Because, the only thing we can know for sure about PC, from the transporter problem as it is usually phrased, is that an identical copy is a continuation of the self.
— Mijin

I don't think this is the case. The problem as it's usually phrase is designed to test your intuitions about what constitutes identity. — AmadeusD

I think this is the critical misunderstanding on your part, and is my response to all of your points in that post.
I was laying out what the personal continuity position is. The "you are transported" position.

No, it is not asking you to question whether an identical copy is you: that's the point of Parfit's transporter problem in the first place. PC is explicitly a response about such problems; it's making an explicit claim about what would happen.

I do not thikn this is right(substantive after formal) The experiment has two prongs, so to speak:

1. You hear the story, and have an intuition about it: Survive, or not. If you choose 'survive'; then
2. You need to justify how it is that you survive, identically, in person2; or
3. Explain why identity fails.

If what you're saying is that the 'response' you're laying all this at the foot of is just 2 and 3 above, I'm unsure that you're being all that serious. That has been what I've been saying all along and is not in any way a misunderstanding.

The substantive objection I'd make is that your position in your self-quote above is (as best I can tell/as far as I know) entirely wrong. Psychological continuity is one way for 2 and 3 to go coupled with the person's explications. The way the story is usually phrased doesn't give us anything to go on, without our own intuitions. We don't 'know' anything. You're free to reject that PC continues any kind of self (which I do, personally). This has now gone in the same circle three times.

I would appreciate if you could actually clarify how any of this is being misunderstood (so far, you have not done so).