The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Bateson, Form, Substance, and Difference
The mind-created world, as I understand the OP, has no external cause and is a monism where everything that exists has mental properties. — JuanZu
Was that controversial key-word a Freudian slip, or intentional challenge, to keep this thread going in circles for 70 pages? :wink:I acnowledge that the word 'created' might be a poor choice of words in the context. — Wayfarer
Nicely put, (I’m not familiar with Plotinus), I would go further. There are a constellation of souls including some who instantiate matter from pre matter. But I would caution that these latter souls are very distant from our own, (“ Some very old material is moving through”, from your post).In Plotinus, the soul animates matter as far as it can. The source is a power that can only go so far because matter is never completely mastered by form. The origin of that soul is from before our birth. Plotinus has also said he has visited that realm through contemplation.
My argument is that a person may misjudge what one is perceiving, and this does not imply that the person perceives nothing. That was to counter your claim that if a person is not perceiving objects one is perceiving nothing. It may be the case that the person judges oneself to be perceiving objects, but is not perceiving objects, yet still is perceiving. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. They are perceiving something. Things are objects. That fact we can't know what/which (and similar questions) doesn't change that part of the position. (and, as above, Kant knows this too). — AmadeusD
What are the criteria?but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving, — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact remains, Kant's system *does not work* unless there is an assumption that something causes our sensations. — AmadeusD
It therefore has subjective real-
ity in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of
time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded re-
ally not as object but as the way of representing myself as object But
if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sen-
sibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to our-
selves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the represen-
tation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its
empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. — CPR A36/B53
Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that — AmadeusD
The "physical objects" we experience in our sensations and judgements are representations made possible through combinations of our intuitions of space and time. — Paine
What are the criteria? — Patterner
If these representations are false, it may be the case that the person is not actually perceiving objects, despite believing oneself to be perceiving objects. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that does (edited to correct stupid auto correct) not have temporal extension?but if "objects" doesn't fulfill the criteria for what the person is actually perceiving,
— Metaphysician Undercover
What are the criteria?
— Patterner
I would say that the single most important criterion for "object" is temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover
That error comes up a lot in Aristotle. Perhaps you could point out where that happens with Kant. — Paine
Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that fits not have temporal extension? — Patterner
Perhaps. But is it likely that someone who thinks they are perceiving an object is actually viewing an activity?Can you give an example of something a person is actually perceiving that does (edited to correct stupid autocorrect) not have temporal extension?
— Patterner
Any activity I suppose. At each moment it is new and different, therefore there is no temporal extension of any specific thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps. But is it likely that someone who thinks they are perceiving an object is actually viewing an activity? — Patterner
Speaking of the distinction between a Created vs Constructed world, Dan Brown's new mystery/thriller, Secret of Secrets --- I'm almost to the halfway point --- hinges on the competition between Materialistic and Noetic worldviews.↪Gnomon
In Western metaphysics, ‘creation’ has a specific status, reserved for the Creator (‘creature’ meaning ‘created being’). It is of course used more broadly nowadays, for all manner of creative work, but it still retains some overtones, in the philosophical context. But I’m not going to retroactively update it. Besides, ‘mind-constructed world’ just doesn’t have a ring to it. — Wayfarer
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