This is no paradox. What is wrong for a deontologist is to choose to kill someone. In the 1 vs. 1 case, the agent isn't choosing to kill. He is forced to kill. He is only choosing to kill one person or another. This choice may carry no particular moral weight to the deontologist.

What about simply being compelled to kill someone? As in, someone overpowers you, and physically forces you to press a button that results in a death. Is this a "paradox" to the deontologist?

You seem to be arguing against a mentally crippled version of deontology.

He is forced to kill. — hypericin

The key point here is not the action itself, but the preference (even "choice" isn't the right word).

What about simply being compelled to kill someone? — hypericin

That is a completely different scenario because we're trying to contrast again consequentialism here.

1. If all available options violate rights, can morality demand a choice at all?
2. Does the reframed problem prove that utilitarianism is the only viable framework when non-interference is impossible?
3. Can an individualist ethic survive scenarios where all choices involve direct harm?
4. Is the moral guilt of killing one equal to the moral guilt of killing three, or are outcomes morally significant regardless of principles?
5. Does the reframed trolley problem show that philosophy must move beyond rigid doctrines and toward pluralistic ethics? — Copernicus

1. Why not? It seems plausible that some rights are more important than others.
2. Prove is a very strong word to use in debates like this. But it does not even necessarily support utilitarianism in my opinion. Not all deontological moral theories are absolute in the sense that it is always wrong to violate a right. Sometimes, the consequences are just more important than rights (but not always). W.D. Ross' prima facie duties theory is an example of a more moderate deontology, which I happen to prefer.
3. Yes, why not?
4. If you mean guilt the emotion, I would probably feel more guilty killing three people than one. Except in cases like the organ harvesting case.
5. I don't think the reframed trolley problem shows that philosophy MUST move beyond rigid doctrines (since utilitarianism is one of them, and this does not refute utilitarianism). However, I am in favor of moving toward pluralistic ethics.

Why not? It seems plausible that some rights are more important than others. — 83nt0n

How so? If you bring it down to numbers then you're a utilitarianist.

Sometimes, the consequences are just more important than rights — 83nt0n

That's literally the core of utilitarianism.

Yes, why not? — 83nt0n

Then what is the solution?

I would probably feel more guilty killing three people than one. — 83nt0n

There you go. Numbers.

I am in favor of moving toward pluralistic ethics. — 83nt0n

I see. I also think situational (contextual) morality is the way to go, except it has the most basic philosophical/legal flaw (who concludes and judges the affairs as rightful of wrongful?), the same reason why we have codified laws above court's scope for contextual judgement.