That's part of the problem... the idea is equivocal. — Banno

So the problem is that it speaks to both sides? Curious.

Yep. On this we agree. — Banno

For funs, I popped the question to AI. I well remember how aggressively dismissive you were of Peirce right from the start. Seems that Peirce's reappearance into public prominence would have indeed caused an issue.

So OK AI! Compare and contrast!...

Determining the "more famous" philosopher between Donald Davidson and Charles Sanders Peirce depends on the context, as each has significantly different but profound legacies. However, within academic philosophy, Charles Sanders Peirce is generally considered the more historically significant and foundational figure.

Charles Sanders Peirce

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) is often called "the father of pragmatism" and is recognized as America's first great philosopher. His fame stems from his foundational work across multiple fields, including:

Pragmatism: Peirce originated the philosophical movement of pragmatism, which was later popularized and modified by William James and John Dewey.

Semiotics: He developed a comprehensive theory of signs, or semiotics, that has been highly influential in linguistics, communication, and other fields.

Logic: Peirce made groundbreaking contributions to logic and philosophy of science, including developing concepts of abductive reasoning and second-order quantification, before many of his more famous European counterparts.

Despite this, much of Peirce's work was unpublished or unorganized during his lifetime, and he died in relative obscurity. His wide-ranging influence has been fully recognized only posthumously, as scholars have assembled and studied his papers.

Donald Davidson

Donald Davidson (1917–2003) was a preeminent figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, most active from the 1960s onward. His fame rests on his influential work in specific areas of philosophy, including:

Philosophy of mind: He introduced the influential theory of "anomalous monism," which states that mental events are identical to physical events but are not governed by strict physical laws.

Philosophy of language: Davidson integrated Alfred Tarski's theory of truth to create a theory of meaning, an approach that was highly influential in the later 20th century.

Action theory: He famously argued that reasons for actions are also the causes of those actions, opposing the prevailing view at the time.

Davidson's influence largely peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, and while his work is still discussed, it is often in relation to specific issues rather than as a singular, dominant school of thought.

Conclusion

In terms of lasting historical impact across a broad range of philosophical traditions and disciplines, C.S. Peirce is the more famous and foundational figure. His ideas in pragmatism, semiotics, and logic laid much of the groundwork for 20th-century thought, though he was not widely celebrated during his own lifetime.

Donald Davidson is extremely important within the 20th-century analytic tradition but is less of a foundational figure spanning the wider history of philosophy.

The interpretive process and meaning holism

Both philosophers developed thought experiments—radical translation for Peirce and radical interpretation for Davidson—to investigate the nature of meaning and the interpretive process itself.
Meaning is a "vector of forces": Both acknowledge that assigning meaning to a speaker's words is not a simple task because it depends on both what the words mean and what the speaker believes. Davidson described this as meaning being a "vector of two forces".

Meaning holism: They share the view that the meaning of a single utterance cannot be determined in isolation. For Peirce, a sign's meaning is embedded in the entire system of signs and its interpretants. For Davidson, a radical interpreter must develop a theory of meaning for a speaker's entire language, inferring the truth conditions of sentences based on observation of behavior and contextual cues.

Explanatory hypothesis and abduction

Both philosophies emphasize the role of hypothesis formation, or abduction, in generating new knowledge.

Peirce's abduction: Peirce introduced abduction as a third mode of inference, distinct from deduction and induction. Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis to account for a surprising observation. This provides the "new ideas" that are then tested through deduction and induction.

Davidson's Principle of Charity: In Davidson's radical interpretation, the interpreter uses the Principle of Charity, which attributes beliefs to a speaker that are mostly true and coherent. This can be seen as a form of abduction. The interpreter creates the best possible "explanatory hypothesis"—a Tarski-style truth theory—for the speaker's behavior, which is then tested against further observations.

Ooh dear. And I believe AI has extra training in being charitable in its replies.

But this was a useful prompt. It reminds me now that anomalous monism was the bugbear. Biosemiotics really killed that one stone dead.

Pathetic.

"My daddy's a policeman..."

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

I forgot to include the bits where the similarities were stressed. And that was the original point too.

Charles Sanders Peirce and Donald Davidson, despite belonging to different philosophical periods, share striking similarities rooted in their anti-Cartesian pragmatist approaches to truth, meaning, and knowledge. Both philosophers reject the idea of a private, foundational mind and instead situate meaning and belief within a public, intersubjective process of interpretation.

Intersubjectivity and anti-foundationalism

Both Peirce and Davidson reject Cartesian foundationalism, the idea that knowledge rests on a foundation of indubitable inner experience. Instead, they argue that meaning and thought are public, social phenomena that arise from interaction with others and a shared world.

Peirce's semiotics: Peirce's triadic model of the sign—involving a sign, an object, and an interpretant—is inherently social. A sign's meaning is not fixed in a person's mind but is determined by its interpretation within a community of inquirers. Infinite semiosis, the endless chain of interpretants, prevents any ultimate, private foundation for meaning.

Davidson's triangulation: Davidson's concept of triangulation mirrors this social basis for meaning. Meaning and objective thought are possible only through a three-way interaction: one person, another person, and a shared external object or event. This mutual reaction to a common cause provides the necessary external check for thought and meaning to be determined.

Truth, coherence, and the long run

Both thinkers relate truth to a process of rational inquiry rather than to a static correspondence with reality.

Peirce's "long run": Peirce defined truth as the final, settled opinion that a community of inquirers would reach if they pursued a question long enough. A true belief is one that is "unassailable by doubt" in the infinite long run. This is a pragmatic, fallibilist account, holding that our current beliefs are always subject to revision.

Davidson's coherence: Davidson developed a coherence theory of truth, arguing that coherence provides the test for both truth and the judgment that objective truth-conditions are justified.

For Davidson, we have no independent access to reality outside of our beliefs, but the demand that our beliefs cohere sufficiently guarantees a large measure of truth. Coherence acts as a test for a non-confrontational form of correspondence, where a theory of truth is tied to how a speaker's utterances relate to events in the world.

Answers to 'Why' questions all end up the same way, sooner or later— "Because I said so!" or the less responsible version, "It's Godswill!". Either are best said in a somewhat irritated and aggressive tone to convey the end of the discussion.

'How' questions seem to me to be more 'scientific' because they can end on the other side of the discussion when the questioner says "Show me!", after which the discussion hopefully turns to demonstration. Thus no science is done in discussions, but only in the laboratory, or the field.
And the distinction between good theory and conspiracy theory is also made there, and not in discussion.

I’m watching this happen in real time after Charlie Kirk’s shooting. And the process is not so simple.

The problem is that we do live in a world where everyone is telling self-interested stories. Governments - even when their intentions are good - will edit the facts to make them palatable for public consumption. — apokrisis

There are elementary errors being made. Two in particular: bias and too little evidence.

A dearth of evidence implies a plethora of possibilities. Bias narrows the possibilities one considers.

Consider the Trump shooting last year. Some on right jumped to the conclusion that there was a leftist conspiracy. Some on the right thought it was contrived by Trump. Investigations have exposed no such conspiracies. Of course, coverups are possible, but possibilities are not evidence.

Any citizen who starts to dig into the facts as they are presented will always seem to find more and more that does not fit the narrative.

And some will rationalize the evidence that doesn't fit. For example, by claiming it's contrived by the conspirators. "This is what they want you to think." So it becomes further "proof" of the conspiracy, in their minds.

Answers to 'Why' questions all end up the same way, sooner or later— "Because I said so!" or the less responsible version, "It's Godswill!". — unenlightened

Some will resonate with this sentiment, no doubt. All the same, it’s a bit Orwellian in its nature, even if unintentionally so. This being the notion that there is no such thing as an objective (i.e., utterly impartial to all egos everywhere) truth to be had and thereby pursued—very much including to questions of why. Why can 2+2=5 in addition to equaling four? Because Big Brother says so; and, therefore, so it can be.

Why did the avalanche happen? Because I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did. There is no objective truth to its reason for happening—that is, none other than that it happened because “I/you/he/she/they/we so say/declare/reckon/will that it did.”

Orwell said a lot in favor of objective truth and the perils of this commonsense notion’s destruction by tyrants—including that he unfrivolously feared its loss in society more than he feared bombs of any kind—but here’s a readily obtainable and easy to understand short quote of his:

The very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. Lies will pass into history. — George Orwell

(And yes, I’m saying this via the lens of objective idealism, one to which objective truths thereby very much pertain. Point being, one need not be a physicalist to uphold the reality of objective truths via rational justifications for this common sense notion.)

BTW, in keeping with both my last post and the theme of this thread, Hume can be interpreted in multiple ways, one of which is that we was, in fact, a staunch causal realist—this being how I myself interpreted his writings when reading them—his only issue being with rationalism’s (at the very least to him) false presumption that particular instantiations of causation could be infallibly known (to emphasize, this epistemologically) via sound deductions. But, as facts go, Hume never once claimed that causation was in fact illusory … hence, that there was no objective truth to causes (not in these or any other words).

Of course, coverups are possible, but possibilities are not evidence. — Relativist

But do we even know what really struck his ear and how the damage healed so fast? Everything was publicly witnessed in 4k and yet what are the facts? This kind of nonsense is a fascinating.

The footage isn’t grainy anymore. And yet public truth only seems to grow more elusive. With photoshop having become AI, where is this going?

Orwell said a lot in favor of objective truth and the perils of this commonsense notion’s destruction by tyrants—including that he unfrivolously feared its loss in society more than he feared bombs of any kind — javra

Yes. I used to be reassured that governments lied routinely but that also the truth would eventually be declassified. Wait 20 to 40 years and history would get written.

So the question becomes what is history telling us about the nature of truth and objectively so far as it matters in human affairs. The world has found it own pragmatic accomodation that bears perhaps only faint resemblance to what was considered its ideal.

I see a new approach to truth and fact in an analysis of how things have gone for real. We can’t just assume we know what is best for social order even though Orwell felt like he was speaking for something we must defend.

Hence my interest in the new conspiracy theory industry on YouTube. Candace Owen and the like. Is this the new free press with the power to investigate or something compounding the problem, playing into the hands of information autocracy by amplifying the public confusion?

It used to be the case that life lived as truth seemed just commonsense. Now maybe life lived as conspiracy theory is what is and always has been real. Or life lived as a reality show. A juicy topic. Debord in the age of the accelerationist.

Hence my interest in the new conspiracy theory industry on YouTube. Candace Owen and the like. Is this the new free press with the power to investigate or something compounding the problem, playing into the hands of information autocracy by amplifying the public confusion? — apokrisis

Yes, and the same could be said of AI.

But I don't think truth ever really dies. A conspiracy theorist with a YouTube channel that generates lots of views is relying on an equivocation. They rely on their audience (and perhaps themselves) believing that their end is truth when in fact it is views, or popularity, or drama, or something like that. When the dissimulation gets too far over its skies it becomes noticed that the person is not conveying truth but is instead merely gratifying their own desire for popularity, and at the point the game is up. The audience doesn't say, "Ah, well now we know for sure that none of this is true, but we're going to believe it anyway." That form of self-deception is only possible up to a point. The truth can only be ignored up to a point.

Shots were definitely fired, an audience member was killed, and so was the shooter. The shooter had the actual gun. Trump's injury was minor -evident from the absence of a visible scar. At one point, the FBI director suggested the injury may be from shrapnel, such as a richocheted bullet fragment or from something a bullet hit. Trump verbally attacked him for this.

A family member of mine considers 3 "facts" to be proof positive it was staged: 1) Trump's injury was minor 2) he capitalized on the attempt in his campaign- including making out his injury to be worse than it was. 3) Trump's an asshole.

IMHO, that is not sufficient basis to draw that conclusion. It also overlooks the fact that the Secret Service (and FBI) identified negligence by the Secret Service.

So I think the evidence points to this being a genuine attempt on his life, although his actual injury was minor. Trump is apt to exaggerate, and he's adept at taking political advantage of anything. It played well to his devoted followers who consider him an emissary from.God.

Yes. I used to be reassured that governments lied routinely but that also the truth would eventually be declassified. Wait 20 to 40 years and history would get written.

[...]

It used to be the case that life lived as truth seemed just commonsense. Now maybe life lived as conspiracy theory is what is and always has been real. Or life lived as a reality show. A juicy topic. Debord in the age of the accelerationist. — apokrisis

I can see this … and can develop it a bit more. As our technology progresses, AI included, we will (granting that by then we don’t become extinct) eventually arrive at a future wherein everything knowable once again becomes for all practical purposes nothing short of oral tradition (as was generally the case for the Celts, the Dacians, the Native Americans, and so forth, to not here start on a long list of past cultures worldwide). For instance, it’s quite conceivable to me that at some future point of our technological evolution we’ll devise a way to indiscernibly mimic carbon dating. That Torah there can be carbon dated to, say, 300 BCE, but it was manufactured just yesterday; or else this dinosaur fossil here, carbon datable to some 100 million years back, was likewise manufactured via nano-technology this past week. And so forth. Add in the moral relativism of “might makes right” and you could easily end up with both an epistemological and ensuing ontological nightmare for our global species of life.

Seems to me that is precisely one of the pivotal reasons for why a metaphysics' rational justification for there in fact being objective truth(s) becomes so enormously paramount to our future survival as a species. And this, maybe obviously to some, in non-infallibilist manners of justification. The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. Things I so far find lacking in the metaphysics you subscribe to, what I take to be the many good features it has aside—and fundamentally physicalist though it may be. But, as always, feel free to demonstrate otherwise.

But, as facts go, Hume never once claimed that causation was in fact illusory … hence, that there was no objective truth to causes (not in these or any other words). — javra

That's true and you have a point. But it is an argument from silence and as such falls short of being conclusive. There's a complication, though, that Hume is quite explicit about metaphysics and about the "Schoolmen's" concept of power. So far as I know, he doesn't explicitly discuss whether there is a reality distinct from experience, which is a bit odd. I don't know what to think.

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. He provided an account of causation as the result of an association of impressions and ideas that leads us to believe in causal relationships through "custom or habit". The issue about this account is that it seems to assert that we have this custom or habit but not to justify it. However, I think there are grounds for thinking that he thought that account did justify our custom.

Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition. — Enquiry, section VI, Probability, footnote to title

They rely on their audience (and perhaps themselves) believing that their end is truth when in fact it is views, or popularity, or drama, or something like that. When the dissimulation gets too far over its skies it becomes noticed that the person is not conveying truth but is instead merely gratifying their own desire for popularity, and at the point the game is up. — Leontiskos

It would be nice if that were true. But I think instead that people get used to living in a reality show. The fact that the dramas are made up becomes neither here nor there. Instead the heightened life becomes what absorbs us into its reality.

In any reality show, you know that the whole thing sits on some weird balance of people acting out plot lines and really also exposing their worst selves.

So reality shows became a huge industry. And conspiracy theory is now moving out of the fringe and into the mainstream. It is becoming corporate and industrial. It is a flourishing economy with a real power grip on society.

Charlie Kirk is an event. And now it becomes this season’s freshest hit. The Epstein show still rolls. But Charlie Kirk could become even splashier if any of the conspiracy analysis is even a little bit true.

Reality shows spawned something real enough in Donald Trump. Conspiracy shows are becoming mainstream franchises now. An even more blurred line. What does that look like when it is the new dominant form of media owned by those with a will to power?

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. He provided an account of causation as the result of an association of impressions and ideas that leads us to believe in causal relationships through "custom or habit". The issue about this account is that it seems to assert that we have this custom or habit but not to justify it. — Ludwig V

I'll go further, but again nothing conclusive. First, you have to place him in his time-period, a time-period of heresies and the maybe yet occasional burning for such. Hume does mention and relies upon what he in his lexicon termed instincts. If I remember right, at one point or another even briefly alluding to lesser animals having the same as man, this in terms of considering causal relations (?). Kant replaced this notion with categories. When i read Hume, I thereby deemed his overall thesis regarding causality as being non-contradictory and thereby consistent with evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviors via genotypes. Operant and classical conditioning in animals (and in humans), for one example, would be impossible without such innately held means of association. To me also interesting, Darwin did read Hume prior to his books on evolution, including his "On the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals". But, no, nothing philosophically conclusive in any of this.

IMHO, that is not sufficient basis to draw that conclusion. — Relativist

Of course. But my point was we still don’t know what actually clipped his ear. Shrapnel seems the likeliest.

So here we have the double thing of the most unlikely close shave - an existential level ambiguity in itself. And then what seems like a quite unnecessary obsfucation over what the object in question was.

We like to treat reality as fundamentally intelligible or legible. And yet in 4K and slo-mo replay, it still ain’t.

It is like the move to refereeing sports by video analysis. In rugby, it turns out that nearly every try scored be perhaps ought to be disallowed as there is always some tiniest infringement to be found. Or at least a tiny infringement that one might as well see either way.

The general point is that truth is pragmatically complex. Do we loosen the grip of the narrative or tighten the definition of the fact. Back to the explanation-description dichotomy. :grin:

I couldn’t follow your question. Are you asking me to successfully define “the good” as something physically real and beyond the collective pragmatic narrative? Or what exactly?

I couldn’t follow your question. Are you asking me to successfully define “the good” as something physically real and beyond the collective pragmatic narrative? Or what exactly? — apokrisis

Well, again:

The likewise rationally justifiable objective truth regarding meta-ethics, explained in manners that accounts for all possible values and value theories, including that of “The Good”, also wouldn’t hurt—this for the same purposes. — javra

In other words, a metaphysics that via falliblist means rationally justifies the objective truth of meta-ethics in manners that account for all value systems: hence including the values held by those who willfully engage in activities which the average person might likely deem evil-doings but also including the neo-platonic value system of "The Good".

The question being, how does the metaphysics you subscribe to rationally justify the objective truth of such a meta-ethical reality? (Something, btw, which my "mushy" or such objectively idealist metaphysics, something yet in the process of being formally concluded in written form, is quite adept at. ((To illustrate this ain't posturing: You're free to check it out and try to falsify any part of its fallible conclusions. Link provided in my profile. The basic gist to meta-ethics is presented in Chapter 14. No pressure though; just if you're curious.) But I am asking you how your fundamentally physicalist metaphysical system does account for the objective truth of meta-ethics - this, maybe needless to add, in a manner that cogently accounts for all conceivable value structures present and past.)

It would be nice if that were true. But I think instead that people get used to living in a reality show. The fact that the dramas are made up becomes neither here nor there. Instead the heightened life becomes what absorbs us into its reality. — apokrisis

So one example would be the shift from the popularity of WWF and WWE to the popularity of MMA. With the former there was a cognitive dissonance where one needed to pretend that a form of acting was not a form of acting, and the transition to the latter ironed out that cognitive dissonance. You get the same sort of event without the dissimulation.

So reality shows became a huge industry. And conspiracy theory is now moving out of the fringe and into the mainstream. It is becoming corporate and industrial. It is a flourishing economy with a real power grip on society.

Charlie Kirk is an event. And now it becomes this season’s freshest hit. The Epstein show still rolls. But Charlie Kirk could become even splashier if any of the conspiracy analysis is even a little bit true.

Reality shows spawned something real enough in Donald Trump. Conspiracy shows are becoming mainstream franchises now. An even more blurred line. What does that look like when it is the new dominant form of media owned by those with a will to power? — apokrisis

Those are good points, but at the same time I think you will find that the conspiracy theorists need to take care not to get too far over their skies. The popularity distribution will be a bell curve between non-conspiratorial material and excessively conspiratorial material. The sweet spot must still mind the further extreme, and truth or plausibility is one of the central variables governing that sweet spot.

The development of a taste for the conspiratorial is almost certainly bad for the flourishing of a society, and in this case it looks to be a reaction to an overly unified media landscape. But when you introduce magnifiers like YouTube or AI it's hard to know whether the pendulum will swing in the same manner it has in the past, or if a new dynamic will emerge.

, a compelling line of thought. Good stuff.

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. For Hume, causation is instead an aspect of our psychology: the association of impressions and ideas through “custom or habit.”

Javra agrees, and adds that these customs or habits may arise from the evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviours via genotypes.

I would like to add that causal expositions can also be understood as a language game—an activity we perform in the world, using words to describe patterns and decide what to do next. In this sense, Hume’s “customs or habits” can be seen as a precursor to Wittgenstein’s “language games.” On this view, causes are not waiting out there in the world to be discovered; they are part and parcel of the way we interact with the world. This need not conflict with Javra’s account, but can complement it: our evolved predispositions may make us disposed to engage in these language games, generating causal explanations as part of practical life.

Thus, the focus shifts from grand metaphysical schemes to the practical question of how we act and respond to patterns in our experience.

How did you go from this:

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. — Ludwig V

to this:

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. — Banno

?

This is what I at first took T Clark to be saying, here:

My conclusion - identifying one element as the cause of another depends on where you look. What constitutes the cause is a matter of convention, not fact. It works when you can isolate the elements of the phenomena you are studying at from their environments... e.g. if I push the grocery cart it moves. — T Clark

But perhaps not.

Let's see what @Ludwig V says, but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, replacing it with habit and custom.

Operant and classical conditioning in animals (and in humans), for one example, would be impossible without such innately held means of association. — javra

That's right. For Hume (by implication), association of ideas and impressions is the one piece of equipment built in to your minds. (Contrast Kant). The thing is - again by implication - it is a causal account. Again, it would be very odd, wouldn't it, if a sceptic about causality proposed causal relationships to explain what causes are. I think the best way of understanding this is by comparison with Wittgenstein's exasperated "This is what I do."

On this view, causes are not waiting out there in the world to be discovered; they are part and parcel of the way we interact with the world. — Banno

Yes - emphasis on interaction. Hume doesn't seem to escape from the passive observer trying to piece the world together. But causality plays a vital role in our ability to do things in the world and to change things in the world. I think there is still a hunger for something beyond regularities - as everyone keeps reminding me, correlation is not causality. If that's not looking for a secret power, what does it mean? Regularities are a brute fact, perhaps.

but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, replacing it with habit and custom. — Banno

Well, yes. But we do still use purposive explanations; the difference is that we only use them in specific domains and we don't (most of us) have a grand overall hierarchy of purposes and values. However, I'm not sure that material and formal causes make much sense any more.

but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, — Banno

Yes, he was one of the folks that discredited teleological and formal causes. (Not that I support him on this.) But it is due to him that we have a much firmer understanding of what efficient causes are to begin with. He defined their properties

As to this

Javra agrees, and adds that these customs or habits may arise from the evolutionary inheritance of predispositions and behaviours via genotypes. — Banno

Whatever metaphysics one subscribes to, we, genetically, phenotypically, consciously, are part and parcel of the metaphysics of the world. So no, while I maintain what I said, I don't agree with your interpretation of causation being unreal (metaphysical though it always is be definition).
.

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. — Ludwig V

I meant that Hume does not question the idea of causation itself; he questions, and rejects, a particular account of what (efficient) causes are.

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. — Banno

I was referring partly to his rejection of metaphysics as such, and to his criticism of the traditional conception of causal powers.

So one example would be the shift from the popularity of WWF and WWE to the popularity of MMA. — Leontiskos

Yep. Another resonating point. Especially as before Trump was on The Apprentice, he was part of WWE.

I used to like old school boxing but find modern MMA unwatchable. One claimed to showcase the skill, the other only the brutality. Though boxing was the deadlier sport in fact.

Games of dominance and submission. That is the genetic legacy that civilisation must build over. And to which civilisation can swiftly return. As again Trump is showing.

Boxing presented us the civilised and dignified face. Wrestling was the watered down, dress up version suited to kid’s TV. Now there is cage fighting - the old bare knuckle brawl - gone mainstream.

And Trump running the hegemonic power as a planetary dominance and submission reality show.

he popularity distribution will be a bell curve between non-conspiratorial material and excessively conspiratorial material. The sweet spot must still mind the further extreme, and truth or plausibility is one of the central variables governing that sweet spot. — Leontiskos

I completely agree. That is why I focus on Candace Owens as a particular case in point. The medium is evolving fast. It is too easy to dismiss it for its history on the fringes and its WWE levels of believability.

But when you introduce magnifiers like YouTube or AI it's hard to know whether the pendulum will swing in the same manner it has in the past, or if a new dynamic will emerge. — Leontiskos

My suggestion is that the media may evolve but it always becomes what power must capture and control. And that exists in tension with the power of the people to resist.

So the printing press at first liberated people power - taking back the written world from the social elite. Then it became the tool of class factions and eventually the liberal order, such as it was.

How is the internet likely to fare in that regard? How do things go as even social media crashes into the new AI paradigm.

That is why I now toy with AI as the instant fact checker on PF opinion. It is interesting to introduce a neutral referee into this little social game of dominance and submission. To understand where things might go, one must experiment with the new forms. :razz:

Again, it would be very odd, wouldn't it, if a sceptic about causality proposed causal relationships to explain what causes are. I think the best way of understanding this is by comparison with Wittgenstein's exasperated "This is what I do." — Ludwig V

That nicely frames the incipient circularity in explaining causation in terms of evolution. To make use of evolutionary explanations, we are already talking in terms of causation. It's not mistaken, so much as unsatisfactory.

"This is what I do." — Ludwig V

This is where we might sidestep Wittgenstein and invoke Davidson. We might overcome Hume's passive observation using something like Davidson's interactive process of interpretation; which is itself a development from Wittgenstein's language games. We sidestep the circularity problem by seeing causation not as something to be explained only by invoking causal mechanisms but as something continuously enacted and interpreted in practice.

Added, for @javra: And that is an evolved practice.

Regularities are a brute fact, perhaps. — Ludwig V

Or rather, there is a pragmatic need to be able distinguish the contingent from the necessary. The differences that make a difference from the differences that don’t.

Neurocognition tells us how we are organised to sift the world into the facts we must attend to and the facts we can safely ignore.

Facts ain’t any kind of facts until they have been properly dichotomised along those semiotic lines.