I've been working on epistemology, via Wittgenstein, for some time, and the following is my take on epistemology using Wittgensteinian methods. I believe traditional JTB excels within these parameters.

Knowledge as Justified True Belief—Situated in Language and Life
(Merging with Wittgenstein)

I want to defend a classical claim of JTB with a contemporary twist. I hold that knowledge is justified true belief. However, I will claim that JTB only becomes stable when we embed it in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: language-games, meaning as use, family resemblances, rule-following, the beetle analogy, the private-language argument, and the hinge propositions from On Certainty. Add to this an analogy I draw from Gödel’s incompleteness results: just as formal systems require unprovable truths to function, our epistemic practices require certainties that are not proved from within the practice but make proof possible. That, in a sentence, is my picture.

Let me restate JTB simply. To know that P is to believe P, to have P be true, and to have genuine justification for P. I emphasize genuine. Much of the literature treats Gettier as a mortal wound to JTB. I don’t. Gettier cases work only if we confuse seeming justified with being justified. If the support for a true belief essentially depends on a false ground, the belief fails the J-condition, full stop. I mark this with an anti-false-grounds constraint: justification must not essentially rely on falsehood. That preserves the classical core without endless epicycles.

Now, what do I mean by justification? In practice, we justify in five primary ways (the five ways are not exhaustive), each with its own standards:

1. Testimony—we lean on credible sources, expertise, honesty, and corroboration.
2. Logic—deductive validity and inductive strength.
3. Sensory experience—trained observation, intersubjective checks, calibrated instruments.
4. Linguistic training—competent grasp of concepts and criteria; knowing how a term applies.
5. Pure logic/tautology—truths true in virtue of form.

These are not abstract algorithms floating above life. They are language-games, rule-governed practices situated in our forms of life. “What counts as a good reason here?” is answered inside the practice: replication and statistics in science, chain-of-custody and cross-examination in law, careful term use in conceptual analysis. Meaning is use: we learn what “justify,” “know,” and “evidence” do by watching how they function in these games. And because concepts work by family resemblance, I don’t hunt for one essence of justification; I look for overlapping patterns that guide our reasoning.

Two Wittgensteinian reminders guard the gates. First, the beetle in the box: meaning isn’t secured by pointing to a private inner object, “my beetle;” it’s secured by public rules of use. Second, theprivate-language argument: without public criteria for correctness, the distinction between using a word correctly and thinking I’m using it correctly evaporates. The epistemic parallel is straightforward. Being justified is not the same as feeling justified. That distinction only survives if standards are publicly learned, shared, and, crucially, open to correction.

Related to this is a small but important grammatical point. We use “I know” in two ways. There is an epistemic use, truth, belief, and justification that meets public criteria, and there is a convictional use, an expression of inner assurance. Conflating them produces two classic mistakes: dogmatism (conviction masquerading as knowledge) and hyper-skepticism (demanding maximal proof where our practices don’t require it). Keeping the senses apart does quiet philosophical work.

So far, I’ve kept to the foreground of justification. Now the background. Following On Certainty, I hold that our practices of giving and asking for reasons presuppose hinge certainties, things that “stand fast” so doubt and proof can get traction. Hinges are not items of evidence. They are the conditions under which evidence counts as evidence.

I distinguish two kinds. Linguistic hinges are certainties embedded in how we talk and understand: that words generally retain their meanings; that others understand me; that our talk of the world hooks onto a world. Non-linguistic foundational beliefs are certainties carried in stable patterns of action, pre- or non-verbal, but still beliefs in my sense, acquired and held within a form of life. For example, our practiced confidence in a stable, manipulable environment, the way ordinary engagement presupposes a world with enduring objects and reliable regularities. We do not typically state these as propositions; they are expressed in what we unhesitatingly do.

Hinges also come in layers. At the base are bedrock hinges, largely immutable without collapsing inquiry: there is an external world; other minds exist; meanings are generally stable. Remove those and you haven’t revised a theory; you’ve disabled the language-games that make reasons possible. Above bedrock are cultural–historical hinges that can shift, think of the movement from geocentrism to heliocentrism, without destroying our capacity to inquire. And then there are personal–experiential hinges, what stands fast for a particular life, which can shape what one finds immediately plausible. One more point here: testimony functions as a social hinge at the general level. If we tried to doubt testimony wholesale, science, history, education, and ordinary life would unravel. We can and should scrutinize particular reports; but general trust stands fast.

This is where my Gödel analogy enters. Gödel showed that sufficiently strong formal systems contain true statements unprovable within the system. My claim is that epistemic practice works the same way. It contains indispensable certainties unprovable within the practice. These are not defects. They are structural necessities. Both systems contain an “outside” that enables the “inside.” Hinges sit outside the inferential game yet make the game possible. In this picture, the unprovability of hinges is not a concession to dogma; it’s a sober description of how our games of reason actually function.

Let me turn this into a method you can apply.

1. Fix the language-game. What practice are we in, experimental science, legal reasoning, ordinary observation, mathematics, or conceptual analysis?

2. State the proposition precisely and register the belief state.

3. Assemble the reasons via the relevant methods: testimony, logic, experience, linguistic competence, pure logic.

4. Apply the public criteria that govern the game: credibility rules, inference standards, observational protocols, and correct concept use.

5. Screen for defeaters and enforce anti-false-grounds: if a key ground is false, justification fails.

6. Identify the operative hinges. Does the claim tacitly require denying bedrock? Which cultural or personal hinges are active? Is general trust in testimony doing enabling work here?

7. Disambiguate “I know.” Reserve the epistemic use for claims that meet public criteria; mark convictional uses honestly as conviction.

On this method, the verdict “S knows that P” states something robust: P is true; S believes P; S’s justification meets the public standards of the operative language-game; it does not essentially rely on falsehood; and it rests on, without trying to prove, the relevant hinges.

Objections come predictably. “Isn’t this relativism?” No. Truth remains mind-independent. Practices differ in criteria, but those criteria evolved to track reality, replication, cross-examination, calibration, and proof. “Isn’t this dogmatic?” No. Bedrock hinges are not arbitrary commitments; they are pragmatic necessities. Deny them, and you do not tidy up your theory; you lose the very game of giving and asking for reasons. “Isn’t it circular to presuppose what you need?” No. I do not deduce hinges; I show their role. That is a grammatical elucidation in Wittgenstein’s sense, showing the conditions under which our concepts do what we use them to do.

Why prefer this to bare JTB? Because it clarifies what “justification” amounts to in real life, public, trained, practice-relative reasons, while hardening justification against Gettier with the anti-false-grounds constraint. It explains why justification can’t be private. It ends regress without skepticism by acknowledging hinges where they belong. And it integrates language and life: knowledge isn’t a disembodied logical state, nor a private feeling; it is belief and truth joined by reasons that count within the living practices of a community, standing on certainties that enable those practices to work.

This is the theory I’m offering: classical JTB disciplined by Wittgenstein, undergirded by hinge certainties, and illuminated by a Gödelian insight. It’s not an abandonment of rigor; it is a clearer picture of where rigor lives.

The problem with JTB boils down to the definitions.

True - What is truth? If knowledge requires truth, then don't we run into a problem that we also have to know if something is true?

Justification - What is justification? Is it proof that something is true? Do we know what is justified? In which case, how do we justify our justification?

Belief is at least straight forward. "A claim that X is a real state." We can of course add "possibly real", but the "possibly" must be believed to be a real state vs "impossibly".

So how did Wittenstein tackle this? "Knowledge is a web of beliefs."

Justification - A whole bunch of people hold this web of beliefs.
Truth - Its true that this web of beliefs exists.
Belief - The web. And yes technically we've just create a whole other belief that's not really proven but it WORKS. And that's the key. As long as it works like science giving us thing we can use correctly in reality, we're all good.

Honestly...kind of a dodge around the issue with fancy wordplay as a lot of philosophers attempt to do. Wittenstein abandoned any formal analysis of knowledge and tried a descriptive approach. The problem with a descriptive approach is that it describes how we get along, and that getting along works, but avoids the larger question about why it works. Wittenstien wouldn't have an answer to a society that based their entire culture around a sky God that made it rain. This society would be largely functional and have enough common predictability with a scientific culture, so people would get what they needed out of it. Wittenstein wouldn't be able to answer why this culture was inferior to another if the outcomes were the same or even better, even though its clear this system lacks real 'true' knowledge by relying on a belief system of a sky God.

Its a very, "Live and let live" approach to knowledge and demands further questions and follow ups. I have my own theory of knowledge if you're interested Sam. Its basically a break down of knowledge into contextual deduction, and from there a way to rationally analyze induction through a hierarchy. I know I've critiqued your works in the past, feel free to do so in return if you're interested. Its intended to be approachable to even people without a philosophy background, but there is a summary below from the first poster that I approved if you need to organize your thoughts. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Calling this “fancy wordplay” misunderstands what I’m doing. I’m not juggling synonyms; I’m tightening the spec for when “I know” is actually warranted. Disambiguating terms isn’t a rhetorical flourish; it’s how you remove failure.

When I separate epistemic “I know” from convictional “I know,” I’m not being cute with language; I’m blocking a well-known error path where confidence is mistaken for knowledge. That has operational consequences (e.g., whether we act on a claim, fund it, publish it, or treat it as settled).

When I distinguish justification from proof, I’m not hedging; I’m aligning the concept with real practices (science, law, measurement, math) where we need defeater management and anti-luck conditions, not impossibly global proofs.

When I talk about hinges, I’m not inventing mysticism; I’m displaying the enabling conditions of the game, exactly the places where attempts at global doubt collapse the practice that doubt presupposes.

Philosophy earns its keep when it sharpens the rules of the game so that good methods win and bad ones wash out. That’s what I’m doing: specifying the norm-set that separates knowledge from confidence. If someone’s theory survives these gates, public criteria, anti-false-grounds, practice-safety, defeater screening, I’m happy to call it knowledge. If it needs us to blur meanings, relax standards, or ignore failure modes, then yes, I’ll call that wordplay.

On this method, the verdict “S knows that P” states something robust: P is true; S believes P; S’s justification meets the public standards of the operative language-game — Sam26

I admire the clarity of this position -- many thanks.

As you no doubt know, there is a question about JTB concerning whether "true" and "(genuinely) justified" are independent criteria. How would your Wittgensteinian version of JTB respond to this?

Great question, and thanks.

Short answer: on my view, truth and genuine justification are conceptually independent but methodologically coupled. “True” says how the world is; “(genuinely) justified” says your reasons meet the public criteria of the relevant practice. They are not the same property, and neither reduces to the other, but my Wittgensteinian add-ons (public criteria, anti-false-grounds, practice-safety, and hinges) are precisely there to lock justification onto truth-tracking without collapsing them into each other.

Knowledge on my account = truth + belief + this kind of disciplined justification (public-criteria, no false grounds, practice-safe), all within the hinge-enabled framework. That gives you a clean separation of properties and a principled explanation of why good justification is not mere social agreement but a world-tracking practice aimed at truth.

Calling this “fancy wordplay” misunderstands what I’m doing. — Sam26

I didn't mean you, I was commenting on Wittgenstein.

on my view, truth and genuine justification are conceptually independent but methodologically coupled — Sam26

Good. So what we want to know is, does the coupling of the methodologies for determining what is true and what is genuinely justified result in a vicious circle?

That it is a circle seems clear, but that may not be a problem. We might start by asking, is it possible to determine what is true without using the methods that "lock justification onto truth-tracking"? -- that is, without engaging in justification?

I'm guessing not, but then how do we respond to the objection that we have "collapsed into each other" the criteria for truth and justification? Note that this objection doesn't depend on claiming that justification has been reduced to "social agreement," opening the door for some invidious form of relativism. The criteria for both truth and justification can be as "objective" as you please, but we still have the problem of whether they are indeed two separate legs of the tripod.

What do you think?

I would respond the same way, whether Witt or myself.

Good. So what we want to know is, does the coupling of the methodologies for determining what is true and what is genuinely justified result in a vicious circle?

That it is a circle seems clear, but that may not be a problem. We might start by asking, is it possible to determine what is true without using the methods that "lock justification onto truth-tracking"? -- that is, without engaging in justification?

I'm guessing not, but then how do we respond to the objection that we have "collapsed into each other" the criteria for truth and justification? Note that this objection doesn't depend on claiming that justification has been reduced to "social agreement," opening the door for some invidious form of relativism. The criteria for both truth and justification can be as "objective" as you please, but we still have the problem of whether they are indeed two separate legs of the tripod. — J

Great, this is exactly the pressure point to push on, and here’s my view.

There is a circle here, but it is a benign, hinge-supported feedback loop, not a vicious circle and not a collapse. Truth and justification remain conceptually distinct, two different “grammars” in Wittgenstein’s sense, even though, in practice, our only route to truth runs through justificatory methods.

Truth: how the world is (a world constraint on speech acts).

Justified: whether one’s reasons meet the public standards of the operative language-game (science, law, everyday perception, math).

We don’t reduce truth to justification, and we don’t pretend justification is free of truth. We couple them so that justification tracks truth (anti-false-grounds + practice-safety), and Wittgensteinian hinges stop the regress (and circularity) that would make any coupling impossible.

Why this isn’t a collapse (three quick tests)

I can be genuinely justified yet false. Example: at T1, I check the official schedule, the app, and the platform announcement, public criteria are satisfied. At T2, a last-minute disruption cancels the stop. Justification stands (by the practice’s rules at T1), truth doesn’t. They come apart.

Luck test (Gettier without false grounds; environmental luck).

I can be true yet unjustified: I guess, and I’m right. Or I form the belief by a method that would easily be wrong in nearby cases (Fake-Barn County). That’s truth without knowledge because it flunks practice-safety. Again, they come apart.

Methods that systematically miss reality (bad calibration, poor replication, unchecked bias) are revised or rejected. That asymmetry, the world’s recalcitrance, shows that justification is answerable to truth, not identical with it.

Conclusion: Different roles, different failure modes, no collapse.

Why the “circle” is benign, not vicious

You asked: “Can we determine what is true without the very methods that ‘lock justification onto truth-tracking’?” In practice, no, we have no non-method magic eye for truth. But that does not mean identity or vicious circularity.

It’s like a clear window and a landscape. You only see the landscape through the window, but the window isn’t the landscape. You can replace or polish the window; the hills don’t move with your squeegee.

The loop is externally constrained: prediction, intervention, replication, calibration, cross-examination, and defeater management are world-sensitive tests. When they fail, the world corrects us.

Hinges, bedrock certainties like “there is an external world,” “other minds exist,” “meanings are generally stable,” are not evidence; they are the conditions for evidence to count. They prevent regress without pretending to “prove” themselves from within. My Gödel analogy captures this logic: unprovable statements that enable the system are a feature, not a bug.

Why this isn’t “objective-in-name-only”

You’re right that objectivity matters, and I’m not smuggling in “mere social agreement.” Public criteria in this framework are geared to track reality:

Anti-false-grounds: your case for P may not essentially run through a false premise.

Practice-safety: given the domain’s recognized error profile, the same method wouldn’t easily have delivered a false belief in nearby cases.

Error-controls: replication, calibration, pre-registration, blinding, proper scoring (e.g., Brier), independent testimony, valid inference, and correct concept use.

These are norms with teeth. They preserve the independence of truth while bending methods toward it.

The tripod stays a tripod

Truth = world-constraint (not defined by our procedures).

Belief = our doxastic stance.

Justification = public rule-governed standing (anti-false-grounds; practice-safe).

Yes, the only epistemic way to reach truth is via methods, but method-dependence of access does not entail identity of property. The two legs, truth and justification, remain distinct, even as they are methodologically coupled and mutually calibrated by the way the world pushes back.

That’s my Wittgensteinian JTB: no collapse, no vicious circle, just a disciplined coupling inside hinge-enabled practices that keeps knowledge world-answerable.

Great, this is exactly the pressure point to push on, — Sam26

Glad you agree.

method-dependence of access does not entail identity of property. — Sam26

And this is the result we want. You make a strong case, which also has the advantage of replicating very closely what we actually do when trying to assess the validity of what we think we know.

I'll devote more time to this soon -- real life calls -- and focus on what may be the weak point: a somewhat cavalier acceptance of a "world" that is supposed to remain constant across multiple conceptions of justification. Is the "window/landscape" analogy good enough here? We can see the landscape, but not "the world" -- that might be an objection. But I need to think more about it. TBC.

The analogy is weak.

Non-linguistic foundational beliefs are certainties carried in stable patterns of action, pre- or non-verbal, but still beliefs in my sense, acquired and held within a form of life. For example, our practiced confidence in a stable, manipulable environment, the way ordinary engagement presupposes a world with enduring objects and reliable regularities. We do not typically state these as propositions; they are expressed in what we unhesitatingly do. — Sam26

I would emphasize the ‘how’ more than the ’what’ in forms of life. Not just that the world has stable, reliable patterns. After all, all forms of life open up stable, patterned ways of engaging with the world. What is intrinsic to any particular form of life is how it opens up such a stable comportment. What is the qualitative nature of the way these patterns are organized, and when a qualitative pattern is transformed as one form of life becomes another, how does this change the way the world appears? It also seems to me that what is most significant about justified true beliefs for Wittgenstein is that securing the validity of a belief is not the reference
to a pre-existing fact, rule, picture, criterion or norm.
In his discussion of rule-following , Wittgenstein indicates that this is not enough for knowing what is true. Justification requires a creative, inituitive use of criteria, norms and facts that modifies them for the contingencies of actual situations.

My stance in brief...if I understand you correctly.

I agree that forms of life are about the how of engagement, not only the what of a stable world. But I reject two further moves in your reply:

1) that “securing the validity of a belief is not the reference to facts/rules/criteria,” and

2) that rule-following requires a “creative, intuitive” modification of norms to count as knowledge.

On my account, facts still bite, and public criteria remain the arbiters of epistemic “I know.” There is skilled judgment in application, yes, but it’s judgment inside guardrails, not free-form creativity. That is a core difference.

Where I agree, and how I build it in...

Forms of life: the how.

Non-linguistic foundational beliefs aren’t just tacit endorsements of what the world is like; they show up in how we move, measure, compare, and correct. My framework already captures that “how” at the method level with practice-safety: a method counts as justificatory only if, given the domain’s known hazards, using the same method in nearby cases would not easily lead you to false. That is precisely about how we proceed in a form of life.

Transformations across forms of life.

When a qualitative pattern of practice changes (say, pre- to post-Copernican astronomy; pre- to post-germ theory), some cultural–historical hinges and method-norms shift. My layered-hinges view predicts that: bedrock hinges (external world, other minds, stability of meaning) remain; practice-level norms adjust; what counts as a good reason evolves publicly, not privately.

Where I disagree

1) “Securing validity is not a reference to facts/rules/criteria”

Wittgenstein’s later work denies that mere citation of a rule or fact settles anything, but it does not follow that justification floats free of facts/rules/criteria. His point is that application is shown in training, correction, and agreement in judgments, i.e., in the public criteria of the practice. So...

Truth remains a world-constraint (thin correspondence). If your model predicts rain and it doesn’t, the world corrects you.

Justification is publicly rule-governed: replication, calibration, valid inference, cross-examination, correct concept use, and defeater management.

Hinges are the enabling backdrop; they are not extra evidence but the conditions for evidence to count.

So, no: I don’t replace reference to facts/rules/criteria with “what works.” I discipline appeal to facts/rules/criteria by showing how they have epistemic force only in use, in the practice that allows us to teach, check, and correct.

2) “Creative, intuitive” modification of norms

What application requires is disciplined judgment, not creative norm-making. Yes, rules are “open-textured;" there is no decision-procedure that eliminates judgment. But that judgment is trained and answerable to public standards. If “creative” means improvisational within the practice (e.g., a physician integrating atypical signs without violating diagnostic criteria), I agree. If it means license to bend criteria ad hoc, I reject it: that collapses the difference between seeming justified and being justified. My anti-false-grounds and practice-safety constraints exist to prevent precisely that slide.

Bottom line...

I can happily emphasize the how of forms of life, indeed, I already do via practice-safety and my method-first account of justification. What I won’t concede is that justification floats free of facts, rules, criteria, or that it needs “creative, intuitive” norm-shifting to count as knowledge. In a Wittgensteinian JTB, facts still constrain, criteria still govern, and judgment still answers to the community that can teach and correct. That’s how we keep knowledge distinct from confidence while explaining how real inquiry actually moves.

I reject two further moves in your reply:

1) that “securing the validity of a belief is not the reference to facts/rules/criteria,” and

2) that rule-following requires a “creative, intuitive” modification of norms to count as knowledge.

On my account, facts still bite, and public criteria remain the arbiters of epistemic “I know.” There is skilled judgment in application, yes, but it’s judgment inside guardrails, not free-form creativity. That is a core difference. — Sam26

The question is whether justification is fundamentally a matter of rule-following within stable criteria, or of creative, situated responsiveness. You interpret “creative, intuitive” norm-use as “free-form ad hoc improvisation” unless tightly constrained. But I mean something more like Gadamer’s phronesis — a context-sensitive application of rules that inevitably alters their force.

As Joseph Rouse interprets Wittgenstein:

We can’t appeal to social regularities or collectively presupposed norms within a practice: there are no such things, but more important, if there were they would not thereby legitimately bind us. Any regularities in what practitioners have previously done does not thereby have any authority to bind subsequent performances to the same regularities. The familiar Wittgensteinian paradoxes about rule following similarly block any institution of norms merely by invocation of a rule, since no rule can specify its correct application to future instances Practices should instead be understood as comprising performances that are mutually interactive in partially shared circumstances

The intelligibility of performances within a practice then depends upon the anticipation and partial achievement of appropriate alignment with others' performances and their circumstances,

You emphasize that “facts still bite” and “truth as thin correspondence.” This is consistent with a realist bent, but I don’t see Wittgenstein as a realist. Wittgenstein sees “fact” not as a metaphysical anchor but as a role within a language-game. This is how “facts” remain practice-constituted and reality-constrained.

When a qualitative pattern of practice changes (say, pre- to post-Copernican astronomy; pre- to post-germ theory), some cultural–historical hinges and method-norms shift. My layered-hinges view predicts that: bedrock hinges (external world, other minds, stability of meaning) remain; practice-level norms adjust; what counts as a good reason evolves publicly, not privately. — Sam26

Wittgenstein stresses that criteria gain their force through use, not through a fixed “guardrail” independent of practice. Are your guardrails themselves subject to evolution within forms of life, or do they function as transhistorical constraints? What does it mean to assert that some meta-level bedrock hinge remains? Why should it? Your inclusion of the concept of other minds and the external world as transhistorical reminds me that these are the very concepts that Husserl bracketed as part of his method of phenomenologically reducing presuppositions. I think Wittgenstein would be sympathetic to Husserl’s aim here. All hinges are ultimately contingent, because they are formed within ongoing historical processes of discursive interaction.

Wittgenstein stresses that criteria gain their force through use, not through a fixed “guardrail” independent of practice. Are your guardrails themselves subject to evolution within forms of life, or do they function as transhistorical constraints? What does it mean to assert that some meta-level bedrock hinge remains? Why should it? Your inclusion of the concept of other minds and the external world as transhistorical reminds me that these are the very concepts that Husserl bracketed as part of his method of phenomenologically reducing presuppositions. I think Wittgenstein would be sympathetic to Husserl’s aim here. All hinges are ultimately contingent, because they are formed within ongoing historical processes of discursive interaction. — Joshs

Here's a short answer:
Methods evolve; no, the core “guardrails” aren’t optional. The standards by which we employ justification (replication, calibration, Bayes, preregistration, etc.) are historical. However, the meta-level constraints that make any justificatory practice possible , publicity of criteria, other minds, an external world, and sufficient stability of meaning to teach/correct, are not optional add-ons. They’re what Wittgenstein would call hinges: not evidences, but conditions of sense for giving and asking for reasons.

However, the meta-level constraints that make any justificatory practice possible , publicity of criteria, other minds, an external world, and sufficient stability of meaning to teach/correct, are not optional add-ons. They’re what Wittgenstein would call hinges: not evidences, but conditions of sense for giving and asking for reasons. — Sam26

I think what you’re looking for is not some meta-level hinge, but the interwoven threads (family resemblance) that run though all hinges, not as a general overarching category (Wittgenstein never placed the general above the particular) but as that which emerges always in its own particular and unique way in actual use. Put differently, it seems to me what you’re talking about here is not itself a hinge, a belief, whether certain or not, but the condition of possibility for any hinge, any belief. For instance, the structure of temporality is a pre-condition for hinge beliefs, but we dont have to believe in time in order for it to make hinges possible.

Some further reflections on keeping truth and justification separate. . .

When we say, “The world pushes back,” what are we describing?

"Truth remains a world-constraint (thin correspondence). If your model predicts rain and it doesn’t, the world corrects you.” — Sam

What if we changed the example from a prediction to an observation? I see a moist situation outside my window that appears to be rain; I offer genuine justifications for my belief, “It’s raining”; but when I go outside I discover that actually it had stopped raining quite a while ago, and what I saw from my window was the rainwater continuing to fall from the high trees in my yard.

What has happened here? Can I say that my belief in the rain was justified, but untrue? Shouldn’t I have taken into account the possibility of rainwater falling from the trees – a phenomenon I’ve seen many times before – when I provided my public-standard reasons for my belief? (the “defeater” criterion). That would make my belief unjustified; at best, I should have said that it was quite likely to be raining. But then again, my “JB” -- my assertion of belief plus justifications – was not offered as a piece of knowledge. Not if I believe in the JTB theory, anyway.

So -- at what point is justification only “genuine” if it indeed tracks the truth? You say, “I can be genuinely justified yet false,” and give the example of the cancelled train stop. Yes, it appears that you were justified in believing the train would come . . . but isn’t another analysis possible? Couldn’t we say, “We all know that train stops can be cancelled. You can affirm your belief that the train will come; you can give your genuine justifications for thinking so; but only the fact (truth) of the train’s arrival will turn this into a JTB, a piece of knowledge.”

I guess I’m asking how we should characterize a “JB” -- a belief that is genuinely justified, according to your criteria, but whose truth is still undetermined. Does a person who asserts a JB assert that they know it? Only the “know of conviction,” perhaps. If JTB is meant to be the definition of knowledge, we can’t say “I know X” until we discover whether X is true – we need all three legs of the tripod. So again, how should we describe “genuine justification” in a way that preserves some daylight between that concept and “true”? How carefully must we consider every conceivable defeater before saying that our justification is genuine?

These are reservations and puzzlements about the JTB concept in general, I think. I want to turn to your more focused version, with its use of Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, especially the idea that hinge propositions “stop the regress (and circularity) that would make any coupling [of methods for determining truth and justification] impossible.” But that will wait for a subsequent post.

BTW – I don’t think you and @Joshs have a serious disagreement about “creative, intuitive modification of norms.” Josh says:

I mean something more like Gadamer’s phronesis — a context-sensitive application of rules that inevitably alters their force. — Joshs

As a third party following along, this seems to me quite compatible with:

Yes, rules are “open-textured;" there is no decision-procedure that eliminates judgment. But that judgment is trained and answerable to public standards. If “creative” means improvisational within the practice (e.g., a physician integrating atypical signs without violating diagnostic criteria), I agree. If it means license to bend criteria ad hoc, I reject it. — Sam26

Gadamer’s phronesis is not at all ad hoc, and I’m pretty sure Josh wouldn’t recommend that.

Amusingly, this is a case of not having rules for knowing when and how to apply rules! And as we know, the lack of “rules for rules” doesn’t make everything ad hoc and chaotic.

Gadamer’s phronesis is not at all ad hoc, and I’m pretty sure Josh wouldn’t recommend that.

Amusingly, this is a case of not having rules for knowing when and how to apply rules! And as we know, the lack of “rules for rules” doesn’t make everything ad hoc and chaotic. — J

:100: :up:

We can doubt many things. I can doubt whether my watch is accurate, whether a friend has told the truth, or whether tomorrow’s forecast will hold. These are the ordinary doubts of everyday life, and they make sense because they belong to practices where answers are possible. But some questions do not enrich inquiry at all: Am I really a person distinct from others? Did the world exist before I was born? Does the floor disappear beneath me when I take a step? Such doubts collapse the very framework in which doubt and knowledge have meaning.

In OC, Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to name these background conditions. He called them “what stands fast,” comparing them to the hinges on which a door turns. Hinges are not conclusions of reasoning but the enabling ground of reasoning itself. They anchor our language-games, steady our practices, and form the inherited background against which justification makes sense.

My thinking takes Wittgenstein’s insights as a starting point and extends them. Where he left fragments, I aim to bring structure. Where he hinted at distinctions, I will sharpen them. Where he suggested limits, I argue for expansion. Several themes stand out:

Certainty as enacted, not merely held. A hinge shows itself in seamless action before it is ever put into words.

The communal depth of hinges. Certainties are taught, imitated, and inherited; they belong to world-pictures, not to isolated individuals.

Doubt and knowledge as coin-faces. To doubt presupposes that knowledge is possible; to know is to stand in a space where doubt could, in principle, be raised. They are inseparable aspects of one grammar. “Certainty” here divides into two registers: subjective conviction (the psychological assurance of being right) and objective certainty (knowledge settled by public standards). Hinges make the coin itself possible, the background metal from which both sides are struck.

Memory and time as hinge-like. The continuity of self and past is not inferred but presupposed, anchoring knowledge and identity.

The limits of explanation. Every justification reaches a horizon where “why?” runs out; this is not a defect but a condition of intelligibility.

Rigid and elastic hinges. Some certainties are logically non-revisable (personhood, continuity of the world), while others can shift with practice (cosmology, measurement standards).

Language itself as a hinge. Grammar and meaning are not justified from outside; they are what make justification possible. Yet language is not bounded once and for all. As forms of life expand, so language expands with them.

The result is an epistemology that integrates Wittgenstein’s late philosophy with a broader framework of justification. I will argue that knowledge is not just justified true belief but Justified True Belief + Understanding. Understanding is not a private feeling but competence-in-practice: the ability to use words with public criteria, to handle defeaters responsibly, and to live within the background certainties that make doubt and knowledge possible.

My ideas are not a commentary on On Certainty, nor a retreat into quietism. It is an effort to extend Wittgenstein’s fragments into a coherent epistemology that remains faithful to his insight: that doubt has grammar, that knowledge is enacted within forms of life, and that ungrounded foundations enable inquiry rather than undermine it.

If Wittgenstein showed that the demand for infinite justification is misconceived, my aim is to show how his insight opens the way for a richer picture of knowing: one that begins with embodied certainty, grows through language, and reaches beyond supposed limits of expression. What stands fast before words is not a barrier but a foundation, the place from which our words can reach further than Wittgenstein himself allowed.

What On Certainty Can Teach Us About AI

When I read Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I can’t help but think about how it touches on questions we’re now facing with artificial intelligence. His remarks weren’t about machines, of course. They were about us, about the background that makes human knowing possible. But the more I’ve worked with his ideas, the more I see how they matter for thinking about the development of AI.

One of Wittgenstein’s simplest but most powerful points is that doubt only makes sense against a backdrop of certainty. I can doubt whether my car will start, but I can’t doubt that there’s a world in which cars exist. If I try to doubt that, I lose the very stage on which doubting makes sense. Now, think about AI. A system that treats all doubts as equal, as if “What is the capital of France?” and “Does the world exist?” were both just queries, misses something basic. Humans know how to sift idle doubt from meaningful doubt. For AI to be trustworthy, it will need something similar: a grammar of doubt, a way of recognizing which uncertainties are live and which are nonsense.

Another thought from On Certainty that strikes me is how much of our knowledge is enacted rather than stated. I don’t prove to myself each morning that the floor will hold me; I simply stand. Certainty shows itself in action. With AI, though, we tend to optimize for propositions: correct outputs, factually accurate answers. But there’s no hinge of action beneath it. Machines don’t “stand fast” in the way we do. That tells me we should be cautious about equating AI’s linguistic performance with human understanding. Without hinge-like certainties, embodied anchors, a sense of persons, continuity of the world — the words may ring hollow.

There’s also the question of inheritance. Wittgenstein says we are taught certain things without question. That’s our world-picture. AI, too, inherits a world-picture — its training data. What goes in as unquestioned background shapes everything that comes out. The danger, of course, is that we treat the dataset as neutral when it is already hinge-laden, already thick with assumptions. If we don’t examine that, the machine’s “certainty” may be nothing more than a mirror of our own blind spots.

Finally, Wittgenstein reminds me that explanations cannot go on forever. At some point, they end, and not because we’re lazy or careless, but because all justification rests on hinges that are not themselves justified. For humans, this is just how rational life works. For AI, it suggests that the demand for fully “explainable” systems may be a mirage. Like us, machines will have to rest on foundations that can be mapped, checked, and disciplined, but not explained away.

When I connect these dots, I come away thinking that On Certainty offers a kind of realism about intelligence, human or artificial. Knowledge isn’t just propositions strung together. It depends on hinges: embodied trust, inherited world-pictures, shared grammar, limits of doubt, limits of explanation. If AI is to grow into something we can genuinely trust, then what Wittgenstein saw about human knowing should not be ignored.

I guess I’m asking how we should characterize a “JB” -- a belief that is genuinely justified, according to your criteria, but whose truth is still undetermined. Does a person who asserts a JB assert that they know it? Only the “know of conviction,” perhaps. — J

Returning to your 'raining' example, would you have said that you know it is raining? Justification is a slippery concept. It might be said that it would be natural to conclude that it is still raining if I see water falling. But then if I know there are high trees in the yard and that after sufficient rain water continues to drip from them, could I be said to be justified in my belief?

If it had still been raining would I then be justified in my belief, even though I didn't take into account that it could have been water dripping from the trees instead? If there had been no trees in my yard and I saw falling water and concluded that it was raining, would that have been a justified conclusion on the basis that events so unlikely as that the neighbor was spraying water over my roof with his hose need not be taken into consideration?

Assuming that we can say that some beliefs are justified, which might yet turn out to be wrong, and given that the truth cannot always be discovered, would it not be the case that sometimes we possess knowledge, but cannot know that we do? And doesn't that seem a little weird, that we might know something to be the case, but not know that we know?

I don’t really see a problem here. First, most of our knowledge is probabilistic, so if new evidence comes into the picture, it overturns what we believed we knew. Second, there’s a difference between thinking we’re justified, and being justified. This is similar to the Gettier mistake. Here's the move: Gettier's sting relies on a skimpy view of what "justified" really demands. He paints justification as this solo act—private reasons, thin evidence, no real-world grit to test against. But crank it up: justification isn't just a hunch with a receipt; it's got to be robust, publicly accountable, and hooked into practices that weed out the lucky breaks. Start with no false grounds—no sneaky false lemma propping up the chain, like assuming Jones is the lock when the evidence could've flagged alternatives. In the job case, Smith's reasons scream "Jones," but if we'd baked in a defeater screen—cross-checking the boss's reliability, weighing other candidates, or even probing the "10 coins" as a quirky proxy—the fluke wouldn't glide by so easy. It's not that the belief's true by luck; it's that the justification was flimsy from jump, masquerading as solid because no one poked the seams.

I'm not sure, but you seem to think that if knowing isn't absolute, it isn't knowledge. This is a classic misunderstanding of what knowledge is.

Second, not only are there beliefs that arise non-linguistically, but our thoughts are also not dependent upon linguistics. This it seems, has to be case if one is to make sense of the development of linguistics. For if there are no beliefs and no thoughts prior to the formation of linguistics (language), what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically? It also seems to be the case that language is simply a tool to communicate our thoughts to one another, which also seems to lend support for the idea that thinking is prior to language. — Sam26

We are not certain that language evolved separate of thought. The idea that thoughts are not dependent on lingustics, ignores that language does not need to be a complex chain of communication (internally or externally), it can also be argued that the thought itself has a linguistic dimension, a linguistic structure.

If we look back at what would arguably be a logical development of our cognitive abilities. Here we have an ape, using its instincts and pre-determined evolutionary knowledge of the surroundings and themselves, like any other species. But the demands of nature around this ape put so much pressure on him that his evolution starts to change through generations, demanding better and better ability to adapt to changing conditions. Slowly, evolution develops a more complex mental map of his surroundings, giving him the ability to understand context better, understand causality better. In order to adapt, the ape needs to utilize this understanding of causality and this is fundamentally an understanding of context over time.

Context over time is essentially linguistics, even if it goes on internally within the mental map of reality inside the ape. It is a form of understanding that requires a start and an end, like a sentence. It requires a context over time and a mental projection of possible context over time.

Add to that the importance of communication between apes, another result of evolution evolving the capacity for adapting to changing conditions. If the conditions are so complex that an internal context over time isn't enough to save entire groups of apes, the collective of apes forms the evolutionary trait to communicate this context between each other and thus language is spoken.

Beliefs require a context over time, it evolves out of the questions asked about reality around the ape. The question of why hunting the herd gives you food gives rise to the context over time being the herd giving you food. A belief forms of the herd's connection to you and your group of apes. And the need to adapt to changing conditions makes your context over time try to formulate a complex mental understanding of why the herd gives you food. A question, needing an answer. A language of forming more and more complex mental models of reality.

Language and our consciousness, our ability to reflect and create these mental models of reality might not be separable. I'm not in the camp believing that language formed cognition, but I do think that our complex language formed as part of the whole experience of the evolutionary trait to adapt to our environment. Without it, we couldn't form any context over time and thus we couldn't produce mental models that predicted our next moves, which is what separates us from pure instinctual planning or repeated behavior.

What Is Knowledge? A Clear Explanation
In my view, knowledge is more than just a correct guess or a strong feeling. I define it using a framework called JTB+U, which stands for justified true belief plus understanding. Let me explain this step by step in simple terms.

For something to count as knowledge:
It must be true: The statement matches reality, like saying "the sky is blue" when it actually is.

You must believe it: You accept it as fact, not just as a possibility.

It requires justification: You have solid reasons that anyone can verify, such as evidence from observation or reliable sources.

And it includes understanding (+U): You grasp the concepts involved and know how to apply them correctly, avoiding confusion in how words or ideas are used.

To build those reasons, I outline five main paths, though there could be others:

Testimony: Relying on what trustworthy people report, checked by seeing if multiple accounts agree, come from diverse sources, stay consistent, and can be confirmed independently.

Logic: Reasoning things out. Inductive logic looks at patterns, like expecting rain tomorrow because it has rained every cloudy day this week. Deductive logic follows strict steps, like knowing all squares have four sides, so this shape does too.

Sensory experience: What you directly see, hear, or feel, as long as conditions are normal and not misleading.

Linguistic training: Learning and using words accurately, so you do not mix up meanings.

Pure logic: Basic rules like "it is this or it is not," which help structure thinking but do not add new information.

A common issue is endless questioning: "Why believe that reason?" To handle this, I draw on ideas like "hinges"—basic certainties we rely on without proving them each time, such as the world existing or words keeping their meanings. These hinges fit into "language-games," shared ways we use words in everyday practices, and "forms of life," the broader patterns of how we live and interact.

I also distinguish two uses of "I know": One is factual and provable to others; the other is just a personal sense of certainty.

To determine if something is knowledge, I use a straightforward process:
State clearly what you claim to know.
Choose the path for your reasons.
List the supporting evidence.
Apply checks specific to that path.
Ensure no false information is included.
Confirm the method usually leads to accurate results.
Look for anything that might disprove it.
Decide based on that, noting what could change the conclusion.

This approach makes knowledge reliable yet open to updates.

How It Differs from Traditional JTB
The traditional view of knowledge, known as justified true belief (JTB), says it is a true statement you believe with good reasons. My framework builds on this but adds improvements for better clarity and strength:

Adding understanding (+U): Traditional JTB does not require fully grasping the ideas. I insist on it, so you demonstrate knowledge by using concepts properly.

Incorporating hinges and shared practices: Traditional JTB can get stuck in endless questions or tricked by coincidence. I address this with hinges (unproven basics) and language-games (group rules for words), providing a stable foundation.

Focusing on public checks and flexibility: Traditional JTB can seem personal. I emphasize reasons everyone can examine and allow knowledge to be revised if new evidence appears.

Providing a clear process: Traditional JTB is more of a definition. I offer a step-by-step method with rules against errors to make it practical.

These changes make the idea of knowledge more robust and easier to apply in real situations.

Wow, you went back a bit to find that. I would phrase that a bit differently now, but it's off the main topic, which is an epistemology following Wittgensteinian methods, but not strictly. I'm trying to expand epistemology using for example, OC.

Wow, you went back a bit to find that. — Sam26

Sorry, the thread popped up and it's a long read to go through everything so I was just thinking I would address the original premises. Maybe the discussion has taken such routes already.

It was mainly my reaction to that premise of how language and thoughts/beliefs are separated, which I don't think is true. If it's already been addressed or if it doesn't add any dimension to the discussion you can ignore it.

To be honest I'm not sure I would agree with my point back then. I'd have to give it more thought. I do appreciate that at least you were trying to read the thread, most don't. Many of my thoughts have evolved in the last couple of years.

Returning to your 'raining' example, would you have said that you know it is raining? — Janus

Not if I accept JTB as the standard of knowledge. I can't say I know it's raining unless it's true that it's raining; truth is the third leg of the tripod. What complicates this is the justification part: Am I justified in saying "It's raining" even if I don't know it to be true? I'm not sure we have rules for this, or clear intuitions about what we would feel in every case. A slippery concept, as you say. In this case, I'd probably say "I believe it's raining" or "I think it's highly likely it's raining." But if you then asked me, "Is your belief justified?" the answer isn't obvious. I might say, "Yes, up to a point" or "I have good reasons." The crux is that, following @Sam26's thought, there needs to be some space between justification and truth in order for JTB to really be a three-legged tripod. I have to be able to be justified yet wrong.

would it not be the case that sometimes we possess knowledge, but cannot know that we do? And doesn't that seem a little weird, that we might know something to be the case, but not know that we know? — Janus

A good question. Again accepting JTB, the answer has to be no, unless you're wanting to tweak how we understand "possess." If I don't know whether [consciously possess the knowledge that] X is true, then I can't claim to know X, according to JTB. It might turn out that "I knew it all along," but this is only a semi-serious use of "know," I believe. If Joe is revealed as the killer in a mystery movie, and someone says "I knew it all along" but during the film was guessing with the rest of us, we don't take the claim to knowledge very seriously.

Assuming that we can say that some beliefs are justified, which might yet turn out to be wrong . . . — Janus

This is the same problem as above, I think. What counts as "justified" is slippery. Also, your phrasing is a little ambiguous: Do you mean "turn out to be wrong that what we believed was justified" or "turn out to be wrong that what we named as a justification was incorrect"?

EDIT: Sorry, the last phrase should be "turn out to be wrong that what we named as a justification was correct."

I'm going to repeat my position on Gettier because people seem to think it has weight.

The so-called “Gettier problem” rests on a sleight of hand. It trades on the difference between thinking one is justified and actually being justified. Gettier’s examples always contain a flaw in one of the three conditions of JTB: either the justification is faulty, or the belief is formed through a false step, or the connection between evidence and conclusion is too fragile to deserve the title of knowledge.

Take the stopped-clock case. A man looks at a clock, sees 2:00, and believes it is 2:00. By chance it really is 2:00, though the clock is broken. Here we do not have justified true belief at all. The belief is true, but the “justification” rests on a false ground: the clock is not functioning. That means the J (justification) condition fails. The man thinks he is justified, but he is not.

The same holds in other Gettier constructions. Somewhere along the line, one of the elements fails, usually the J. But if a case fails the J condition, then by definition it is not JTB. It is a case of apparent justification, not real justification. And if there is no genuine justification, then there is no knowledge to begin with.

When I speak of “real” justification, I mean justification that is not merely persuasive to the subject but actually satisfies the standards of knowledge: it must be publicly checkable, truth-conducive in the given context, and free of false grounds. Real justification is the kind of reason that anyone could in principle examine, replicate, and confirm, not just the kind of reason that feels convincing from the inside. Gettier’s examples work only by smuggling in defective grounds and then treating them as though they were genuine reasons. But if justification rests on a broken clock, a hidden falsehood, or a fragile inference that could collapse with the slightest change in circumstance, then it is not justification in the robust sense required for knowledge. It is a case of apparent justification: the subject thinks they are justified, but the conditions for knowledge have not actually been met.

This is why I see the Gettier literature as a long detour. It multiplies refinements to patch a problem that dissolves once we keep the standard for justification strong. By “strong” I mean publicly checkable, defeater-sensitive, and free of false grounds. If a justification fails those checks, it does not count as justification. Once that is clear, Gettier’s cases lose their force: they are examples not of knowledge, but of its counterfeit—instances where someone takes themselves to know but does not in fact know.

The dispute, then, is not a deep discovery but a confusion. Gettier showed that seeming to satisfy JTB is not the same as satisfying it. The lesson is valuable in its own way, but it is not the crisis it is often taken to be. The traditional JTB definition was never refuted; it was only misapplied.

The crux is that, following Sam26's thought, there needs to be some space between justification and truth in order for JTB to really be a three-legged tripod. I have to be able to be justified yet wrong. — J

I would put it this way: the real issue lies in how we understand justification. It is more than simply a person thinking they are justified. Genuine justification must be open to public testing, not just persuasive from the inside. Even so, it can fail—our best reasons are probabilistic, not infallible. But generally, these standards serve us well as guides to knowledge. And when a defeater arises that overturns what seemed to be justified, we recognize that the claim was never knowledge to begin with, but only something that masqueraded as such.