Nice.

Can you clarify what it is to be morally valuable? Does having a moral value "supervene on some of our essential properties", or is it itself a property? IF "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is" then isn't moral value a property of the thing - the kind of thing that it is - rather than something that supervenes on a property?

On the one hand, a thing has some set of properties and the moral value of that thing supervenes on at least some of those properties, while on the other, the moral value just is a property of the thing.

So isn't supposing that a thing can have an intrinsic moral value denying that values supervene on properties?

Excellent first post, by the way. Welcome.

Thank you for your reply.

That something is morally valuable would be a property of that thing. But it would be a supervenient property, meaning that it is resultant from some of the thing's other properties. The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, whereas in the latter case it is not.

So all moral value - whether possessed intrinsically or extrinsically - supervenes on something's other features. But intrinsic value supervenes on something's essential features. I think that's right, anyway.

An example, maybe: suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that moral value is an attitude adopted towards some thing. Then we might say that having a moral value supervenes on a given act, and on the attributes of that act.

The moral value of a thing is, for the purpose of the argument, an attitude towards that thing that supervenes on it.

Can we say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing in question? That seems to be what would be implied by "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is"...

'Consciousness' is spatiotemporal (i.e. embodied, causal) and therefore physical (i.e. a very rare kind of physical process). Also, whether or not 'we are conscious', we are bodies and therefore physical beings (i.e. biological organisms). "Moral values", however, are
non-physical (i.e. abstractions).

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude.

To use my valuing of something as an example, if I value something intrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something essential to it, whereas if I value something extrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something non-essential about it. Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing.

Applied to moral value, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it - the thing - to have moral value due to some its essential properties. I think that's correct anyway.

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude. — Clarendon

Yes, I see that. So you are right here:

Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing. — Clarendon

Here you show again that the value supervenes on the property. It appears to me that what you have shown is that the idea of something's having an intrinsic value doesn't work in this scheme.

To be forthright, if the value is a property of the thing, then it can be intrinsic to the thing. But if instead it is a seperate property that does not belong to the thing but supervenes on the properties of that thing, then it is not a property of the thing.

In your argument I think you move from one to the other. So rather than showing that we are not physical things, perhaps you've shown that values are not intrinsic properties of things.

To my eye, what all this shows is the poverty of the notion of a property. Better by far to talk of predicates.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things. — Clarendon

Welcome to the forum. I might argue that people do not have intrinsic moral value, but I won’t do that here because I want to keep to the terms of your OP.

I don’t understand why a person cannot have both moral value and an essential physical nature.

The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, — Clarendon

I don’t understand the basis of the claim that something being intrinsically morally valuable implies the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing. Alternatively, I might claim that it is God‘s judgment that people have intrinsic moral value. I think it would be fair to characterize that as an essential property. That brings us back to the possibility of having both a physical and a non-physical nature.

I guess what this boils down to is that I don’t see you’ve demonstrated your claim from the OP.

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties. That is 'being morally valuable' is a 'resultant' property- something is morally valuable 'because' it has certain other features.

If something is intrinsically morally valuable, then - by definition - it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is. This is why intrinsic moral value must supervene on some or all of a thing's essential features.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things.

Maybe it will objected to this argument that the essential property that makes us morally valuable is our consciousness. However, consciousness is clearly not an essential attribute of a physical thing - at best it would be an accidental property of one. So as our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties, then it can't be that one if, that is, we are a physical thing. — Clarendon

I think this is an interesting argument that could be reworked to be valid and even sound. The idea is something like, "Our moral value does not derive from any physical attribute, therefore we are more than merely physical."

This is not to deny that consciousness may be an essential attribute of the kind of thing we are. Nor is it to deny that it may be the property in virtue of which we - the things that have it - are morally valuable. The point is that as consciousness is not an essential property of physical things, then we can conclude that the kinds of thing that are essentially conscious are not physical things.

Does this argument work? I think it does, but perhaps I am mistaken. — Clarendon

The counterargument would seem to be something which is essentially conscious and essentially physical. Or else, if your premise, "consciousness is not an essential property of physical things," means that no physical things are essentially conscious, then I would object to such a premise.

But what do you mean when you say, "X is an essential property of Y"?

I am glad you think the argument has some merit.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false).

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical.

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties — Clarendon

I don’t have a background in philosophy, but I’m wondering on what grounds we would say that we possess intrinsic moral value? What exactly is intrinsic moral value?

Objectively, we are objects so that can't be the reason. Have you ever considered that we are inherently valuable because we are objects instead of nothing?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Morality is an abstract concept that, alongside psychology, is a physical construct made by hormonal and neural activities.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false). — Clarendon

Okay great, thanks for this elaboration.

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical. — Clarendon

This paragraph presents the tension I am worried about. First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious. I am wondering how we get to the conclusion, "No physical thing is conscious," especially given that humans seem to be an example of something which is simultaneously physical and conscious.

Moral value isn't something that can be described as intrinsic without divine command theories. I reject those, so I reject that there could be an intelligible discussion of that position.

Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case).

I take it to be a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on other properties. That is, there is always a 'because' where something's possession of a moral property is concerned (it is morally valuable 'because' it has this or that feature etc.). This is why if something is represented to be morally valuable, there is a further question of why or in virtue of what it has that moral value. It is, of course, upon this that my case hinges.

But if an object can have moral value in addition - rather than because - of its other features, then granted the argument would not work, for then we could not read more into what our reason represents to be the case.

I don't think that's widely accepted. The notion of 'intrinsic moral value' doesn't seem to presuppose a divine command theory of ethics. As I understand it, the ontological commitments of moral value - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - are matters of debate. My argument, in helping itself to the notion of intrinsic value, does not commit me to any particular view about those ontological commitments, I think.

"First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious."

Yes, I think the premise is consistent with that. And I'd say it is important that it is, for otherwise it would beg the question. However, the argument as a whole seems to entail that physical things are essentially not conscious. That wouldn't be question begging, but would constitute an apparent refutation of the idea that physical things can have conscious states.

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt:

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible.

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to.

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things.

I hope we are in a position to see the problem with the argument as it stands.

Some item X has properties a,b,c... Moral values supervene on these properties, and so on X - value(a), value(b), value (c) and so on. The value of X is some summation of the value of its properties.

But an intrinsic value, instead of taking another property as its object, is understood as instead one of the items a,b,c...

Is that close to what you have in mind? If so, there are two approaches to value at work here.

Also, and parallel to this, there seems to be a presumption that a,b,c... are physical, while valuations are not. I agree, roughly, with this, and with the intuition that sits behind it, that moral values are not physical things. But I think here, it is presumed, rather than demonstrated.

Thoughts?