Nice.

Can you clarify what it is to be morally valuable? Does having a moral value "supervene on some of our essential properties", or is it itself a property? IF "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is" then isn't moral value a property of the thing - the kind of thing that it is - rather than something that supervenes on a property?

On the one hand, a thing has some set of properties and the moral value of that thing supervenes on at least some of those properties, while on the other, the moral value just is a property of the thing.

So isn't supposing that a thing can have an intrinsic moral value denying that values supervene on properties?

Excellent first post, by the way. Welcome.

Thank you for your reply.

That something is morally valuable would be a property of that thing. But it would be a supervenient property, meaning that it is resultant from some of the thing's other properties. The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, whereas in the latter case it is not.

So all moral value - whether possessed intrinsically or extrinsically - supervenes on something's other features. But intrinsic value supervenes on something's essential features. I think that's right, anyway.

An example, maybe: suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that moral value is an attitude adopted towards some thing. Then we might say that having a moral value supervenes on a given act, and on the attributes of that act.

The moral value of a thing is, for the purpose of the argument, an attitude towards that thing that supervenes on it.

Can we say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing in question? That seems to be what would be implied by "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is"...

'Consciousness' is spatiotemporal (i.e. embodied, causal) and therefore physical (i.e. a very rare kind of physical process). Also, whether or not 'we are conscious', we are bodies and therefore physical beings (i.e. biological organisms). "Moral values", however, are
non-physical (i.e. abstractions).

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude.

To use my valuing of something as an example, if I value something intrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something essential to it, whereas if I value something extrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something non-essential about it. Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing.

Applied to moral value, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it - the thing - to have moral value due to some its essential properties. I think that's correct anyway.

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude. — Clarendon

Yes, I see that. So you are right here:

Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing. — Clarendon

Here you show again that the value supervenes on the property. It appears to me that what you have shown is that the idea of something's having an intrinsic value doesn't work in this scheme.

To be forthright, if the value is a property of the thing, then it can be intrinsic to the thing. But if instead it is a seperate property that does not belong to the thing but supervenes on the properties of that thing, then it is not a property of the thing.

In your argument I think you move from one to the other. So rather than showing that we are not physical things, perhaps you've shown that values are not intrinsic properties of things.

To my eye, what all this shows is the poverty of the notion of a property. Better by far to talk of predicates.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things. — Clarendon

Welcome to the forum. I might argue that people do not have intrinsic moral value, but I won’t do that here because I want to keep to the terms of your OP.

I don’t understand why a person cannot have both moral value and an essential physical nature.

The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, — Clarendon

I don’t understand the basis of the claim that something being intrinsically morally valuable implies the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing. Alternatively, I might claim that it is God‘s judgment that people have intrinsic moral value. I think it would be fair to characterize that as an essential property. That brings us back to the possibility of having both a physical and a non-physical nature.

I guess what this boils down to is that I don’t see you’ve demonstrated your claim from the OP.

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties. That is 'being morally valuable' is a 'resultant' property- something is morally valuable 'because' it has certain other features.

If something is intrinsically morally valuable, then - by definition - it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is. This is why intrinsic moral value must supervene on some or all of a thing's essential features.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things.

Maybe it will objected to this argument that the essential property that makes us morally valuable is our consciousness. However, consciousness is clearly not an essential attribute of a physical thing - at best it would be an accidental property of one. So as our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties, then it can't be that one if, that is, we are a physical thing. — Clarendon

I think this is an interesting argument that could be reworked to be valid and even sound. The idea is something like, "Our moral value does not derive from any physical attribute, therefore we are more than merely physical."

This is not to deny that consciousness may be an essential attribute of the kind of thing we are. Nor is it to deny that it may be the property in virtue of which we - the things that have it - are morally valuable. The point is that as consciousness is not an essential property of physical things, then we can conclude that the kinds of thing that are essentially conscious are not physical things.

Does this argument work? I think it does, but perhaps I am mistaken. — Clarendon

The counterargument would seem to be something which is essentially conscious and essentially physical. Or else, if your premise, "consciousness is not an essential property of physical things," means that no physical things are essentially conscious, then I would object to such a premise.

But what do you mean when you say, "X is an essential property of Y"?

I am glad you think the argument has some merit.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false).

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical.

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties — Clarendon

I don’t have a background in philosophy, but I’m wondering on what grounds we would say that we possess intrinsic moral value? What exactly is intrinsic moral value?

Objectively, we are objects so that can't be the reason. Have you ever considered that we are inherently valuable because we are objects instead of nothing?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Morality is an abstract concept that, alongside psychology, is a physical construct made by hormonal and neural activities.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false). — Clarendon

Okay great, thanks for this elaboration.

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical. — Clarendon

This paragraph presents the tension I am worried about. First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious. I am wondering how we get to the conclusion, "No physical thing is conscious," especially given that humans seem to be an example of something which is simultaneously physical and conscious.

Moral value isn't something that can be described as intrinsic without divine command theories. I reject those, so I reject that there could be an intelligible discussion of that position.

Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case).

I take it to be a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on other properties. That is, there is always a 'because' where something's possession of a moral property is concerned (it is morally valuable 'because' it has this or that feature etc.). This is why if something is represented to be morally valuable, there is a further question of why or in virtue of what it has that moral value. It is, of course, upon this that my case hinges.

But if an object can have moral value in addition - rather than because - of its other features, then granted the argument would not work, for then we could not read more into what our reason represents to be the case.

I don't think that's widely accepted. The notion of 'intrinsic moral value' doesn't seem to presuppose a divine command theory of ethics. As I understand it, the ontological commitments of moral value - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - are matters of debate. My argument, in helping itself to the notion of intrinsic value, does not commit me to any particular view about those ontological commitments, I think.

"First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious."

Yes, I think the premise is consistent with that. And I'd say it is important that it is, for otherwise it would beg the question. However, the argument as a whole seems to entail that physical things are essentially not conscious. That wouldn't be question begging, but would constitute an apparent refutation of the idea that physical things can have conscious states.

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt:

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible.

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to.

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things.

I hope we are in a position to see the problem with the argument as it stands.

Some item X has properties a,b,c... Moral values supervene on these properties, and so on X - value(a), value(b), value (c) and so on. The value of X is some summation of the value of its properties.

But an intrinsic value, instead of taking another property as its object, is understood as instead one of the items a,b,c...

Is that close to what you have in mind? If so, there are two approaches to value at work here.

Also, and parallel to this, there seems to be a presumption that a,b,c... are physical, while valuations are not. I agree, roughly, with this, and with the intuition that sits behind it, that moral values are not physical things. But I think here, it is presumed, rather than demonstrated.

Thoughts?

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt: — Clarendon

Wonderful - thank you for this.

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging — Clarendon

Yes, that clarifies the point for me. It's a good argument! (A minor thing is that you have two 5's - you might fix that with an edit.)

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors. — Clarendon

Yes, very good.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to. — Clarendon

All of this turns on the meaning of the clause in (4), "[Minds] bear conscious states." The metaphysical interpretation seems perfectly plausible to me, but someone can pursue the objection you note if they like.

But we could also ask whether the objection you note is valid. Suppose we grant that minds are definitionally conscious. Have we lost our conclusion? Or do we just open ourselves to a definitional objection?

Huh! I have never encountered this argument before, but it looks to be quite solid. Nice work. I will have to think on it more.

-

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things. — Clarendon

Right, and this is the argument that I am familiar with.

I take 'intrinsic' moral value to be moral value that is supervening on something's essential properties. i take that to be true by definition. So, I take it to be uncontroversial that moral value - any and all - supervenes on something's other properties. The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic moral value resides in what it is supervening upon - if it is supervening on something's essential properties, then we can call it intrinsic moral value, whereas if it is supervening on something's non-essential properties, then we can say that it has extrinsic moral value (for then it does not have its value due to what it is, but rather due to some accidental feature of it).

I think all that's widely accepted - well, at least the idea that moral properties supervene on other properties (or, to put it another way, there can't be bare moral differences).

As such, if something is represented to be intrinsically morally valuable, then we can safely conclude that it has that moral value in virtue of some of its essential features. But when we consider all of those properties that are plausible candidates for being a physical thing's essential features - such as shape, size, location etc. - none of them seem to be that in virtue of which we have our intrinsic moral value. As such, the conclusion that is then forced is that we must be non-physical things.

The only plausible - and I'm not saying this 'is' the property in virtue of which we are intrinsically morally valuable, only that it is a good candidate (because 'if' something has this property, then it does seem to follow that it has intrinsic value) - candidate is that we have intrinsic moral value due to being the kind of thing that has conscious states. But as that doesn't seem to be an essential property of physical things - that is, it would be odd to suggest that part of what makes a physical thing a physical thing is that it can bear conscious states - then what we learn is that we're not physical things, but things that essentially bear conscious states.

I take the soundness of this case to be unaffected by what moral value itself is, as what it capitalizes upon is widely agreed-to seeming conceptual truths about moral value (ones that any plausible account of what moral value itself is would have to respect or be deemed implausible).

5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects

...

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible. — Clarendon

For what it's worth, there are a lot of anti-religious and a lot of mind/body monists on the forum, and both groups will view your OP with some suspicion. There is also some anti-essentialism on the forum, but that's more of a fad. The anti-essentialists seem to have never investigated essentialism with any level of seriousness.

From the perspective of Aristotelian hylomorphism—a form of mind/body monism—an objection is that a human being is essentially physical and essentially conscious. In your terms we might say that the human being has the essential property of physicality and the essential property of bearing conscious states. This means that, for the Aristotelian, although consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects, nevertheless consciousness is an essential property of the object "human being," which also possesses the essential property of physicality. Or in other words, the Aristotelian would agree that not all physical things bear conscious states without agreeing with the idea that no physical thing has 'bearing conscious states' as an essential property. The intuitive value of this lies in the fact that whereas for your theory we must reject the intuitive belief that we are physical beings, for the Aristotelian this is not necessary.

The crux here seems to be specification or taxonomical methodology, where you are thinking of a substratum of "physical object" to which properties then attach, such as "extensive," whereas the Aristotelian is thinking of a substratum of "human object," to which properties then attach, such as "physical" or "conscious." It comes down to the question of the nature of the property/predicate-bearer. This is a pretty common conflict when different forms of essentialism rub up against one another. I have a few posts relating to this problem, including <this one>.

What sources are you drawing on for your understanding of essentialism?

Ok, thanks - that's clearer. So values always supervene on properties, and hence intrinsic values are those that supervene on intrinsic properties. Seems I misunderstood your "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is" to be saying that values are properties, and not something that supervenes on a property.

I gather that your argument now depends on physical properties not being the sort of thins that supervenes on an item, and since values do supervene, then values are not physical. Hence,

...if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. — Clarendon

So your argument runs somethign like :

• All moral value supervenes on properties — that is, nothing is morally valuable “for no reason.”
• Intrinsic moral value supervenes specifically on essential properties of a thing.
• For physical things, essential properties are things like shape, size, location.
• Our intrinsic moral value does not supervene on those physical properties.
• Therefore, we are not purely physical things — our intrinsic value must supervene on something non-physical (e.g., consciousness).

But a person, or a balloon, remains what it is despite change in shape, size or location. So these do not seem to be good candidates for essential properties. It seems to me that, for example, personality might be a good candidate for an essential property of a person, and that's not physical anyway. Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork.

But I might leave you to it. The notion of essential properties is far more problematic than just this.

↪Philosophim Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case). — Clarendon

Every object has inherent value in comparison to there being nothing. Meaning the core of morality is that existence is better than nothing. I argue from here that more existence is better than less existence. Existence is not only action, but potential.

Imagine that only sheep and grass existed. Eventually the sheep would breed to eat all the grass. All the sheep and grass would die. Introduce some wolves however, and the existence of sheep, grass, and wolves will go on forever.

Morality in human is about creating the most existence from our actions. Do we commit actions that build up the world, or tear it down? Do we create an environment of safety, free thought, creativity, and joy? Or do we create an environment of danger, restriction, mundanity, and fear?

But a person, or a balloon, remains what it is despite change in shape, size or location. So these do not seem to be good candidates for essential properties. It seems to me that, for example, personality might be a good candidate for an essential property of a person, and that's not physical anyway. Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

However, though a physical thing's shape and size and location can change, it doesn't seem possible for it not to have a shape, size or location. The claim that these are essential features of a physical thing is not equivalent to the claim that they do not change, but only that without them it could not be that kind of thing at all.

Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

I don't think I have committed to a view about the composition of moral values. I think my argument is neutral on that. Thank you for your comments though.

I admit that I am groping around in the dark where views about essential properties are concerned.

I suppose that if someone says humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, that's consistent with what's of intrinsic value about us being something that is essentially not physical. And so I think I can agree with someone who says that humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious. I am a human, but I do not think I am essentially a human. If I were to discover I was a cow, my reason still represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable.

Someone who says that we - the things that are of intrinsic moral value - are essentially physical and essentially conscious would be saying that consciousness is an essential feature of physical things. And that, I think, does not appear to be true.

Perhaps something can be intrinsically morally valuable due to answering to a concept and the moral value supervene on something essential to the concept rather than the thing itself. For want of a better example, perhaps someone could be intrinsically morally valuable due to being a bachelor with the intrinsic value supervening on the fact they are unmarried. I think we would actually describe that as extrinsic value precisely because the one who is a bachelor is not essentially a bachelor. But even so, we can simply run the thought experiment where we ourselves are concerned and simply remove any and all of those features that our moral value is proposed to be supervening on and see if it remains.

For example, if my intrinsic moral value is claimed to be supervening on the fact I am a human, then I can simply imagine finding out that I am not one (as I did above) and see if this affects my intrinsic moral worth. As it does not, then my intrinsic moral worth is not grounded in that fact about me. And as that can continue until we arrive at something like "the fact I am a bearer of conscious states" - something that does not seem an essential feature of any physical thing - we still arrive at the conclusion that we are not physical things.

I am not sure how plausible it is to claim that every existing thing has intrinsic value. Does a germ have intrinsic moral value?

Maybe everything does have some intrinsic value. Even so, my argument would not really be affected, I think. As clearly I have a different order of intrinsic moral value to a germ. And so whatever my intrinsic features of me my moral value is supervening on will be different to those on which a germ's intrinsic moral value (if have it it does) is supervening on. And I think that's all my argument needs. For if I just focus on me, then my intrinsic moral value does not seem to be supervening on any of the plausible candidate intrinsic properties of physical things. My moral value seems to be supervening on the fact I am a bearer of conscious states. Thus I can conclude that I am essentially a bearer of conscious states - something no physical thing seems to be.

Morality is an abstract concept that, alongside psychology, is a physical construct made by hormonal and neural activities. — Copernicus

No one seems to agree or comment on it.