Yes, and there's plenty more here to unpack. "Why" questions presume intent, in some aspect, and so all that goes with intentionality.

My point is that: 1) we can draw some conclusions based on the information that IS available; 2) some conclusions are more reasonable than others; 3) (obviously) it's contingent upon the information being correct.

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mine. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?

My point is that: 1) we can draw some conclusions based on the information that IS available; 2) some conclusions are more reasonable than others; 3) (obviously) it's contingent upon the information being correct. — Relativist

Is the argument that abduction can be used to pick out which theories are conspiracy theories? Then what counts as a conspiracy theory is which "conclusions are more reasonable than others"; but a conspiracy theorist may just insist that the conspiracy is the more reasonable conclusion.

Hence Melina Tsapos' conspiracy definition dilemma.

"Why" questions presume intent, in some aspect, and so all that goes with intentionality. — Banno

As in the rock intended to start the avalanche that happened by intending to pursue gravitational paths of less resistance down the mountain just so?

That would make a rather extreme animist of you. Not even the spiritualists I've encountered hold such views.

Why questions all presuppose purpose, ends toward which things move physically or otherwise, and hence teleological causation - of which intents, and hence intentionality, is just one relatively minor instantiation of within the cosmos at large. The reason why leaves flutter is not because the wind so wills it. Lest we loose track of what are poetic truths and what is objectively real.

But I guess none of this matters much when causes are taken to be unreal. No objective truth to them to speak of - only the invented illusory truths of those who domineeringly subjugate the minds of others. What tyrant wouldn't approve?

(Still very much concur with Orwell's perspective.)

As in the rock intended to start the avalanche that happened by intending to pursue gravitational paths of less resistance down the mountain just so? — javra

That'd be more a "how" than a "why" - how the avalanche started rather than why.

Why questions all presuppose purpose — javra

Yep.

What's proposed is causation not as an external “thing to be explained” but as a feature of our ongoing engagement with the world. Saying that causes are unreal would be a misrepresentation. Pushing the trolly causes it to move, hence it's true that pushing the trolly caused its movement. That's not an antirealist ploy.

Added:

The reason why leaves flutter is not because the wind so wills it. Lest we loose track of what are poetic truths and what is objectively real. — javra

Reconsidering, "Why did the leaves flutter - because the wind blew them" presumes neither intent nor purpose. Fair point.

Davidson treats intentions as causal, after all. I'll give @unenlightened's post some more thought.

Why did the wind blow? - because of areas of differing atmospheric pressures.
Why were there differing areas of atmospheric pressures? - because of solar heating on a rotation earth.
Why was there solar heating on a rotation earth...

Each of these presents a broader description.

Do we end with "because godswill" or perhaps "Becasue triadic thingumies"?

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mind. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable? — Relativist

Of course. But I was discussing conspiracy theorising in general. As in the sociologic context of what can count as legitimate belief.

In the modern world, is your anti-conspiratorial stance still the legitimate thing? Can the truth even be secured without accepting a dash of conspiratorial doubt given the fact that even the well intentioned have reason to gloss over or edit the facts as they might exist.

If correlation ain’t causation, well what if even correlation ain’t much of a fact either. Even description can’t ground truth.

All this arises from my point that truth is a pincer movement. We can make objective measurements, but even these become subjective facts. So pragmatism requires we also do equal work on the causal explanation side. We must have grounded logic - that pesky all-encompassing theory of everything.

The best we can do is play the two sides of this dichotomy off against each other. Conspiracy theories show how the facts are always irreducible ambiguous. We can’t rely absolutely on them. But where conspiracy theory falls down is often on some grounding holism of causal logic.

We could ask if the world really works in a way where it is reasonable that Charlie Kirk was popped at close range with some kind of special bullet fired by Azov regiment agents on the behest of Israeli forces, with Tyler Robinson set up as the patsy with AI doctored footage of him clambering of a rooftop, etc?

Anything is possible. So the burden shifts to what - by logical constraint - remains credible.

We can pretend life is a science project or learn to assess situations in more pragmatic fashion. A skill becoming more necessary everyday it seems.

But again my point is how even for conspiracy theories, it cuts both ways. We are in a new media era where there is vastly more individual capacity to data mine and fact check. We can find out what is real about public events to a degree that we couldn’t before. That should be a good thing. And couple that power to a general rationality - an ability to step back with a world view that asks, well what are the odds - then conspiracy thinking could morph into something valuable. Producing needed social change.

I’m not giving Candace Owen high marks as yet. I just think this is a very interesting space. Especially if AI could be a neutral judge on the balance of the odds. The media has always evolved. But the pace of that is now really fast. And theories of truth need to keep up to date.

Hence Melina Tsapos' conspiracy definition dilemma. — Banno

Reductionism is always caught on the horns of a dilemma. Just as for PoMo, everything is mired in self-refuting paradox.

There is a reason why the unity of opposites is the more reasonable totalising framework when it comes to a metaphysical ground for our habits of mind.

That'd be more a "how" than a "why". — Banno

Not when it's an explanation for why the avalanche happened. Quite obviously I would think.

Why questions all presuppose purpose — javra

Yep. — Banno

OK then. Point being that not all purposes are intentions or else intentional. The rock's movement ended in there being an avalanche. In this very affirmation, there is a presupposed background of teleological reason in the form of "something's movement toward an addressed as of yet unactualized end/telos resulted in the actuality of the end addressed" and thereby caused the given effect. There's two glitches, though. The rock is devoid of intentions it wills to accomplish, for it it devoid of sentience and thereby will. Debatable within panpsychism contexts, true, but more importantly, to so consider all whys dependent on purpose in one way or another is to claim that all inanimate physical givens nevertheless do what they do sans intentionionality for the sake of accomplishing some ultimate end. Otherwise, there'd be nothing purposeful to it.

I can live with this. Can you?

Especially when you state that:

Saying that causes are unreal would be a misrepresentation. — Banno

Given your rudeness and ridicule, why should I respond to your posts? Your worldview strikes me as sophistic bullshit.

That'd be more a "how" than a "why". — Banno

Yep, one can’t avoid dichotomising. But it is the unifying that separates the reductionists from the holists.

How and why don’t have to be a dilemma - two disconnected monisms. Anomalous monisms indeed. They can instead be the two limits of inquiry. As in the material and formal causes of substantial being. Aristotle’s hylomorphism.

How always needs a why, and why always needs a how. So no dilemma. Just the opposing bounds on inquiry that we then bring back together to account for the whole. :up:

I can live with this. Can you? — javra

Yep.

See the musings added to the previous post. You've got me rethinking my reply to Un.

Is there a problem?

Given your rudeness and ridicule, why should I respond to your posts? Your worldview strikes me as sophistic bullshit. — Banno

I realise you would prefer a public fluffing and then you might graciously dole out your little morsels of Davidsonian wisdom mixed in with exciting news about what you have planned for lunch.

But sorry that ain’t happening. I’m here for the contest of ideas. Not to play your popularity competition. The good old days of like buttons and bragging about the inordinate length of your threads.

If you want my respect, it has to be earnt, Show up with an argument. And make it interesting. Give that a try.

I can live with this. Can you? — javra


Yep. — Banno

That's cool

See the musings added to the previous post. You've got me rethinking my reply to Un.

Is there a problem? — Banno

I have a problem with this part:

Do we end with "Becasue godswill" or perhaps "Becasue triadic thingumies"? — Banno

Neither of these present an ultimate end as the teleological reason for what is. Godswill is a mouthful: what is this "god" supposed to be to begin with, for example; is it supposed to be an omni-creator deity which created everything, including right and wrong and truth and falsehood, in line with the "His" own whims. If so, then this god cannot rationally equate to the divinely simple unmoved mover of everything that is as teleological ultimate end, for whims and creations are aspects, parts, of His being - which cannot be rationally said to occur within divine simplicity. ... A rather expansive subject. In a roundabout manner same with "triadic thingness": it is a supposed explanation for what is that cannot serve as an ultimate teleological end of what is: for starters, it doesn't predict that the cosmos's ultimate end is that of triadic thingness.

I know, these can be argued back and forth. But I think I'll be leaving that to others. Still, I can't find either to be that ultimate end which teleologically determines all that is, was, and will be - our myriad intentionings very much included - till the time this ultimate end is actualized.

Almost nothing in life is provably true, but we can still weigh facts and evidence - and strive to do this as reasonably as possible- that is all abduction is. — Relativist

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. The labels "conspiracy theory" or "inference to the best explanation" are never substantive labels given that they always involve a begging of the question. The "conspiracy theorist" is always the other guy, just as the guy with the best explanation is always me.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. If your explanation is good or the best, then you should say why it is such. Labels like "conspiracy theory" or "inference to the best explanation" don't add anything substantial to a conversation, particularly when they lack context.

For example, if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. But when you continually say that IBEs are all there is and also claim that "IBE" means something intelligible, you aren't making much sense.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. And if you say that an explanation (or every particular explanation) is an inference to the best explanation, then you've fallen into the viciously circular quandary. If you give a traditional account of what an explanation is, then we already have an alternative to an IBE, at least from an ontological perspective, and therefore not every account is (or professes to be) an IBE.

There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations?

I have a problem with this part: — javra

Me, too. It's intended to show how the "why" doesn't end satisfactorily in at least some cases.

There's a whole side road concerning intentionality here, that is well worth considering. At issue is the difference, if any, between these and other causal explanations. All good stuff.

Do we go there, in this thread?

Is the argument that abduction can be used to pick out which theories are conspiracy theories? — Banno

No. Rather, abduction would tend to rule out theories that are commonly called conspiracy theories, but it's irrelevant whether they've been labelled as that.


As far as I'm concerned, anything goes when it comes to proposing an explanatory hypothesis. Brainstorming works best when unconstrained. But applying abduction results in sorting out from consideration those hypotheses that have the weakest support.

a conspiracy theorist may just insist that the conspiracy is the more reasonable conclusion. — Banno

You can lead a horse to water....

But not really relevant. I argue that we think abductively all the time: we make epistemic judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion. This isn't about trying to convince anybody, it's about ourselves thinking critically.

Of course, it does help to review one's hypothesis with others, to invite criticism - hearing different perspectives on the body of facts (adding, removing, revising), exposing our biases, and hearing alternative interpretations. But ultimately, we all make our own epistemic judgements.

If our case IS sound (in an abductive sense), then it probably would convince others, but that's a byproduct.
.

First issue is whether abduction is just brainstorming, or if it includes some selection amongst the hypotheses generated. To you, it seems it does. To others, it seems it doesn't.

The problems I want to point out apply to abduction considered as being normative - as involving choosing between hypotheses. So, to your account.

How is it that "abduction would tend to rule out theories that are commonly called conspiracy theories"? What's the basis for the selection?

The criticism I began with is that if you set out those criteria, if you set out your expectations for a good hypothesis, then what you are in effect doing is choosing only the hypotheses that meet those expectations; I somewhat hyperbolically called that "confirmation bias" - you get what you want, an so perhaps not what you need.

On this approach, is any theory that does not meet one's expectations a conspiracy theory? Seems to be so, unless there is some additional criteria.

Next step was introducing Feyerabend, who shows historical cases in which going against expectations and logical conclusions leads to progress in science - were irrationality leads to choosing the better theory. His argument gets a bit deeper than that, but there's a start, since this is counter to the naive view of abductuion as choosing the best theory.

Now some care is needed here. We agree that we do "make judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion". what I am baulking at is calling these judgements "abduction", if what is meant is that they are correct, or true, or worse, necessary.

All up, it seems to me that there remains a hole in your account, that explains the why of how we must choose this hypothesis over that one.

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. — Leontiskos

Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning. What possibly happened to them? Did it fall into an interdimensional portal; did a poltergeist hide them? Did a monkey come through an unlocked window and take them? Was there a glitch in the matrix? The possibilities are endless. But only a few are truly worth consideration, like - maybe you. left them in the pants you were wearing, you dropped them, left them on the kitchen table, or in the car.

More generally, it is often the case that we would consider some possibilities more credible/plausible/likely than others. Examples:

-It's quite plausible for one person to keep a secret, but less plausible that hundreds can keep the same secret for decades with no noticeable slip-ups (this is one common problem with conspiracy theories).

-Suppose you have 2 alternative possibilities, but there is supporting evidence for only one. Evidence gives a good reason to treat it more credibly.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. — Leontiskos

That assumes the other person is reasonable. I actually did explain to my sister-in-law why her belief that Trump staged his assassination attempt was flawed, and she just responded that I give Trump too much credit.

Another factor: background beliefs. They are factors that influence our judgements. Of course, they can be challenged, but how deep do we ever go? People are apt to get frustrated or pissed off before a meeting of the minds is reached.

Yet another factor: Some people are more apt to make clear epistemic judgements, and some are more apt to reserve judgement. There's no objectively correct point at which judgement is deemed appropriate, although one ought to try an be consistent. This is a factor in past judgements that are within our background beliefs - so there's an abundance of reasons why 2 reasonable people may disagree.

if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. — Leontiskos

Agreed.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. — Leontiskos

In this context, an explanation is a conclusion someone is drawing from some set of evidence and background facts.

There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations? — Leontiskos

I don't know what your talking about regarding "causality and explanation". But I'd say that an IBE is always a conclusion, but it may simply be a conclusion to reserve judgement. For example: is there a "best" interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? IMO, no- because they are all consistent with the measurements- there's no objective basis to choose one, so I think we should reserve judgement.

We often don't have multiple, distinct "explanations" to choose from; we're just assessing whether or not there's sufficient justification to support an assertion. We examine this justification and decide whether to affirm it, deny it, or reserve judgement. It's the same process, whether or not we choose to label it abduction.

Take a look at this.