The point I would press here is again that what makes science work is not a series of logical rules, but a group of sociological rules. — Banno
What these examples show is not just that abduction is sometimes mistaken, but that it leads to a lack of progress, and that other, wildly differing background assumptions are instead needed to progress our understanding. — Banno
The point I would press here is again that what makes science work is not a series of logical rules, but a group of sociological rules. It's not a special type of logic - induction or abduction - that makes science effective, but the open interplay between scientists. — Banno
theories were not created for sociological reasons but because of a restriction that phenomena and physical referential problems impose on the formulation of theories. — JuanZu
A neat example that supports the hypothesis that "abduction" - understood as accepting the best hypothesis - is central to scientific method. — Banno
Notice that in each case, abduction leads to the confirmation of the accepted paradigm, where what was needed was a change to that very paradigm. Abduction as a counterproductive process. — Banno
We have before us quite different notions of abduction. Sometimes it is talked of as the process of forming an hypothesis. We know that, for any set of observations, there are innumerable possible explanations. Simply having available a range of hypotheses is insufficient. We must choose between them. — Banno
More recent developments in Philosophy show us how experience and custom are themselves grounded in the community in which we live. To doubt requires a background of presumed certainty. Those fundamental beliefs are what enable doubt.Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom. — JuanZu
His work is a bit broader than just that. His classic formulation, "anything goes", is of course mistaken; but the interesting bit is how it is mistaken - what it is that restricts which ideas are considered scientific and which are not.From what I know of Feyerabend, he appears to be discussing the creative processes of scientists — Relativist
This is a simple logical truth - a hypotheses being unfalsified does not make it more likely to be true. On this we agree. We could take a Bayesian approach to selecting amongst competing hypotheses, but note well that this is not adopting induction. There is a world of difference between an hypothesis being unfalsified and it's being more likely than other hypotheses. Popper’s point was exactly that: science isn’t about confirming hypotheses through accumulation of positive cases (which falls afoul of Hume’s problem of induction), but about weeding them out through falsification. A hypothesis standing unrefuted is not “more true,” it’s just “not yet eliminated.”What is central to the scientific method of the empirical sciences (in contrast to what some term “the science of mathematics” and such, which have no such method) is communal verification via empirical means (aka, peer review and replicability of test results) that falsifiable hypotheses are not in fact false and, thereby, are likely to be true. — javra
Nice. But is it right, or even fair, to lump all this together and call it "abduction", and then to set it out in some gross oversimplification such asAs with all trial-and-error heuristics, most abductions are bound to be wrong. Yes, of course. Notwithstanding, for any paradigm shift to ever occur one must first conceive of a new paradigm from outside the boundaries of the old that better accounts for the known data. This will not be a process of deduction, nor will it typically be one of induction (generalization from particulars, for example), but instead will typically commence with what we in retrospect will then likely claim to be a flash of insight, as per the Eureka moment; this then yet being abduction. One which happens to eventually produce a better understanding regarding what is by newly devised deductions and inductions, which yet pivot on the given roundabout abduction. But again, without being falsifiable, it will not be science (not of the empirical kind). — javra
The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. — SEP article
More recent developments in Philosophy show us how experience and custom are themselves grounded in the community in which we live. — Banno
Abduction is worse. The SEP notes that Peirce’s conception of abduction shifts over his long career, making it hard to pin down a coherent, stable doctrine. — Banno
What is certain is that abduction is no improvement on induction, and certainly cannot overcome Hume's objections. — Banno
Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. "Inference to best explanation" is utterly hollow, until one sets out what a best explanation is. Further, is the mooted "natural law" an explanation of what happens, or just a description - "for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction" sets out what happens; does it explain what happens?Here's how I approach it: some explanation is needed for the constant conjunction of past regularities. I judge that the "inference to best explanation" for this is that there exist laws of nature that necessitate this behavior. Inferring a best explanation is rational - it's a form of abductive reasoning. — Relativist
there's a lot in that, a fair bit of it being quite agreeable, some less so. — Banno
Here's, I think, the first use of "abduction" in this thread: — Banno
Laws are descriptions, not explanations. — Banno
“Abduction” just papers over the real philosophical problem (Hume’s), instead of answering it. — Banno
You haven't provided one. You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed.So there's good reason to question the use of abduction hereabouts.
1h — Banno
Abduction doesn't provide explanations, it COMPARES explanations. I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction.Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. — Banno
...happens a lot more then it perhaps ought, around these fora. A favourite grump of mine.entertaining Aristotelian notions... — javra
Does it explain why? Or does it just detail the description of the motion?We then use the notion of gravity to explain why an object thrown up into thin air will always come back down to earth... — javra
Further, is the mooted "natural law" an explanation of what happens, or just a description - "for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction" sets out what happens; does it explain what happens? — Banno
I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction. — Relativist
...happens a lot more then it perhaps ought, around these fora. — Banno
Now my point would be that it doesn't matter. What we get is a brilliant and useful way of working out what will happen - description or explanation, be damned. — Banno
:wink:"be-cause of gravity" — javra
You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed. — Relativist
And is that better than "Be-cause it is the will of the Flying Spaghetti Monster"? — Banno
What makes gravity a better account is F=Gm₁m₂/r². — Banno
Laws appeal to symmetries. So they are grounded in mathematical logic. — apokrisis
Nothing more nor less than creating explanatory hypotheses. I'm not seeing the difficulty you are apparently having with the idea. — Janus
"plausible" adds the normative element that lets confirmation bias in. We can now reject all the explanations we take as implausible.There are not innumerable possible plausible explanations. — Janus
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