This is no paradox. What is wrong for a deontologist is to choose to kill someone. In the 1 vs. 1 case, the agent isn't choosing to kill. He is forced to kill. He is only choosing to kill one person or another. This choice may carry no particular moral weight to the deontologist.

What about simply being compelled to kill someone? As in, someone overpowers you, and physically forces you to press a button that results in a death. Is this a "paradox" to the deontologist?

You seem to be arguing against a mentally crippled version of deontology.

He is forced to kill. — hypericin

The key point here is not the action itself, but the preference (even "choice" isn't the right word).

What about simply being compelled to kill someone? — hypericin

That is a completely different scenario because we're trying to contrast again consequentialism here.

1. If all available options violate rights, can morality demand a choice at all?
2. Does the reframed problem prove that utilitarianism is the only viable framework when non-interference is impossible?
3. Can an individualist ethic survive scenarios where all choices involve direct harm?
4. Is the moral guilt of killing one equal to the moral guilt of killing three, or are outcomes morally significant regardless of principles?
5. Does the reframed trolley problem show that philosophy must move beyond rigid doctrines and toward pluralistic ethics? — Copernicus

1. Why not? It seems plausible that some rights are more important than others.
2. Prove is a very strong word to use in debates like this. But it does not even necessarily support utilitarianism in my opinion. Not all deontological moral theories are absolute in the sense that it is always wrong to violate a right. Sometimes, the consequences are just more important than rights (but not always). W.D. Ross' prima facie duties theory is an example of a more moderate deontology, which I happen to prefer.
3. Yes, why not?
4. If you mean guilt the emotion, I would probably feel more guilty killing three people than one. Except in cases like the organ harvesting case.
5. I don't think the reframed trolley problem shows that philosophy MUST move beyond rigid doctrines (since utilitarianism is one of them, and this does not refute utilitarianism). However, I am in favor of moving toward pluralistic ethics.

Why not? It seems plausible that some rights are more important than others. — 83nt0n

How so? If you bring it down to numbers then you're a utilitarianist.

Sometimes, the consequences are just more important than rights — 83nt0n

That's literally the core of utilitarianism.

Yes, why not? — 83nt0n

Then what is the solution?

I would probably feel more guilty killing three people than one. — 83nt0n

There you go. Numbers.

I am in favor of moving toward pluralistic ethics. — 83nt0n

I see. I also think situational (contextual) morality is the way to go, except it has the most basic philosophical/legal flaw (who concludes and judges the affairs as rightful of wrongful?), the same reason why we have codified laws above court's scope for contextual judgement.

How so? If you bring it down to numbers then you're a utilitarianist. — Copernicus

It seems to me that the right to life is more important than the right to not be offended. This does not 'bring it down to numbers'.

That's literally the core of utilitarianism. — Copernicus

I disagree. Utilitarianism involves the claim that consequences are the only morally relevant consideration. I am saying that consequences are important, sometimes the most important, but not the only important moral consideration.

Then what is the solution? — Copernicus

If all choices involve direct harm and violate rights in the same way, then minimize the harm.

There you go. Numbers. — Copernicus

Right. In this case, it is just numbers. But not all moral cases come down to numbers.

I see. I also think situational (contextual) morality is the way to go, except it has the most basic philosophical/legal flaw (who concludes and judges the affairs as rightful of wrongful?), the same reason why we have codified laws above court's scope for contextual judgement. — Copernicus

Yeah unfortunately I don't really see a way around that. We can have laws that apply to most cases, but there's always gonna be some situation that the law has not considered yet, so it may have to be left to the discretion of a court.

It seems to me that the right to life is more important — 83nt0n

Yes. Both party's.

I am saying that consequences are important — 83nt0n

Not to deontological individualists.

Not to deontological individualists. — Copernicus

The kind of deontology I endorse is Ross' intuitionism, which acknowledges the importance of consequences. SEP page: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/

As an individualist, I'm stuck.

Just out of curiosity, what would you do in this situation:

At 14:59:53 o'clock, a man, charged with serious crime and sentenced to immediate death-by-sniper-bullet by 15:00:00 o'clock, is on the rooftop holding a child's hand who is about to fall if not pulled up (the whole thing could take at least 20 seconds).

Would you execute justice (legal, not your conscientious) or wait to save the falling child?

@83nt0n??

Would you execute justice (legal, not your conscientious) or wait to save the falling child? — Copernicus

I would wait for the child to be saved.

I see.

the Trolley Dilemma — Copernicus

Since the intention is to save five, not to kill one, then in this case the utilitarian solution is the same as the deontological one.

Problem solved.

intention — Colo Millz

Since when did categorical morality depend on intentions?

Since when did categorical morality depend on intentions? — Copernicus

One might say categorical morality depends on intentions, iff the agency in possession of an autonomous, self-determinant will, respects, without exception, such law as practical reason provides as legislation for its volitions. Respects the law without exception, makes explicit the fully voluntary intention to be obligated by it.

Deontological moral doctrine, which can be considered synonymous with categorical morality, doesn’t concern itself with saving, but only with the conditions for eliminating causal necessity for it.

Deontological moral doctrine, which can be considered synonymous with categorical morality — Mww

...follows principles (accepted doctrines) and principles only. Intent, approval don't matter.

A categorical moralist is a robotic person who's programmed to execute principled actions only and forfeits any free will that may sabotage the execution.

If a moral agent conditioned by deontological predicates doesn’t intent to be obligated by them, he is logically self-contradictory with regard to reason, and morally inept with regard to conscience, from which follows necessarily, that his intention regarding his moral principles, matters. Approval, on the other hand, is irrelevant.

Deontological doctrine doesn’t follow principles; it determines the origin of them and thereby what they may be. The acts, whatever they may be, judged as necessary for the properly deontological moral agent, follows them. Or, follows from them.

Anyway…..my two cents.

what you described is situational (contextual) morality, which leaves room for due diligence, conscience, and judgement call.

Categorical morality is textual. Whatever is doctrinized must be followed. Much like the chain of command in the military.

Since when did categorical morality depend on intentions? — Copernicus

Since Aquinas.

Summa Theologiae I–II, q.18, a.4.

Morality depends on what the will chooses as an end.

Much like the chain of command in the military. — Copernicus

If the soldiers don't intend to follow orders there's not much point being in the army.

I certainly didn’t mean to describe situational morality; not even sure what that is.

I’m just saying that even though that which is doctrinized must be followed, in accordance with a categorically conditioned moral philosophy, the contrariness of human nature itself, only becomes offset by the intention to follow.

I’m arguing that intention matters, insofar as without it, categorical morality, even while being a justified doctrine, is worthless without those actions determined by it alone. The ideal moral agent will always follow the categorical moral principles, which speaks to affirmation of his intent, but the ideality of any moral agent, merely from his basic human nature, is always contingent on circumstance, which speaks to the negation of his intent.

intention matters — Mww

Not in categorical morality, sorry.

If the soldiers don't intend to follow orders there's not much point being in the army. — Colo Millz

Tell that to your fellow militants. I'm a colonel and you're a sergeant and I shout "attention", you must comply. Same with principles and actions.

Since Aquinas.

Summa Theologiae I–II, q.18, a.4.

Morality depends on what the will chooses as an end. — Colo Millz

Whatever that may be, it's not categorical morality (adherence to rigid principles).

Whatever that may be, it's not categorical morality (adherence to rigid principles). — Copernicus

I begin to suspect that you are arguing against a strawman here.

I don't think any deontological theorist would define "categorical morality" in the way you are doing.

For Aquinas, for example, all three of: intention, object and circumstances; must align with right reason, in order for the act to be moral.

Even Kant, the ultimate deontologist, elevated Aquinas' "intention" into a categorical "duty".

Tell that to your fellow militants. I'm a colonel and you're a sergeant and I shout "attention", you must comply. Same with principles and actions. — Copernicus

Aquinas would say that principles are not like commands shouted by a superior - they are expressions of reason itself.

intention matters
— Mww

Not in categorical morality, sorry. — Copernicus

I’d agree if categorical morality was a thing. But it isn’t; it is only a doctrine describing the justifications for the possibility for a thing. It is a product of pure practical reason, having no validity otherwise.

Just as in any metaphysical thesis.
————-

….elevated Aquinas' "intention" into a categorical "duty". — Colo Millz

….just like that.

Perhaps I follow a particular sub-branch of the ideology, like anarchism within libertarianism.

Aquinas would say that principles are not like commands shouted by a superior - they are expressions of reason itself. — Colo Millz

I see principles as constitutional amendments.

The job of philosophy is to codify morals (doctrinate) with propositional arguments and then come to a conclusion (finalized principle).

The job of the state is to put that into the constitution.

Justice should be governed by principles, not populism or logic (empirical or personal).