Errors of perception, like the one you describe, are a common theme in Aristotle. Dysfunctions caused by illness or old age are brought up in De Anima. Imagination is described at DA 428b in distinction to other kinds of false appearances.

Deciding what is a mistake in Kant is more difficult. We don't have the object of representation in hand to compare with another supposed object in the unexperienced bush.

Deciding what is a mistake in Kant is more difficult. We don't have the object of representation in hand to compare with another supposed object in the unexperienced bush. — Paine

That's why I was talking about the possibility of mistake. Instead of insisting that there must be real independent objects, because we perceive objects, as Amadeus seemed to be doing, we ought to accept the possibility of mistake.

But later, he's saying we must pre-suppose them (despite, not being able to know them). — AmadeusD

Kant is right to emphasize that appearances are always appearances of something. But he does not press the consequences of this observation. It sets up a close relationship between appearance and reality and undermines the idea that appearances are entities that exist independently of what they are appearances of. It even suggests to me the somewhat surprising possibility that appearances are, or at least can be, what reveal reality to us, rather than concealing it.

Deciding what is a mistake in Kant is more difficult. We don't have the object of representation in hand to compare with another supposed object in the unexperienced bush. — Paine

"Difficult" is a very mild description for this situation. It suggests that you think that "representation" is not really an inappropriate concept to apply here. But you also (seem to) accept that there is no real evidence for such an object "in the unexperienced bush". So I'm rather puzzled what to make of this.

Instead of insisting that there must be real independent objects, because we perceive objects, as Amadeus seemed to be doing, we ought to accept the possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's hard to disagree with that. But if we accept that possibility, should we not, by the same token, accept the possibility that there is no mistake. We could then ask which of those possibilities is actually the case. Or even question the framing of the question.

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that. — AmadeusD

That makes a lot of sense. But you seem to me to be giving with one hand and taking back with the other.
You describe these objects as "actual, physical objects beyond the senses". But since we cannot, apparently, go beyond the senses, these objects turn out to be unavailable to us, which places them beyond our reach. Kant realizes this and so adopts the concept of the object-in-itself or being-in-itself. These concepts are hard to grasp. On the one hand, we know that they exist. On the other hand, we know, and can know, nothing whatever about them. Given that existence is not a predicate, this "knowledge" doesn't seem to amount to very much.
What all this even harder to understand is that physics appears (!) to have provided us with a view of the world that describes objects-beyond-appearances as radically different from what appears to us, on the evidence of what appears to us.
When you say that actual physical objects are an assumption or presupposition, you seem to leave open the possibility that that assumption is wrong - or at least that a different assumption or pre-supposition may also result in a not incoherent alternative conceptual structure. Compare what happens when you abandon the parallel postulate in geometry. We need something a bit stronger than this.

It's hard to disagree with that. But if we accept that possibility, should we not, by the same token, accept the possibility that there is no mistake. We could then ask which of those possibilities is actually the case. Or even question the framing of the question. — Ludwig V

I think the issue is the nature of "representation", and the different types of mistakes which are possible.

Suppose that we consider words as an example of a representation. Mistake could consist of two principal types, mistake in producing (choosing} the representation, and mistake of interpretation. Each assumes a form of consistency whereby inconsistency would constitute mistake.

Mistakes of interpretation are maybe easier to determine, but some, such as those caused by ambiguity, are not so easy because they require an understanding of the intent behind the act of producing or choosing the representation. Other mistakes of inconsistency in interpretation are easier to determine.

Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation are more difficult to determine because that requires an analysis of the context, and the intent, to determine whether principles of consistency are being followed.

"Difficult" is a very mild description for this situation. It suggests that you think that "representation" is not really an inappropriate concept to apply here. But you also (seem to) accept that there is no real evidence for such an object "in the unexperienced bush". So I'm rather puzzled what to make of this. — Ludwig V

I figure a representation happens when what is given through sensible intuition becomes an object one can have knowledge about:

The synthetic unity of con-
sciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not
merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object but
rather something under which every intuition must stand in order to
become an object for me, since in any other way, and without this
synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness. — CPR, B138

The intuitions are given sensations without which there would be no objects. The things-in-themselves are the result of our activity of thinking about objects. They are not representations of what is beyond experience. They do reflect the given aspect of objects. In that sense, they point to a cause that AmadeusD is calling for. But I cannot refer to the noumena as a cause even if we speculate about it:

The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation
and extend to objects of intuition in general, whether the latter be sim-
ilar to our own or not, as long as it is sensible and not intellectual. But
this further extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition does
not get us anywhere. For they are then merely empty concepts of ob-
jects, through which we cannot even judge whether the latter are pos-
sible or not - mere forms of thought without objective reality - since
we have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of apper-
ception, which they alone contain, could be applied, and that could thus
determine an object. Our sensible and empirical intuition alone can
provide them with sense and significance.

Thus if one assumes an object of a non-sensible intuition as given,
one can certainly represent it through all of the predicates that already
lie in the presupposition that nothing belonging to sensible intuition
pertains to it: thus it is not extended, or in space, that its duration is
not a time, that no alteration (sequence of determinations in time) is to
be encountered in it, etc. But it is not yet a genuine cognition if I merely
indicate what the intuition of the object' is not, without being able to
say what is then contained in it; for then I have not represented the pos-
sibility of an object for my pure concept of the understanding at all,
since I cannot give any intuition that would correspond to it, but could
only say that ours is not valid for it. But what is most important here is
that not even a single category could be applied to such a thing, e.g., the
concept of a substance, i.e., that of something that could exist as a sub
ject but never as a mere predicate; for I would not even know whether
there could be anything that corresponded to this determination of
thought if empirical intuition did not give me the case for its applica-
tion. But more of this in the sequel. — ibid. B148

Reading on from here through B159, these limits upon representing things beyond experience are shown to apply to experiences of ourselves:

In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in
general, on the contrary, hence in the synthetic original unity of apper-
ception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am
in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thinking, not
an intuiting. Now since for the cognition of ourselves, in addition to
the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intu-
ition to the unity of apperception, a determinate sort of intuition,
through which this manifold is given, is also required, my own existence
is not indeed appearance (let alone mere illusion), but the determina-
tion of my existence* can only occur in correspondence with the form
of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold
that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have no cog-
nition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. The con-
sciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself,
regardless of all the categories that constitute the thinking of an object
in general through combination of the manifold in an apperception. — ibid. B159

the different types of mistakes which are possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's quite a tall order. But still, if they can all be determined as mistakes, it follows that there must be a truth of the matter, beyond appearances.

Suppose that we consider words as an example of a representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That tells me a lot about what you mean by "representation". You don't mean that the representation is similar to or resembles or looks like its object. So now I need to know what kind of relationship you think there is between the representation and what it is a representation of.

I figure a representation happens when what is given through sensible intuition becomes an object one can have knowledge about: — Paine

Do you mean what I would call an experience? Something that one might be "directly" aware of? Are you gesturing at a "raw" (uninterpreted) experience? I don't see how anything like that could become a table or a chair. I do think that Kant's point about appearances apply also to experiences - they are always experiences of something; it seems obvious that the object of an experience cannot be the experience, but also experiences cannot also be objects of experience. This is really quite bewilderning.

I'm sorry, but the quotations don't help me.

Kant's terminology is intimidating. I think the way Kant speaks in the Preface to the Second Edition is a good outline to his intentions and what he means by experience, intuition, and cognition:

Hence let us once try whether we do not
get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the ob-
jects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the
requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to estab
lish something about objects before they are given to us. This would
be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not
make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he as-
sumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried
to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer re
volve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a sim-
ilar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform
to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know
anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses)
conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very
well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with
these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them
as representations to something as their object and determine this object
through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which
I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then
I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything
about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same
thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given ob-
jects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an
easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cog-
nition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in
myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is ex-
pressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must
therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. As for
objects insofar as they are thought merely through reason, and neces-
sarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given
in experience at all - the attempt to think them (for they must be capa-
ble of being thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we as-
sume as the altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can
cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.* — CPR, Bxvi

The text is linked through the citation. The footnote to this passage speaks of being "imitated from the method of those who study nature." Observe how most of the other footnotes in the Preface make similar parallels.

That's quite a tall order. But still, if they can all be determined as mistakes, it follows that there must be a truth of the matter, beyond appearances. — Ludwig V

I don't think so. First, i didn't say anything about how mistake would be determined, only that we ought to believe it is possible. Then, when we look at the primary feature of determining mistakes, mistake is commonly a matter of not producing the desired result. This doesn't imply truth or lack of truth.

So now I need to know what kind of relationship you think there is between the representation and what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V

I think there is a relationship of mastery, like a tool masters the circumstances it is applied to, to produce the desired end. The representation (symbol) is a tool, the living being uses it, and this tool assists the being in survival, as well as making use of its environment toward its ends, and perhaps some other things, dependent on intention.

I don't think so. First, i didn't say anything about how mistake would be determined, only that we ought to believe it is possible. Then, when we look at the primary feature of determining mistakes, mistake is commonly a matter of not producing the desired result. This doesn't imply truth or lack of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

In general, that's right. It depends on the project. But sometimes the aim of the project is truth, so in those cases mistake does imply the (possibility of) truth.

I think there is a relationship of mastery, like a tool masters the circumstances it is applied to, to produce the desired end. The representation (symbol) is a tool, the living being uses it, and this tool assists the being in survival, as well as making use of its environment toward its ends, and perhaps some other things, dependent on intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

H'm. But it is odd to say that the tool masters the circumstances. I always thought it was the user who mastered the circumstances by using the tool. But isn't there a case for describing the tool as adjusted to or fitting in with the relevant circumstances. A carpenter's saw is good for cutting wood. For metal, you need a hacksaw. Hammers for nails (appropriate in some circumstances). Screwdrivers or spanners in others. Certainly, the enterprise is to adjust circumstances in certain ways; but one needs to recognize what can be changed and what can't.

Kant's terminology is intimidating. I think the way Kant speaks in the Preface to the Second Edition is a good outline to his intentions and what he means by experience, intuition, and cognition: — Paine

That is much more helpful. At least, I seem to be able to get my head round the argument. I wasn't much impressed by the analogy with Copernicus, however. Yet it is an ingenious thought. Maybe there is some sort of parallel. On this reading, my doubts focus on his "a priori" and especially the requirement that the a priori tells us something about the objects in the world. However, I'm delighted to learn that there are objects in the world and that we can know something about them. Some wires may have got crossed between here and the belief that we only know phenomena (are phenomena objects in the world, I wonder) and we cannot know anything (much) about objects or being in "themselves" (unless objects (being) in themselves are not objects in the world.

I believe Kant thought he had uncrossed those wires when he refuted both Descartes and Berkeley with a single blow:

The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience. — CPR, B275

That supports the statement at B159 that we can know things in the world better than we can know ourselves.

The need for the a priori is to explain why we are built that way. The need becomes necessary by the "altered method of our way of thinking." Otherwise:

If intuition has to conform
to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori — CPR, Bxvi

The analogy with Copernicus is to demonstrate how mutually exclusive the two standpoints are.

How some of us went from this location to reading "things-in-themselves" as "mind independent" is a long and winding road through perilous terrain. Time for lunch.

I always thought it was the user who mastered the circumstances by using the tool. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but I think it is the tool, as the means to the end, which actually overcomes the circumstances. It is more proper to say that the means is what brings success rather than the will. If it was just the will, you could will yourself to success. Instead, success is highly dependent on the tool employed.

But isn't there a case for describing the tool as adjusted to or fitting in with the relevant circumstances. A carpenter's saw is good for cutting wood. For metal, you need a hacksaw. Hammers for nails (appropriate in some circumstances). Screwdrivers or spanners in others. Certainly, the enterprise is to adjust circumstances in certain ways; but one needs to recognize what can be changed and what can't. — Ludwig V

Of course. I recognized this type of mistake when I said in the earlier post, "Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation". That would be a mistake of trying to use the wrong tool. We were talking about the different types of mistakes which are possible, and whether each type could be recognized.

The need for the a priori is to explain why we are built that way. The need becomes necessary by the "altered method of our way of thinking." Otherwise:

If intuition has to conform
to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori
— CPR, Bxvi

The analogy with Copernicus is to demonstrate how mutually exclusive the two standpoints are. — Paine

We don't know anything of objects or phenomena in general a priori—in terms of what commonalities we can know about all objects without actually consulting particular objects in real time, we must reflect on their general characteristics as perceived. That is we must reflect on prior experience of phenomena in order to see what they all have in common.

Kant agrees with that in the first section of the Introduction to the Second Edition, titled:
On the difference between pure and empirical cognition. Experience is prior in time to knowledge but the possibility for experience is prior as a condition.

In the sequel therefore we will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience. Among a priori cognitions, however, those are called pure with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition "Every alteration has its cause" is an a priori proposition, only not pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience. — CPR, B2

In the Preface, objects of experience are either made present to us through an intuition that has to
"conform to the constitution of the objects" or by means of our processes of reason.

Experience is prior in time to knowledge but the possibility for experience is prior as a condition.

In the sequel therefore we will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. — Paine

I'm afraid this makes no sense to me. I don't see how any cognition can be "absolutely independent of all experience". Can it be explained?

As a matter of textual interpretation, it is clear that reason is being closely tied to the limits of empirical knowledge. That our judgement is, to some extent, a result of our nature established before our particular experiences is not, by itself, an observation given through experience. Kant calls that part thinking about what occurs "independent of all experience."

So, it is not a claim to a noetic hinterland but a parallel to Aristotle trying to understand the relationship between potential and actual beings.

That our judgement is, to some extent, a result of our nature established before our particular experiences is not, by itself, an observation given through experience. Kant calls that part thinking about what occurs "independent of all experience." — Paine

You mean that we are not born blank slates is not something we can know via our experience of ourselves? Can we not know via observations, both our own and via accessing the records of the observations of others, e.g., via ethology and anthropology, that we and other animals are not born as blank slates?

Also, referring to having a pre-cognitive nature as being a purely mental attribute seems tendentious. Physiological investigations seem to show that what is given pre-cognitively via the senses is processed by the body pre-cognitively, and only ends up being conscious experience on account of processes of which we have no awareness or knowledge in vivo. The understanding we do have of such things would seem to be all a posteriori.

You are putting a lot of theories in my mouth. I am not trying to defend what Kant said but clarify what I heard he was saying. Neither was I trying to defend what Aristotle said.

I am guessing that Kant introducing a new standpoint is neither here nor there from your standpoint.

You are putting a lot of theories in my mouth. I am not trying to defend what Kant said but clarify what I heard he was saying. Neither was I trying to defend what Aristotle said.

I am guessing that Kant introducing a new standpoint is neither here nor there from your standpoint. — Paine

I didn't mean to suggest you were defending Kant. Perhaps I should have been more careful with the wording.

I think Kant did introduce a new standpoint, and I also think doing that is always worthwhile in moving ideas along. Kant's standpoint seems to me to be superceded today.

The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience.

I'm very much in sympathy with the sentiment. But Kant was right not to mention Berkeley here. He does distinguish between those experiences which have a cause that is not myself and those that are caused by myself. His criterion is that the latter are less "vivid" than the former.

If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori.

On my understanding of a priori, we don't know anything about how the world is before we experience it. The clue is in the label - the a priori is what we know before experience. But if it is just a metaphor, we need to be a bit careful in interpreting int. It's hard to see how we could know anything about the objects of experience before experience. On the other hand, mathematics and logic could be seen as telling us about what objects are possible in experience.

I'm fascinated by the phrase "conforms to the constitution of objects"? It's another metaphor. Does it mean "is true of.." or perhaps "applies to.."? Am I wrong to be reminded of the picture theory of meaning, or perhaps of W's idea that language describes the world because it is structured (logically speaking) in the same way as the world.

The analogy with Copernicus is to demonstrate how mutually exclusive the two standpoints are. — Paine

Yes, I get that. I suppose it's not an unreasonable idea. But it doesn't explain the metaphors that riddle his language.

How some of us went from this location to reading "things-in-themselves" as "mind independent" is a long and winding road through perilous terrain. — Paine

Yes, indeed. I hope lunch was good.

We don't know anything of objects or phenomena in general a priori—in terms of what commonalities we can know about all objects without actually consulting particular objects in real time, we must reflect on their general characteristics as perceived. That is we must reflect on prior experience of phenomena in order to see what they all have in common. — Janus

Yes. Does that fit with the standard analytic view of the a priori? I think not. Yet there is something important here, I suspect.

Experience is prior in time to knowledge but the possibility for experience is prior as a condition. — Paine

I don't think you can separate experience from knowledge in that way, unless you think you can catch the wild goose of raw experience.

In the Preface, objects of experience are either made present to us through an intuition that has to "conform to the constitution of the objects" or by means of our processes of reason. — Paine

Are there two roads to the same destination or different roads to different destinations?

I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them (sc. objects) a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a
priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. — Bxvii

The bolded passage is the slide from something I understand to something I don't. Our experiences of objects are not the objects (dare I say "themselves"). Yet I can see a point here. What we know of objects must be based on how they appear to us. I part from Kant where he says that all we can know is the experiences/appearances. They themselves show us what reality is and that reality is not limited to what appears, what we experience.

Perhaps, but I think it is the tool, as the means to the end, which actually overcomes the circumstances. It is more proper to say that the means is what brings success rather than the will. If it was just the will, you could will yourself to success. Instead, success is highly dependent on the tool employed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that this is glass half-full/glass half-empty. I'm very much inclined to represent human beings as iinter-acting with the world, rather than mastering it. The latter version reminds me too much of the Biblical idea that we dominate the world. In some ways, that seems true, especially these days. But climate change reminds us that we don't.

"Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation". That would be a mistake of trying to use the wrong tool. We were talking about the different types of mistakes which are possible, and whether each type could be recognized. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know whether a complete catalogue of possible mistakes is possible. Perhaps it is.

I don't know whether a complete catalogue of possible mistakes is possible. Perhaps it is. — Ludwig V

I think it is definitely not possible, that's why we categorize by types, to extend our comprehension of what is possible as much as we think is possible. So we start with the most general "mistake is possible", and we assume this catalogues every possible mistake. Then we divide into different types of mistakes, but we realize that some may complete escape our categories. But if that is the case, then it means that we don't completely understand what "mistake" means. And if we look back at the initial category "mistake" and the proposition "mistake is possible", we can see that there may be some mistakes which escape our judgement of "mistake". There may be some mistakes which we never would know as mistakes. Then we have to admit that "mistake is possible" doesn't capture all the possible mistakes. And that's just the nature of what a mistake is, something which eludes judgement.

And that's just the nature of what a mistake is, something which eludes judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. It's just that it seems to me that there are always endless ways to screw things up, but very few to get things just right. Though some mistakes may be small enough to be unimportant.

Berkeley is, in fact, mentioned by name at the beginning of the Refutation of Idealism:

Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is thedogmatic idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if
one regards space as a property that is to pertain to the things in themselves; for then it, along with everything for which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity. — CPR B274

Kant figures his refutation of both is one stop shopping if he can prove the Theorem:

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me — B275

One question is how far outside of myself have I gotten if it is my intuition of space and time that allows for the possibility for the experience. To argue on behalf of Kant, I think that question gives the Copernicus analogy a job. It is to say you cannot jump back and forth between standpoints. The conditions for objectivity in one cannot be used as grounds in the other. Kant's position reverses the imagery of Copernicus. He is the one standing still while the objects revolve around him. He describes the problem of switching back and forth between views as a misunderstanding of specificity:

I, represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are indeed specifically a wholly distinct appearances, but they are not thereby thought of as different things. The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter.

If, therefore, as the present critique obviously requires of us, we remain true to the rule established earlier not to press our questions beyond that with which possible experience and its object can supply us, then it will not occur to us to seek information about what the objects of our senses may be in themselves, i.e., apart from any relation to the senses. But if a psychologist takes appearances for things in themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about the way in which that which is no thing in itself, but only the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself. — CPR A379

I do think that these issues relate to Wittgenstein, especially his different discussions of solipsism. But I have chores to do. I have to paint a very specific appearance. Maybe later.

I think it possible my response to MU just before will do some work for me.

Essentially, I agree with you and those final couple of lines sit very well with me. This speaks to the dual aspect I've been vying with. Obviously, "noumena" is a limiting factor for human reason and in the CPR this is essentially all he does with it (though, I have provided some titilating indications otherwise). But logically, and in terms of his description of his system, it requires something beyond the understanding. "Something" to me speaks "object". I don't care what form that comes in. Denying that these "objects" obtain precludes the entire system from doing anything for us.

"Required as an assumption" implies that the assumption is a necessary aspect. That is why the sensation is commonly called a representation. It is assumed to represent something. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't grasp what the purpose of this response is. From what I gather, this agrees with my quoted reply.

If these representations are false — Metaphysician Undercover

In the context which we are, this is not a possible situation unless idealism proper (or solipsism i guess). At any rate, it isn't in the system Kant describes.

You describe these objects as "actual, physical objects beyond the senses". — Ludwig V

I did exactly the opposite:

I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses) — AmadeusD

When you say that actual physical objects are an assumption or presupposition, you seem to leave open the possibility that that assumption is wrong - or at least that a different assumption or pre-supposition may also result in a not incoherent alternative conceptual structure. — Ludwig V

That's true in some sense - except that I accept this, and remove 'physical' "Some object" is good enough for me.

On the one hand, we know that they exist. On the other hand, we know, and can know, nothing whatever about them. — Ludwig V

Bang on.

You describe these objects as "actual, physical objects beyond the senses". — Ludwig V

I did exactly the opposite:
I misunderstood you. I'm sorry. — AmadeusD

Berkeley is, in fact, mentioned by name at the beginning of the Refutation of Idealism: — Paine

Yes, I knew that he explicitly criticised Berkeley somewhere. Thanks for the reference.

One question is how far outside of myself have I gotten if it is my intuition of space and time that allows for the possibility for the experience. — Paine

I'm not sure, but I think the correct answer starts from the fact that space and time are infinite. But it seems absurd to say that I have (actually) got infinitely far outside myself just because I have a mathematical function in my head that is infinite.

Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if
one regards space as a property that is to pertain to the things in themselves; for then it, along with everything for which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity. — CPR B274

I'm pretty sure that Berkeley would not recognize this critique. As I remember it, he argues (rightly. as it turns out) that space is relative, not absolute. He does claim that space is not absolute, but that doesn't mean that he claims that space is impossible. Since he doesn't have a concept of things-in-themselves, it seems a bit of a straw man to space can't be a property (??) of them. It would seem, however, that Kant thinks that space is absolute. How does that square with his idea that space is an intuition? Thinking about this, it seems that Kant's (and Berkeley's) conception of space seems to be that it is something that exists as a vessel or a medium in which objects have their existence. I don't see that. The existence of objects in space and space itself are not two separate discoveries. Each depends on the other, conceptually speaking.

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me — B275

Well, yes. Except that the distinction between me and objects outside me requires that both are established in the same argument. I don't see how one could establish my own existence first and then establish the existence of objects in space outside me. Now we have to go back to the cogito and its implications.

I, represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are indeed specifically a wholly distinct appearances, but they are not thereby thought of as different things. The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. — CPR A379

If, therefore, as the present critique obviously requires of us, we remain true to the rule established earlier not to press our questions beyond that with which possible experience and its object can supply us, then it will not occur to us to seek information about what the objects of our senses may be in themselves, i.e., apart from any relation to the senses. — CPR A379

The way he expresses this thought is - a bit awkward, because he seems to allow us to formulate our questions and then ask us not to press them. But once a question is asked, it is necessary to respond, either with an answer or an explanation why the question is illegitimate. Sadly, experience does in fact pose questions to us that invite us to push at the boundaries. My favourite example here is the discovery of pulsars. This happened because a radio signal received by a radio telescope in Cambridge (UK) that in some ways was entirely unremarkable could not be explained, until an entirely new kind of astronomical object - the pulsar - was posited and then proved (by experience with some help from mathematical calculations) to be the explanation. Kant's limit seems arbitrary.

But if a psychologist takes appearances for things in themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about the way in which that which is no thing in itself, but only the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself. — CPR A379

This isn't psychology as we now know it, is it? Still, that's not important. I have say, I was pondering whether one could argue that appearances exist and therefore are real in their way and consequently things-in-themselves. It seems I've been headed off. But I still need to ask how appearances can be appearances of things-in-themselves and things-in-themselves be completely unknown.

I'm grateful for your patience with me. I may be raising objections all the time, but I am learning as well.

I should not have used a spatial metaphor while discussing space. I meant to say that taking intuition of space and time as a process of my perception raises the question of how "objective" it is. That ties into Kant's beef with Berkeley who treats space as an experienced phenomenon. Kant argues that it is, rather, an a priori condition for sensibility:

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth."

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer
illusion, and only in experience is there truth."

But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my reviewer to see it everywhere?

The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so. Space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception, together with its determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its determinations a priori, can be known by us, because, no less than time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing a priori at their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein. — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, page 374, or page 69 in the linked document

This view of intuition is at odds with your statement:

Thinking about this, it seems that Kant's (and Berkeley's) conception of space seems to be that it is something that exists as a vessel or a medium in which objects have their existence. I don't see that. The existence of objects in space and space itself are not two separate discoveries. Each depends on the other, conceptually speaking. — Ludwig V

The "objects in space" appear to us through the function of the intuition. What makes the experience possible is what makes it a priori. The possibility for experience is not experienced. That is why it is said to be "beyond experience." This is the language Janus was objecting to upthread.

In the sequel therefore we will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience. Among a priori cognitions, however, those are called pure with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition "Every alteration has its cause" is an a priori proposition, only not pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience. — CPR, B2

In the Prolegomena quote above, this corresponds to:

whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein — ibid.

I, too, am learning from this discussion.

I will try to respond to some other of your comments but need to get back to painting a specific appearance.

….painting a specific appearance. — Paine

I saw that, and the first thing that came to my mind was, to say the same thing….I’ll have to think about it.

Probably not what you meant, but, considering the currently discussed author and his original Prussian linguistic tendencies, I might be forgiven.

It seems I've been headed off. But I still need to ask how appearances can be appearances of things-in-themselves and things-in-themselves be completely unknown. — Ludwig V

The things-in-themselves are, by definition, what is not experienced. The appearances do not represent the things-in-themselves ala Aristotle. We investigate the appearances without knowing how they are made or how we came to know them. That is expressed as an unknown ground:

The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. — CPR A379

The various stances taken by the psychologists and the spiritualists in the passage would try to give an account of what objects are in general but do not get us closer to the unknown ground. As the Prolegomena passage emphasizes:

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer
illusion, and only in experience is there truth." — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, page 374, or page 69 in the linked document

While this statement is challenging to understand next to those about what is "beyond experience." It does not involve the questioning of experience as related in your pulsar example.

I started using the phrase from reading:

I, represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are indeed specifically a wholly distinct appearances — CPR A379

That gives me confidence that the door I am painting today is the same one I was painting yesterday.

But I like your interpretation. That I might be starting to pun in a Prussian manner is food for thought.

Years ago, I found it much more advantageous to shy away from the A edition. Read it for context, but not study it for comprehension. I mean…there’s a reason the Good Professor made changes, so I just figured it best to go with what he himself thought as better.

Sidebar: the “a” in “….specifically a wholly distinct appearances…”, is a translator’s (not author’s) footnote indicator belonging to “specifically”; it isn’t the indefinite article of grammar spellchecker wants it to be.

I think it potentially very confusing to think of “I” as an appearance, as mentioned in A379, however specifically distinct it may be, especially if one has already understood the transcendental aesthetic in which appearance is only that empirically/physically/materially real thing from which sensation follows necessarily. One would naturally surmise that “I” is certainly no real thing therefore should not have been considered as an appearance at all.

But an appearance to the senses is that by which they are affected. To be consistent, then, regarding appearance, if I am an appearance it must be that I am an affect on myself, which, of course, is that very specific distinction he meant to convey in the text but only makes perfectly clear in a bottom-of-the-page asterisk.

Still, I’m sure you’re aware, all that is revised in the B edition, 157, where “that as I appear to myself” reduces to “only the consciousness (…) that I am”, which releases appearance as previously given in the Aesthetic, from the intuition which is proposed as necessarily following from it. And, which is kinda cool, by doing that he tacitly supports Descartes’ sum while not being quite so supportive of the “problematic” idealism explicit in the cogito ergo… part. Also, he belays the whole existence thing, relegating it to a category where it belongs, rather than connecting to the “I”, which is only a transcendental thought to which existence proper does not belong.

(I am)….not because I think, but because the (consciousness of thinking) represents that I am. Or something like that…. “synthetic original unity of apperception”, is what he’s trying to establish to modify or amend or basically replace the whole original cogito idea.

If you haven’t already, scroll all the way to the end of the text you’re referencing, to the translator’s comments, by text page-grouping, to see that Kant had trouble with this whole thing….getting what he wanted to say across to his readers. And if he had that much trouble with getting it out to us, it’s not hard to image how much trouble we have taking it in.

Or…it’s just me and I’ve completely missed the mark. (Sigh)