 pebbles, whereas a group of 3 trees lacks this property. This property of four-ness is ontological. It exists irrespective of human minds or anyone doing a count.

We recognize the pattern of fourness and form the concept of 4 via the way of abstraction: consider multiple objects with common property and mentally subtract all other properties. This forms the basis for the concept of 4. The concept "exists" exclusively in the mind, whereas four-ness exists in certain states of affairs.

We also recognize that adding a pebble to a group of 3 pebbles creates a group of 4 pebbles. This is a logical relation, not a physical one. These logical relations are an epistemological ground for counting.
The intellectual capacity to abstract can be applied to other abstractions, so we can apply counting to abstractions.

can insight be described algorithmically? — Wayfarer

Why not? It's not magic or clairvoyance. Experts have insights - but only within their own field*. a chef's insight will be recipe related; he will not have the insight of a mathematician when it comes to proving theorems. It's pattern recognition, which artificial neural networks perform in rudimentary fashion.
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* Conspiracy theorists also have "insights", and the same cognitive faculties are involved: they perceive patterns based on their background beliefs.
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Thanks for clarifying. But notice what you’ve said: the “in principle” part of physicalism is a metaphysical claim — that all things are ultimately just arrangements of particles under natural laws. That’s not a finding of science but a philosophical commitment hiding behind the skirts of science. — Wayfarer

Nothing is in hiding, but you're mashing together the physics and metaphysics. Let's be clear: physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything in the material world (the domain of physics) is made of particles. It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. There's no good reason to doubt that the standard model of particle physics identifies all the elementary particles that account for the physical composition of everything (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy).

The metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion, there's nothing more to the object. Do you deny this is true for nonliving objects?

with mind, the issue is different: truths, meanings, logical relations, and intentions are not computationally intractable physical behaviors. They are not physical categories at all. — Wayfarer

Truths, meanings, logical relations aren't ontological-
they reflect patterns of thought. Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.

You are obviously in the habit of treating these 3 concepts as something more than patterns of thought, and this makes you incredulous to an alternative account. I'm not trying to convince you that this physicalist perspective is correct. I'm just trying to show it is coherent.

Albert Einstein had good reason for asking the rhetorical question 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it.' Do you appreciate why he would ask that question?

I don't know enough about his perspective to answer that. I guess it could be viewed as a thought experiment in philosophy. But from my pragmatic perspective, it's a silly question: no sane person would think to doubt the moon exists unless they were presented this as a thought experiment to explain why they believe it so. So I expect Einstein didn't actually have doubts along these lines.

And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is - you basically gloss over it or ignore it. — Wayfarer

I have absolutely not ignored it! I identified it as a "negative fact" - implying a large space of possibilities, and also asked you to suggest how to use this negative fact. You had little to offer: you noted it shouldn't be treated as an object. That, and you seem to insist that the negative fact falsifies physicalism. This led to discussing other aspects of physicalism, and it became clear that you don't understand physicalism (I've identified several errors you made in your characterizations).

And what is that 'something'? Why, it is the subject to whom a theory is meaningful, the mind that provides the definitions and draws the conclusions. — Wayfarer

You're the one insisting physicalism is false on the basis of the "something", but you have no answers as to what it is (other than an additional negative fact: not an object).

Within the space of possibilities is that the "something" is a physical property that some or all objects have, that manifests as consciousness when matter is structured a certain way (like a brain with attached sense organs). This "physical" property is undetectable through scientific study, because it has no measureable effects. It manifests only as conscious states.

This is Michael Tye's theory. This adds a property to matter (inconsistent with traditional physicalism), but maintains the overall physicalist framework.

So if I must explain the negative fact, I can use this. Two questions for you: 1) can you propose a better alternative? 2) Can you think of a reason (on my terms,) I ought to reject it?

So I come back to Armstrong: if physicalism is only “in principle,” then his theory remains more an aspiration than an account. — Wayfarer

Special pleading/double standard. You're trying to hold physicalist metaphysics to a scientific standard, while having no qualms about treating your own unverifiable/unfalsifiable assertions as reasonsble.

What did you think of my example? If I have good reasons to believe that some of the world's problems will never be solved, don't you think it's irrational for me to also believe that all the worlds problems will be resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not parallel. Your example entails a contradiction, mine does not.

I think your judgement is unreasonable then. Since you have "good reasons" to believe something which is contrary to the essential nature of a specific principle, it's irrational to maintain that principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand IBE. An IBE is unreasonable only if there overlooked facts that would affect the analysis, or if there are overlooked alternative hypotheses that would be better than the selected hypothesis.

You also ignored my explanation of what I meant by "good reasons". You're incorrectly treating "good reasons" as entailing a conclusion that I regard as categorically true.

The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs
— Relativist

That directly contradicts what you said before, when you rejected extreme skepticism. You said there is uncontroversial facts. Now, you take the position of extreme skepticism, claiming "there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs". If there is reason to doubt all your beliefs, how can you say that any of them represent "uncontroversial facts"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again, you're treating all beliefs as categorical: that I can only choose to believe a proposition true or false, and these entail absolute commitments. My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. Believing an analytic truth, or the Pythagorian theory would be an absolute certainty. Same with any belief established by deduction from premises we're certain about. But beliefs established by weighing evidence generally don't deserve the same level of certainty. It's a bit like being on a civil jury, whereca verdict is reached on a preponderance of evidence. This standard is clearly less than absolute certainty.

Extreme skeptics require something close to absolute certainty to hold a belief. Most reasonable people don't have this (rarely attainable) standard. We believe the moon is up there even when we aren't looking at it; we believe man landed on the moon, and that vaccines prevent diseases.

"Reason to doubt" = lower the level of certainty

If you judge something as uncontroversial fact, then you are judging that there is no reason to doubt it.

No. That's not how I use the term. I would have said "all facts", but then you could have brought up some crackpot idea you believe that I had not accounted for. Or a theist would bring up that I overlooked God. My intent was to focus on commonly accepted facts that have good epistemic support. This would include established science, but exclude speculative hypotheses. The term I chose was "uncontroversial facts". The phrase I put in bold may be better.

Your example entails a contradiction, mine does not. — Relativist

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ, other than simply saying one is contradiction and the other not. To me there is no real difference What do you think it is about the one, which makes it contradictory, while the other is not?

My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. Believing an analytic truth, or the Pythagorian theory would be an absolute certainty — Relativist

How could the Pythagorean theorem constitute absolute certainty, when the hypotenuse of a square is irrational? That's like saying that the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, pi, is an absolute certainty, when it's precise value cannot even be stated.

You continue to practise your contradictory ways. An instance where the reality of uncertainty has been proven, an irrational ratio, you claim is an example of absolute certainty.

You're conflating the mental act of counting with four-ness. A group of 4 geese has a property in common with a group of 4 pebbles, whereas a group of 3 trees lacks this property. This property of four-ness is ontological. It exists irrespective of human minds or anyone doing a count. — Relativist

It’s ontological but not physical - an intellectual act which enables the recognition of abstractions. The property can only be recognised by a mind capable of counting. Real numbers are independent of any particular mind, but they can only be grasped by a mind. And they're certainly not physical.

Let's be clear: physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything in the material world (the domain of physics) is made of particles. It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. — Relativist

You’re talking atomism. Ever since Heisenberg discovered uncertainty - 100 years ago as it happens - the possibility of atoms as ultimate point-particles has been undermined (or undetermined). Nowadays atoms are conceptualised as excitations of fields, and the ontological status of fields is far from settled. It is well known that the equations of quantum physics show that particles can be in superposition, i.e. have no definite location. This is incidentally one of the things that caused Einstein to ask that question. Nowadays, interpretation of physics with realist vs anti-realist arguments is still the basis of controversy which mitigates against the kind of physicalist realism you're proposing.

You're the one insisting physicalism is false on the basis of the "something", but you have no answers as to what it is (other than an additional negative fact: not an object). — Relativist

I made it perfectloy explicit:

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is - you basically gloss over it or ignore it. And what is that 'something'? Why, it is the subject to whom a theory is meaningful, the mind that provides the definitions and draws the conclusions. — Wayfarer

The fact that you ignored it makes my argument for me!

Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral. — Relativist

Well your screen name is ‘Relativist’, and you're preaching relativism.

As for 'special pleading', it's physicalism that does this. It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'.

As for philosophical idealism, the one apodictic fact it begins with is the one proposed by Descartes - cogito ergo sum. Whereas physicalism attempts to account for that in terms of the objects the ultimate nature of which is indeterminable in the absence of an observer.

It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

We ought to recognize this as the end of the rule of science. Physics has determined the limit to the usefulness of the scientific method. And what has been revealed is that there is a vast expanse which lies beyond that limit.

I made up the term. My focus is an effort at seeking truth that is of practical use. This entails things like:
1) setting a practical epistemic bar for accepting a statement as true (but see #3). This is in opposition to extreme skeptics who set a bar so high, they profess to few beliefs.
2)(generally) treating bare possibilites as equivalent to zero probability when making epistemic judgements,
3) recognizing the nature of belief as a psychological state that has degrees of certainty, rather than categorically true and false
4) recognizing that these degrees of certainty tend to be imprecise (thus Bayes' theorem is inapplicable)
5. Trusting beliefs that are likely to be innate (e.g. belief in the existence of a world external to ourselves; default trust in our sensory input - but recognizing it to be fallible).
6. Fearlessly making truth judgements when it's impractical to withhold judgement.

If I gave it more thought, I could probably add a bit more.

BTW, your comment prompted me to ask DEEPSEEK what it meant. There are some parallels, but it's very different. E.g. it mentioned "pragmatic theory of truth", which I reject.

Scientific materialism and science are not the same.

//Neils Bohr said 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature.'

That is neither polemic nor rhetoric.//

Physics concerns what we can say about Nature.' — Wayfarer

More precisely, physics is restricted to what we can say about nature. But metaphysics determines what we can say and is therefore not restricted in that way. That is why those who believe things like "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" are mislead into philosophies like physicalism, which assume that we are restricted in such a way, so that when physics reaches the limits to what we can say about nature, so does human knowledge.

The problem you present with "the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism", is that reality extends beyond the capacity of physics, and empirical science in general, to represent. If we are limited in our capacity for knowledge, to "what we can say about Nature", and we find that Nature extends beyond this, then the appearance is that a part of reality cannot be understood.

The true philosopher sees that when we hit what we cannot say, then we must find a new way to speak, if we want to talk about that. The reality is, that the means are adapted to end, therefore the method is restricted by the end. But the end is not restricted by the means. If the conventional end is, "what we can say about Nature", and we've reached that limit without satisfying our need for knowledge, then the goal must be changed. With that comes a change of means, method, allowing us to get beyond the boundary presented by "whereof we cannot speak". If "whereof one cannot speak" was a true barrier, knowledge would never get beyond infancy. Even Wittgenstein came to understand the falsity of that statement as exposed in his Philosophical Investigations where he inquired into the method by which we learn how to speak.